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When research is undertaken into the field of contemporary political his-
tory the investigator is soon acutely aware of the many special problems 
which present themselves. The decline and dissolution of the United Party 
is a recent event which has, as yet, merited only limited attention. One 
of the main reas~ns for this is a lack of readily available and indexed 
sources. Since 1969 the University of South Africa has become the official 
repository of the papers of the United Party and is in the process of arran-
ging them in an orderly manner. With the demise of the Party in 1977 the 
amount of material which has been deposited at the University has increased 
substantially. Some forty percent of the papers, dating back to the days 
of the Afrikaner Bond in the Cape, have thus far been catalogued. They 
include material of every description, ranging from private donations to 
, political cartoons, minutes of meetings and taped recordings. 
The Institute of Contemporary History at the University of the Orange Free 
State has extensive holdings of private political papers and also a register 
I 
of private documents on the political history of South Africa which dates 
back to 1902. Included in its archives are, for instance, the private papers 
of Catherine Taylor, Bill Deacon and Bill Sutton, all former United Party 
parliamentarians during the 1970's. 
The University of the Witwatersrand has little that is relevant to this 
period. The David Friedmann memoirs which have recently been donated to 
it and the University of the Orange Free State had ·not arrived at either 
University by the end of September, 1982. The only ori9inal material in 
. this/ •••• 
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this field of research· in the Cory library, Rhodes University, was a small 
collection of papers donated by Bill Deacon, the former M.P. for the Albany 
constituency. 
Although the records at the University of South Africa remain incomplete and 
uncatalogued, with new donations continuing to arrive, this University remains 
the major source of contemporary United Party history and it was a rewarding 
experience for me to be al lowed to consult certain files which had a. bearing 
on this dissertation. Equally interesting was a short interview with Prof. 
WA Kleynhans, one of South Africa's leading political analysts who generously 
agreed to comment Ci1 the work which had done and to point out the difficulty 
of establishing, with any degree of certainty, various facts relating to some 
of the problems which beset the United Party, such as the numerical strength 
of its branch structures. 
My major source of information was the private papers of Joh_n Wiley, M.P. 
Soon after the dissolution of the United Party he gave me permission to make 
use ·of them. They are in four large suitcases crammed with every type of 
political material. The collection was, in many ways, a replica of the 
University of South Africa 1 s archives in miniature and many of the documents 
in Wiley's files are also to be found in Pretoria. Included in his papers 
is a comprehensive record of press cuttings relating to the affairs of the 
Party between 1970 and 1977. This record, the owner claims, is the most· 
extensive compiled by any politician in South Africa. It was without any 
doubt a mine of information. Care had to be taken, when making use of this 
material, to sift political fact from comment, but by comparing reports of 
the same events by ne1-1spapers holding diametrically opposing political 
viewpoints/ ••.• 
.111 
viewpoints, it was possible to reach reasonably unuiased conclusions. Wiley's 
papers will in due course be donated to the University of South Africa (or 
possibly to the University of the Orange Free State) and will then forma1ly 
become part of the United Party archives. The same will happen to documents 
which I made use of but which belong to Senator Horak. Thus, many of the 
private manuscript sources listed under the names of the present owners and 
either still in their possession or in mine, will be donated to the University 
of South Africa to be added to the United Party Collection. 
Other than making use of these sources I was fortunate to be able to interview 
some of the leading figures who played important roles in the affairs of the 
United Party prior to its dissolution. These consultations were most re-
vealing, providing as they did wonderful first-hand accounts of events. The 
interviews in each case were taped and took the form of a question and ans\ver 
session which lasted between one and a half to two hours. Those who generous-
ly participated were Sir De Villiers Graaff, national leader of the Party, 
,. 
Senator Horak, its general secretary, Myburgh Streicher, the Cape leader 
and his deputy, John Wiley. The interviews took place after the bulk of 
the research into the decline of the Party had been completed. I was, thus, 
in a position to question the participants on their interpretation of those 
events which had ~one the Party most harm. As the questions did not vary 
to any marked degree, it was possible to determine from the separate res-
ponses whether tne politicians were in general agreement as to the causes 
of the Party's decline. The answers elicited were surprisingl·y similar, 
which seemed to indicate that they were aware of the problems, but ~ere 
powerless to deal effectively with them. 
One/ .•.• 
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One disappointment wa~ the refusal of Harry Schwarz, leader of the Young 
Turk movement and founder of the breakaway Reform Party, to be interviewed. 
Appointments were broken and in a final attempt to obtain his views, I 
submitted the same set of questlons through the post for consideration. 
Unfortunately, Mr Schwarz was not prepared to answer them and thus an 
opinion which may have differed substantially from those of the others was 
not forthcoming. 
I also relied heavily for information upon official parliamentary publ i-· 
cations such as Hansard and various commissions, particularly the 1 Schlebusch 1 
Commission, on which the Party served. In addition, the United Party Divi-
sion of Information and Research provided a great deal of material by way 
of general releases. Admittedly, this was largely political propaganda 
but, nevertheless, was very informative and gave a clearer insight into 
official Party thinking. 
As far as unpublished theses were concerned, only a handful touched on 
the topic under consideration and only two proved really useful. Dr S.L. 
Barnard's 'Politieke Orientasie in die Suid-Afrikaanse Opposisie sedert 
1958 1 is a major work dealing with all opposition groupings from 1958 to 
1975. It did not deal solely with the United Party although the major 
part of the thesis concerned it. The work also terminated two years 
prior to the Party's demise. It was interesting to discover that where 
our research co-incided we did not differ materially as to our views on 
the United Party. The other thesis, that of H. du Toit, 'Die Parlementere 
Verkiesing van 1977', provided useful statistical information on the elec-
tion results of that year. 
A/ •••• 
v 
A more definitive version of the decline of the United Party will probably 
be written as material hitherto in private hands em~rges and the task of 
arranging the United Party papers at the University of South Africa reaches 
completion. 
VI 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS PAGE 
These political cartoons all have a bearing on the text. 
1. Japie Basson encouraged the U.P. to adopt a fresh approach. 25 
Cape Times, September 1971. 
2. Schwarz takes over the U.P. in the Transvaal. 40 
Sunday Times, 3.9.72. 
3. Eric Winchester is offered a new South African heart.· 46 
Die Burger, 21.11.72. 
4. Introduction of the United Party's federal policy. 108 
Volkstem, November 1973. 
'· 
5. The 1973 National Congress ends the year on a high note. 114 
Sunday Times, 11.11.73. 
6. The a~tivities of the Cape leadership harm the Party. 132 
Sunday Times, 21.10.73. 
- - ;:°'~~ .,.]. -Graaff-contemplates his position as Party leadeL 
-~----~·- -...... .,.._,.,,,..,. 
150 
Sunday Times, 5.5.74. 
8. The Pinelands by-~lection result poses a threat to the Party's 158 
future. 
Sunday Tihles, 16.6.74. 
VII 
9. The Cape Provincial Congress of 1974 was a battle-field. 179 
Die Burger, 8.11.74. 
10. The formation of the Reform Party stirred old memories. 200 
Die Burger, 12.2.75. 
11. Durban North was another by-election setback for the U.P. 225 
Sunday Times, 9.5.76. 
12. Eglin will co-operate in the 'save South Africa' campaign. 237 
Die Burger, 9.10.76. 
13. Doubts regarding co-operation between Eglin and Graaff. 238 
Sunday Times, 10.10.76. 
14. Streicher dissociates himself from further negotiations with 
the Progressives as the likely outcome would be unsatisfactory. 244 
'· 
Die Burger, 20.11.76. ~~.. .. 
.(_:""'r;" 
15. Initially the Marais Report was favourably received. 250 
Die Burger, 22.12.76. 
16. Conservatives were driven from the Party. 
The Citizen, 14.12.76. 
17. An opposition shambles. 260 
Die Burger, 16.8.77. 
VI 11 
18. Judge Marais lends his support to Eglin. 
The Citizen, 15.2.77. 
19. Japie Basson resigns as Transvaal leader. 
Die Burger, 2.4.77. 
20. The United Party is abandoned by Graaff. 
Die Burger, 21.6.77. 
21. An uncertain future awaits the new party. 
Sunday Times, 26.6.77. 
22. Is the new opposition any di{ferent from the old? 
Die Burger, 1.7.77. 
23. The shrinking opposition; 
Die Burger, 8.12.77. 






























S.A. I .R.R. 
IX 
Anglo American Corporation 
Annual General Meeting 
Christian Institute 
Central News Agency 
Cape Peninsula Council 
Democratic Party 
Get Rid of Wiley 
Herstigte Nasionale Party 
Independent United Party 
Member of the Executive.Council 
Member of Parliament 
Member of the Provincial Council 
National Party 
New Republic Party 
National Union of South African Students 
Orange Free State 
Progressive Federal Party 
Progressive Party 
Progressive Reform Party 
Reform Party 
South African Associated Newspapers 
South African Bureau for Racial Affairs 
South African Institute of Race Relations 










Y. S .A. 
i ..,.... - - ... - '/-:-- ~:!' -- •• 
x . 
South African Party 
South African Press Association 
South African Student Organization 
South African Television 
Student Representative Council 
South West Africa 
University Christian Movement 
University of South Africa 
University of Orange Free Stati 
United Party 




CHAPTER I I I: 
XI 
CHAPTER HEADINGS 
A RECOVERY OF SHORT DURATION 
April , 1970 - Apr i 1 , 1972 
2 The Brakpan by-election 
3 The by-election in Oudtshoorn 
VERLIG-VERKRAMP, THE INSOLUBLE PROBLEM 
The issues involved 
2 The verkrampte mafia 
3 The role of the Progressive Party 
MARAiS STEYN OUSTED: THE END ON AN ERA 
Prelude to the Transvaal congress of 1972 




BI LI NGUALI SM 
THE SCHLEBUSCH COMMISSION 
1 The appointment of a select committee 
2 Th~.,t.abling oy the first interim reports 





















CHAPTER VI I : 




4 Graaff 1 s leadership attacked 
5 The role of the English newspapers 
6 Speculation .concerning consensus 
7 Senator Horak 1 s letter 
THE TRANSVAAL PROVINCIAL CONGRESS AND THE DEFECTION 
OF MARAIS STEYN 
THE ROAD TO THE NATIONAL CONGRESS, NOVEMBER 1973 
.Problems in Caledon and in the Young South African 
Movement 
2 The Congress 
1974: A DECISIVE ELECTION YEAR 
The Mahlabatini dee la ration 
2 Nomination disputes 
3 The election 
4 The Pine lands by-election 
5 1 G.R.O.W. 1 contributes to party disunity 
6 Resignations and expulsions 
7 The Cape congress 
8 The new senate 
1975: THE REFORMIST SPLIT 
The departure of Dick Enthoven 


























3 The final Le Grange Reports 
4 Erosion of support continues 
1976: THE DECLINE GATHERS MOMENTUM 
1 Alberton and Durban North 
2 The Graaff initiative 
3 The Marais proposals 
1977: THE DEATH OF THE UNITED PARTY 
The consequences of the Marais report 
2 Municipal elections in Johannesburg 
3 The final months 















I do not boast when I say that the United Party was in a great 
measure my work - my best work for South Africa, my pride and 
honour. It was an ideal for which I sacrificed ·everything, for 
which sacrificed my personal interests. 
I did everything I could to ensure long life to the Party. 
There was only one wish I had for my old age - to see that the 
Party remain as strong as a rock for South Africa, and after I 
had disappeared, the generation who would follow would have an 
impregnable foundation on which to build. 1 .General J.C.Smuts 
It is widely believed that Smuts sacrificed the pre~iership when the United 
Party was formed in 1934. He could possibly have won the 1933 election 
for the South African Party but in the interests of a greater vision he 
made peace with his arch poiitical rival General J.M.Hertzog in order to 
promote national unity in a time of crisis, and was prepared to serve in 
the lesser capacity of deputy prime minister. 2 The ideal for which he 
sacrificed so much was a broader South Africanism in which both English 
and Afrikaans speaking citizens could be reconciled iri a spirit of national 
unity. 3 It was the same goal as that of Gen Louis Botha before him but 
which had been battered by an unfortunate war, a rebellion and a burgeoning 
and resentful Afrikaner nationalism. The ideal, however, remained and on 
Botha's death in 1919 Smuts continued his life's work: 
••• aan sy vriend was die bitter lot beskore om horn te 
begrawe en om te bly by die taak, wa~ selfs vir horn amper te 
4 swaar was. 
1. Sunday Times, 26.6.77, Gen J.C.Smuts to the Natic~al congress of the 
United Party, Bloemfontein, 3.11.39. 
2. J.C.Smuts, Jan Christian Smuts(London, 1952), pp. 326-327. 
3. W.K.Hancock, Smuts - The Fields of Force 1919-1950(Cambridge, 1962), 
pp. 245-248. 
4. F.V.£ngelenbur~Genl. Louis Botha(Pretoria, 1928), p. 363, from Smut's 
funeral oration at Botha 1 s gravesi~e. 
2 
The circumstances which brought about coalition in 1933 made possible the 
merger between the National and South African parties in the following 
year and provided the opportunity to heal the wounds of the pust. Con-
ciliation had again become an attainable ideal in the United Party under 
Hertzog's leadership. , 
The United Party governed until 1948 b~t its unity of purpose was destroyed 
before then when yet another disastrous war splintered it on a m~tter of 
principle. Dr Malan•s5 prediction that those who did not belong together 
would not remain together was vindicated for the coalition could not sur-
vive intact the first real crisis it had to face. 6 Smuts persuaded the 
majority of the Party to support him by 80 votes to 67 on the war issue 
and became prime minister for a second time. 7 Gen. Hertzog 'returned, briefly, 
to lead the National Party but the ideal of 1 saamwerking 1 had again suffered 
a m~jor reverse as the Urited Party experienced an exodus of parliamentarians 
8 
and supporters. This was a foretaste of what was to become a fairly 
frequent occurrence after the Party had lost the 1948 election. 
Notwithstanding vociferous opposition from a divided nationalist movement 
the U.P. fared well during the war years(1943 election) 9 and its defeat 
at the polls in 1948 surprised both Smuts and Malan who described it as a 
1miracle 1 • 10 
5. Prime Minister of South Africa 1948-1954, and leader of the 'purified' 
nationalists who did not join the U.P. in 1934. 
6. D.F.Malan, Afrikaner Volkseenheid en my Ervarin~s op die Pad Daarheen 
(Kaapstad, 1959), pp. 157-159. 
7. Ibid. , p. 1 76. 
8. W.H.Hancock, Smuts - The Fields of Force, p. 33. 
9. T.R.H.Davenport, South Africa: A Modern History(Johannesburg, 1977), 
Table 2. 
10. J.C.Smuts, Jan Christian Smuts(London, ~952), p. 510 and W.H.Har.cock, 
Fields of Force, p. 505. 
3 
The long life that Smuts had intended for his 'be~t work for South Africa' 
. -
did not eventuate. After his death in 1950 the impregnable foundation on 
which the ideal was to grow barely survived a generation and. in 1977 the 
United Party voluntarily dissolved. Its leader at the time, Sir De Villiers 
Graaff, was heir to the Botha-Smuts tradition of conciliation and political 
moderation in the South African context. Yet a point was reached during 
the 1970's when Graaff, in the Smuts manne~, was prepared to sacrifice both 
himself and his party in an endeavour to 'save South Africa' by bringing 
about a new political dispensation which he believed would successfully 
11 challenge the ruling party. The U.P. disbanded in favour. of the New 
Republic Party. What this, in practice, accomplished was to divide the 
parliamentary opposition still further and contribute materially to the 
1 d l "d . t "f h . l" . h 1977 1 1 . 12 ·ans 1 e v1c ory o t e nat1ona 1sts 1n t e genera e ect1on. 
The irony of the s;tuation was that the U.P. had, for the first time since 
1948, made significant electoral gains both in the general and in the 
provincial elecitons of 1970 and had continued for a while thereafter, to 
do well in by-elections. 13 How then was it possible for a party which had 
survived so many frustrating years in opposition, and which had witnessed 
its electoral position weaken with virtually every successive poll since 
14 1948 suddenly dissolve at the point when its prospects had begun to 
• ? improve. 
11. Argus, 18.8.76, Graaff's opening speech at the Cape U.P. Congress, 
East london, 17.8.76. 
12. H.du Toit, 'Die Parlementere Verkiesing van 1977: n Ontleiding van die 
Faktore wat die Verkiesing Beinvloed het~unpublished thesis, University 
of Pretoria, 1979, pp. 11"7-liO-. - · 
13. B.M.Schoeman, Parlementere Verkiesings 1910-1976(Pretoria, 1977), PP 486-90 
i. Brakpan - N.P. majority of 1 392, 23.3.1972 cumpared with 3 725 in 
1970. 
11. Klip River - N.P. majority cut from 1 093 in 1970 to 232, 29.11.72. 
14. Dr S.L.Barnard, 'Pol itieke Orientasie in die Suid Afrikaanse 9PQOS_is_i_e 
sedert 1958', D.Phi 1., University of the O.F.S .• 1979, p. 104. Except 
for-the 1959 Provincial election where the U.P. pushed up its majority 
in a number of seats and won Boksburg from the National Party, its first 
win since 1943. 
4 
Among the historical reasons is the one advanced that thP. U.P. was never truly 
united. It was a loose coalition15 of widely ditfering opinions, from 
'liberal 1 English speaking suburbanites to 'bloedsap' platteland Afrikaners 
h h . . • h N . 1 P 
16 
who.had little in common other tan t e1r oppos1t1on tote at1ona arty. 
The former, in the Unionist 17 manner, could never vote for an Afrikaner govern-
ment while the latter were the heirs to the traditional supporters of Botha 
18 and Hertzog. 
Further, there was little that the U.P. could offer to counter the. sectional 
appeal of Afrikaner national ism with its compel I ing call for a republic and for 
h . . l 19 w 1te surv1va • The U.P. was depicted as a dangerous movement which would 
plough the Afrikaner under and surrender white interests in South Africa. Its 
race federation plan and its federal derivatives were unable to satisfy an 
electorate which had witnessed the surge of black nationalism throughout South 
Africa, and the f~r from ordered advance to majority rule and independence. 
The question of wh~ther the U.P. had not served its purpose should also b£ 
considered. It could be argued that it had fulfilled a need but was no longer 
relevant. The future strug~le as seen by the enfranchised voter lay between 
white survival and black rule. There was,conceivably,no longer any room for 
a white opposition party, particularly one which tried to steer a middle course 
between the radicals and the reactionaries and which by a policy of gradualism 
sought to build bridges among the different races. 
15. E.Potter, The Press as Opposition(London, 1975), p. 33. 
16. 'Liberal' in the context of white politics, that is left of centre. 
'Bloedsap', conservative, right of centre within the U.P. 
17. The party of Dr L.S.J~meson and Sir Thomas Smartt which disbanded to JOln 
the South African Party for the 1921 election. It had always been strongly 
pro-British. 
18. Dr S.L.Barnard, 'Pol itieke Orientasie~ p. 9. 
"' 19. Phil Weber, Na die Generaals - Re ubl iek en Nasionale Eenheid, 
Genl. J.B.M.Hertzog gedenk lesing i I I Stellenbosch, 1973 , pp. 3-13. 
5 
Moderation and slow change were unac~eptable to an increasingly more 
·sophisticated black majority which rejected any r~cial discrimination by 
a minority. The policy of 1white leadership with justice', not withstanding 
its·merits, caused the U.P. endless problems and was rejected by both whites 
and blacks. In these circumstances the centrist position which the Party sought 
to occupy was fast disappearing as black-white polarization became ever more 
evident. Whites would rather support the National Party which offered the 
enfranchised group an apparently secure future and which, unti 1 1977, rejected 
any suggestion of power sharing, a principle implicit in u;P. policy no matter 
h . 1 20 ow tentative y. 
The 1977 election results, besides reflecting the confusion in opposition ranks 
also revealed the shrinking numbers who were prepared to support any form of 
. h • 21 genuine power s ar1ng. In the light of. this contention the demise of the 
U.P. can be regarded as being in the logic of South African political history 
and was merely the most recent manifestation of white solidarity opposing a 
very real threat to its continued survival on the continent. 
If the long term view is taken then the electoral successes of 1970 can be 
discounted as nothing more than a brief renaissance during an inevitable declii1e. 
There was less and less room for an opposition party in a world st~ongly ranged 
against the 'white tribe' of Africa • 
. This is, however, by no means the complete picture for, between 1970 and 1977 
the United Party also faced innumerable and seemingly insurmountable internal 
problems which hastened its destruction. 
20. K.Heard, General Elections in South Africa 1943- 1970(London, 1974), 
pp. 236-239. -
21. H.du Toit, 'Die Parlementere Verkiesing', P. 117. The N.P. won 134 seats, 
P.F.P. 17, N.R.P. 10 and ~.A.P. 3. . 
6 
Instead of 1970 heralding a new political d~wn which would result in the 
replacement of a tired N.P. regime within the forseeable future it started 
a period of unparallelled feuding which rent the Party from top to bottom. 
The electoral successes of 1970 attracted new blood to the Party and gave 
it a fresh lease on life. 22 People who had given up its cause as a lost one 
or who had merely marked time within its ranks again wanted to be associated 
with it. They anticipated further success and were impatient for lt. Tried 
and tested policies and methods could be improved. The old should make way 
for the young who would furnish the Party with a bright new image - a reform-
23 ist one. The term 'Young Turk' was coined to embrace those who were regarded 
as progressive and reformist in their views. The 'Old Guard' or party re-
actionaries were branded as being opposed to change and attached to tradition. 
24 They were criticized as being obstacles to the future success of the U.P. 
Consequently, a 'verligte-verkrampte' feud. emerged which resulted in a sequence 
f . 25 o crises. From the moment Marais Steyn, the 'verkrampte', was ousted from 
the leadership of the Party in the Transvaal(1972) until his successor Harry 
Schwarz and his 'Young Turks' either left of their own accord or were expelled 
to form the Reform Party in 1975 virtually every action taken by the U.P. 
. . . f f . h 26 was open to cr1t1c1sm rom one action or anot er. 
Nomination squabbles, notably prior to the 1974 elections, harmed the Party's 
performance as different groups, amid wide publicity, struggled to secure the 
candidature of their particular choice. 
22. Interviews with Horak, 8.6.82, Wiley, 5.4.82 and ~treicher, 5.5.82. 
23. Interview with Graaff, 16.6.82. 
24. Ibid., Horak. He belived that the term~ 'Young Turk' and 'Old Guard' were 
coined by Joel Mervis of the Sunday Times, which certainly made frequent 
use of them. Dr S.L.Barnard on p. 263 of his thesis attributed the use 
of the term 'Young Turk' to D.v.d.Merwe Brink, Transvaal M.E.C., on 
14.6.72. 
25. Dealt with in Chapter I I. 
26. Dealt with in Chapters I I I. and IX. 
7 
Expulsions, court cases, disciplinary matters and the question of party loyalty 
became frequent topics for dispute. Serious differences of policy inter-
pretation emerged with the Old Guard supposedly placing a 'verkrampte' view 
before the electorate and the Reformists a 'verligte' one. Hand-in-glove with 
these ideological differences, which tended to be ones of degree rather ·than of 
substance, were the personality clashes. Whether the former preceded the latter 
or vice versa was a moot point but both certainly existed and this aggravated 
h 
. 27 t e issue. 
Yet, throughout the declining years of the U.~. a pervasive influence which 
contributed to its misadventures, if not at times being the cause of them, was 
the role played by the press, ironically mainly the English language opposition 
newpapers. It was the press which labelled the different groups within the 
party, which campaigned vigorously to expel democratically elected leaders, 
which demanded the resignation of Sir De Villiers Graaff and which insisted 
that the U.P. adopt a reformist platform. ·Small incidents were given great 
prominence. The Old Guard, .whether young in years or not, were castigated, as 
was the Party's approach on important issues like the Schlebusch Commission where 
those who served on it were stigmatized as doing a disservice to South Africa. 
The press attempted to formulate policy while tendentious journalistic methods 
influenced the voter against the Party by seldom giving the full story and 
mostly placing it in an unfavourable light. Some newspapers were more un-
sympatheti~ than others but towards the end of its life the U.P. enjoyed little 
. 28 
or no press support at all. 
27. Interviews. 
28. See Chapter V.5. 
8 
The baleful role of the media in its affairs forced the Party onto the 
defensive as it justified or rejected reports of~en containing confidential 
information which ought never to have reached the newspapers in the first place 
but· for 'leaks' by its own members. The credibility of the Party was so badly 
damaged that its performance at the polls deteriorated markedly. 
The climax to these related events was reached after the defection of the 
Schwarz group to establish the Reform Party in 1975, an event which did not 
end the feuding within the U.P. Consequently it continued to lose supporters 
to both the left and to the right. Sir De Villiers, in what appeared to be a 
desperate bid to rescue the philosophy of the U.P., if not the Party itself, 
embarked upon a 'new initiative', the goal being the formation of an entirely 
new party which would be able to accommodate all those opposed to nationalist 
rule, and in the proces$ offer an alternative to the government and 'save 
South Africa' from the unenviable situation to which it had been reduced. 29 
With this in mind, negotiations with the Progressive Reform Party as well as 
~ith the small Democratic Party were launched with a view to finding common 
ground. Meetings were held and points of agreement reached but the initiative 
eventually foundered on differences of interpretation leaving only the Democratic 
Party and a section of the U.P. to disband and then come together as the New 
Republic Party. At that point 30 parliamentarians like Japie Bass~n and other 
reformists who remained within the U.P. refused to be part of the new 
dispensation and soon thereafter joined the P.R.P. which again changed its 
name, this time to the Progressive Federal Party. 31 
29. Graaff's East London address, 17.8.76 
30. 29 June, 1977 
31. Parliamentary Register Part I I 1961 - 1980~ published by the House of 
Assembly, pp. 174-6. The following M.P. 's refused to join the New 
Republic Party: J. Basson, I. de Villiers, B. Mclntosch, H. Miller, 
N. Olivier and H. van Hoogstraten, all of whom joined the P.R.P. on 
5.9.77 to form the Progressive Federal Party. 
9 
Conservatives including Messrs Myburgh Streicher and John Wiley had by then 
already established the South African Party rather than have had anything to 
32 do with the 'Progs'. 
By the end of June the U.P. had ceased to exist. The electorate had not been 
given the opportunity to decide whether it still had a role to play. Instead, 
by an act of self-destruction a once powerful party had taken its own life. 
The party of Smuts, his impregnable foundation, for which he 'sacrificed 
everything' had in its turn destroyed itself. 
32. IBID., Others were: T.Hickman, W.De~con, S.A. van den Heever and 
T.Aronson. The S.A.P. was establish~d on. 28 May 1977. 
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CHAPTER 
A RECOVERY OF A SHORT DURATION 
1. April 1970 - April 1972 
The result of the April general election was a shot in the arm 'for the United 
Party. For the first time' since 1948 it had made not insignificant progress 
by capturing eight nationalist seats •. In a parliament of 166 members the 








Benoni, Florida, Jeppe and Turffontien in the Transvaal, Maitland and Port 
Elizabeth Central in the Cape, and Umhlatuzana, Umlazi and Zululand in Natal 
fell to the U.P. although. Umlazi had always been a Party stronghold which had 
b d . . . h . M P H L . 
2 h d d h fl ecome a government 1v1s1on wen its .. , arry ew1s, a crosse t e oor 
during the previous parliamentary session. 3 
The swing against the government continued in the Provincial elections of 
November of the same year. On that occasion the U.P. won nin~ Nationalist seats 
1. T.R.H.Davenport, South Africa: A Modern History; (Johannesburg, 1977), 
Table 2. 
2. Parliamentary Reqister Part I I 1961-1980, published by the House of Assembly. 
H.M.Lewis the member for Umlazi resigned from the U.P. on 11.2.1969 to 
join the N.P • 
. 3. U.P. Division of Information and Research, 30.4.1970(JHB, 1970), 1970 
general election. Further information included the following: 
Unopposed: U.P. 6, N.P. 5 
Total votes cast 1 508 284 
Total registered voters: 2 028 487 
Percentage poll: 74.35 
Votes cast according to Party(total number and ;::;:!rcentages): 
N.P. 820 968 54.43 
U.P. 561 647 37.23 
H.N.P. 53 763 3.56 
P.P. 51 76D 3.43 
Others. 8 365 0.725 
See also K.Heard, General Elections in South Africa 1943-1970(London, 1974), 
p. 209. 
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Commenting on these developments Dr Willem Kleynhans, then senior lecturer 
in political science at the University of South Africa, said that the U.P. 
was in 'sight of power' if it was able to attract the large'floating vote 1 
then emerging among disgruntled nationalists. 
h h .. h • d 4 owever, ave to put its own ouse 1n or er. 
To be able to do so it would, 
In the light of later events 
it is interesting that the points raised were to become contentious issues 
within the Party. Kleynhans suggested, among other improvements, that the 
U.P. should eliminate policy inconsistencies and adopt an unequivocdl 'verl igte' 
approach; that it should modernize the party machine and match the nationalists 
enthusiasm for bilingualism and the degree of bilingualism of their public 
representatives. It had also to project a bolder, more dynamic and 'verl igte 1 
image and draw dynamic young people into the party machine to replace a 
generation that was no longer politically effective. 5 
7 
It was the reformist element which subsequently tried to move the U.P. along 
the road sketched by Dr Kleynhans but in so doing they clashed head-on with 
the party conservatives to create in$Ol~ble p0litical problems. 
2. The Brakpan by-election. 
While 1971 proved generally to be an uneventful year6 the following one was 
punctuated by a number of crucial.by-elections which initially encouraged the 
Party but which later resulted in acriminous exchanges that did nothing positive 
for its unity of purpose. 
4. Argus, 30.10.70, 'U.P. in sight of power'. 
5. IBID. . 
6. Although a debate regarding the United Party's approach to the 'homelands 
policy' was gaining momentum and involved politicians such as Japie Basson 
and Cathy Taylor who saw positive features in it wh!le Marais Steyn rejected 
it. The Sunday Times and the Sunday ExprAss began to identify with the 
different views and personalities involvE~ and so fired the first shots in 
the verligte-verkrampte feud which was to follow and which is examined 
in later chapters. 
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The first, held in Brakpan in February, provided the government with a 
further shock but raised the United Party hopes as it clearly indicated 
that the swing towards it was continuing, at least in the urban areas. 
Julius Civin had reduced the N.P. majority from 3 725 votes (1970) to 
1 392. This represented a swing of 12.6 percent away from the N.P. 
compared with the 1970 parliamentary result. 7 
. 8 
Various reasons were 
advanced to account for this including that the government was old and 
tired, that the prime minister, Vorster, was a weak leader, costs ":ere 
rising and that the voters were dissatisfied with the manner in which 
public funds were used in such 'scandals' as the Agliotti land deal. 9 
It was significant that no political commentator suggested that the 
electorate was being attracted to the U.P. because of its sound policies. 
It appeared to be benefiting from a protest vote and a swing that had 
actually begun as far back as the 1969 Newcastle by-election and which 
had gained momentum in 1970. Hans Strydom of the Sunday Times maintained 
that the result was 'a body blow from whi<;:h Vorster would never recover'. He 
predicted, inaccurately as it turned out, that from that point the N.P. could 
only proceed downhill.lo 
Municipal elections on the Witwatersrand on the following Wednesday (2 March) 
produced further U.P. gains at the expense of the nationalists. 
7. B.M.Schoeman, Parlementere Verkiesings 1910-1976(Pretoria, 1977), pp. 486-90. 
8. Rapport, 5.3.72, 'Sterk debat oor tcruggaan in stede'. The action of 
ministers and the rising living costs were blamed as contributihg to the 
Brakpan and municipal council setbacks for the nationalists. See also 
Die Burger, 25.2.72, 'Groot teleurstell ing oor Rrakpan uitslag'. 
Suggested that a grievance 'stay-away' vote by t:he nationalists effected 
the resu 1 t. 
9, Sunday Times, 27.2.72, Hans Strydom: 1 Brakpan 1 • See atso Rapport, 20.6.71, 
'Algiotti geval '. This involved the selling of land near Jan.Smuts air-
port by senior state officials of the Dc~artment of Planning for an in-
flated price of R7~ m. to a Mr Agliotti. The government appointed a 
.. Commission of Inquiry, the evidence from which was handed to the police 
for. investigation but little seemed to have resulted from this. See also 
Hansar~, 4.2.1972, Column 384. 
10. Sunday Times, 27.2.72, Strydom: 'Your time's run out'. 
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In Johannesburg itself, seven N.P. seats were captured which increased the U.P. 
total to 36 on the council leaving the nationalists with only 10 while the 
Progressive Party accounted for the other one. In Randburg the U.P. won 8 out 
of 10 wards, in Brakpan 4 out of 8 and in Springs 5 to the N.P.'s 7. 11 To a 
greater or lesser degree the same pattern was repeated in all the major centres 
on the Rand. Thes·e results,following so closely on the Brakpan success, caused 
considerable rejoicing among U.P. supporters but alarm and dismay within the 
National Party. Marais Steyn, Transvaal leader of the U.P. 9 regarded the results 
as dramatic when he expressed the opinion that,'werklike drama kan nou verwag 
word in Suid Afrika se politiek 1 • 12 There seemed to be a light at the end of the 
long, dark tunnel of opposition. 
The nationalist press pinpointed,as far as possible,the reasons for these setbacks. 
They ranged from ministerial incompetence13 to the fact that the government was 
doing too much for th~ Blacks. Rapport noted that,'dit gis en woel in N.P. 1 but 
d h h P Id d · · k 14 Th B f 1 h h asserte tat t e arty wou reme y its m1sta es. e urger e t tat t ere 
was no need for panic and that the decline in the Party's Brakpan majority w2s 
largely owing to abstention by its supporters. 15 Faced with these electoral re-
verses the N.P. was shocked into self-examination and to the satisfaction of its 
supporters made every effort to recover lost-ground and to correct its faults, 
an exercise which was to pay dividends, and from which the U.P. failed to learn 
h • . d. ff. 1 . 16 w en 1 t too was 1 n 1 1 cu t 1 es. 
11~ Die Burger, 3 3.72, 1 Uitslae: U.P. juig, N.P. vra ondersoek'. 
12. IBID. 
13. Tiiterviews with Wiley, 5.4.82, Streicher, 5.4.82 and Horak 8.6.82, mention 
Agliotti, Land Bank loans and fishing scandals as a few examples. 
14. Rapport, 5.3.72. 
15. Die Burger, 25.2.72. 
16. Refer to the Oudtshoorn by-election campaign in Chapter 1.3. 
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3. The by-election in Oudtshoorn. 
The next major test for the two parties was in the Oudtshoorn parliamentary 
by-election of 19 April 197i, a poll which was destined to become a minor 
watershed in national politics for it was there that the U.P. suffered a 
very real setback to its recent steady performances. 17 Although there 
were other by-elections during the months ahead in which the U.P., in 
some cases, continued to improve on its position as for example in Klip 
Rive) 8 1t never fully recovered from the blow it received in Oudtshoorn 
when its own vote dropped by some 450 and the N.P. pushed up its majority 
by 1 401 votes to 4 848. 
Thereafter the internal squabbling within the United Party became more 
marked. It became evident tha.t it would have to clarify its policies and 
make them acceptable to the voters and not rely simply on government blunders 
. 19 b 1 • 20 to capture support. Later in the year, before the Caledon y-e ect1on, 
the U.P. did, in fact, introduce its new federal policy in an effort to 
improve its tarnished public image by propagating what it believed was a 
more acceptable product which excluded the political albatross of a racially 
I
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mixed par 1ament. 
17. B.M.Schoeman, Parlementere Verkiesings 1910-1976(Pretoria, 1977), 
pp. 486-90. The result was: P.Badenhorst(N.P.) 6 666 
P.Myburgh(U.P.) 1 818 
F.van der Merwe(H.N.P.) 259 
N.P. majority 4 848 
Percentage poll 85.9 
18. IBID. lne result was: V.Volker(N.P.) 5 227 
C.J.Uys(U.P.) 4 995 
N.P. majority 232 
Percentage poll 81.6 
The date of the by-election was 8.11 .1972. 
19. Cape Times, 1.6.72, 'U.P. rethink on non-white~ in Assembly'. See also 
'A federal alternative'. 
20. Voting took place on 8.11.72. 
21. U.P. Division of Information Research(JHB, 1967), Sir De Villiers Graaff 
on Current Affairs, 24.10.67, Bloemfontein, 'Blue print for racial 
harmony ' , p. 2. 
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Unfortunately, party differences continued, for the latest plan was also 
open to various interpretations depending on whether the commentator was 
've~lig' or 'verkramp' in outlook. 
It was the Oudtshoorn result which crystal! ized the debate between the 
verligtes and the verkramptes. The N.P. fought the election on a platform 
of so-called 'boerehaat' which appealed to the Afrikaners sense of ethnic 
unity and identitiy; The call was to stand together against those who 
hated the Afrikaner. It was implied that those who did the hating were 
to be found in the ranks of the United Party - the party which would 
22 plough the Afrikaner under if given the slightest chance. It would 'gang' 
up with the Blacks in order to do so by using its proposed non-white 
representatives in parliament if necessary. 'Blaar' Coetzee, himself a 
former United Party M.P., and thereafter a cabinet minister, suggested in 
Rapport that a United Party government would be disaster for South Africa 
resulting in black majority rule as it would not be able to restrict its 
h . . . l. . 23 non-w 1te representation 1n par 1ament to sixteen. 
The whole campaign was conducted in a highly charged atmosphere, a 'Cold 
Boer War', which received the full backing of the Burger and the N.P~ 
leader in the Cape, P.W.Botha, who was regarded as having started the whole 
24 'boerehaat' ruse. Whatever the motives, this call to the blood had the 
desired effect and the N.P. gained an impressive victory, demonstrating 
that it had the vitality to turn the tide which, to.that point, had been 
running strongly against it. 
22. Hansard, 19.4.72, column 5 309, P.W.Botha.. '!n daardie party sit daar 
elemente wat die Afrikaner haat'. 
23. Rapport, 3.3.72, 'Sappe sit al klaar met 33 verkrampte L.V. 's'. 
24. Sunday Tribune, 26.3.72, Hans Strydom: 'Panic stricken Nats. step up 
race hate war 1 • 
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For the U.P. it raised searching questions which were never satisfactorily 
answered and which had far reaching repercussions. To have dismissed the 
defeat as being unrepresentative of U.P. support in the country as a whole 
or of being a freak result of 'the deep platteland' as suggested by 
Senator Horak, the national secretary of the Party, was unconvincing. 
The U.P. had entered the contest, which in retrospect proved a costly 
political blunder, with every intention and hope of improving its position. 25 
Had it succeeded it would not have been possible for the Party reformists 
to have mounted their campaign with as much success as they later did. 
For the Oudtshoorn by-election was conduc~ed by the Party's designated 
'verkramptes'. Philip Myburgh, its candidate who was later to resign 
because of its leftist drift, was a 'bloedsap'. He appeared set on 
outdoing the nationalists and adopted an extremely conservative line on 
. . h h B 26 Th . h b 1 important issues sue as t e antustans. ese were not t en accep~a e 
to the U.P., 27 although certain of its M.P. 's such as Catherine Taylor 
and Japie Basson favoured a change of policy and their recognition. By 
opposing the homelands policy Myburgh upset verl igtes in the Party 
because it implied that the government' was doing too much for the Blacks 
by carving up the country into independent states. His Oudtshoorn campaign 
was also a slap in the face for the great majority of opposition news-
papers which, since Brakpan, had decided that the electorate had opted to 
. . . 28 move in a reformist d1rect1on. 
25. Interviews wJth Messrs Wiley, S.4.82, Streicher, 5.5.82, Horak, 8.6.82, 
and Graaff, 16.6.82. 
26. John Wiley, in an interview, 5.4.82, maintained that the Oudtshoorn 
campaign was not verkramp, but was fought acr,ording to Party pol icy. 
27. U.P. Division of Information Research(JHB, 1967), Sir De Vil I iers 
Graaff on Current Affairs, 'lmportanf differences', p. 1. 
28. Interview with Streicher. The successes of 1970 and aftetwards had 
been interpreted incorrectly, according to him, as a victory for a 
spirit of verl igtheid which the Engl !sh newspapers thereafter supported. 
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The Oudtshoorn result again confronted the U.P. with an old but very 
real dilemma. It could never hope to come to power without the Afrikaner 
vote. To achieve this it had to adopt a conservative approach particularly 
on the platteland, for the rural population was essentially conservative 
and any verligte overtures there would meet with little success as was 
demonstrated by the 1981 general election when the Herstigte Nasionale 
Pa~ty29 pushed up its vote vis-a-vis the N~P. on the platteland which 
was seen as becoming 'too liberal 1 while the P.F.P. hardly bothered to 
1· •• 
put up any candidates, it rated its chances so poorly. Conversely, 
this approach would be un~cceptable in the urban ~reas where a verl igte 
image was necessary to capture the more moderate vote. The U.P. was never 
able to resolve this problem, if indeed there was a satisfactory solution. 
Consequently, it had two political faces - one related to that of Helen 
Suzman and the other to Dr Albert Hertzog. 30 1 Dawie 1 of the Burger 
asserted that Lhe U.P. reformists were prepared to tolerate the reactionaries 
as a necessary evil in order to retain its Afrikaner vote in the rural 
areas and that their tactics, as a result, should not be too closely 
examined. When the U.P. came to power it would be a 1 1iberal 1 government 
even though its success was achieved with 1verkrampte 1 help. The 1 Sap-
Afrikaner• could then be relegated to a 1 bywoner 1 position in.the Party. 
This, claimed the newspaper, was the reason for Myburgh 1 s Oudtshoorn 
nomination, for only a reactionary could hold the Afrikaner vote in the 
. 31 country regions. 
29. Die Herstigte Nasionale Party was formed as a result of a verl igte-
verkrampte split in the N.P. It was established on 25.10.1969 by 
Dr A.Hertzog and three other M.P. 1 s who were expelled from the N.P.· 
because of their opposition to the government 1 s sports pol icy among 
other things. 
30. Helen Suzman was a founder member of the Progressive Party(1959) and 
a 1 Jiberal 1 in white politics. Dr Albert Hertzog, son of Genera? 
Barry Hertzog, was expel led from the N.P. in 1969 and formed the 
Herstigte Nasionale Party which was to be the standard bearer of 
extreme conservatism in South Africa. 
31. Die Burger, 11.3.72, 1 Dawie 1 : 'Breek die Nasfonaliste, hoe dan ook 1 • 
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Although 'Dawie's' analysis was an interesting supposition and had merit 
he overlooked the fact that all parties in all countries nominate 'horses 
for courses' to gain the maximum advantage for themselves. 
Nevertheless, Myburgh's nomination was a blow to any enlightened im~ge 
which the party might have been cultivating in certain quarters and because 
he was unsuccessful the way was open for a verligte backlash. Hennie 
Serfci1tein of the Sunday Times, although attempting to minimize the shock 
of the 'Nat. win' by suggesting that Oudtshoorn was traditionally a govern-
ment constituency unaffected by current political trends, wrote that it also 
contained lessons for the U.P. He suggested that the voter would not fall 
for scare stories about potentially dangerous Bantustans, and that the U.P. 
should follow a verligte direction which would win votes in the cities, 
'where it counts'. Verkr2~pte tactics of expendiency, he felt,would lead 
nowhere. 32 Once again the dilemma presented itself as to which approach the 
Party should adopt in order to retain as broad a spectrum of support as 
possible among both language groups and so remain a country-wide movement 
with some pretence of being able to defeat the government. Confusion would 
remain as long as conflicting views were held regarding this issue and to 
the very end of its 1 ife the U.P. was unable to resolve the matter in a 
satisfactory manner. 
Another controversial aspect of U.P. policy which came under the microscope 
during the Oudtshoorn campaign was its race federation plan.33 
32. Sunday Times, 23.4.72, Hennie Serfontein: 'Shock Nat. win sets vote 
riddle'. 
33. Aims and Principles and Constitution of the U.P., September, 1964, 
issued by the general secretary, Cape Town, p. 1. 
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'White leadership with justice', including limited non-white representation 
• • 1 l . 34 • d . d f 1 • • 1 l f d 1n a sing e par 1ament receive w1 e comment ram po 1t1ca p at ·arms an 
particularly in the Burger which left no stone unturned to point out its 
dangers. 35 The paper dismissed the 'boerehaat' stories as unconvincing 
and blamed the U.P. 's colour policy for its defeat. The electorate, it 
contended, would not swallow such a perilous plan as an alternative to 
separate development and had consequently voted against it. The earlier 
Brakpan election had been fought on economic issues but in Oudtshoorn the 
U.P. was called to account for its race federation policy and had been found 
wanting. 36 According to the Burger the proposed presence of 16 non-white 
representatives (8 Black, 6 Coloured and 2 Indian) in parliament would 
lead to racial chaos, and contained the seed of civil war. They could 
hold the balance of power and would always be an aggrieved group of M.P. 's, 
actively leftist and able to keep the N.P. in the minority in the Assembly. 
They would simply be used by the United Party for its own political ends. 
The various attacki on U.P. race policies were not without their effect for 
by the end of 1972 a new federal pol icy had been launched during the Caledon 
by-election which provided for a white parliament excluding all non-white 
representation. 37 On the other hand provision was made for a multi-racial 
f d 1 bl 1 l h 38 . Th. . 1 d h e era assem y to represent a t e race groups. 1s s1mp y move t e 
debate to the new council and the same arguments continued unchanged. 
34. Division of Information Research, 'Graaff on blue print for racial 
harmony', Bloemfontein, 24.10.67, p. 2. 
35. Die Burger, 29.4.72, 'Waarheid van Oudtshoorn te vreeslik vir V.P.' 
36. IBID., 'Waarom Oudtshoorn so gestem'. 
37. Interview with Senator Horak, 8.6.82. The new pol icy had evolved 
over the years and was not a sudden departure from previous race 
policies. 
38. Sunday Tribune, 27.8.72, Martin Schneider: 1 Courage, that's what 
this Plan has'. See also The Aims and Principles and Constitution 
of the U.P., Nov. 1975, p. 2. 
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In retrospect the Oudtshoorn by-election was a body blow which left the 
U.P. deeply scarred. Whether it was 1 boereha2t 1 , the Party's race policies, 
its reactionary campaign or whether the local N.P. organization was 
simply superior, the failure of the U.P. to maintain its position led to 
an intensification of the internal feuding that eventually had fatal 
consequences for it. Other by-elections were fought during the year with 
the same prob 1 ems recurring. 39 What emerged was that, in genera,l, the 
trend was no longer strongly in favour of the U.P. and as the internal 
problems escalated the Party's electoral support waned. 
39. Rapport, 21.5.72, 'Brakpan moet V.P. en N.P. aan dink sit'. The 
N.P. candidate van Eeden pushed up his majority over Steynberg 
of the U.P. to 2 130 votes in the Brakpan provincial by-election 
of 17.5.72. Refer also to the Sunday Times, 12.11.72, 'No need 
for U.P. despondency'. In the Caledon parliamentary by-election 
of 8.11.72 the U.P. candidate D.Graaff polled 4 020 votes to 
L.Munnik's 6 054 which increased the previous N.P. majority by 
174 votes to 2 034. 
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CHAPTER 11 
VERLIG-VERKRAMP, THE INSOLUBLE PROBLEM 
1. The issues involved. 
The verligte-verkrampte conflict which ran 1 ike a silver thread through 
the maze of issues which the U.P. faced in its declining years remained 
1 unresolved at the end. The concepts themselves defied clear definition 
but reformists in the Party were regarded as being verlig or enlightened 
wher~as conservatives were unenlightened or verkramp. But as both groups 
purportedly adhered to the same political principles, differences tended 
to be confined to the manner in which policies were implemented or 
• d 2 1nterprete . The media capitalized on labelling its favourites as verlig 
and its adversaries as verkramp. Consequently, men like Messrs Japie Sasson 
and Harry Schwarz were described as being reformist in outlook, although 
they frequently denied the existence of 'Young Turk' and 'Old Guard' 
divisions in the Party. On the other hand, provincial leaders such as 
Marais Steyn, Myburgh Striecher, Radclyffe Cadman and Herman Oelrich, of 
the O.F.S. were branded as being verkramp and were heavily criticized. 
The divisions also tended to have a regional basis. The reformists were 
essentially a Transvaal phenomenon with pockets of support in the Cape but 
little in Natal and none in the O.F.S. Further,their strength lay in the 
cities and was negligble in the rural areas. 
1. Dr S.L.Barnard,'Politieke Orientasie in die Suid Afrikaanse Opposisie 
sedert 1958~ D.Phil:, u.O.V.S., 1979, pp. 3-25. This c~nflict was 
not new as liberals and conservatives of all gradations had been members 
of the Party since 1934 and in the South African Party before that 
date. They were responsible for the sporadic feuding which 
characterized its history. During the 1970's the inherent differences 
remained but the terms verkramp, for conservative, and verl ig, for 
reformist, were used in~tead. 
2. Interview with Sir De Villiers Graaff, 16.6.82. He never believed 
there were serious pol icy differences within the Party. 
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The reformists were, however, fortunate to enjoy the support of virtually 
the entire English language press - the only 1:iajor exception being the 
Sunday Express which threw its weight behind Sir De Villers Graaff and 
the Old Guard until its editor M.A.Johnson stepped down in 1974 and it too 
defected to the reformist camp. 3 The most vociferous voice raised in 
support of the reformist cause was that of the Sunday Times which had 
begun a series of articles as early as August 1971 demanding a fresh 
approach and change of direction by the United Party. The result of this 
sustained public debate, which continued for a number of years, was to 
undermine the credibility of the U.P. and create a picture of feuding 
and division which was a caricature of the actual situation. 
. 4 
Professor W.J.de Klerk of Potchefstroom University was credited as 
being the father of the words 'verlig' and 'verkramp 1 when he first used 
. 5 . 
them at the S.A.B.R.A. y0uth congress in 1966. In a subsequent article 
in Rapport he detailed and updated his understanding of the terms. 6 
Verligtheid was depicted as a positive force .which for South Africa could 
be a third possibility in the field of group relations, differing from 
verkramptheid or 1 die chaos van die integrasiestiese standpunt'. 
3. Johnson always maintained that he was simply 'for the Party'. See 
his editorial of that name 15.7.73. 
4. Son of the former Minister of Education, Arts and Science, Senator 
Jan de Klerk. 
5. E.Potte;, The Press as Opposition(London, 1975), p. 193. See also 
K.Heard, General Elections in South Africa 1943-1970(London, 1975), 
p. 183. 
6. Rapport, 23.3.72, Prof. W.J.de Klerk: 'Nuwe lig op Verl igtes'. 
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It was an atitude which strove for equality in differentiation and the 
following could be termed verl ig: Firstly, the maintenance of the separa-
tion of nations in South Africa with the retention of group identities. 
De Klerk believed that the history of Africa indicated that nationalism 
was exclusive and that Africanization was preferable to ersatz Europeaniza-
tion. Secondly, equality in separation demanded the removal of discrimina-
tion, or the domination of one group over another and of control which 
bloGked forever indep~ndence and freedom. There would be equal treatment 
and opportunities in all spheres. Thirdly, the Whites had to accept that 
the present situation contained much inequality which they could help to 
alter in a correct manner which would lead to full independence. Once 
these points had been accepted it would be necessary to agree to the full 
development, on. all levels, of the Bahtustans including their consolidation 
and expansion to allow for this as well as full political independence when 
these states were ready to accept responsibility. It would also entail 
the development of co-operation between these independent states in a form 
of partnership while the immediate removal of discrimination was also 
necessary where white and non-white lived in one country. Coloureds and 
/ 
Indians, should in addition, retain their own identities, and their political 
rights had to be guaranteed in a framework of differentiation. 7 
Prof de Klerk believed that these were the main points in any verl igte 
dispensation. South Africa should move in this direction. Opposition 
could be expected from the integrationists and verkramptes but there was, he 
felt, a swing away from verkramptheid while the integrationists had been 
totally rejected as they misread the fundamental racial differentiation 
which existed in South Africa. 
]. IBID. 
Japie Basson, frequently regarded as the fat~er of the reform movement in 
the U.P.,
8 
delivered a controversial speech to the 1971 Party congress in 
the Transvaal which stressed the need for a new approach to race relations.9 
He called for reform in the face of growing anti-white feeling. As the 
situation was changing rapidly and radically in South Africa 'anybody who 
continues to believe that Black and Brown people will be satisfied with 
a few paternalistic political crumbs from the whiteman's table is living in 
t 1 1 d• I 10 a oo s para rse . Contact with non-white leaders, he said, would reveal 
that they were no longer prepared to tolerate being represented by whites 
who spoke for them in parliament. Such representation was worthless and 
whatever form future contact took it would have to be direct. 11 This 
view was in conflict with the existing Party policy which still advocated 
that non-whites receive 1 imited representation by whites in parl lament. 
Sasson was al~o of the opinion that the Bantustan concept was relevant and 
formed an important part of the broader political direction, one of a few 
from which South Africans would have to choose. Once again he differed from 
official policy which rejected the ultimate homeland plan. He also discarded 
the traditional 'white baasskap' idea as being unacceptable policy in the 
current political climate. Sasson felt that 'Black power' wo~ld grow and 
would have to beaccomm~dated but that any party attempting to do so in an 
integ'rated political system would meet with such white resistance that it 
would never rule in South Africa 'in our time•. 12 
8. Interview with Senator Horak, 8.6.82. See also the Sunday Times, 
26.8.73, 'Prophet Japie is inspiration of reform'. 
9, U.P. Division of Information, (undated), J.Basson, address to the 
Transvaal U.P. Congress, 17.9.71. 
10. Argus, 27.9.71, 'Revision of U.P. Race policies'. It dealt with Japie 
Basson's congress address of 17.9.71. 
11. Sunday Times, 26.9.71, 'Facing reality of Black power'. 
12. IBID., Congress address. 
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The direction advocated by Sasson - the third option - was to channel black 
and white aspirations into a decentralized system of power in which the races 
would feel sufficiently secure to make co-operation between them possible 
without one race dominating the other. 
Sasson pleaded for a fresh approach. Hebel ieved that the fundamentally 
. 13 
important thing in politics was direction and not necessarily pol icy. His 
congress speech was hailed far and wide by those who believed it was a 
verligte one. The press gave it extensive coverage, the English newspapers 
praising it in the manner of the Cape.Times editorial which described it as 
being 'a dynamic verligte challenge to the United Party• 14 while the Afrikaans 
press predicted all sorts of dire consequences because of 'Japie Sasson se 
15 opstand'. 
'All change for the Seventies• 
13. Sunday Times, 1).2.72, Japie Sasson: ·'Party friction not always 
dis 1oya1ty 1 • 
14. Cape Times,. 20.9.71, editorial: 'Japie Sasson and U.P.'. 
15. Die Burger, 20.9.71, 1 Japie Basson C:;! Opstand'. 
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If his directions were to be adopted then far reaching changes would have to 
be made to party policy, But since the Party lea~ership would be unlikely 
to accept them a great deal of conflict could be expected. 
Basson's speech more than any other, came to be regarded as having started 
the verligte-verkrampte debate in earnest and won for him the title of spiritual 
leader of the reform movement though he was often to disappoint his admirers 
by remaining within the United Party when lesser politicians left for more 
I . d . . 16 ver 1gte est1nat1ons. 
The way ahead suggested by Japie Sasson agreed in many instances with the points 
raised by Prof de Klerk in his definition of verl igtheid. Both envisaged three 
choices - integrationism, verkramptheid and ver1 igtheid, with the latter 
receiving approval, the others being rejected. Nevertheless, the concept re-
~ained subjective, for what ~as verlig to one pol itici~n might be regarded as 
verkramp by another. The question of independent homelands was a case in point. 
Was it verl ig to reject or accept them and by what yardstick should the juJge-
ment be made? 
Notwithstanding such difficulties it became accepted that verl igtes pursued a 
certain general directiontno matter how ill-defined,while those who were opposed 
to them or who remained non-committal were the verkramptes, regardless of party 
affiliations. Therefore, U.P. representatives, for example, who came out 
strongly against the police for dispersing demonstrating students in front of 
St. George's Cathedral in Cape Town in June 1972, were praised for being verlig. 
The issue involved was, for them, the denial of certain liberties, in this 
instance the right to prot~st. Those who did not condemn the pol ice were sus-
pect and were branded as being verkramp. 
16. Interview with Sir De Villiers Graaff 16.6.82. He spoke of Basson 1 s loyalty 
to him over the years. See also Hansard, 24.2.75, column 1238. Sasson 
denied that he had ever enc6uraged the reform movement in the Party. 
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Bannings without recourse to the courts was characteristic of verkramptheid 
whether the security of the state was involved or 11ot. Serving on the 
Schlebusch commission, which investigated the activites of certain organi-
zations.was frowned upon while to endorse its, findings was definitely 
verkramp. Reformists always adopted a verl igte approach on these matters. 
Consequently, members of the U.P. were forced to take sides; either they 
supported the reformist-wing of the Party or else the traditionally more 
conservative one. 17 The resultant feuding took its toll on morale and 
many supporters abandoned it to join either the Nationalists on the right or 
the Progressives on the left - surely the more genuine conservatives and 
liberals in South African politics. 
Headed by Stanley Uys, Hans Strydom and later H~nnie Serfontein the Sunday 
Times mounted a sustained onslaught on the U.P. verkramptes and fully backed 
the views of Japie Basson. The newspaper became the mouthpiece of the 
reform movement and went to great lengths to undermine the democratically 
elected party leaders. It was ecstatic when Marais Steyn was replaced by 
Harry Schwarz as Transvaal leader of the Party ln August 1972. 19 It claimed 
·credit for the shift in U.P. pol icy once it accepted the concept of in-
dependent homelands and professed throughout that it had the interests of the 
Party at heart and that its campaign was directed at revitalizing the oppo-
sition. It is, however, arguable whether the Times did not do more harm to 
the Party than any other section of the media or whether·itsmotives were 
above reproach. 
17. Dr S.L.Barnard, 'Pol itieke Orientasie', pp. 12-13. 
18. Interview with John Wiley, 5.4.82. See also the numerous Sunday Times 
articles on the subject which appear as footnotes throughout this thesis. 
19. Sunday Times, 27.8.72, 'How Young Turks did it'. 
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When the English press in general, and elements supporting it, were 
unable to achieve their goal of reforming the Party from within they set 
about wrecking it with the intention of rejoining the acceptable parts 
with other interested groups in a 'verl igte front' to oppose the 
20 
government. In this connection it is of interest to note that the 
editor of the Sunday Times,Joel Mervis, who was a delegate at the final 
congress of the Reform Party before its dissolution, eventually went 
on to become the P.F.P. M.P.C. for Hillbrow thus vindicating the views 
adopted by certain U.P. parliamentarians, such as John Wiley of Simonstown 
that the English press and the Times in particular did not really have the 
interests of the U.P. at heart. They merely regarded it as a vehicle to 
21 achieve their own µol itical objectives or those of their owners. 
2. The verkrampte mafia. 
In July 1972 following pol ice action against students in Cape Town Stanley 
Uys attacked the U.P. leadership and accused Graaff of being in the hands 
of a 'verkrampte mafia' which prevented the party from changing. 22 It 
was essential that the power of the verkramptes be broken in order to 
bring about a new political orientation. It was demanded of the U.P. 
that it strongly oppose any attack on civil liberites. This role.however, 
was being restricted by the verkramptes who were narrowing the Party's 
base by appealing to the conservative nationalist vote instead of broadening 
its appeal by courting verl igtes. 23 Uys called on the party to stop 
fighting the Church, students and Progressives and to seek a new strategy. 
20. l~terviews with Messrs Wiley, Streicher and Horak. 
21. IBID., Wiley. See also Chapter V.5. 
22. Sunday Times, 2.7.72, Stanley Uys: 'Major shake up in United Party 
urged'. 
23. IBID., 16.7.72, Uys: 'U.P. must attract all verligtes'. 
23 
Although this new plan was never more than superficially outlined the 
negative criticism of groups within the Party es~alated. 
In the following weeks' editorial, headlined 'Verligte Party' the Times 
24 called on the U.P. to take an unequivocal stand on issues that mattered. 
These included Bantustan pol icy, where government changes should be accepted, 
petty apartheid, where a firmer stand was needed and civil liberties where 
the Party should be more consistent. The U.P. at that time, claimed the 
leading article, Jacked initiative and dynamic leadership which hampered 
its chances of becoming the majority party. If it appealed to the verligtes 
right across the political spectrum it would come to power .. 'A verl igte 
front, could become a victory front•. 25 This editorial was supported in 
the following issue by another Stanley Uys article in which he pleaded for 
all verligtes to combine and for the U.P. to improve on its ideas, move 
into the 1970's and replace its verkrampte leaders if it wished to regain 
office. 
Copy of this nature, though glib, focused unfavourable attention on the U.P. 
by making demands which the Party was unable to fulfil even if it so de-
sired. It operated on a democratic basis, its leaders were chosen at 
provincial and national congresses and policy was formulated by its rep-
resentatives and not by the press which was not answerable to any section 
of the electorate for its actions. 
'Yes, there are verligtes in the U.P, but far more verkramptes', according 
to Colin Eglin, of the Progressive Party, in the Sunday Times of the follow-
ing week. 
24. Sunday Times, 9.7.72, editorial: 1 Verligte Party'. See also 'A 
radical personality change is called for•. 
25. ~Q.:_, 16.7.72, 'U.P. must attract all verligtes'. 
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Uys agreed with him and went on to attempt a definition of a verl igte, 
not an easy task. Those who had outgrown the N.P. for economic reasons 
were classed as verl ig, as were opposition supporters who were prepared 
26 to ·back the positive steps of separate development. A week later Uys 
defined verligtes as all forward looking men who favoured radical change 
in the party political alignment. Verkramptes were opp~sed to this. He 
accused the U.P. of being verlig in theory but verkramp in practice and 
that political expediency determined its actions. The solution to the 
problem.he felt.was for the Party to reject its verkrampte ideas and leaders 
and be governed by its 1 iberal and civilized principles. 27 
Stanley Uys and other political commentators found no shortage of material 
to draw attention to the inconsistencies of approach by the U.P. reflected, 
for example, in the differing reactions by De Villiers Graaff and Mike 
Mitchell of Durban North, to civil liberties following the student protest 
at St. George's Cathedral. By giving prominence to these and similar in-
cidents the Party's credibility was damaged. Yet, as will be demonstrated, 
when the. Times attempted to define verligtheid it was vague and merely 
played with words in as unconvincing a manner as it accused the U.P. of so 
often doing. When it spoke of the formation of a rverligte front• it was 
skating on very thin ice for it never clearly explained on what basis this 
was to be achieved in practice and what chance of success such a grouping 
was likely to enjoy if it were not based on an acceptabl°e programme of action. 
What future would such a front have if it simply was formed to .. oppose the 
government? South African political history since 1948 boasted the failure 
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of many such fronts. 
26. Sunday Times, 16.7.72. 
27. Sunday Times, 23.7.72, 1 Uys on verligtes 1 • 
28. There was the United Democratic Front of 1953 and also the alliance in 
1961 between Japie Basson•s National Union and the United Party. 
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And if the U.P. was to rid itself of its verkramptes who was to draw up 
the complete list of qualifiers and on what basis was it to be done? The 
Sunday Times campaign was transparently superficial and was an example of 
prejudiced journalism which succeeded to an extent because the same type 
of article was repeated with monotonous regularity. 
During June 1972 the Witwarersrand General Council of the U.P. was re-
organized, giving reformists such as Messrs Harry Schwarz, Dave Dal ling, 
Dick Enthoven and Horace van Rensburg a base from which to operate and 
to extend their influence. This development was lauded by the Times 
which expressed the hope that the revitalizing process would be copied 
in other U.P. divisions. 29 Determined efforts were, in fact~ made 
throughout the country to bring this about but instead of creating a 
'victory bandwagon' it led to one feud after another which sapped the Party 1 s 
·. l. 30 Vita 1ty. 
3. The role of the Progressive Party. 
From July 1972 when the Party was given so much gratuitous and mischievous 
advice a point which was also raised concerned the relationship existing 
between the United and Progressive parties. The P.P. had been all but 
annihalated in 1970 and had returned only one member to parl lament yet 
there remained a great deal of sympathy for it, with Helen Suzman receiving 
. . 31 
far more attention than the support for her party warranted. The Progressive 
Party and the U.P. competed for the same vote in the urban areas and the P.P. 
could only do well if the U.P. fared badly. 
29. Sunday Times, 6.8.72, 'Shake up needed if U.P. are to win power'. 
30. Rapport, 23.7.72, 'Is hulle almal Sappe? 1 • 
31. K.Heard, General Elections in South Africa 1943-1970(London, 1974), 
pp. 218-219. Although only winning one seat the percentage of voters 
supporting the P.P. had increased. 
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This had not happened in the 1970 elections and consequently the P.P.'s 
share of the vote was very small. 32 By 1974,when the U.P. was losing 
support, the P.P. staged something of a revival. In truth, the growth 
of the P.P. was closely linked to the decline of the U.P. But when 
the Progressives were in troublo sympathetic newspapers, the same ones 
as supported the reformists, did their best to boost the Party's plummet-
ing fortunes. And not without success. Artificial life was breathed 
into th~ P.P. and it was kept alive long enough to benefit from the 
decline in the fortunes of the U.P. Victor Norton called for a 'sensible 
approach' to the U.P.-P.P. fight when his favourite party was struggling, 
and suggested that Suzman, Eglin and Ray Swart should be returned unopposed 
at the next election. 33 In return the P.P. would restrict its electoral 
effort against the U.P. in other seats. This could hardly have appeared 
an attractive offer to the United Party. Stanley Uys reiterated this 
h b • l . b h · 34 A approac y supporting an e ect1on pact etween t e two parties. 
similar appeal was made towards the end of the year subsequent to the 
Progressive's weak showing in the parliamentary by-elections in Vereeniging 
and Johannesburg West where they polled 559 votes and 192 votes respec-
tively.35 In an editorial the Sunday Times called for the two_parties 
to pool their electoral resources. 36 
Throughout the period of verligte-verkrampte quarrels in the U.P. there 
was strong media sympathy and later unequivocal support ·for the Progressives. 
32. Division of Information and Research, (Johannesburg, 1970), United Party, 
1970 general election. The Progressive Party share of the vote was 3.43 
percent. See also K.Meard, IBID., p. 211. He puts the P.P. share of 
the vote at 3,5 percent and they had contested seven fewer seats than 
in 1966. 
33. Sunday Times, 29.7,72, Victor Norton: 'U.P.-P.P. fight'. 
34. Sunday Times, 5.8.72, Stanley Uys: 'Election pact with Progressive Party'. 
35. B.M.Schoeman,- Parlementere Verkiesings 1910-76(Pretoria, 1977), 
pp. 486-90. i. Johannesburg West 29,11.72, P.P. 559 votes 
1 1. Vereen i g i ng 29. 11 . 72 P. P. i 92 votes. 
36. Sunday Times, 11.12.72, editorial: 'A truce, why not?' 
33 
Currently, virtually the entire English language press supports the P.F.P. 
and none the N.R.P. the successor to the defunct United Party.37 This 
tends to confirm the suspicion that at heart they had always been progressive 
and that leading newspapers had initially supported the reform movement as 
it appeared to stand a better chance of success than the ailing Progressive 
Party. As the U.P. infighting intensified it became increasingly clear that 
the so-called verkramptes in its leadership positions could not all be 
removed. Con~equently, the U.P. gradually shed its press support to such 
an extent that most newspapers during the 1974 election were adopting an 
'independent stance' and were asking the electorate to support the best 
candidates irrespective of party affiliation as long as they were verl ig. 38 
This strange advice will be examined at the appropriate time but what clearly 
emerged was that when the English press was unable to exert its will on the 
U.P. and when 'verkrampte leaders' in all the provinces, save for the 
Transvaal, retain3d their positions the newspapers deserted the Party and 
- propagated their verl igte front among the Progressives and those reformists 
who had abandoned the U.P. 
In the light of subsequent events, and with hindsight, it is on balance 
correct to maintain that many who joined the U.P. after 1970 were but 
f . h f . d d • 1 . • l • l • d 39 a1r-weat er r1en s an were 1n rea 1ty progressive y inc 1ne • 
37. See Chapter V.5. 
38. By their own admissions the Sunday Times, the Cape Times, Rand Daily Mail, 
Natal Hec~ry, Daily Dispatch and Eastern Provioce Herald, among 
others, were adopting this approach where they were not supporting 
Progressive candidates unconditionally. 
39. Examples would include Robin Carisle(who joined in 1972) and many of the 
members of the G.R.O.W. movement in the Cape who virtually a!l left the 
U.P. with Harry Schwarz in 1975 to join the ·Reform Party. Prof Nie 
Olivier who became M.P. for Edenvale in 1974 cs an important example 
in the Transvaal. See also Dr S.L.Barnard, 'Pol itieke Orientasie', pp. 
259-260. 
Their support was not sincere but was bestowed because the U.P. had done 
well in 1970. It was this group which favoured rapid change and new 
leaders, and which enjoyed media support but \vhen their objectives 
remained unrealized they left the Party as readily as they had joined 
40 it and moved to the Progressive Party which received increasing atten-
tion as the reformist bandwagon ground to a halt within the United Party. 
40. The Young Turks who joined the Reform P?.rty in 1975 became members of 
the Progressive Reform Party when the former merged with the Progressives 
later in the same year, that is on 26.7.1975 
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CHAPTER I I I 
MARAIS STEYN OUSTED: THE END OF AN ERA. 
1. Prelude to the Transvaal Congress of 1972. 
The verligte-verkrampte battle reached its zenith in the Transvaal in 
August 1972 when Harry Schwarz, standard bearei· of the Young Turks, top-
pled Marais Steyn in dramatic fashion at the Transvaal provincial congress 
of the U.P. Marais Steyn who was Graaff 1 s 'right and left hand' was re-
garded as the leading member of the 1verkrampte Mafia' by the Sunday Times, 
1 and an opponent of reform in the U.P. He had endured the brunt of a 
virulent press campaign to change the Party leadership in the. Transvaal. 2 
Marais Steyn was not opposed to renewal but as an experienced and able 
politician he had a different approach to party politics and how to bring 
about a change of government. His methods had proved successful iri 1970 
when the U.P. in the Transvaal, under his leadership, did better than any-
. 3 
where else in the country. Yet, it was in his own province that the 
greatest pressure for rapid reform was exper!enced. Tre group of Young 
Turk M.P.C.'s responsible for encouraging a new direction, also sincerely 
believed that they had the interests of the Party at heart when they ~omi-
4 nated Harry Schwarz for the leadership position and in a vigorous, well 
organized campaign supported his candidature. The differences between the 
two men were more of style than of policy for both professed to support 
5 the principles of the U.P. But there was a difference of emphasis and 
possibly, because certain policies were open to divergent interpretations 
they were both, correctly, entitled to their viewpoints. 
1. Sunday Times, 2.7.72, Stanley Uys: 'Major shake up in United Party urged'. 
2. Interviews with Senator Horak, 8.6.82, and Sir De Villiers Graaff, 16.6.82. 
3. K.Heard, General Ele~tions in South Africa 1943-1970(London, 1974), p. 209. 
4. Harry Schwarz had been elected deputy lc~der of the U.P. in the Transvaal 
in September 1971. Marais Steyn had been re-elected leader of the Party 
at the same provincial congress. 
5~ lntervlcw, Graaff. 
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Harry Schwarz, himself, denied that· Marais Steyn was a verkrampte and 
insisted, for many years, that everyone in the U.P. was ~verl ig'. He 
opposed, to no avail, the labelling of party members by the press. 
To confront Marais Steyn was a major decision and created immediate tension 
within the Party as Schwarz had been associated, in the eyes of the public, 
with the growing reform movement while Marais Steyn was regarded as a 
member of the Old Guard. To give but ohe example: Die Vaderland of July 26 
reported that certain young fund raisers in the U.P. had been accused by 
'leading verkramptes ... of being .a power group of liberalists and big 
6 
money men', whose aim it was to oust Graaff and Marais Steyn from their posts. 
This story was embellished in Rapport 7 and subsequently investigated by the 
Sunday Express8 where its correspondent, Kitt Katzin, revealed that a 
certain Daan Lemmer, a paid U.P. organizer, had been the source of the Die 
Vaderland's story. He had iold the newspaper that Schwarz was the leader 
of a powerful liberal group in the U.P. which consisted of disguised 
progressives who wished to capture control of the Transvaal. Lemmer, who 1n 
a signed statement later admitted that his allegations were untrue, had 
spread the story as he was a Marais Steyn supporter. 
This incident which was widely publicized was partly responsible for the 
leadership conflict between Marais Steyn and his deputy leader becoming more 
acute. Although revealed to be a mischievous story it contained the germ of 
truth, and in a ~oncise manner drew attention to a situation which was widely 
believed to exist. 
6. Die Vaderland, 26.7.72, Koos Liebenberg: 'Magsblokke wil die V.P. van 
binne oorneem'. 
7. Rapport, 30.7.72. 
8. Sunday Express, 13.8.72. 
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The predictions made by Liebenberg in his Vaderland article proved to be 
uncannily accurate. His unnamed source stated that Harry Schwarz would make 
a bid for the leadership of the Party in the Transvaal while the verl igtes 
would also attempt to have Japie Sasson elected his deputy. These reformists 
would then infiltrate the Party's divisional structure in order to get 
'liberal 1 candidates .nominated for the next election. This sequence of 
events duly occurred. 
When Schwarz actually won the election, the U.P. was never again destihed 
to be the same. He provided the reformists with a base from which to spread 
a new style of politics, a style which led to clash after clash and from 
which the U.P. was unabie to recover. Marais Steyn, after a 1 ifetime in 
opposition,resigned from the United Party and joined the government, 9 
previously regarded by him as the worst God had given to the country. In 
1975 Harry Schwarz travelled a similar road to that of his predessor and 
10 left the Party, his reform mission complete. Two years later the U.P. 
had ceased to exist. 
It could not have been easy for Schwarz to oppose his own leader and this 
he admitted when he agreed to stand for nomination, • ... (it was) one of 
the most difficult decisions of my political career but I took it in the 
belief that it would be in the best interests of the Party itself 1 • 11 It 
can only be presumed that these interests were of a reformist nature. In the 
light of· later developments it is worth recording the pledges that Schwarz 
made in the event of his election. They included, among others, a promise 
to promote the unity of the U.P. and to strengthen the leadership of Sir De 




Parliamentary Re4ister Part I I I 1961-1980, published by the House of 
Assembly, pp. 17 -176. Steyn left the U.P. on 1.9.73 and joined the 
N.P. on the fourth. 
IBID., Schwarz was expelled from the U.P. on 12.2.75. 
Sunday Tribune, 20.8.72, Martin Schneider: 'Schwarz bids to oust Steyn•. 
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A . . h . d 12 ct1on, net promises was w at was requ1·re. There was indeed to be plenty 
of activity but not of the kind that promoted party unity. Conceivably, 
Schwarz's envisaged path of action was later obstructed and he therefore 
felt that he had no alternative but to leave the U.P. Whatever the reasons, 
they contributed to the disunity within it. Schwarz's period in office co-
incided with the most bitter feuding in the U.P. 
. 13 Marais Steyn,who approached the fateful congress with unwarranted complacency_, 
declined to issue any manifesto for his candidature, ' ••. others can say nice 
things about me if they wish .. My past record is all I wish to point to, 
\ 
14 and is for all to see'. Other provincial leaders condemned, to~ man, the 
intensified press campaign which preceded the Transvaal congress and which 
th b 1. d . d d . fl l5 . ey e 1eve was 1nten e to 1n uence events. 
2. The election of Harry Schwarz. 
In a well organized and smooth operation the Young Turks had Schwarz elected 
. 16 
leader of the Party in the Transvaal. He reportedly defeated Marais Steyn 
by 29 votes out of about 500 cast. 17 This was a reward for hard work an~ 
thorough planning which ensured that the largest number of reformist delegates 
18 that were entitled to be there and vote attended the congress. 
12. IBID. 
13. Interview with Sir De Villiers Graaff, 16.6.82. 
14. Sunday Express, 20.8.72, 'U.P. Transvaal leadership battle'. See also 
Dr S.L.Barnard,'Politieke Orientasie in die Suid Afrikaanse Opposisie 
sedert 1958: D.Phi 1, University of the Orange Free State,- 1979, pp. 292-S.'.i. 
15. Sunday Express, 20.8.72, Hugh Roberton: 'U.P. Leaders Condemn Anti-
Steyn Campaign'. See also Die Burger, 25.8.72, 'Leiding kies Steyn se 
kant'. 
16. Dr S.L.Barnard, 'Politieke Orientasie~ pp. 292-295. 
17. Die Burger, 26.8.72, 'Marais se kop waai 1 • 
18. Interview with Senator Horak, 8.6.82. See also Barnard, p. 292. 
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This meant that in the months prior to the meeting reformists had gained 
control of the notoriously poorly organized U.P. branch structure, particularly 
on the Witwatersrand, and so placed themselves in a position to attend the 
Congress as official delegates. 19 This was confirmed by the Young Turks, 
who had sponsered the Schwarz car.didature, in the SuDday Times of August 27 
which was euphoric in its praise of 'how they did it 1 • 20 
After the election of Schwarz the reformists tried, but narrowly failed, to 
make a clean sweep of the leadership positions in the Transvaal when they 
nominated Japie Basson for the post of deputy leader. Dr Gideon Jacobs, 
however, a confidant of Sir De Villiers, and one of the Old Guard, defeated 
him by an estimated 70 votes. 21 
The Transvaal congress left Marais Steyn without a party post in the Province 
while its new leade: would not even be a member of the parliamentary caucus 
as he was still a representative of the provincial • 1 counc1 •. His deputy, 
however, was an M.P. Hardly an ideal state of affairs. Schwarz's success 
was widely acclaimed by the entire English language press except for the 
Sunday Express which had reservations, and which had always backed Marais 
22 Steyn. 
19. Sunday Times, 30.7.72, Uys: 'Young U.P. men obliged to move fast'. 
20. IBID, 27A8.72, Serfontein: 'How Young Turks did it'. 
21. TBTD, J HP Serfontein, 'Jacobs is No. 2 1 • He added that his election 
was a 'pathetic backlash in favour of the establishment 
Senator Horak in an interview maintained that Graaff wanted Jacobs elec-
ted although he was not keen to stand, and consequently Graaff approached 
Schwarz to use his influence among his supporters to ~nsure this. See 
also Dr S L Barnard, p. 297, where he suggests that many of the reformist 
delegates had left by the time voting for deputy leader took place. 
22. Graaff was also disappointed, see interview. 
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Sir De Villiers Graaff, whatever he may have felt about the Joss of his most 
trusted lieutenant, announced that notwithstanding differences over elected 
positions the Party had closed its ranks 'and is now united and determined 
as ever•. 23 
'Schwarz takes over the U.P. in the Transvaal 1 
Unfortunately, this optimistic observation was misplaced. Following the 
election of Harry Schwarz feuding within the Party intensified, and the 
electoral support won in the previous couple of years began to evaporate. 
The Cape Times welcomed the defeat of the 'establishment' regarding it as 
a break-through for a new and bold political approach. 
23. Sunday Express, 27.8.72, 'All stand together', and 'Party has closed 
ranks 1 • 
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Ripple effects could be expected and if the U.P. lost support on the rig~t 
and on the platteland it would not be a disaster. The editorial suggested, 
incorrectly as it turned out, that the Party would then be equipped to 
capture the urban vote of 'mod~rn South Africa•. 24 This type of article 
appeared in many parts of the country and hopes were raised to expect great 
things of the reformists. 25 Yet, in the by-elections of November the U.P. 
did reasonably well in seats where there was little or no Young Turk in-
fluence as for instance, in the Klip River constituency in Natal where the 
campaign was conducted by the established party organization.There the N.P. 
scrapped home by 232 votes while in Vereeniging the N.P. majority was cut 
by 751 votes but in 'modern South Africa•, in the Johannesburg West con-
stituency,where the election was entirely in the hands of the reformists 
26 the nationalists increased their majority by 150 votes. This was the only 
disappointing result in that series of by-elections. It was also a set-
back for the Young Turks who h~d promised great things for Johannesburg West 
. 27 
and for the rest of the Witwatersrand. Significantly, Schwarz did not 
avail himself of the opportunity to test his popularity as a candidate in th~ 
seat. Had he won, he would also have been returned to parliament with the 
added knowledge that the voters supported his style of reformist politics. 
His approach contrasted sharply with that of his predecessor who had 
invariably fought the nationalists, in fact,having defeated Dr Verwoed in 
28 
the 1 94 8 po 11 . 
24. Cape Times, 28.8.72, editorial: 'Road to renewal'. 
25. Rand Daily Mail, 26.8.72, editorial: 'Healthy Shock', Argus, 26.8.72, 
'Young Cape U.P. Leaders Jubilant', and Sunday Times, 27.8.72, 'New 
U.P. born in the Transvaal 1 • 
26. B.M.Schoeman, Parlementere Verkiesings 1910-1976(Pretoria, 1977), 
pp. 486-490. i. Klip River 29.11.72 N.P'. 5 227 U.P. 4 995 
ii. Veree~iging 29.11.72 N.P. 5 271 U.P. 3 193 
iii. Johannesburg West 29.11.72 N.P. 5 345 U.P. 3 903 
27. Sunday Times, 23.7.72, 'Dynamic young men wipe out debts, aim to win 35 
Rand seats•. 
28. B.M.Schoeman, p. 513. The 1948 general election, .Alberton constituency: 
Marais Steyn 4 867, Dr H.Verwoed(N.P.) 4 696, U.P. majori.ty 171. Poll 80.9. 
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It became increasingly apparent that, notwithstanding the rhetoric, the 
reformists never produced the results they claimed were possible. During 
the 1974 general election reformist candidates did well only in a small 
number of the urban seats where they were not opposed by the Progressive Party. 
They were,apparently,unable to attract nationalist votes, nor were they 
able to make inroads among P.P. supporters who would only back them in 
the absence of a candidate of their own party. 29 The viability of the 
reform movement was limited unless it could capture control of the U.P. 
This attempt later failed but in the process created great tension within 
the Party and did it immense harm. With hindsight the question to be asked 
of the reformists was whether their victory over Marais Steyrr was worth-
while in tangible political terms? As it contributed to the demise of the 
Party rather than its renaissance the answer must be an emphatic no. On 
the other hand had Marais Steyn remained at his post reform may not have 
been possible at all. As it turned out there was neither reform nor party 
left in the end. 
29. See Chapter VI I I .3. 
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CHAPTER IV 
BIL I NGUALI SM 
The issue of bilingual ism also caused dissension within the United Party 
after the matter had been raised at its Cape Congress in Port Elizabeth 
in October 1972. ·It was decided that in future all parliamentary and 
provincial candidates in the Cape would have to be fluent in both official 
1 
languages. The decision was prompted by accusations made during the 
Oudtshoorn by-election that the Party harboured ant i-.Afr i kaans e 1 ements 
within it. P.W.Botha's 'boerehaat' speeches, before the poll, started 
the 'language row' although the issue was also raised in parliament where 
certain opposition members were taken to task for never speak1ng Afrikaans.
2 
The entire matter was probably engineered by the Nationalists to embarrass 
the U.P. and to promote Afrikaner unity at a time when the Party had been 
losing votes. The success achi~ved in Oudtshoorn encouraged the further 
use of this sensitive issue for party political gain. The U.P. in the Cape 
reacted by passing its bilingual resolution. 3 This had implications further 
afield and in Natal, in particular, caused problems where many of the Party's 
representatives were uni lingual, including some of those on the Provincial 
E . c . 4 xecut1ve omm1ttee. 
As Afrikaner votes were necessary to restore the U.P. to power it could not 
afford to be suspect in this matter. 
1. Herald, 23.10.72, 'Candidates to be bilingual'. 
2. Hansard, 12.4.72, Columns 4671-4. Mr P.W.Botha made reference to his 
'boerehaat' speeches in Villiersdorp and Ceres and then, in parliament, 
repeated the names of U.P. members who showed contempt for Afrikaans 
and were therefore 'Afrikaner haters'. They included, among others, Messrs 
Hourquebie, Wood and Emdin. The U.P., he said, was becoming 1 a home for 
everything that hates Afrikaners'. See also C.Taylor's If Courage Goes, 
M Twent Years in South African Politics(Johannesburg, 1976), pp. 222-2). 
3. Interview with John Wiley, 15 .. 2. 
4. Cape Times, 21.11.72, editorial: 'L~ng~age and politics'. 
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Yet it was forced on the defensive over an issue on which it had a proud 
record. Conciliation and co-operation between the language groups had long 
been the cornerstone of its pol icy. It was far less a sectional party than 
h . 1 • 5 c 1 h were t e nat1ona 1sts. onsequent y w en the language row was given 
prominence, between October and December 1972, it embarrassed the Party and 
to a certain degree damaged its image in the eyes of Afrikaners who were 
led to believe that their language would not receive equal treatment within 
the U.P., notably in Natal.
6 
An aggravating factor was .that the leading figures involved were those 
associated with the verligte-verkrampte developments in the U.P. In this 
instance, however, the 'verkramptes' supported bi! ingual candidates while 
the 'verl igtes' adopted an equivocal approach. Eric Winchester, an outspoken 
M.P. representing Port Natal, threatened to resign from the Party if a 
resolution similar to the one in the Cape were to be adopted in Natal. 
Winchester, who regarded bilingual ism as desirable but not essential felt 
that the quality of the representative was a more important factor. 7 These 
remarks were made at a Coast council meeting of the Party in Natal when 
John Phipson, M.P.C., tabled a motion calling for bilingual candidates in 
future. The motion,which reportedly would not have been passed, was later 
withdrawn. 8 
This incident was giYen wide publicity and the nationalist press made a 
great issue of lt in order to discredit the U.P. 9 The Burger, which accused 
the Party of having two strategies, used Winchester's approach to substan-
tiate its claim. 
5. Letter by Myburgh Streicher to Die Burger, 22.3.72, explaining the Party's 
bi 1 i ngua 1 tradition. 
6. Interview with John Wiley. He felt that it definitely cost the Party votes 
in the Kl ip River by-election. 
7. He believed that language was an accident of geography. 
8. Daily News, 20.10.72, 'Stormy U.P. meeting'. See also IBID., 19.10.72, 
'Natal will not insist'. 
9. Die Burger, 22.11 .72, 'Vat Winchester vas'. 
45 
There was one strategy for the North, where the Progressive presence had 
created a bitter anti-Afrikaans atmosphere, and made it all important to 
seek unity among the English vote, particularly as the Johannesburg West 
by-election was approaching. Any reprimand, argued the Burger, of an 
English speaking M.P. like Winchester.would have serious repercussions and 
would drive his supporters into the Progressive camp. On the other hand, in 
the Cape~ where the Afrikaner vote was more important, the strategy regarding 
bilingualism was also different for there it was necessary to actively 
10 canvass this section of the electorate. 
While the Burger's editorial was outspoken it does partially explain why 
no disciplinary action was taken against Eric Winchester. Natal, where 
United Party support was strongest~ was predominantly English-speaking and 
there was less reason, as far as local objectives were concerned, to take 
a firm stand regarding bilingual candidates. 11 This attitude, however, 
could only have an adverse influence in other provinces and notably in the 
rural areas. The nationalists exploited this situation to their advantage 
ignoring the fact that among their own parliamentarians were unilingual 
members who never spoke in Engl ish. 12 
Philip Myburgh who had sponsored the original Cape motion was most dissatis-
fied over his colleague's atitude which he regarded ~s an insult to all 
Afrikaners. 
10. Die Burger, 17.11.72, 'Twee Strategiee•. 
11. Interview with Senator Horak, 8.6.82. 
12. Hansard, 19.4.72, Column 309, Marais Steyn pointed out that 'Hansard 
shows that the majority of members opposite have never spoken English 
in this House'. 
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. 13 He would I ike to see him Jeav~ the Party and par I 1ament. 'Winchester kan 
maar loop', were the head! ines in the Burg~ of 1fovember which also pub-
1 ished a letter by Myburgh publicly calling for the Party to censure him. 14 
Winchester did not react to this letter but it is worth noting that both 
these men eventually parted company with the U.P., Myburgh be~ause it 
was becoming too 'liberal' and Winchester because it was not sufficiently 
reform:st in outlook. 
'Eric, ek is Phillip Myburgh en hier is die Barnard-broers, Afrikaners deur 
en deur. Hulle het aangebied om vir Jou h ware Suid-Afrikaanse hart oar 
te plant' 
13. Die Burger, 20.11.72, Editorial: 'Myburgh in Opstand'. 
14. Die Burger, 20.11.72, 'Winchester moet betig word'. 
C.1 
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John Vorster added his voice to the debate when in Durba~ he criticized the 
attitude and spirit prevailing in the U.P. with regard to bi! ingual ism. He 
claimed that he could not understand how the Party could talk of national 
unity when it shared such 'contempt for Afrikaans'. l5 Speaking at a by-
election meeting in the Klip River constituency Marais Steyn, fully aware 
of the sensitive nature of this issue, made it clear that he 'would like 
all U.P. representatives to be bilingual but sometimes it happens that 
they aren't~ Neel Uys, the U.P. candidate, also admitted that the 
Selection Committee preferred bi! ingual candidates but that they were 
I . . h . 16 re uctant to reject a constituency c 01ce. As will be demonstated, prior 
to the 1974 general election certain locally favoured candidates were, in 
fact,overlooked fer other reasons by the provincial selection committees. 
This caused the U.P. a great deal of discomfiture at the time and al~o 
lost it votes. 
The result of the Kl ip River poll on November 29 was very encouraging to 
the U.P. for it substantially reduced the nationalist majority. 17 What 
influence, if any, the language row had on the voting will always remain 
unclear. Certain commentators 18 maintained that it had cost the United Party 
the seat while others such as Radclyffe Cadman, newly elected Party leader 
in Natal, believed that the voters had accepted the Party's integrity re-





Argus, 27.10.72, 'Vorster tackles U.P. in Natal'. See also Cape Times, 
27. 10.72, 'U.P. show contempt for Afrikaans'. 
Die Burger, 27.11.72, 'Taal Politiek'. 
B.M.Schoeman, Parlementere VerkiesSngs, V.Volker of the N.P. polled 
5 227 votes to the 4 995 of the U.P. candidate, C.Uys. N.P. majority 
232. Percentage pol I 81.6. pp. 486-90 .. 
John Wiley was .such an example. He had also written a letter to Eric 
Winchester on 18.11.72 expressing his concern at i:he approach the 
latter had adopted towards the issue of bi! ingualism. 
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Thereafter the language argume;1t was allowed to subside and it was relegated 
to its traditionally dormant place in South African politics with both Vorster 
and Graaff agreeing on the need for bilingual ism and respect for language 
rights. 19 
Th d b h d h d b . f. . 1 . 20 h. h h 1 d d e e ate a a a out 1t a super 1c1a 1ty w 1c nevert e ess create a -
verse publicity for the U.P. at a time when the verl igte-verkrampte clash was 
gaining momentum. Rapport contended that Winchester was worth his weight in 
21 gold to the National Party, an opinion with which Hans Strydom of the Sunday 
22 
Times agreed. The issue reinforced the widely held view that the U.P. was 
divided and, depending on its audience, spoke with more than one voice. It 
contributed to the widening rift in the Party and reflected the historically 
divergent streams of thought 0ithin it. 
19. Hansard, 18.4.72, Column .5188 
20. Cape Times~ 3.11.72, 1 Bil ingual ism a red herring•. 
21. Rapport, 10.12.72, 'Winchester werd sy gewig in goud vir N.P. 1 • 
22. Sunday Tii:ies, 10.11.72, Hans Strydom: 'Winchester Boob- will be ex-
ploited b.y--N'.P. 1 • 
CHAPTER V. 
THE SCHLEBUSCH COMMISSION 
The upheaval caused by the Schlebusch Commission shook the United Party to 
its very core. It brought to public attention the twin issues of internal 
security and national unity,.matters on which the U.P. officially adop~ed 
a bi-partisan approach and supported the government. As a consequence it 
had to endure a sustained press campaign of unparallelled ferocity. By 
serving on the commission the Party was accused of abandoning its attachment 
to civil liberties which were purportedly threatened by the various re-
commendations of the commission. It was argued that support for internal 
security measures would irrevocably damage individual freedoms. This issue 
aggravated the verligte-verkrampt~ split then developing in the Party. The 
reformists wer~, for the most part, opposed to serving on the ~chlebusch 
investigation while the conservatives were in favour of participation. 1 
Officially the U.P. agreed to serve on the commission but the degree of 
opposition to this decision indicated that there was both a lack of dis-
cipline among party representatives and open division on matters of national 
concern. According to Senator Horak the U.P. wanted to be seen to be doing 
what was right for South Africa, in this instance by serving on a body 
investigating organizations the nature of whose activities could possibly 
be directed towards the overthrow of the existing politi~al order and its 
replacement by a radical-leftist one. 2 It was in the national interest that 
any such plots should be revealed and their protagonists prosecuted. Tl1e 
United Party's association with the Schlebusch Commission badly damaged its 
unity of purpose. 3 
1. Sunday Express, 15.4.73, 'Enough of Schlebusch'. 
2. Interview with Senator Horak, 8.6.82. 
3. Dr S.L.Barnard, 'Politieke_ Orientasie1, p. 329. 
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Its commissioners were vilified and one, Etienne Malan, was destined to 
lose his parli~mentary seat, Orange Grove, as a direct consequence of his 
4 
membership of this body. The Party had fared badly in the 1974 election, 
which had reversed the successes of 1970, and had lost support to both the 
National and Progressive parties. Disenchanted with the growing rift within 
the U.P. an increasing number of voters had switched ·their allegiance to 
other political homes. 
1. The appointment of a Select Committee. 
In February 1972 the prime minister announced the appointment of a parliamentary 
Select Committee of Investigation into Certain Organizations under the chair-
manship of Jimmy Kruger M.P. It would investigate the National Union of South 
African Students(N.U.S.A.S.), the University Christiin Movement(U.C.M.) and 
the South African Institute of Race Relations(S.A.l.R.R.). The prime minister 
intimated that he WdS in possession of information which persuaded him to see 
what the inside of these organizations looked like. 5 It was, in short, a 
matter of security. 6 Sir De Villiers Graaff expressed reservations con-
cerning the merits of such a select committee as its members would all be 
politicians who were not necessarily the best people to judge, impartially, 
questions related to state security. It also appeared to him that the committee 
was to ,inquire into the guilt or otherwise of these organizations with regard 
to un-South African activities. Consequently,he called for a judicial 
commission to investigate the matter, if any inquiry was thought desirable. 7 
4. IBID., p. 422. In the 1974 election he lost to Rupert Lorimer of the 
Progressive Party who had specially been requested to vacate Bryanston 
for.Orange Grove by Joel Mervis of the Sunday Times. 
5. Hansard, 10.2.72, Column 725-727. 
6. C.Taylor, If Courage Goes, My Twenty Years in South African Politics, 
(Johannesburg, 1976), p. 240. 
7. Hansard, 10.2.72, Column 729. 
) 
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Graaff's appeal fell on deaf ears and the U.P. had to decide whether or not 
h . 8 to serve on t e committee. The caucus agreed that it was better to parti-
cipate in the investigation rather than allow the government to have every-
9 thing its own way. The Select Committee was, in due course, converted into 
a commission popularly known as the Schlebusch and later as the Le Grange 
commission. It sat between 1972 and 1975 and produced a number of reports 
containing certain recommendations on which the government could act if it 
so wished. Steps, subsequently taken, such as the banning of N.U.S.A.S. 
leaders led to a great furore and as the United Party was closely associated 
with .the Commission it was tarred with the same brush as the government not-
. b" . h . k b h N . l" lO If withstanding its o Ject1on to t e actions ta en y t e at1ona 1sts. 
the Party had not served on the Commission it believed the students would still 
have been restricted and possibly other measures taken against N.U.S.A.S. as 
we 11. 
When the names of the commissioners were announced in March 1972 they included 
four from the United Party, Messrs R.M.Cadman(later replaced by Bill Sutton), 
L.Murray, E.Malan and Marais Steyn. Catherine Taylor, chairman of the Party's 
~ducation group, was a notable omission, a decision which was surprising as it 
amounted to a vote of no confidence in her. 
Taylor, who had close links with student organizations, resented this snub 
d 1 b f h C . . 11 an ater ecame a strong opponent o t e omm1ss1on. 
8. C.Taylor, If Courage Goes, pp. 240-242. , 
9. Hansard, 10.2.72, Column 800-802. Marais Steynexplained the U.P. attitude 
to security on the Select Committee but expressed fear that the Inquiry 
may 'bring the evils of McCarthyism to South Africa'. 
10. Interview with Sir De Villiers Graaff, 16.6.82. 
11. C.Taylor, If Couraae Goes, pp. 241-242. 
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She came to support the reformist-\'Jing of the Party and ended her political 
career in a running battle with the Cape leadership over nomination procedures 
d h . 12 an ot er issues. 
Matters were aggravated in early June 1972 when a student demonstration was 
dispersed by the police on the steps of St. George's Cathedral in Cape Town. 13 
The stude~ts led by Dirk Kemp,a British citizen, were protesting against 
university apartheid and state intervention in college affairs, particularly 
• B 1 k . . ' • 14 1n ac un1vers1t1es. When Colonel Crous, in charge of the pol ice 1 was 
allegedly 'manhandled' his men executed a baton charge which also cleared 
. 15 
the pavement of demonstrators. This rather trivial incident received 
wide publicity and 'Black Friday' was regarded by those strongly attached 
to civil liberties as a blow to free assembly and legal protest. The prime 
mlnister, on the other hand, was satisfied with the action taken by the 
. 16 police but the U.P. again adopted an equivocal stand. Sir De Villiers 
condemned the police tactics while Mike Mitchell, the Party's leg~l 
spokesman, stated that the churches should not have allowed their premises 
to be used for a demonstration.17 
At the N.U.S.A.S. congress in December its president, Paul Pretorius, in his 
openingaddress suggested that in certain circumstances the organization 
would disobey the law: ' •.• if the right to lawful meetings •.• was removed 
12. See Chapte;- VI 11 .2. 
13. T.R.H.Davenport, South Africa. A Modern History(Johannesburg, 1977), 
p. 308. 
14. C.Taylor, pp. 242-250. 
15. Hansard, 5.6.72, Columns 8706-15. The minister of Pol ice, L.Muller, 
gave an official report on the demonstration~ 
1~. IBID., 5.6.72, Column 8737-8. Vorster supported the police action and 
'would have been disappointed' had they not acted as they had done. 
17. IBID., 5.6.72, Columns 8718-22. Graaff called for a judicial inquiry 
into the actions of the pol ice. See also the Sunday Times, 9.7.72, 
'A Verligte Party'. 
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(N.U.S.A.S.) would ignore such removal and take the consequences of 
(its) stand 1 • And 1 the time was approaching when one 1 s conscience 
would have to take precedence over corrupt edicts of those that rule .•• 
d . 1 1 1 d b h h . f 1 18 A · e 1cts c every concea e eneat t e guise o aw. supporting reso-
lution was accepted by 47 votes to 6 with 10 abstentions. Even the Cape 
Times, long ·sympathetic to student causes, regarded this speech as a major 
blunder which would encourage the nationalists to take firm measures 
against them at a time when they should have been grateful to the courts 
for recently having upheld their rights to lawful protest following the 
June demonstrations. l9 
2. The tabling of the first interim reports. 
These fears were realized when early in 1973 the Prime Minister tabled the first 
two reports of the Schlebusch Commission. 20 Both were unanimous and therefore 
included the support of the United Party commissioners. The first, which 
recommended that the commission become a permanent institution to deal with 
security was accepted by the government. The second, also an interim repor~, 
21 concerned the activities of N.U.S.A.S. It recommended that steps should 
be taken against individuals and not against the organization per se as it 
was a small group of activists who determined the policy direction of N.U.S.A.S. 
A leadership clique kept control of the movement year after year and it 
was influenced by people within South Africa, but who were not members, and 
also by interested parties from beyond the borders of the country. The 
Report mainta.incd that a~ fewer than five percent of English speaking 
students were active in the organization it was necessary for its leader-
ship to create provocative situations to arouse the interest of the wider 
student body. 
18. C.Taylor, p. 253 and p. 266. 
19. ~ape Times, 30.1.73, 'N.U.S.A.S. Major Blunder•. See also Davenport, 
South Africa. A Modern History(JHB, 1977), p. 308. 
20. Hansard, 27.2.73, Columns 1485. 
21. C. laylor, p. 265. 
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N.U.S.A.S. also sought financial aid, which was not forthcoming in South 
Africa, from foreign sources and consequently had to behave in a manner 
acceptab 1 e to these donors. It had to compete for funds with other 
militant groups intent on the overthrow of the existing order. 22 This 
state of affairs the commission found to be undesirable. 
The report concluded that the N.U.S.A.S. leaders had been acting in a manner 
which could be described as creating a climate for revolution and that the 
danger of agitation which might result in student violence had 'become 
actual and must receive urgent attention'. Vcrster, who had tabled the 
findings, then referred to the December speech of Paul Pretorius as an 
example of how the way was being prepared for illegal action. 23 He also 
quoted from the Nata I University publication Dome which contained a 
number of provocative statements. 
Since the final report was not ready for submission the Commission re-
commended that immediate steps be taken and it named those who had man-
oeuvered N.U.S.A.S. into a position which endangered internal security. 24 
Their participation in student affairs was regarded as undesirable and 
as their cases fell within the purview of the Suppression of Communism 
Act the Minister of Justice, P.C.Pelser, banned them forthwith in the 
'interests of South Africa, the universities, of students and parents whose 
children attend them•. 25 
22. IBID., pp. 265-266. See also Hansard, 27.2.73, Columns 1485-1489. 
23. IBID., 27.2.73, Cloumns 1488-1490. See also the leading article 
·in Dome, 21.2.72, l/1hich threatened demonstrations which would make 
the June ones(1972) 'appear as a Sunday school picnic', if students 
were restricted. 
24. IBID., 27.2.73, Colum~ 1489, namely Messrs P.Pretorius, P.Ensor, 
P.le Roux, N.Curtis, C.Wood, C.Keegan S.L~pinsky and R.Turner. 
25. IBID. 
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Eight leaders of the South African Student Organization(S.A.S.O.) also 
received banning orders bringing the total to sixteen.
26 
The restriction 
of the student leaders caused widespread dissatisfaction because it had 
been accomplished through arbitraryexecutive action and without recourse 
to the courts. 27 They had not been found guilty, in open court, of any 
crime. The English language press, with one exception, the Sunday Express, 
mounted a massive cmapaign against the bannings and castigated the official 
. . f b . h . f . . 1 1 . b . 28 oppos1t1on or e1ng an accessory to t e erosion o c1v1 1 ert1es. 
This sust~ined criticism, which was not entirely warranted, did much to 
lower party morale at a time when it also had to endure an on-going campaign 
to change the Party leadership. Both the Financial Mail and the Sunday Times 
had called on Graaff to resign. 29 
In addition,the U.P. was being criticized for the timid manner in which 
it had introduced its new feder~l policy. 30 The Party was facing a crisis 
which was aggravated by growing verligte-verkrampte tensions. 
As the recommendations of the commission on which the government acted were 
unanimous the U.P. was regarded,by its critics,as having been equally res-
ponsible for the arbitraryaction that had been taken although it was totally 
opposed to the bannings and would have preferred it had the students been 




Davenport, South Africa. A Modern History, (JHB, 1977), p. 308. 
Cape Times, 28.2.73, 'By-passing courts'. 
IBID., 1.3.73, editorial: 'Not proven'. See also interview with 
Sir De Villiers Graaff, 16.6.82. 
In February 1973. 
Hansard, 8.2.73, Colu~ns 287-298. 
TBTD-.,-27.2.73, Columns 1508-1513. 
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In her autobiography, Catherine Taylor maintained that the U.P. commission-
ers were aware of the steps that the national is ts ;were 1 ikcly to take 
notwithstanding Graaff 1 s denial at a public meeting in Rondebosch that, 
'at no time did it (the government) consult the commission on what it 
should do and at no time did it consult the opposition. It took the 
decisions on its own•. 32 Marais Steyn in an information p~mphlet on the 
bannings made it clear that the four Party commissioners were permitted 
publicly to state their opposition to it and that they had also previously 
d h . 1 h c . . 33 ma e t 1s c ear to t e omm1ss1on. This statement appeared to indicate 
that the commissioners had at least discussed the possibility of banning 
even if the U.P. was not consulted by the gpvernment on its subsequent 
actions. 
The United Party, it was felt by Catherine Taylor and its other detractors, 
had presented the nationalists with a blank che~ue of which they had made use. 34 
There was no virtue in being angry after the event. What made it worse, 
was that the U~P. representatives had not even submitted a minority repbrt 
d. d . f f . 35 recommen 1ng a more emocrat1c orm o action. 
3. Th~ United Party takes the blame as the civil war intensifies. 
The U.P. found itself in an unenviable position. The real issues involved 
were those of state security and civil liberties, two causes which were 
···- -se 1 dom 1 i ke 1 y to co_-ex is t harmonious 1 y in any state. Which ever one the 
U.P. decided to support it was certian to be neavily criticized by those 
who set greater store by the other issue. The Burger, and the Afrikaans 
press without exception, were generally satisfied with the U.P. for adopting 





C.Taylor, If Courage Goes, p. 270. 
·IBID., pp. 266-270. 
· IBID. 
A minority report was submitted with the fourth Interim Report of 
the Commission in 1974. 
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The Engiish newspapers, on the other hand, excluding the Sunday Express, 
were vociferous in their condemnation of the role played· by the Party in 
the Schlebusch Commission.36 They demanded the resignation of its four 
representatives from the committee and held them responsible for the 
destruction of civilized values. 37 Within the Party formations pro and 
anti-Schlebusch factions emerged as for instance in the North Rand con-
stituency where the H.P., Brigadier Bronkhorst, supported the official 
party decisions while his M.P.C., Dave Dall ing was totally opposed to the 
commission. 38 Bronkhorst was consequently relegated to the conservative 
camp and Dal ling, who had previously been involved in the defeat of Marais 
Steyn as Party leader in the Transvaal, enhanced his reputation as a re-
formist. Brigadier Bronkhorst informed the parliamentary caucus of his 
divisions disapproval of the Party's Schlebusch connections but the matter 
was never discussed and no further action was taken. 39 
The United Party served on the Commission because it was a parliamentary 
duty and it was regarded as the correct course of action for a responsible 
opposition to follow. 40 At the very least, it could fulfil a watchdog role 
and attempt to influence nationalist decisions. Etienne Malan, under 
difficult circumstances,explained to Witwatersra11d University students 
that the U.P. commissioners had in fact achieved this objective.
41 
They 
were opposed to~rbitrary administrative action but had they not signed the 
interim report, making it unanimous, the nationalists would have submitted 
their own recommendations requesting much stronger steps under the Suppres:ion 
of Communism Act. 
36. Cape Times, 2.3.73, 1 A bewildering performance•. 
37. IBID., Shaw: 'Object lesson in bungling'. 
38. Dr S.L.Barnard, 'Pol itieke Orientasie', p. 337. 
39. Sunday Times, 15.3.73, 'North Rand hits at U.P. role'. 
40. Interviews, Wiley, Streicher, Graaff and Horak. 
41. S.L.Barnard, p. 343. 
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He continued ' ••. had we not been on the Commission may not N.U.S.A.S. have 
been banned or restricted, might not unfair things have happened 
on that Commission?' •.• 'I am proud of what we did 1 • 42 Although never 
officially acknowledged, it became widely believed and reported that the 
government had intended to ban thirty student activists and the whole 
of N.U.S.A.S. This would confirm Etienne Malan's contention concerning 
the moderating influence exerted by the U.P. on the commission. 
Marais Steyn also expressed his opposition, in parliament on the day the 
reports were tabled, to the government having acted in terms of the 
Communism Act43 as the Commission had not found that N.U.S.A.S. activities 
f h d h . f . 44 urt ere t e arms o communism. On the following day he suggested that 
the evidence against the students be forwarded to the Attorney Genera1. 45 
Lionel Murray supported this request and added his disapproval of the 
bannings by executive action. 
No matter how strongly, or how often, the U.P. expressed itself against 
restriction without trial it remained the villain of the piece as far as 
its critics were concerned, and many of them were found to be within the 
P • . 1 f 46 arty rtse . It was found guilty by association. The Progressives 
_made the most political capital out of the U.P. 's difficulties with Helen 
Suzman also speaking of a 'blank cheque' which the U.P. had given the 
government . 
42. C.Taylor, If Courage Goes, pp. 266-78. 
43. Hansard, 27.2.73, Columns 1508-15. Marais Steyn clarified his Party's 
approach to the Commission, standing by the factual reports but being 
'unhappy' that the prime minister had acted ~nder the Suppression of 
Communism Act against the students. 
44. There was no other act which could be used where internal security 
was involved. 
45. Hansard, 28.2.73, Columns 1565-1566. Marais Steyn said the U.P. had 
always 'resisted executive action which deprives people of their 
liberty'. He then asked that the evidence be given to the Attorney 
General. 
46. Sunday Times, 22.4.73, 'Schlebusch bannings not justified - Basson'. 
See also Barnard, p. 349. 
/ 
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The unequivocal stand taken by the Progressive Party on civil liberties 
paid dividends in the general election of 1974 when it attracted a 
considerable number of disgruntled former U.P. supporters to raise its 
parliamentary representation to six. 
The U.P. was unable to counter, effectively, all the unfavourable criticism 
it received. To reduce the number of statements made by Party representa-
tives the caucus decided that Sir De Vill iers'and the four commissioners 
. 4 
alone would be permitted to speak to the press concerning the reports. 7 
Graaff felt that.the commission had certain Jchievements to its credit 
and that its U.P. members had acquitted themselves well. N.U.S.A.S. had 
been saved and not outlawed while a small clique, exploiting the organi-
zation, had been identified, as had a potential danger to internal security. 
In addition, the good standing of students at English medium universities 
. 48 
had been endorsed. These 'positive' achievements, which Graaff in-
timated were a result of the U.P. 's prese~ce on the commission, were, 
however, completely ignored by its detractors who held the Party res-
ponsible for the bannings. 
Harry Schwarz who was overseas at the time of the bannings, stated on his 
return in March, that he was totally opposed to any such action without 
trial. He also had reservations about the apparent willingness of the U.P. 
to serve on a permanent security body as envisaged by· the Commission. He 
arranged a meeting with Sir De Villiers Graaff to clarify the situation. 49 
Two other reformists, Dave Dalling and Horace van Rensburg had already 
held discussions with Graaff to express their misgivings concerning tactics 
on the Schlebusch commission.SO 
47. Daily News, 27.4.73, 'U.P. bans comment on Report'. See also interview 
with ~~nator Horak. 
48. C.Taylor, p. 276. 
49. Rapport, 18.3.73, 'Harry kwaacl vir Div.'. 
50. Dr S.L.Barnard, p. 336. 
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Both objected to the presence of the Party's representatives on the 
commission. Van Rensburg, who was the M.P.C. for Randburg, had even 
signed a petition supporting N.U.S.A.S. and critizing the action which 
had been taken against its leaders. 51 Dave Dall in~ was a member of the 
rebellious North Rand divisional committee which had drawn up a 
memorandum condemning the part played by the U.P. on the commission and 
which it wanted circulated among the parliamentary caucus. 
It had become abundantly clear that the reformists were vociferously 
opposed to official Party policy. Theirattitudewas praised by the 
English newspapers notwithstanding that it could be construed as an 
act of disloyalty harmful to the unity of the Party. The, reformists 
were never able to effectively reconcile their differences with the 
Party leadership and eventually they all found new political homes 
but in the process their abrasive presence contributed further to the 
decline of the United Party. 52 
While the meeting with Schwarz's two lieutenants produced nothing of 
substance the discussion between the Transvaal leader and Sir De Villiers 
Graaff, midway through March, created wide interest as a clash had been 
predicted. This did not materialize and a statement issued after the 
meeting indicated that the two were in 'complete accord'. On leaving 
Cape Town Schwarz announced that there was no crisis in the United Party 
and that its stability was not in any way endangered. 53 
51. Die Burger, 9.4.73. 'Ou Garde lus vlr van Rensburg'. 
52. Interviews with Horak and Streicher. 
53. Senator Horak in an interview regarded it as unlikely that Sir De Villiers 
would have come to a unilateral agreement with Schwarz. 
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This the Rand Daily Mail was unwilli11g to accept and, in view of earlier 
statements by various reformists, wished to know exactly on what terms 
'complete accord' had been reached. 54 It was not sufficient to state, 
as Graaff had done, that 'the results of the discussions will become 
apparent within a reasonable tlme•.55 
The results of these discussions were never clarified and remained open 
to a number of interpretations which resulted in further Party differences. 
The apparent accord, however, involved certain aspects of the commissioners 
work. As far as can be ascertained, Graaff and Schwarz had agreed that the 
U.P. had not as yet committed itself to serve on a permanent security 
commission, nor .was it bound to agree to legislation to create such a 
body. 56 Schwarz also explained to a youth meeting on the Rand that the U.P. 
commissioners could not bind the Party to accept the commission's rec-
ommendations and had not done so in the case of the proposed permanent 
security body. He added, that he felt that it would never do so. Schwarz 
feared the creation of a body akin to the French revolutionary Committee 
of Public Safety. The Witwatersrand Regional Counicl endorsed their 
leader's view as did Senator Horak57 who pointed out., however, that mem-
bership of any security commission could only be decided upon once the 
draft law setting it up was investigated. It was thus premature to take 
any final decisions. 
Schwarz appeared to be overreacting for none of the Party's commissioners 
were entitled to formulate policy which was the task of its national con-
gress~ and when not in session, of Sir De Villiers Graaff. 
54. Rand Daily Mail, 20.3.73, 'You promised Harry'', 
55. Interview with Graaff, 16.6.82. 
56. Argus, 19.3.73, 1 Graaff and Schwarz in accord?.. 
57. General Secretary of the ~nited Parcy. 
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Consequently, the divisions which were being provoked by the Schlebusch 
connection could have been less serious had Party representatives been 
more patient, and accepted that the U.P. was merely fulfilling a par-
liamentary duty similar to others it had undertaken in the past. 58 
,£ven Suzman had not objected when it had sat originally as a select 
committee in 1972. As the Schlebusch commission, it had certain defined 
functions. It was a fact finding 'body acting within its terms of reference 
and neither the government nor the United Party were in any way committed 
to supporting its recommendations. 59 This point of view, however, received 
scant support and the U.P. was placed in the dock for being seen to be 
associated with the actions of an authoritarian government intent on 
crushing civil liberties. 
The Sunday Times60 headlined Schwarz 1s explanations and praised the stand 
he was taking to protect democracy while additional attacks were made 
on the Party's commissioners and on Graaff 1s leadership. The 'complete' 
accord' reached between the two party leaders was not reflected in media 
reports where the battle raged unabated. The Sunday Express pleaded for 
co-operation in the interests of South Africa and claimed that the U.P. 
had not broken a single principle by serving on the Commission and by 
supporting its findings. 61 Gerald Shaw had on the previous day, in the 
Cape Times, written that although Schwarz and Graaff had reached accord 
at leadership level a left and right-wing split in the U.P. remained a 
real possibility and one which Vorster would relish. The prime mini~ter 
issued a statement at the end of March reflecting his concern for a 
situation in which certain of the commissioners were being subjected to 
f 
. . . . 62 un air cr1t1c1sm. 
58. Interview with Myburgh Streicher, 5.5.82. 
59. Sunday Express, 6.5.73, 'U.P. Commi~sioners Hit Back'. 
60. Sunday Times, 25.3,73, 
61. Sunday Express, 25.3. 73. 
62. S.L.Barnard, p. 345. 
' I ,• 
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This could only apply to U.P. representatives as none of the nationalist 
members received any adverse pub I icity. The fact that Vorster threatened 
to initiate proceedings against certain critics was indicative of the 
vicious campaign mounted against the U.P. commissioners and, by implication, 
against the Party. 
The Burger expresse'd similar views to those of the Cape Times when it 
predicted an 'inevitable' clash between the Young Turks and the Old Guard 
notwithstanding any recent accord. It also warned that Schwarz would 
have to tread carefully to retain the support of those who had organized 
his election. Already some were drifting to the Progressive Party on the 
Witwatersrand63 wi1ile other Young Turks in the Cape Peninsula were in 
'revolt' and had formed themselves into an 'lntermediatory Group' which 
was d . . f . d . h h p h. h 
64 1ssat1s 1e wit t e arty 1erac y. 
Whether it had been manoeuvred by the government to serve on the Schlebusch 
commission out of concern for public safety as suggested by Professor 
Davenport or whether the decision had been entirely its own there was no 
doubting that the U.P. found itself in a most uncomfortable position, 
one from which it could not extricate itself without estrariging at least 
. . 65 some of its supporters. l"f it dissociated itself from the commission 
to please the reformists there was no guarantee that the conservatives, 
who wished to support the nationalists on issues of national security, 
wou Id not rebe i. 
63. One example was John Brittain a U.P. organizer on the Witwatersrand. 
64. Die Burger, 26.3.73, 'Kloof al weier in die V.P. 1 • 
65. T.R.H.Davenport, South Africa: .A Modern History(JHB, 1977), p. 308. 
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Opposition to the Party's involvment in the commission was centred mainly, 
though not exclusively,on the Witwatersrand, wnere the same Young Turks 
who had spearheaded the defeat of Marais Steyn mounted an attack on the 
membership of the commission. In early April the Witwatersrand Regional 
Counci1
66 
of the Party held a stormy meeting where strong opposition to 
the role played by the U.P. was expressed. 67 Reformists at the meeting 
made their presence felt by monopolizing speaking time to create the 
· · th t th k f th · · One of them, Peter Scott68 1mpress1on a ey spo e or e majority. 
proposed a resolution demanding the resignation of the four U.P. commi-
ssioners. This was withdrawn at the request of Schwarz who wished to 
avoid embarrassing the Party. 
Matthis, a Randburg city councillor, proposed a second resolution con-
demning the commissioners for not submitting a minority report. To the 
surprise of the Young Turks this was defeated. Dall ing and other dele-
gates from the North Rand constituency also spoke against their partici-
pation on the commission. 
It was only the intervention of Graaff and Schwarz which prevented the 
69 meeting from degenerating into an unseemly squabble. They adopted a 
conciliatory approach and since reaching their own accord over the matter 
wished to restore Party unity. Theirattit~de rescued the meeting but 
the more determined of the reformists had no intention of being thwarted 
or disciplined un issues over which they felt strongly. 
66. This Regional Council consisted of delegates from 40 Witwatersrand 
electoral divisions and was the body on which the reformists were 
most strongly represented. 
67. Sunday Express, 15.4.73, 'Stormy Witwatersrand meeting'. 
68. Scott was chairman of the Johannesburg West constituency. 
69. The Sunday Times, 15.4.73, H.Serfontein: 'Rand U.P. rebuffs Graaff'. 
He interpreted the meeting as a defeat for the Party's leader and 
a victory for the Young Turks. 
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They reopened their attacks at the Transvaal provincial congress later 
in the year. 
Whereas strong opposition to Schlebu~ch was expressed in the Johannesburg 
area the General Council of the U.P. in the Transvaal as well as its 
Platteland Council fully supported the caucus decisions concerning the 
com~ission as did the major Party formations i'n the Cape, Natal and the 
Orange Free State. 70 This widespread support for Party pol icy again 
emphasized the divisive role beihg played by the reformists whose main 
strength lay in certain Johannesburg constituencies but which was well· 
organized and highly motivated. After the U.P. had disbanded it was 
significant that its successor the N.R.P. was unable to win a single 
Transvaal parliamentary seat. In fact, it fared worst wherever the re-
formists had been most acii~e and best where the U.P. had been most stable, 
bl . N 1 71 nota y 1n ata . 
In Cape Town, Cathy Taylor, who was becomin~ increasingly disillusioned 
with the U.P., prepared a press statement criticizing its commissioners 
for not having submitted a minority report which would have dissoc)at~d 
it from the total itar!an methods of the government on matters of internal 
security. As Graaff had recently decreed that cnly he or the U.P. 
commissioners could issue public stctements concerning the report Taylor 
faced the risk of being disciplined if she proceeded to have her views 
published. Graaff, who was shown her statement, requested that it should 
not be made public as it reflected on the integrity of the U.P. commission-
ers.72 
70. Sunday Express, 15.4.73, 'Steyn and Commissioners have full support of 
Pretoria General Council'. 
71. The 1977 election results reveal that tiie N.R.P. won 10 seats, nine 
of which were in Natal. 
72. C.Taylor, If Courage Goes, p. 278. 
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Much against her will Taylor asked Gerald Shaw of the Cape Times to 
withhold her statement from publication but to announce instead her 
resignation from the United Party's shadow cabinet where her position 
as Chairman of the Education group had become untenable. She found it 
unacceptable to be 'gagged' by her colleagues when she \vishcd to comment 
on student affairs. 73 
The majority of the newsp~pers made her resignation their main story and 
coming as it did at the height of the Schlebusch controversy did nothing 
to restore confidence in the United Party. Both the Daily News 74 
of Durban and the Burger75 predicted that a split in the Party was 
imminent. 
In an explanation to the caucus Taylor maintained that a minority report 
would have added weight to the Party's stand ~gainstarbitr~ry arrest and 
would have prevented the subsequent confusion. She received no open 
support among caucus members while her resignation was accepted with 
regret. 76 Messages of congratulations, however, poured in from outside 
which reflected the wide interest the whole Schlebusch affair had generated 
h . ' bl. 77 among t e oppos1t1on pu 1c. 
Sir De Villiers, on the same day as her resignation, addressed a public 
meeting in Rondebosch and with her permission quoted selected sections of 
the statement which he had earlier squashed. Those parts which were used 
•. 
implied a critical standpoint towards certain students but when he was 
78 challenged b'y _student leaders in the audience, such as Steve Jooste, 
73. IBID. 
74. DaTTy News, (undated), 'Taylor move may trigger Split'. 
75. Die Burger, (undated), 'Breek punt in die V.P. lyk onvermydel ik'. 
76. Dr S.L.Barnard, pp. 340-j41. 
77. C.Taylor, pp. 283-285. v 
78. President of the S.R.C. at UCT. 
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to read the whole statement, Graaff refused to do so as he said he did 
not have Taylor's permission. 79 Tony Heard, ~ditor of the Cape Times, 
then took it upon himself to publish Taylor's statement in ful 1 although 
Gerald Shaw had previously agreed to honour her request not to do so. 
The editor claimed that he w~s doing it in the interests of 'clarity' 
but as likely a reason was that he was making use of another opportunity 
to embarrass the United Party for which he had little regard. Its pub-
1 ication added to the criticism of the Party which was aggravated ~·hen 
Taylor denied that she had prevented Sir De Vi 11 iers from making use of 
her entire statement. She also denied that she had given permission for 
h C T
. . . 80 t e ape 1mes to print 1t. Cathy Taylo~ was suspected, in certain 
circles, ·of having reflected on the integrity and credibil i.ty of Sir 
81 De Villiers Graaff. This rather delicate issue was eventually explained 
. d. d . 82 d h h h d T 1 I away as a m1sun erstan 1ng an wen t e caucus ear ay or s account· 
of how her statement came to be published it was accepted without dissent. 
Any other course of action wouldJat that point,have damaged the Party's 
image still further. As it was, the entire Grahamstown Youth Branch 
resigned as a demonstration of support for Taylor who was enjoying wide publ le 
acclaim for her stand. 83 
The Party's press relations were at a low ebb. Other than the Sunday 
Express-all the English newspapers supported Cathy Taylor who by then 
was clearly representative of the reformist··wing of the Party, the very 
faction they were encouraging. 
79. C.Taylor, pp. 285-289. 
80. IBID. 
81. Die"Transvaler, 14.3.73, 'Cathy gooi 'n skadu oor Sir De Villiers'. 
See also the Rand Daily Mail, 15.3.73, 'A Credibility gap for Div.', 
and the Sunday Times, 18.3.73, Uys: 'G.-aaff's credibility gap'. 
82. Interview with Graaff, 16.6.82. 
83. Taylor, p. 285-289. 
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Matters were not improved when Myburgh Streicher, the Party's Cape 
leader, made a scathing attack on the Cape Times for having published 
Taylor's statement against her wishes. Speaking in Kimberley he stated 
that the Cape Times had not published the article to help break the 
'political logjam' but to damage the U.P. at a sensitive time. It was, 
I 
he said, an example of immature political journal ism that was helping 
to make the English group politically impotent. 84 The increasingly 
strident reporting about the U.P. and its problems tended to bear out 
Streicher's contention that the English press was driving a wedge 
between the English speaking voters and was keeping them out of the main-
stream of white political thinking. An analysis of the 1977 election 
results reveal that the Opposition and therefore the English vote which 
traditionally had supported it, was hopelessly divided into three small 
parties which together could total a mere thirty seats in par I lament. The 
government, on the other hand, had attained its greatest electoral success 
(135 seats) with as many English speaking voters supporting the National 
Party as the official Opposition. 85 This was· the legacy of the United Party's 
demise. Not a stronger, more effective opposition but a weaker and more 
impotent one whose chances of ever becoming the government were even 
more remote than had been the U.P. 's in its declining years. Yet, not~ 
.withstanding the divisions and tensions which beset the United Party it 
was unlikely to have disbanded had its credibility not been constantly 
undermined by a hostile press, both English and Afrikaans. The influence 
of the former was more decisive as it was read by the opposition supporting 
bl . 86 pu IC. 
8~. Die Burger, 19.3.73. 
85. H.du Toit, 1 Die Parlement@re Verkieslng van 1977: h On~leidlng van 
die Fakture wat die Verkiesing Beinvloed het~ University of Pretoria, 
-1979, p-. 167, where he quoted H.Lever as estimating English support 
for the N.P. in 1977 at 30,9 percen'. in his book, South African 
Soceity. W.A.Kleynhans is quoted a~ placing it as high as 35.1 percent. 
86. See Chapter V.5. 
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The Schlebusch Commission, and reaction to it continued throughout the 
year. After the 1973 Easter r~cess 87 prime minister Vorster tabled a 
third interim report dealing with the activities at so-called Christain 
and ecumenical fellowship centres such as Wilgespruit in the Transvaal 
which were hired for use by both the University Christain Movement and 
88 
by N.U.S.A.S. Here sensitivity training was conducted by people 
regarded by the government as bein~ unqualified. The report also re-
vealed !ncidents of a most unsavoury nature including sexual promiscuity, 
the use of strong drink and dagga and blasphemous behaviour.by the students 
participating in the fellowship programs. 89 
Vorster referred to Wilgespruit as a 'nest of iniquity' which had to be 
cleaned up by the South African Council of Churches within three weeks 
or else the government would act. 90 The Director of Wilgespruit, the 
Rev Dale White, WdS also disgusted by the activities of the U.C.M. at 
the centre. So was the Cape Times but .this in no way altered its oppo-
sit ion to the U.P. 1 s role on the commission. It was stated that al-
though the affairs at Wilgespruit were unacceptable they had nothing 
to do with the security of the state, which was the real issue~ 91 The 
U.P.,on the other hand,felt that the revelations in the third interim 
report justified the role it played in the investigations and merited its 
continued participation. 
In terms of an earlier caucus ruling only certain parl ia~entarians were per-
mitted to comment on the latest Schlebusch report, a directive ignored by 
87. On 24 April 1973. 
88. Cape Times, 26.4.73,'Schlebusch-3 1 • 
89. Schlebusch Commission, Third Interim Report, 25.~.73, pp. 2-6. 
Few who particfapted in the U.C.M. programmes were bone fide student:; 
and many weren't Christians. 
90. Hansard, 2S./.+.73. 
91. Cape Times, 28.4J3, 'Time to get OUL 1 • 
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Catherine Taylor who felt that public representatives should be allowed to 
interpret the wishes of the electorate on issues of importance. Streicher 
rejected her attitude when he declared that 'no party can function effec-
tively when everyone takes it upon himself to offer public comment' . 92 
There were clearly deep differences of opinion between Taylor and the 
Party hierachy and it became ever more apparent, that she was not pre-
pared to be disciplined by caucus decisions concerning the Schlebusch 
reports. 93 Cathy Taylor made her final speech in the Assembly in May 
1973 but remained on in parliament until April of the following year 
during which period she bec~me an outspoken critic of the Party leader-
ship, particularly in the Cape, where she became immersed in various 
nomination disputes before the 1974 general election. She became identi-
fied, on her own admission, with the reformist-wing of the United Party 
whose political style she admired. 94 Taylor was replaced as chairman 
of the Party's education group by Etienne Malan, ironically one of its 
Schlebusch representatives and an 'Old Guard' supporter of Graaff. 
It is conceivable that had these differences between Taylor and her 
caucus colleagues not become matters of public debate but had 
remained confidential that the fortunes of the United Party might have 
been different. Cathy Taylor was highly regarded in opposition circles 
as an excellent politician, but her growing disenchantment with the U.P. 
encouraged reformists elsewhere to continue their campaign. 
Some of the manouevering which took place behind the Schlebusch reports 
were unofficially 'explained' to Mrs Taylor by Hugh Roberton 95 of the 
Sunday Express. 
92. Interview with Streicher, 5.5.82. 
93. Interview with Senator Horak, 8.6.82. 
94. Sunday Times, 27.7.73, 'U.P. is lucky to have Young Turks - Cathy'. 
95. Senior political correspondent of the Sunday Express. 
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If his 1evelations were correct it would account for the stand taken by 
the U.P. and the views expressed by Etienne Malan to the Witwatersrand 
students. It would also indicate that Roberton enjoyed the confidence 
of certain U.P. commissioners and was therefore better informed than 
the majority of caucus members. He maintained that, initially, the 
report on N.U.S.A.S. had recommended the banning or deportation of 
thirty university lecturers and students, that a commissioner would be 
placed on each campus, N.U.S.A.S. would be banned and would be replaced 
by a general student body controlled by statute. The influence of the 
U.P. members on the commission had resulted in the compromise recornmen-
dations which were presented to parliament but the price was that the 
report had to be unanimous. The responsibility thereafter would rest 
with the nationalists for whatever action might be taken. This left the 
United Party free to deplore the bannings and claim, as Sir De Vil! iers 
did, that N.U.S.A.S. had been saved and that the Party's commissioners 
had been responsible for considerable achie~ements. 96 
Roberton's revelations, taken together with other information already 
mentioned, had about them the ri~g of truth. Although he would not 
reveal his source it was in all probability Mara;s Steyn whom he had 
stoutly defended in various articles in his newspaper and whom he thought 
had been unjustly criticized by Taylor and others who were ignorant of 
all the facts. 97 
The Sunday Express in due course received a letter of thanks from the 
parliamentary caucus of the Party, a gesture which caused further critical 
comment from the reformists who regarded the Express as a stumbling block 
to their progress. 
96. C.Taylor, p. 303. 
97. Interview with Graaff and Horak. Neither believed that any deal was 
struck with the N.P. commissioners. 
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Taylor announced at the end of July 1973 that she would not seek re-
election as she was 'not prepared to remain a prisoner of the system 
anymore•. 98 This decision caused dismay among her supporters and she 
was frequently requested to reconsider it or else to stand as an in-
dependent candidate. As it happened, Cathy Taylor did not seek nomina-
t:ion a_gain but it was significant that the Wynberg constituency became 
embroiled in one of the most bitter nomination battles in the Cape 
with Taylor supporting the reformists against the conservative Candidates 
Committee. Jae de Villiers, who was their choice, won the nomination 
contest in controversial circumstances99 and subsequently the Wynberg 
seat as well, but with a substantially reduced majority. The Party in-
fighting had undoubtedly taken its toll in this constituency.lOO 
Catherine Taylor eventually resignedlOl of her own accord from the Party, 
. 102 
she was never exoelled for being 'too outspoken'. To have done so 
before the 1974 election would have been a political blunder. Ironically, 
it was during the short pre-election parliamentary session that her 
approach to the Schlebusch investigation was partly vindicated. Lionel 
Murray declared that the Party would submit a minority report on certain 
findings of the Commission not yet tabled and t·hat it would recommend 
103 that any executive action be subjected to certain judicial controls. 
This announcement had, however, come too late to influence the course 
of the election for the Party. The electorate, mainly the English 
speaking voters, had by then decided to support whole-heartedly the role 
of the Party on the commission or had abandoned it and no amount of back-
tracking would retrieve the situation. 
98. Taylor, p. 306. 
99. Interviews with Messrs Streicher, Horak and Wiley. 
100. See Chapter VI 11.2. 
101. Rapport, 26.5.74, 'Cathy Taylor se~f ult V.P.'. She resigned her 
membership of the U.P. on 24.5.74. 
102. c.Taylor, p. 308. 
103. Interview with Senator Horak, 8.6.82, where he spoke of the public 
pressure placed o~ the U.P. commissioners. 
'. 
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There \-Jere add i tona 1 factors which contributed to the weaker performance 
of the U.P. in the 1974 elections but the controversial public record 
of its Schlebusch commissioners, particularly when compared with the 
Progressive Party candidates who stood ~nswervingly for civil 1 iberties, 
was the main cause for.discontent among sections of the electorate. 
The 1973 parliamentary session ~ad been a difficult 104 one for the United 
Party as it had to fight both inside the House and outside. 105 Its sound 
performance, as an opposition, in parliament representing more tha·n thirty 
f h l d 1 d I 1 b 1 . 106 percent o t e voters was se om revea e to tie genera pu 1c. In-
stead, the media emphasized extra-parliamentary activities which had a 
divisive effect on the Party at a time when there was still a small swing 
towards it as was reflected in the ~esults of the Al iwal North and 
Umhlatuzana provincial by-elections. 107 The attempts to split the Party 
over the commission, and the press campaign to replace Graaff cast a shadow 
of despondency over its well-b.eing which was, to a degree, temporarily 
dispelled by these results. They at l~ast demonstrated that, initially, 
the attempt to exploit problems within the Party had not resulted in any 
electoral slump. Voting in these constituencies had taken place at the 
very height of the Schlebusch contr?versy when the party was being merci-
lessly criticized. 
104. Sunday Times, 15.4.73, 1 Disastrous period in Parliament for the U.P. 1 • 
105. Sunday Express, 10.6.73, 'Tough Session'. 
106. Du Toit, 'D'ie?arlementere Verkiesing', p. 125. The U.P. received 31.6 
percent of the vote and the ~.P. 54.) in the 1974 election. 
107. The results were: 
i. Umhlatuzana, 5.4.73 
Bill Wood U.P. 3 861 
Mrs Jo Naude N.P. 2 906 
U.P. majority 955 
The 1970 U.P. majority 803 
ii. Al iwa 1 North, 9.5.73 
J.Greeff N.P. 4 969 
H. Smith U.P. 3 810 
N.P. majority 1 159 
The 1970 N.P. majority 1 325 
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Cadman expressed his pleasure that the 'venomous press attack' had not 
had an adverse effect on its performance. 
The Natal constituency was, ho\'Jever, a 'working class• area :not unduly 
concerned about the deprivation of civil· liberties of certain privileged 
students. Far more important to them were the effects of inflation and the 
. . f 1 • • 108 r1s1ng costs o 1v1ng. They voted accordingly. In addition, the 
reformist movement was never strong in Natal where the U.P. tended to be a 
more united and stable force whi)e there was also no Progressive Party 
candidate to draw the votes of those who were disenchanted with the U.P. 1 s 
role on the commission. 
The Sunday Express was also satisfied with t~e Al iwal result and reported it 
as being a setback for the reformists as the campaign had been conducted 
by the Party's e~tabl ishment. 109 Prof Kleynhans,however, in the same 
edition predicted that the U.P. would not do as well in urban seats where 
loyalties were not so ingrained. Gerald Shaw in his Political Survey 
claimed that country by-elections were 'becoming increasingly irrelevant', 
110 and that the b~lance of power lay in the urban and peri-urban seats. 
These two results encouraged the view that the sustained outrage over 
the Party's Schlebusch p~rformance was not nearly as widespread as its 
critics would have the public believe. It was essentially an issue kept 
alive and exaggerated in order to attain certain desired goals, in this 
b h UP . f . d" . 111 case a movement y t e .. 1n a re orm1st 1rect1on. 
108. Die Burger, 6.4.73, 1 Hoekom N.P. Verloor 1 • It placed the blame on 
inflation. See also Hansard, 5.4.73, Columns 4183-86. Cadman 
explained why the U.P. had don~ well in a climate 'of hostility 
and venom•' towards it. 
109. Sunday Express, 13.5.73, 1 Aliwal Setback for Young Turks'. 
110. Cape Times, 12.5.73, Shaw's Pol iti,-:al Survey .. 
111. Sunday Express, 13.5.73, 'Enough of Schlebusch'. 
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4. Graaff's leadership attacked 
The campaign to undermine the leadership of Sir De Villiers Graaff came to 
be regarded in the same manner. The Sunday Times led the way but was by no 
means the only newspaper which felt Graaff should stand down. Aftet what 
certain jouranl ists described as a weak performance in the, no-confidence 
debate
112 
by the U.P. in February 1973 the attack became more forthrig~t. 11 3 
' 
Following a meeting with the editor, Joel Mervis, of the Sunday Times 
where Party-press relations were discussed Graaff issued a statement 
expressing his strong disapproval of the metho9s adopted by certaii1 
correspondents whose object it ~as not to report news but to create it. 114 
He attacked these political commentators ' of having no experience 
of politics save perhaps as unsuccessful candidates .•. ',of trying to,, 
'break down the existing order and with it the official opposition ... ' 
and then hoping that ' .~, something will arise to save South Africa•. 115 
Graaff,whose reaction to press comment was usually expressed in moderate 
tones, was probably reacting to the continous criticism of certain members 
of the U.P. by Hans Strydom and Hennie Serfontein both former candidates 
of Japie Basson's defunct National Union Party in the 1961 general election. 
The attack also appeared to be a· bid to pre-empt the demand by the Sunday 
Times that Sir De Villiers 'should go' 116 which was prominently displayed 
in a variety of articles by its quartet of political writers on February 
25. The editorial claimed that Sir De Villiers had not fulfilled the 
hopes expected of him as leader and that after 'prolonged consideration 
we are now satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt that he has become a 
serious liability to the United Party' and that he ~as 'morally bound to 







Cape Times, 12.2.73, editorial: 'Not good enough'. 
sunclayTfiiles, 18.2.73, 'U.P. should hc,t:,)d press criticism'. 
Interview with Graaff, 16.6.82. Mervis who had been disappointed 
with the Party's performance in the no-confidence debate had asked 
Graaff whether he would consider resigning. 
Cape Times, 24.2.73, 'Graaff attacks 'New Left 11 • 
Dr S.L.Barnard, pp. 321-327. 
Sund~y Times, 25.2.73, Editorial: 'Sir De Villiers Graaff'. 
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The newspaper then 1 isted thirteen reasons why he should step down as 
leader but prefaced the demand by professing that it was made out of 
118 deep and profound interest in the future of the United Party. 
The newspaper did not actually reveal the name of Graaff's successor but 
mentioned Japie Sasson and Radclyffe Cadman as both being able to do a 
better job. 119 As the Sunday Time~ pre-eminently supported the reformist 
faction and Sasson was regarded as its spiritual leader while Cadman was a 
dyed-in-the-wool conservative who was, in future, to receive his share of 
criticism, there was 1 ittle doubt as to whom Mervis would 1 ike to see as the 
. 120 
national leader of the U.P. 
The most objective, and thus valid, reason mentioned fpr Graaff to resign 
was the inescapable fact that he had lost four successive elections. These 
defeats at the polls could, in the final analysis, have been a contributory 
factor to the decision to disband the Party. But could any other leader 
have done any better? Most unlikely, if one considers that since Graaff 
did retire, in 1977, the official opposition has already had three leaders, 
lost two elections, and after the 1~81 poll was reduced to a combined total 
of 34 elected seats. 121 It would appear that the length of tenure in office 
is totally unrelated to the chances of political success. 
118. IBID, 25.2.73, 'Thirteen Reasons Why Graaff should go'. It was probably 
written by Joel Mervis and Stanley Uys though merely penned as the 
Sunday Times feels. See also 1 U.P. leader has a moral duty to voters to 
resign', and 'Stanley Uys slams Sir De Villiers'. 
119. IBID, editorial. 
120. Interview with Graaff. He believed Mervis would 1 ike to see Basson as 
the U.P. leader but Japie would never command sufficient congress support 
to be elected. 
121. Parliamentary Register Part I I 1961-1980, published 
Leaders: Dates 
RM Cadman 1.7.77 to 29. 11.77 
CW Eglin 30.11 .77 to 2.9.79 






by House of Assembly: 
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The Times' vendetta, which lasted a few weeks, stirred up a hornet's 
nest with the rest of the 'fourth estate' making its contribution. 122 
Th Af . k d. d . . 1 . . h p 123 h. 1 e r1 aans press pre 1cte , once again, a sp 1t 1n t e arty w 1 e 
124 the Sunday Express which had warned Sir De Villiers of the planned attack, 
listed thirteen reasons why he should remain en as leader. 125 None of 
this undermining of Graaff 1 s position contributed towards party unity 
and the claim by the Sunday Times that it in no way wished to harm the 
Party was open to the most serious doubt. It was actively attempting to 
dictate to the U.P. how it should conduct its affairs. Graaff summed up 
the position in the Argus, when he asked, 'who is to control the U.P. - the 
leader with his caucus and his congresses, or Mr Mervis and his three 
political writers? 1126 His loyalty was to the former and to the voters and 
not to the Sunday Times. 12 7 
This type of journalism was an obstacle the U.P. had to contend with 
throughout its declining years and although the political comment.more 
often than not, lacked substance the sustained nature of the attack had 
a debilitating effect on party morale. 
128 
It led to retaliatory speeches 
by incensed M.P.'s such as CaptaJn Jack Sasson pf Sea Point who referred, 
in the Assembly, to Mervis as the 'godfather' o~ a press mafia, and to 
the journalists of the Sunday Times, Serfontein and Strydom as 'political 
hirelings who have become character assassins of good Afrikaners 
for dirty silver!~ 129 
122. Cape.Times, 24.2.73, 1 Graaff in firing-1 ine 1 • 
123. Burger, 23.2.73, 'V.P. en Pers oorlog kom 1 • 
124. Sunday Express, 25.2.73, Roberton: 'Plot to oust Div!, editorial: 
1 Div. Beware 1 • 
125. IBID., 4.3.73,'13 Reasons \./hy Div. should stay', by Senator Oelrich 
leader of the U~P. in the Orange Free State. See also the Editorial: 
1 Div. must stay'. 
126. Argus, 26.2.73, 'Graaff to M~rvis: Who is to~control the U.P. 1 • 
127. Die Burger, 26.2.73, 1 Graaff se vyande help horn'. 
128. Cape Times, 27.2.73, 'U.P. men lash out at Sunday Times'. 
129. Hansard, 16.5.73, columns 6713-6714. 
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Relations between the English newspa~ers and the United Party were never 
cordial for any length of time after the campaig~ to replace Marais Steyn 
had succeeded in 1972. One by one they withdrew their support and sel-
130 
dam conveyed to their readers anything but a negative image of the Party. 
The campaign to oust Graaff did not enjoy much genuine support if a poll 
commissioned by the •neutral 1 Rapport can be accepted as being accurate. 
Its survey on April 8 revealed that of the 3 000 voters canvassed the 
overwhelming majority who admitted to being U.P. 1 people 1 supported the 
leadership of Graaff. Sixty-four percent regarded him as the best leader, 
8.8 percent supported Schwarz, 8.4. percent Sasson and six percent Marais 
Steyn. Of those Afrikaners who professed to be U.P. supporters over sixty-
five percent were pro-Graaff while among the English speaking canvassed 
the figure was forty-seven. From this poll Rapport concluded that Schwarz 
did not enjoy the backing of the ordinary voter. It also revealed, if 
it needed revealing, that Graaff commanded, by far, the majority support 
among U.P. adherents. He had, after all regularly been chosen national 
leader b~ the Party congresses and was to be ~lected unopposed in the 
future. 131 What these facts do ~eveal was that the attempt to remove Graaff 
and the concomitant campaigns to boost Schwarz and other reformists was 
not based on any popular public demand but was the creation of certain 
newspapers to capture the Party for the reformists. When it later became 
apparent that this could not be achieved the strategy changed to one- of 
breaking the U.P. and replacing it with a 1 verligte front•. In this in-
stance the campaign was much more successful. 132 
130. Taylor, pp. 255-258. 
131. Sunday Express, 15.4.73, •overwhelming support for Graaff 1 • 
132. Cape Times, 12.7.72, 1A verligte fron_t 1 • See also the Sunday Times, 
20.5.73, 1 Veri igte front, an inspired idea'. 
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The role played by the press in the decline of the U.P. should never be 
underestimated whether it was reporting on real or fabricated concern for 
the Party's leadership or whether raising a storm over its Schlebusch 
connection. These were merely among the issues which received the 
most unfavourable treatment by all the English nevJspapers except for the 
Sunday Express during 1973. 
The pa~liamentary session which had ended in June, had not been a very 
successful one for the U.P. and as its sole supporting newspaper noted, 
a divided party eventually could only fail. It advised that during the 
recess the rifts would have to be healed and that more party discipline 
would have. to be 3ppl ied to isolate the dissidents and prevent national 
issues being raised at provincial level by the Transvaal Young Turks 
. d f. f l . . d . . 133 1n e 1ance o par 1amentary caucus ec1s1ons. 
5. The role of the English newspapers. 
As the newspa~ers played such an influential role in the fortunes of the 
U.P. it is necessary briefly to examine more .closely the forces which 
motivated their activities. The.Afrikaans press supported the government 
and did so unequivocally during the period under review. As such they 
were opposed to the United Party and were only too eager to exploit each and 
every difficulty which beset it. They made use, for instance, of the 
Oudtshoorn by-election to prove that the U.P. was a party which harboured 
·anti-Afrikaans elements. Through its race federation policy these s~pporters 
were prepared to make common ground with the non-whites in order to dis-
posses the white-man.and particularly the Afrikaner, of his ~eritage. 134 
133. 
134. 
Sunday Expres~, 10.6.73, Editorial: 
See Chapter 1.3. 1 
'Tough Session'. 
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This 'boerehaat' campaign embarrassed the United Party and encouraged 
it to scrap, more quickly than it otherwise woulJ have, its pol icy of 
limited non-white representation in parliament. It also resulted in 
the bilingual argument between factions in the Party which cast doubt 
onthe claim that it was a truly broadly-based South Afric2n organization. 135 
When the verl igte-verkrampte debate gained momentum the Afrikaans press 
did it~ best to drive a wedge between the feuding factions. Invariably 
it backed the conservatives when
1 
it did choose sides. It was critical 
of the role played by Harry Schwarz and his followers who were accused 
of not being real 1 Sappe 1 • It praised the role of the U.P. Schlebusch 
commissioners and commended their patriotism in the national interest 
while castigating the un-South African bias of the reformists in the 
U P h • 1 . . 136 .. over t e 1nterna security issue. 
The Afrikaans newspapers painted a picture of turmoil in the United Party 
and may have e·ncouraged some of its more conservative Afrikaans elements 
to follow the road of Marais Steyn into the N_.P. but their influence on 
the majority of the U.P. supporters must have been limited as they were 
English speaking and presumably did not read these newspapers to any great 
extent. They relied for their political information almost entirely on 
a monopolistic ~ngl ish language newspaper cartel. This thesis draws on 
numerous examples to illustrate the stand adopted by these publications 
to various impcrtant issues and to make the point that they did not have 
the interests of the U.P. at heart, but in fact, the very opposite. Suffice 
to say that in 1970 the entire English press with the exception of the . 
Ra,nd Daily Mai1 137 still supported the United Party. 
135. See Chapter IV. 
136w See Chapter V 2 and 3. 
137. Supported the P.P. since its inception in 1959. 
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By 1977 not a single member of the Argus-S.A.A.N. group did. They all 
supported t~e P.F.P. The N.R.P., successor to Lhe United Party was left 
without media support. 
A trend developed, over the years under consideration, where English 
newspaper editors attempted to push the U.P. leadership in a 'verl igte' 
direction as perceived by themselves. They came to support reformist 
factions within the Party to achieve this objective. It was in this 
manner that Young Turks, whether in Johannesburg, Swellendam or Port 
Elizabeth came to enjoy wide press accliam while those wh6 opposed them, 
138 within the Party, were labelled as verkramp and were to be removed. 
But when the camp~ign to replace its conservative leaders by verligte 
ones had largely failed, except in the Transvaal where Harry Schwarz 
had ousted Marais Steyn, the tactics changed. As the United Party 
could not be captured from within it had to be broken up and its re-
formist elements were to join the Progressives in a new 'verl igte front'. 
This appeared to be the goal of the English newspapers. It has also 
been suggested and, judging from subsequent eyents, appears to be correct 
that the underlylng basis for the course of action adopted by the news-
papers was their desire to keep alive the Progressive Party which in 1970 
and after twelve years of existence could still only win one seat in 
parliament, that of Helen Suzman's whose personal appeal was stronger 
than that of her party. During the 1974 election the newspapers eit~er 
supported P.P. ~andidates, U.P. reformists or even what the Sunday Times 
regarded as 'verligte nationalists•. 139 Labelled U.P. verkramptes 
140 received scant attention and in many instances were actively ?pposed. 
138. See Cha__Rter 11 •• 
139. Sunday Times, 14.4.74, 'The Best-man team'. 
140. Etienne Malan in Orange Grove was one such example. 
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To better understand the approach of the English language newspapers it 
is necessary to exa~ine who actually controlled the industry and then 
pose the question of whether it was really a free press? 
By 1968 Argus and S.A.A.N. already owned between them nine out of the 
thirteen dailies and all the English Sunday newspapers.
141 
By 1974 they 
owned more than ninety percent of the English daily newspapers as well 
142 as the three Sunday ones. Through their influence over the Central 
New& Agency (C.N.A.) and the Sou~h African Press Association(S.A.P.A.) 
they could, respectively,monopol ize distribution and control who got the 
news and when. Elaine Potter 1 in her examination of the pr.ess,contends that 
its freedom was hampered by the monopol istlc control exerted by mining 
interests who through their editors influenced pol icy. The fact that the 
owners generally did not actively interfere was because the editors who 
were appointed by them shared their views. 143 
In October 1974 John Wiley gave a more up to date and detailed analysis 
of the ownership of the Engli~h newspapers. 144 Notwithstanding the blocks 
f h h 1 d b . . . . 145 . h. h d. . d h f h o s ares e y nominee compan,es w 1c .· 1sgu1se t e names o t e 
beneficial holders, it revealed that the Argus ~roup effectively controlled 
S.A.A.N. arid that the Argus in its turn, was controlled by the Anglo 
American Corporation of which Harry Oppenheimer was the chairman and 
chief financial backer of the Progressive Party at that point. 146 
141. E.Potter, The Press as Opposition(London, 1975), pp. 50-51. 
142. Sunday Express, Times and Tribune. 
143. IBID., pp. 51-63. 
144. Hansard, 25.10.74, columns 6507-6558. 
145. IBID., Standard Bank nominees and Amosite Nominees Ltd. were the 
main nominee companies in the Argus group. 
146. Dr S.L.Barnard, 'Pol itieke Orientasie~ p. 164. Oppenheimer had come 
out in favour of the P.P. as far back as the 1961 election. 
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. Wiley's investigation disclosed that more than fifty percent of the Argus 
share-holding was in the hands of the Anglo American Corporation and that 
three A.A.C. employees sat on the Board of the Argus Company. 
As far as the South Afri~an Associated Newspapers was concerned the Argus 
Co. had effective control as it was the largest single shareholder in 
S.A.A.N. Thus Anglo's holding in S:A.A.N. is through the Argus and if 
the shares of the Abe Bailey Trust and Bailey nominees, both controlled 
by Syfrets Trust (which merged with Union Acceptances, an Oppenheimer 
company), are taken into consideration then, according to John Wiley, 
Anglo American has a controlling interest of 53. 1 percent of the shares 
in S.A.A.N. 147 
Both Potter and Wiley believed that the Engl lsh press was monopolistic 
and that this impeded its freedom of expression. Wiley's analysis of the 
situation was not seriously challenged in parl lament nor was it convincing-
ly refuted out"side the House. This meant that English readers had no 
148 '• 
choice of newspapers other than those oft.he Argus-S.A.A.N. group 
which were controlled by Anglo American and Harry Oppenheimer. Consequently, 
a uniformity of political viewpoint, which stifled free discussion became 
-(' 
the norm. -. The nature of the control exerted over the English press can 
expl~in the pol1tic~l bias which developed during the 1970 1 s. A progressive-
reformist viewpoint was pushed to the exclusion of all others. The Sunday 
Express, publ is~1ed :by S.A.A.N., was the last English newspaper to support 
the U.P. but when its editor M.A.John~on resigned ~n 1974 it too fell 
in line and propagated 'progressive' politics. 
147. IBID., Hansard. 
148. This was before ~he citizen appeared on the scene. 
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Johnson had been appointed editor(1961) before S.A.A.N. had been 1captured
1 
by the Argus group and had been strong enough to uphold his ~ol itical convic-
tions in the face of unbridled criticism from the Sunday Times in particular. 
However, he paid the price, and was 'overlooked' when Joel Mervis resign-
d d . f h T. . 149 H 1 d b T . M b h h e as e 1tor o t e 1mes. e was rep ace y ert1us y urg1 w o 
could be relied upon to support the reformists initially, and the progressives 
after the demise of the former. 
While the English newspapers may not have been responsible for all:the 
ills which befell the U.P. they, nevertheless, played a major role in 
aggravating and exploiting them in a manner carefully calculated to sow 
division within its ranks. An understanding of the controlling interests 
in the virtually monopolistic combine which the English press undoubtedly 
was helped to explain the politics of uniformity adopted by them. 
6. Speculation concerning consensus. 
By June a comprimise of sorts had been reached between ~hi Transvaal prov!ncial 
caucus and its senior body. It had little option but to agree, albeit 
reluctantly, with the parliamentary caucus ruling to remain on the Commission. 
As a concession it could, if it so felt, debate relevant issues arising 
from the reports but was forbidden to challenge the caucus stand. This 
attempt to reconcile the different factions was in ke~ping with the accord 
reached between Sir De Villiers Graaff and Schwarz. It was essentially 
a delicate balancing act, the object of which was to avoid civil str!fe 
by satisfying both groups. The 'silence rule' was necessary to avoid 
unsubstantiated criticism before the final reports of the co~mission re-
ve~led all the evidence. 
149. Interview with Graaff, 16.6.82. 
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Presumably the U.P. commissioners w~re of the opinion that these findings 
would justify their support of the Schlebusch cc..;,1mission. The internal 
squabbling, however, remained essentially unresolved and in February 
1975 the Transvaal reformists left the United Party virtually en bloc. 150 
Speaking to the Argus,Marais Steyn put the case for closer co-operation 
with the government on certain issues. There already existed a bi-partisan 
approarh to matters of strategic security, defence and foreign pol icy. He 
was convinced it should also include internal security, then being in-
vestigated by the Schlebusch commission. This, he felt, would not end 
political argument but would lead to sharper and more productive dialogue 
th t f .d · 1 d" th 'rule ci:, law•. 151 on o er aspec s o emocracy, inc u 1ng e 
Marais Steyn was making a plea to remove certain areas from the political 
debate which cau~ed discord and division among the voters. He, and others, 
were of the opinion that an understanding with the government on internal 
security mattirs would be in the interests of South Africa. 152 This 
type of tonsensus talk appealed to the U.P. conservatives but found no 
favour with the reformists or the press which supported them. Not long 
after having expressed his convictions Marais Steyn carried consensus to 
its logical conclusion when he resigned from the U.P. and joined the 
nationalists in a move which had far-reaching consequences for the United 
Party. 153 
Reaction to his views were not slow in appearing. Gerald Shaw of the Cape 
~ in his political column wrote that those in the U.P. who felt strongly 
about civil liberties would never find common ground with the government. 
150. See Chapt~r IX.2. 
151. Argus, 9.6.73, 'Marais Steyn leadir:g U.P. contender for consensus'. 
152. Interview with Myburgh Streicher, 5.5.82. 
153. He joined the N.P. on 4.9.1973. . . 
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He would prefer it if 'verl igtes' of all parties sought consensus in 
order to create a verligte drive to save the Republic. He added that 
154 
the most outspoken verligtes were to be found in the Progressive Party. 
The Sunday Times also expressed doubts concerning consensus as it felt that 
the nationalists would demand so many concessions it would be a wasted 
effort. It believed that the U.P. right-wing would, in any event, be 
mar~ likely to join the government, and suggested that it would be far 
b tt "f th U P · h d 't members. 155 C "d · e er i e .. reac e consensus among 1 s own ons1 er1ng 
the amount of in-fighting prevelant this was sound advice which was never 
heeded. 
Neither Graaff nor Vorster seriously considered making concessions which 
would pave the way to a broad consesus between the two parties. Vorster 
was.prepared to accept, as members, U.P. individuals who had escaped what 
he termed the stifling Smuts-Unionist tradition still evident in the Party 
but consensus certainly held few, if any, benefits for him. Graaff also 
rejected the idea unless U.P. pol icy was retained virtually intact in 
156 any merger. The whole consensus debate appeared to be a kite-flying 
exercise following a parliamentary session when vital issues concerning 
national security had been raised. Nevertheless, for the U.P.,they posed 
serious questions of conscience and helped delineate more clearly where 
the different factions stood. Right-wingers would find no di}ficulty 
in co-operating with the government over certain security matters whereas· 
the reformist-wing would never contemplate such a move. The divisior.s 
within the Party remained deep, and were destined to become even more. 
' pronounced notwithstanding the various attempts made to heal the widening 
rift. 
154. Cape.Times, 9.6.73, Shaw: 'The Elusive Consensus•. 
155. Sunday Times, 17.6.73, Editorial: 1 Consensus 1 • 
156. Rapport, 10.6.73, 1 Graaff praat: Konsensus al hoe sterker'. 
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7. Senator Horak's letter. 
While the issue of consensus was being debated the Sunday Express re-
ceived a letter of appreciation from the Party's national secretary 
which thanked the newspaper for its 'consistent and responsible support' 
over the years and for the role it had played in the Party's progress. 157 
The letter followed a combined meeting of the Central.Head Committee and 
parliamentary caucus on June--9 and expressed the 'unanimous appreciation' 
of thosP. present. This was later disputed by certain reformists but 
what caused even more animosity within Party ranks was a letter drawn 
up by the Transvaal caucus, also unanimously, and del levered to the 
same newspaper three days after the Horak letter had been published. It 
took exception to certain Express articles which, among other things, 
had attacked Schwarz and had made, it claimed, unfounded allegations from 
anonymous sources concerning plots to influence future nominations. Whether 
it was Horak.'s letter of appreci~tion or speculation about the intentions 
of the reformists, which the Express had reported on June 17~ that had 
prompted the course of action taken by the Transvaal caucus remains un-
certain. The Express had alleged that the Young Turks would attempt to 
replace seven M.P. 'son the Witwatersrand in a bid to grab power in a 
manner reminiscent of Schwarz's 1972 coup. 158 This would remove from the 
scene those opposed to the reform movement. The Transvaal letter stated 
that these revelations sowed division within the U.P. It was signed on 
behalf on the caucus by O.T.van der Merwe, its chairman.: 
A situation had arisen where a particular province had adopted a stand 
in opposition to its senior body. Two letters, to the same newspaper, 
expressing contradictory sentiments had been written. 
157. 
158. 
Senators-Horak's letter to the Editor M . .l\.Johnson, was dated 16.6.73, 
a copy.of.which appeared in the .~_l''.1day~ress, 8.7.73. 
·Sunday Express, 17.6.73, 'Young Turks try to oust seven M.P.'s'. 
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It was indicative of the lack of discipline and division which existed 
in the Party. 159 It also meant that certain Transvaal M.P. 1 s who had 
attended both meetings had associated themselves with both letters! 
This, as will be explained, was as a result of a genuine misunderstanding 
related to the unanimity of the Horak letter. The whole issue was 
raised by the press and a rather trivial matter assumed national pro-
portions. The Sunday Express vigorously defended its reports and took 
the opportunity of mounting a fierce attack on the reformists whom it 
h 1 d • b 1 f h p I • f 160 e respons1 e or t e arty s mis ortunes. It wrote that it 
found it strange that not a single newspaper had received any official 
letter condemning the campaign to replace Sir De Villiers Graaff which 
recently had been waged. The Express was pointing a finger at the 
Transvaal caucus which had not taken any unanimous decision to condemn 
the Sunday Times for demanding the resignation of the national leader. 
In a number of editorials the Express laid the blame squarely on the 
Young Turks, as it called the reformists, for any disruption in the U.P. 
It rejected the claim by Dick Enthoven that it was 'causing embarrassment 
to the leader and untold damage to the Party•. 'If there were no Young 
Turks there would be no disruption and no Old Guard-Young Turk fued 1 , the 
leader article proclaimed. It asked whether any of the reformists had 
sprang to Graaff 1 s defence when their major backer, the Sunday Times, 
had campaigned to replace him, in the same way they were currently 
rallying to the defence of Schwarz? 161 
The opposing viewpoints with which the public were confronted could not 
be clearer than expressed in these two Sunday newspapers. 
159. Interview with Senator Horak 
160. Sunday Express, 8.7.73, 1 That letter!' 
161. IBID., 15.7.73, 'Where the Blame Li2s 1 • 
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Both claimed that they were in favour of the Party but the Express was 
critical of the reformists while the Times was totally opposed to the 
conservatives. The departure of their respective enemies would lead, 
they both believed, to a genuinely united party. 
The Sunday Express strongly justified the stand it had taken over the 
years. It alone of the English newspapers had constantly supported 
Graaff, even during the 'darkest days', while its support for the Schie-
busch commissioners was well known, as was its backing for the Party's 
chief lieutenants. It was,it claimed,simply 'for the Party', it was not 
its pol icy maker nor was it out to place some faction in power. Bu~ 
for the Party to succeed the in-fighting had to stop - young, ambitious 
politicians had to be more restrained. The priorities for success, 
according to the Express, were loyalty, unity and the discarding of 
• l • r J 162 1rre evant issues ror rea ones. 
It is difficult to disagree with these sentiments when examining the prob-
lems which threatened the United Party. Whichever faction was right, if 
any could lay claim to that distinction, a 1 ittle more discipline and 
loyalty would have gone a long way to counter the attacks by its real 
political opponents. One ·rather irrelevant issue was Senator Horak's 
letter. Had its unanimity not been challenged ever what was in reality 
a procedural matter there would have been no national outcry. The re-
formists, according to the Express, had seized on it in their on-going 
feud with the Party. By challenging the caucus decision they hoped to 
force the Central Head Committee to rescind it and so score a major 
victory for themselves. 163 
162. IBID., 'For the Party'. 
163. IBID., 8.7.73, 'That letter'. 
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The Rand Daily Mail of July 13 predi~ted that there would be resignations 
i.f the letter was not withdrawn, and mentioned J.::pie Basson as being 
among those who was most disturbed. Howevert in a letter to the Express 
of July 22 he denied that he \vould ever leave the Party because of Senator 
Horak's letter but he steadfastly maintained that he had not committed 
himself to it. Consequently, the whole issue dragged on. The Burger 
. d h p f k. . h . 164 h. 1 h s d again accuse t e arty o spea 1ng wit two voices w 1 e t e un ay 
Times could not understand how praise could be lavished on a newspaper 
which was an enemy of the Transvaal U.P. 165 Both Sir De Villiers and 
Jack Cannan, Chairman of the Central Head Committee, supported the 
correctness of the Senator's Jetter, a move which pleaseef the Party con-
servatives but which placed the Young Turks in confl let with major party 
formattons and figures. 166 There was obviously a misunderstanding re-
garding the unanimity of letter in question. Graaff cleared the air 
somewhat by explaining in a statement that there had been an honest 
difference of opinion which would be resolved at the next Head Committee 
meeting on August 30. That turned out to be an extremely stormy gather-
ing where other, more important, issues came to a head but where a 
compromise was reached regarding the Horak letter. The minutes of the 
previous meeting were approved 167 as being correct although there were 
f b . · · 1 d" that of Basso .. n's. 168 our o Ject1ons inc u 1ng The August meeting did, 





Die Burger, 26.6.73, 'Harry Schwarz se Klap vir V.P. leiding'. 
Sunday Times, 8.7.73, Editorial: 'U.·P. Complexities'. 
Sunday Express, 8.7.73, Roberto~: 'Horak acted correctly says Graaff'. 
See also 'Cannan: Decision was taken unanimously'. 
167. Interview with Senator Horak, 8.6.82. 
168. Sunday Express, 2.9.73, 'U.P. minutes approved'. 
169. ·Sunday Times, 2.9.73, 'Graaff rebukes Express'. 
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In this manner the matter,as had bee~ the case with others, was resolved 
by way of a compromise decision and there were nc resignations from the 
170 Party. 
The expl~nation for the misunderstanding was that votes were very 
seldom taken at these committee meetings, particularly with regard 
to less important decisions where consensus was sought with any object-
ions being recorded. Consequently, when Japie Sasson claimed that,• I 
did not vote, nor was I asked to vote, nor would I have•, he was in a 
sense correct but he also failed to make an official objection which 
would have been recorded in the minutes. 171 Thus an honest difference 
of opinion could liave arisen over the word unanimous. 172 Had the in-
cident been ignored the Party would haved spared itself another round 
of critical appraisal and would,possibly,have promoted its fragile unity. 
As with so many of the other disputes the different factions were unable, 




Dr S.L.Barnard, pp. 351-54. 
Sunday Times, 8.7.73, 1 Basson, Enthoven Speak Out•. 
Interview with ~en~tor Horak. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE TRANSVAAL PROVINCIAL-CONGRESS AND THE DEFECTION OF MARAIS STEYN 
The post-parliamentary period was not without incident. Short interludes 
of peace were followed by controversial upheavals as the different party 
groupings continued their tactical manoeuvering. While the reformists 
strengthened their positions on the Cape Peninsula Council and in the 
Young South African movement attention, however, remained focused on the 
Transvaal. 
Following the Party's Central Executive meeting of July 26 Graaff issued 
a clear directive that the feuding and indiscipline in the Party would 
no longer be tolerated. It detracted, he said, from its first duty which 
was to attack the government. 1 The national leader was clearly concerned 
about the seriousness of the situation and the need for unity. His words 
must have had some impact for the Transvaal Provincial Congress on August 
17 and 18, in contrast to the previous years' traumatic events, passed in 
a spirit of apparent goodwill. 2 Harry Schwarz was re-elected unopposed, 3 
as was his deputy Dr Gideon Jacobs. Graaff add(essed the delegates and 
again stressed the need for unity while he promised firm action against 
d . . d 4 1ss1 ents. 
1. Argus, 27.7.73, Editorial: 'Graaff's clear directive' 
2. Dr S.L. Barnard, 'Pol itieke Orientasle in die Suid-Afrikaanse Opposissie 
sedert 1958', D.Phil., u.o.V.S., 1979, p. 358 
3. Die Burger, 18.8.73, 'Eenparig herkies as V.P. leier in die Transvaal' 
4. Argus, 18.8.73, 'Graaff puts foot down on U.P. dissidents'. See also 
Sunday Express, 19.8.73, Editorial: 'Graaff calls on U.P. to close 
ranks', and Die Burger, 18.8.73, 'Graaff se hy gaan twis nou stop' 
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The Congress was interpreted as a triumph for the reformists. 5 It had 
come out strongly in favour of the power sharing component of the U.P. 1 s 
federal policy and had demonstrated its faith in consultation with other 
racial groups by sharing the platform with Prof Hudson Ntsantwisi, Tom 
Swartz and J.N. Reddy of the Indian community, all of whom addressed the 
meeting. 6 Schwarz indicated that he would press for the Transvaal 1 s Act 
of Dedlcation to be included in the Party 1 s constitution when the National 
Congress met later in the year. 7 He would also canvass for· a permanent 
federal secretariat to act as a consultative body for the different race 
groups. The Congress had already taken a 1 verl igte 1 course and received 
widespread praise as a result. The Sunday Times believed that its decisions 
would encourage 1 verl igtes 1 in other provinces to make their voices heard 
8 and in an editorial predicted that the in-fighting in the Party was over. 
The campaign for Graaff to resign was set aside as he was encouraged to 
take note of the spirit evident at the Transvaal congress. 9 
The peace which prevailed at this congress and the optimistic predictions 
for the future suffered a severe reverse a week later when a new bombshell 
struck the U.P. and exposed the deep rift which existed beneath the surface 
of professed unity. Following the combined Head Committee and parliamentary 
5. Die Burger, 20.8.73, 1 Kongres triomf vir Schwarz, se Sir De Vill iers 1 • 
See.also Sunday Times, 19.8.73, 1 Schwarz triumphs in Transvaal 1 , and 
Die Vaderland, 18.8.73, 1 Groot sege vir Harry Schwarz~ 
6. Tom Swartz was leader of the Coloured Representative Council, J. Reddy 
was a member of the Indian Council and Prof Ntsantwisi was the Chief 
Minister-of-Gazankulu. · 1 
7. Act of Dedication to our People, published by the Transvaal Provincial 
Council, 2.5.73. 
8. Sunday Times,.19.8.73, 1 Verl igtes backed to the hilt in the Transvaal 1 • 
See also Cape Times, 20.8.73, •congress a new din;cnsion in South Afr:-.:an 
po 1itics 1 • ---
9. Sunday Times, 26.8.73, Editorial: 'Graaff 1 s Green Light'. 
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caucus meeting of August 29, which was to resolve the Horak l~tter issue, 
10 Marais Steyn announced his resignation from the United Party. Not only 
did he leave, but he appl led for membership of the National Party, the party 
he had fought tooth and na i 1 for over 3·0 11 years. Although the reformist 
12 newspapers were ecstatic with his decision it did the U.P. immeasurable 
harm to lose a parliamentarian of his stature~ a man once described by 
Ben Schoeman as 'the best debater on either side of the House' . 13 Both 
foe and friend recognized his ability and even Helen Suzman of the Pro-
gressive Party called him a 'brilliant debater'. The Sunday Times editorial 
of August 2 pointed out that his departure was to be welcomed as he had 
stood for verkramptheid and he was out of touch with the forces of reform 
in the U.P. 14 The Sunday Tribune of the same day reviewed developments a~ 
being a great success for the reformists while the Burger regarded his 
departure as a paralysing blow for the Party. 15 
The divisions were now more sharply defined. 16 Steyn had left the United 
Party because of the 'unbridgeable personality problems' with Harry Schwarz 
and also over his and the othe~ reformists' interpretation of its federal 
1 . 17 po icy. The sharing of power which they envisaged at the expense of the 
10. Interview with Graaff, 16.6.82. 
11. Rapport, 2.9.73, 'Steyn word Nat'. See also Sunday Express, 2.9.73, 
'Marais Steyn Quits U.P. Will Join Nats'. 
12. Cape Times, 3.9.73, editorial: 'Good - now wi:lo's next'. 
13. Die Transvaaler, 18.5.73, 'Wat ek van premiers, LV's dink'. 
14. Sunday Times, 2.9.73, editorial: 'Marais Steyn - a political tragedy'. 
15. Die Burger, 3.9.73, 'Tragedie v..ir V.P. 1, See also 'Steyn dompel V.P. 
in Krisis 1 , 
16. Argus, 31.8.73, editorial: 'U.P. rift is in the open'. 
17. Horak interview, 8.6.82. 
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sovereignty of the white parliament would endanger its future and would 
be a threat to the 'concept of white leadership with justice'. 18 
A little over a year had passed since Marais Steyn had lost the Transvaal 
leadership of the Party. He had been the victim of a press vendetta 19 
i) 
artificially created to serve the interests of certain groups and had, 
during the previous twelve months, seen the values he had stood for eroded 
by one crisis after another. It was hardly surprising that he took the 
final step of leaving the ~arty which he had helped to guide through the 
difficult years of opposition to its 1970 electoral 
20 
successes. He had 
been Graaff 's adviser and staunchest supporter. He must have been disa-
ppointed when his leader stood by helplessly and watched his defeat at the 
h d f h f 
. 21 an so t e re orm1sts. There can be 1 ittle doubt that personality 
differences played a decisive role in his actions. His ex-wife, Mrs Clem 
Dreyer, in an interview with the Sunday Tribune, confirmed that he hated 
Schwarz and that his defeat as Transvaal leader had led him to consider 
22 
leaving the Party. She also mentioned that he was friends with Daan 
Lemmer and Jack Dormeh1 23 both of whom had been deeply involved in earlier 
24 moves to discredit Harry Schwarz and his supporters. He had lost faith 
in the U.P. in the same manner that many others were to become disillusioned 
18. Argus, 31.B.73, 'Steyn: Why I quit'. 
19. Interview with Graaff, 16.6.82. 
20. Sunday Express, 2.9.73, 'Steyn bombshell!. 
21. Interview with Myburgh Streicher, 5.5.82. 
22. Sunday Tribune, 9.9.73, 'The Four Ambitions of Marais Steyn M.P. 1 
23. Dormehl, a member of the Head Committee in the Transvaal was expelled 
from the Party following attacks on Schwarz which wereconstrued as 
being anti-semitic in character (Feb. 73). See also Barnard, p. 351. 
24. Vaderland, 26.7.72, 'Magsblok wil die V.P. van blnne oorneem'. It 
revealed Lemmer's support for Steyn. 
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as it drifted without apparent direction. Through disloyalty and strife 
the U.P. had become powerless, he explained to the Sunday Times. He spoke 
of the immeasurable harm done by the newspapers to the Party and of the 
groups within it which had co-operated to sow dissension. He compared the 
effective manner in which the prime minister had dealt with the Herstigte 
revisionists with the weak leadership of the United Party to control dissi-
d f 
. 25 ent actions. Marais Steyn had, in his analysis of the U.P., pinpointed 
with great accuracy those areas of weakness which contributed to its decline. 
His departure hastened its downfall and served as an example to other con-
servatives to reconsider their options in the political arena. Vorster, 
in the words of the Sunday Express, regarded the defection as a 'bonus for 
. 26 
the National Party'. It would also divert attention from his O'.'lm,not 
inconsiderable,problems. The prime minister welcomed Marais Steyn with 
open arms and ~xtended an invitation to oth~rs 1 ike him to cross over to 
the National Party. 27 
Marais Steyn had bridged his political Rubicon, he could no longer solely 
through loyalty to his leader 'sustain my membership of an organizatiqn 
that had become ineffective and meaningless •28 For him to have 
left the U.P. and joined the nationalists, whom he had once referred to 
as the worst government South Africa had ever had, must have been a diffi-
cult decision in the extreme. The evidence would suggest that personality 
differences rather than matters of pol icy were the deciding factors. Once 
25. ·Sunday Times, 2.9.73, 'Steyn: Why I must Quit'. 
26. Sunday Express, 9.9.73, Editorial: 'Bonus for NATS'. 
27. Rapport, 2.9.73, 'Steyn word NAT - wic gaan horn volg?' 
28. Argus, 8.9.73, A special supplement by J. 0 1 01 iveira on Marais-Steyn. 
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Schwarz had replaced him an intolerable situation had arisen in which 
the pupil had become the master. 
Sir De Villiers had little option but to condemn Steyn in the strongest 
terms. In the September issue of the Party newspaper Onwards he denounced 
his defection as a 'gross prostitution of his political faith', an 'act 
29 
of vengeance aimed at destroying the United Party'. Graaff correctly 
pointed out that his action would lower the confidence of the electorate 
which had supported the U.P. 
Although Steyn left of his own accord, he had in many ways been driven out 
of the Party. He would not have gone but for the hounding he had endured 
f h f . ' 30 rom t e re orm1sts. His departure contributed to the polarization of 
white politics, with the United Party conservatives or 1 vaderlanders 1 , as 
P.W. Botha called them,gravitating towards the National Party and the 
reformists inexorably joining the Progressives. The political centre was 
left increasingly depopulated. Steyn's move appeared to be most harmful 
to the Party in the Transvaal where its representation decreased in the 
1974 general election and dis~ppeared entirely in 1977 when its successor 
the N.R.P. made no headway whatsoever. Marais Steyn's resignation must 
have been the last straw for many U.P. supporters for whom ~973 had been 
a very trying reriod. The uninspiring no-confidence debate had been 
followed by the Schlebusch controversy and the press campaign to oust 
29. Onwards/Voorwaarts, Sept. 1973, 'Prostituted his political faith'. 
See-also Argus, 7.9.73, 'Graaff on Steyn', 




If a man referred to as 'Mnr Sap'J could no longer find a 
home in the Party then there must indeed have been something amiss. He 
had epitomized the struggle against the N.P. since 1948. He was the 
Party's chief strategist during the 1970 election successes, yet he 
became the first victim of the civil war which had begun in earnest 
in 1972 and which continued after his resignation until the demise of 
the Party itself. The Cape Times, which had rejoiced in his departure 
and had suggested that other 'verkramptes 1 should follow his example, 
predicted that the U.P. would, as a result, become more relevant, 'if 
smaller'. The newspaper was once again proved wrong and the Party did not 
become more relevant although it did indeed become smaller, until in the 
end nothing could rescue it and few wanted it saved. Marais Steyn's 
observation that ~he U.P. was heading for disaster whether Graaff was its 
leader or not, proved more accurate. 
Following a Central Executive meeting to consider the consequences of 
Steyn's resignation the Party issued a statement indicating that it 
was not £mbarking on a 'left-liberal' direction following the Transvaal 
provincial congress but did pledge that its policy provided for white 
leadership in the interests of all 'our people'. Such leadership had to 
be seen as the instrument to bring about the sharing of powers and res-
ponsibilities among 'all our population groups' . 32 This announcement, 
which contained nothing new, would it hoped be acceptable to both camps 
in the ~arty. It provided for white leadership but it would not be per-
v 
31. A term used by the Afrikaans press, particularly Die Burger. 
32. Argus, 6.9.73, 'New Pledge on White leadership'. 
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manent, it would be the instrument of change. 33 It still, however, left 
unresolved the ultimate destiny of the white parl lament and which powers it 
would relinguish to the multi-racial federal Assembly. 
The meeting appointed Dr G Jacobs to fill Marais Steyn's information post 
in the Party and decided, for the umpteenth time, to close its ranks. But 
it was visibly being weakened by the actions of ppl iticians who, presumably, 
wished to keep alive the democratic tradition in South Africa. As it lost 
support the government become stronger and the opposition weaker. A strong 
U.P. would have been better able to keep the nationalists on their toes and 
might have been able to help create the political milieu for the reform 
desired by some of its members. The decline of the U.P. as a result of 
policy and personality differznces which were exploited by an unsympathetic 
press was, in the wider view, symptomatic of the growing irrelevancy of white 
opposition in South Africa • 
3~ Interviews with Graaff and Horak 
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CHAPTER VI I 
THE ROAD TO THE NATIONAL CONGRESS, NOVEMBER 1973. 
Following Marais Steyn's defection the neecl for party unity became even 
more imperative. 1 It was essential to present a unified front to the 
electorate, especially as an early election was expected. With this as a 
prospect unusually high interest was focused on the National Congress 
2 of the U.P. in November. Before then, however, a few incidents 
occurred which demonstrated that the factional strife was still present, 
" 
and contrary to the \varnings that it would no longer be tolerated the 
unsatisfactory situation remained largely unchanged. 
1. Problems in Caledon and in the Young South African movement. 
In preparation for the National congress the Caledon division drew up a 
memorandum that took a strongly reformist approach on topical . 3 issues. 
It was signed by five members of the division including Kobus van Eeden 
its chairman, who was an admirer of Harry Schwarz. A copy of this con-
fidential document was sent to Myburgh Streicher, the Cape leader. 
Sim~ltaneously it was secretly released to the press which gave it wide 
coverage without once condemning it as an act of gross disloyalty.
4 
The source of the 'leak' was never discovered. 5 What aggravated the 
situation was that its release coincided with a visit.by Sir De Villers 
to Bredasdorp where he spoke on September 16. There he warned of the 
dangers of hanging labels around Party representatives and saddling it 







Sunday Times, 4. 11.73, 'Unity or Goodbye'. 
Sunday Express, 4.11.73, Editorial: 'Vital congress'. 
Argus, 17.9.73, 'Caledon memorandum: U.P. calls for dynamic approach'. 
It favoured withdrawal from the Schlebusch Commission, restoration 
of the Coloureds to the common voters roll and m~lti-racial sport. 
Cape Times editorial, 18.9.73, 'What's the fuss about?' It expressed 
pleasure that verligte thoughts emanated from the platteland. See 
also the Herald, 22.9.73, 'Why fuss =ibout Caledon memorandum, 
Mr Streicher?' 
Argus, 17.9.73, 'Alarm in U.P. over leak to press'. 
Die Burger, 17.9.73, 'Graaff waarsku oor ~ linkse beeld ~ir Party'. 
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A strong suspicion 'remained that the Caledon memorandum was released by 
., 
wnnamed reformists to embarrass Sir De Villiers.' They were, in the 
words of Marias Steyn, who was speaking in Stellenbosch two days later, 
'people who were not United Party in their hearts but had climbed 
onto the bandwagon' after its success in the 1972 Brakpan by-election. 
Marais Steyn was explaining to his audience the reasons for his de-
8 parture from the U.P. To judge by the Calcdon disclosures disloyalty 
was still rife and it was being abetted by the majority of English 
newspapers which strongly supported the nature of the proposals. 
A week later another issue, again involving Party differences, made the 
headlines. At the annual Cape conference of the Young South Africans, 
held in Port Elizabeth, towards the end of September a determined and 
successful bid \vas mounted to extend the influence of the reformists. The 
meeting was attended, uninvited, according to Bert Meintjies the local 
youth organizer by Horace van Rensburg M.P.C. and Jonathan Schwarz, son 
of Harry Schwarz. Their presence, he said, created a tense situation 
and was responsible for causing discord among those present. Whether they 
were entitied to be there or not was largley immaterial but what rankled 
was that the meeting approved and accepted the Transvaal's Act of Dedi-
cation against the express wishes of the Cape leader, Myburgh Streicher, 
and his deputy, John Wiley both of whom cautioned that the document 
should be ~tudied first. 9 The congress also elected as its new chairman, 
Maans Kemp, a school teacher dedicated to the Transvaal reformist move-
ment. The U.P. Youth had been effectively captured by the reformlsts in 
10 the Cape. 
7. IBID.' 1 Verraaicrs en saboteurs in V.P. I se Streicher•. 
8. Argus,-18.9.73, 'Still in U.P. if not for Schwarz - Steyn'. 
9. Interview with Streicher, 5.5.82, and Wiley, 5.4.82. 
10. Cape Times, 24.9.73, 'U.P. Youth der1es Cape leadership'. See also 
IBID., 19.10.73, 'Platteland has verligtes too' .. Interview with 
Kemp by a Times correspondant. 
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It was alleged that it had been hijacked by the Transvaal and Dan Rossouw, 
M.P.C., a labelled conservative, attacked the lobbyi~~ done by the 1 invaders' 
11 who had 'led Mr Kemp by the nose'. 
The Transvaal youth movement was already controlled by the reformist~wing 
of the Party with James Ramsay as its chairman. It appeared, was suggested 
and later proved correct that the ultimate objective was.:the removal of 
Andre Fouri~, H.P., from his post as National leader of the Young South 
Africans. 
12 
He was to be replaced by a reformist and the national youth 
f 11 d h · h . l 3 Tl . h f movement was to a un er 1s aut or1ty. 11s was t e reason or 
capt~ring control of the Cape which would then be entitled to iend reformist 
delegates to the vital federal council meeting of the movement in October. 14 
Should a reformist become leader 15 it would also mean representation on the 
important leadership Executive Committee of the Party which consisted of 
twelve members. 
These predictions duly came to pass and Andre Fourie was voted out of office 
at the federal meeting in Bloemfontein. 16 His successor was none other than 
17 Maans Kemp, who reportedly, defeated him by a single vote. The reformists 
had won another battle. 18 Sir De Villiers had had the morti.fication of 
being witness,firstly.to the defeat of Marais Steyn and now had to accept 
the loss of Fourie, another of his trusted supporters. He had not used 
his influence to rescue either of them. 19 
11. Argus, 25.9.73, 'Invaders' alleged at Cape Youth Congres~'. 
12. Interview, John Wiley, 5.4.82 and Myburgh Streicher 5.5.82. 
13. Die Burger, 27.9.73, 'Jong Turke wil Fourie bykom'. 
14. Sunday Express, 30.9.73, 'Reformists' seek control of Youth Movement'. 
15. Sunday Times, 7.10.73, 'Verl igte challenge awaits Fourie'. 
16. 13 October 1973. 
17. Sunday Express, 14.10.73, 'Fourie ousted as Youth leader'. 
18. lnterviev;s with \4iiey and Senator Horak. 
19. Die Burger, 15.10.19T3, Editorial: 'Die passiewe leier'. 
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Andre Fourie was the second youngest member in the House and· if age were 
a criterion could hardly be a member of the 'Old Gudrd'. He was a hard-
working M.P. who had won the Turffontein seat back from the nationalists 
in 1970. He was a conservative as far as loyalty to his leader and party 
were concerned but also,by his own standards, a verligte as opposed to 
being a reformist which were not necessarily synonomous.
20 
It was his 
misfortune to have been branded as a verkrampte by the r~formist supporting 
press, all of which wrote of the challenge he was to face at the federal 
congress. He would meet opposition because of his past verkrampte record, 
21 asserted the Sunday Times of September 30. His major error was to have 
been an admirer of Marias Steyn's political style. Tony Hickman, M.P. and 
chairman of fhe Cape Peninsula Council, who had to fight his 0Wn battles 
against the Party reformists rallied to Fourie~s defence. He clearly 
believed that the latter had been defeated not as a result of his ability 
to do his work but solely becau~e he had been described as being verkramp. 
As he had not been prepared to be associated with the 'leftist-1 iberal' 
direction of the so-call~d 'verligtes' in the Party he had been sacrificed 
in a well planned campaign. Verkramp 'had become a swear word in politics' 
and any man who was labelled as such was finished, asserted Hickman.
22 
What 
he should have said was that any person in the United Party who received such 
a tag was assured of being villified by a hostile press. 
One -0f those strange ironies which surface from time to time in politics to 
expose the essential shallowness of certain press arguments concerned Audre 
Fourie in 1974. 
20. Reformist in this instance being identified wi~h the Young Turks or 
Schwarz group in the Transvaal whose political direction was not 
regarded as being enlightened by certain sections cf the U.P. 
21. Sunday Times, 30.9.73, 'Andre Fourie faces challenge'. 
22. Cape Times, 16. 10.73, 'Hickman condemns attack on Fourie'. 
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His parliamentary seat was contested by his mentor, Marais Steyn, in the 
general election of that year. In one of the toughe~t fights in the country 
the two 'verkramptes' exchanged blows. Fourie was defeated by fewer than 
400 votes and Marais Steyn, far from being finished in politics as Stanley 
Uys had predicted after his defectlon, 23 went on to become a minister of 
state. The press had faced one of these unpleasant dilemmas which was a 
consequence of having labelled United Party representatives as being either 
verkramp or verl ig. As both candidates had been condemned as reactionaries 
opposed to reform the question arose as to which one was more deserving of 
their support. In the end the majority came out in favour of Fouri~, admitted-
ly reluctantly, but at least he had not defected to the N.P. Yet, in 1981 
Andre Fourie was again returned to parl lament, this time as the nationalist 
member for Turffontein, following Steyn's elevation to ambassadorial rank 
and his own switch of parties! 
2. The Congress. 
As the date of the National Congress approached there seemed 1 ittle prospect 
of internal peace. The reformists were rejoicing in Fourie's defeat while 
Stanley Uys made yet another of his wildly inaccurate predictions when he 
claimed that within two years the verkramptes would all have disappeared 
d h U P 1 d b h . . l f . 1 1 . . . 
24 an t e .. wou es aping 1tse into a tru y ver 1gte oppos1t1or.. 
lnstead,it was in 1975 that Harry Schwarz and his reformists left the United 
Party. In the meantime conservatives such as John Wiley and Tony Hickman 
simultaneously atta~ked the 'leftist-liberal' direction of the reformists 
who, in their opinion, wished to take the Party down the road of the Progressives.
25 
23. Sunday Times, 9.9.73, Uys: 'End of the Road for Marais Steyn'. 
~24. IBID., 21.10.73, 1 U.P. Verligte Victory causes a Wai 1 '. 
25. cape-Times, 20.10.73, 'U.P. in Peninsula locked in struggle'. See 
also IBID., Editorial: 'Mr John Wiley, M.P.'. 
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Wiley even named fourteen conservatives vihom the Sund~ Times wished to 
remove from the political scene. 
An interesting development was also the sudden transformation of Joel Mervis 
of the Sunday Times as the reformist-wing of the Party appeared to be making 
headway. He became increasingly more sympathetic towards Sir De Villiers 
whose head he had, earlier that year, demanded on a platter. Having rid 
himself of the 'mill-steyn' around his neck Graaff appeared to have a better 
understanding of the issues at stake and was walking with a 'lighter step', 
claimed the editor. 26 The inconsistent approach of this.newspaper towards 
Graaff's leadership demonstrated to Party stalwarts the folly of expecting 
1. b. 1. h h . d . f 1 1. 
21 re 1a 1 1ty on ot er matters were 1t attempt~ to 1n - uence po icy. 
What did become increasingly clear was_ that Graaff would have to restore 
peace among the warri_ng factions at the congress or the Party would face 
certain ruin. He would have to take a strong line, for as 'Dawie' of the 
Burger pointed out, nothing could be worse than the situation which already 
. d 28 ex1ste .. 
On the eve of the congress Rapport published the results of an independent 
. . d b . t 29 h. h . d. d h b A . l h h survey comm1ss1one y 1 w 1c_ 1n 1cate t at etween pr1 , wen t e 
previous poll had been taken, and October the U.P. had lost the support of 
Afrikaans speaking voters but had increased its popularity among the English 
section. The N.P. had improved its overall position but the P.P. had not 
30 
made any headway. 
26. Sunday Times, Editorial: 30.9.73, 'Graaff on Target'. 
27. On the 10.9.72 the editor of the Sunday Times claimed,'Graaff must 
stay', and then in the follwing year again called for his resignation! 
See also interview with Graaff, 16.6.82. 
28. Die Burger, 29.9.73, Dawie: 1Uit my Pol itieke pen'. 
29. Mark en Menings opnames(Edms.) It used a sample of 3 000 voters. 
,30. Rapport, 4.11.73, 'V.P. nou verder agter N.P.' 
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The results were: 
U.P. 
Afrikaans support in percentages 6.7(9.8) 
English support in percentages 47(41.1) 





8l•. 4 (81 . 6) 
11.3(13.2) 




If political polls have a message it would seem that in this instance the 
in-fighting in the U.P. had not as yet, to any marked extent,affected its 
electoral support except among Afrikaans speaking voters. It could be argued 
that they had followed the conservative Marias Steyn into the National Party 
and that the increas~d support for the U.P. among English speakers could also 
be attributed to his move as they felt that the Party had strengthened its 
1 verligte 1 image. The P.P. had made no progress because •enlightened' English 
voters remained within the U.P. in the belief that the reformist-wing was 
making headway, and in electoral terms represented a better prospect than 
the Progressive Party even though their political inclinations were progressive 
in everything but name. In addition, the survey indicated that Graaff 's 
popularity as leader of the Party had increased notwithstanding the difficulties 
he had encountered. 
Whatever conclusions could be drawn from the poll nothing could alter the 
fact that the forthcoming congress was finely balanced and any explosion there 
would effectively, and possibly finally, tip the _scales against the United 
31 Party among the electorate. 
'31. Sunday Times, 4.11.73, 'U.P. at crossroads'. See also the Cape Times, 
6.11.73, 'U.P. 's crucial congress•. 
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The Burger was convinced that it \·muld b8 a peaceful congress but only because 
the reformists would be in the minority and would be unable to achieve their 
ultimate objective which was to take over the U.P. in the same way they 
had done in the Transvaal. Confrontation, would, therfore, be avoided 
at Bloemfontein, but would be continued behind a superficial facade of 
unity to attain their final goals. The problem with the reformists, asserted 
the Burger, .was that they did not belong to the 'correct• Sap-tradition. 
Their ways were unacceptable to a party of compromise, and of moderation. 
The end result would either be their rejection or the death of the party 
itself or both. 32 The newspaper displayed a good deal of insight for the 
'Young Turks' never did achieve their main objective, and tow~rds the end 
they had been rejected by the establishment but in the process the U.P. had 
been k i 11 ed. 
The Bloemfontein congress turned out to be a surprisingly successful gathering 
33 with an absence of fricion whic~ must have encouraged its supporters. 
An atmosphere of goodwill 34 and conciliation prevailed among delegates. 
Sir De Villiers Graaff's opening address on November 8 explained the key 
points in the U.P. 1 s new federal pol icy which had become one of the areas of 
friction between the Party factions and had contributed to Marais Steyn's 
departure. 35 'White leadership' and 'power sharing' had been stumbling blocks 
since the plan had first been introduced. 36 Sir De Villiers repeated that 
white ·leadership would be the instrument used to achieve power sharing. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~·---------~-~~ 
32. Die Burger, 6.11.73,-Editorial: 'Nie Regte Sappe nie 1 • 
33. Dr S.L.Barnard, pp. 377-382. 
34. Interview with Graaff, 16.6.82. 
35. Graaff opened his address on 8.11 .73 with a statement of policy. 
36. Introduced officially by Mike Mitchel !(Durban North) during the no-
confidence debate in February 1973 although it had been revealed 
to the voters of Caledon in the November by-election of the previous 
year. 
108 
The federal plan would create a 'cornmunlty of communities• which would achieve 
a co~rnon loyalty and a common security. The transf2~ of power to the federal 
parliament would be by the white assembly and the keys of power would only 
be handed over to this central multi-racial body after the approval of the 
enfranchised voter had been obtained.37 
'The introduction of the United Party's federal pol icy'. 
In this important speech Graaff explained that white leadership was in .the 
interests of all and it had to serve as a catalyst and guarantee of orderly 
progress. 
37. Cape Times, 10.11.73, 'Graaff firm on power sharing'. 
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1 Baasskap' had to be rejected but the leading role played by whites in the 
economic, social and political fields had also to be recognized. Whites 
had to take the lead in a new political dispensation which would lead to 
. 38 
the final objective of the sharing of power in South Africa. 
It was a fine exposition but left unresolved the future of the white parl lament. 
Although consensus was reached at the Congress the federal alternative 
was destined to be attacked by both the right and left-wings of the U.P., 
on the one hand for 'selling out' to the Blacks and on the other for retain-
ing effective power in White hands.39 
Graaff also warned that those who in future broke ranks would receive no 
quarter. It was yet another attempt to restore party discipline. 'My 1 ieu-
' 
tenants and I ,are determined that we should fight as a truly united party'. 
Intellectual ferment was naturai in the U.P.,he said,and therefore he 
had been patient but the time to close ranks had arrived. The N.P. was the 
40 only enemy. Sir De Villiers effectively answered his critics who had 
earlier in the year demanded his resignation when he was again unanimously 
re-elected national leader. His popularity and· standing in the United Party 
was overwhelming and confirmed the results of the Rapport poll which had 
indicated that he had no serious rivals. 41 Considering his strong position 
in the Party it is surprising that he was so patient with those in sub-
ordinate leadership roles when they spoke out of turn or ignored disciplinary 
codes to follow their own inclinations. 
38. Interviews with Graaff, Streicher, Wiley and Horak. Graaff 
had no doubt that the multi-racial assembly \vould eventually replace 
the white parliament in importance. 
39. Horak interview, 8.6.72. 
40. Argus, 9.11.73, 'No quarter: Graaff warned'. 
41. Mark en Meningsopnames(Edms.) survey. The result~ appeared in Rapport, 
4.11.73. They indicated that approximately sixty percent of U.P. 
supporters wanted Graaff to lead the P~~ty, sixteen were for.Sasson and 
nine favoured Schwarz. 
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He appeared, indeed, to be too tolerant when dealing with those who deserved 
severe discipline. It looked as if he allowed problems to develop 
before acting and then often only after the damage had been done. It 
is easy to be wise with hindsight but had he nipped in the bud problems 
when they first appeared they might not have developed into the crises 
they frequently became with their consequent debilitating effects on 
Party morale. Graaff did not seem to exercise the strong leadership his 
popular standing in the Party entitled him to.
42 
His political style 
was to seek consensus rather to play the role of a dictator even when 
such an approach was justified. This,possibly,contributed to the decline 
43 of the Party as Graaff, himself, admitted in an interview with S.A.T.V. 
Harry Schwarz when he addressed the congress adopted a conciliatory tone, 
and even proposed that Senator Herman Oelrich, a conservative, be re-
elected chairman of the conference. He also had a proposed Transvaal 
resolution requesting the acceptance of its Act of Dedication withdrawn. 
Had this reformist document been ~ebated it would most certainly have 
sparked off a confrontation between the two factions. A quarrel was 
avoided and Schwarz could feel satisfied that the revised programme of 
principles adopted by the congress in any event incorporated the main 
points of the Act of Dedication. 44 Schwarz admitted to the delegates 
that there were differences among them but added that they were not over 
matters of principle or of policy but rather concerned details of approach 
and the tempo of change. 
42. Interviews with Senator Horak, 8.6.82 and Graaff, 16.6.82. 
43. S.A.T.V. interview, 13.12.77 .. Among other observations Graaff 
admitted that, 1 I w~s inclined to be chairman of the committee 
more.than a leader in respect of certain issues .•• ' and • ..• if 
I had given a stronger lead I'd have had more una11imity in the 
Party ... •. 
44. Argus, 9.11.73, 1 U.P. programme of principles'. It consisted of 
a preamble and six principles. 
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The congress was a major triumph for the United Party coming as it did 
45 
at the end of a year of discord. It was referred to as the 1 peace 1 
or 1 unity' congress. Any clashes which took place must have occurred ' 
behind closed doors.
46 
Officially the feuding groups had agreed to 
differ. But in the light of future events it became clear that the 
congress had merely patched over the cracks. The essential differences 
remained. According to John Wiley the congress had been a success 
because it was the desire of Sir De Villiers that unity be restored. 
The prospect of an election played a role as well. The reformists were 
•accommodated at every turn', although 'I and others, who thought 1 ike 
. 47 
me had the strongest reservations about accommodating ihe Young Turks 1 • 
Wiley believed, as did most of the press, both English and Afrikaans, 
that the congress was in fact a triumph for the reformists. Not a 
single newspaper, though noting the success of the congress, believed 
that genuine unity had been restored. Schalk Pienaar of Rapport, for 
instance, congratulated the U.P. on once again havinq rescued itself from 
a serious crisis but predicted that there would soon be another. He 
believed that differences had been temporarily shelved because of negative 
h h • 1 1 . 
48 l . k h reasons sue as t, e approaching genera e ect1on. Rapport 1 e t e 
Burger49 and other nationalist newspapers reported the congress as a 
vi~tory for the reformists which would have dire consequences for the U.P. 
That the concept of power sharing had been adopted meant that the congress 
was in fact a victory congress for the reformists. 
45. Sunday Times, 11 .11.73, 'A great victory congress'. 
46. Bill Horak in a personal interview explained that there were in fact 
open clashes between Schwarz and the 'establishment' before the 
congress opened and that Schwarz had threatened to leave Bloemfontein 
and return to the Transvaal with his delegates. Dr G.Jacobs had 
interceded on behalf of Graaff to persu?de him to remain. 
47. Interview with John Wiley, 5.4.82. 
48. Rapport, 11 .11 .73, Schalk Pienaar: 'Transvaal red V.P. uit verleentheid'. 
49. Die Burg_er, 10.11.73, 1 Schwarz het tot duisver inisiatif in Bloemfontein'. 
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1 Dawie 1 of the Burger referred to it as 'Harry Schwarz se kongress' and 
a triumph for the 1 leftist-l iberal 1 Young Turks but warned that this 
would lead to disaster for the United Party at the polls very similar 
to that suffered by it at the 1 Hofmeyr election' of 1948. The reason 
would be the 1 iberal interpretation of the federal pol icy by the Young 
Turks. 50 
Hans Strydom of the Sunday times managed to interpret the congress ~s 
the successful culmination of its campaign to reform the U.P. which 
had begun, he wrote, with its editorial of 15 .'l.ugust 1971, 'The Party 
that is losing its way• . 51 The protracted operation had paid dividends 
and he congratulated the reformists for having given the Party •a new lease 
f 1 • f I 52 0 I e .. The Times also maintained that it had always been the Party's 
strongest supporter. Even when it had called for Graaff's resignation the 
resultant shock had been beneficial, for at Bloemfontein the U.P. had 
' 
rejected 1 verkramptheid 1 and Graaff had aligned with the 'verl igte spirit' 
sweeping the Party. The voters would thereafterreturn to it for it was 
53 1 the Party which had found its way' With a stroke of the pen the 
Sunday Times had cancel led its two year vendetta against the Party's 
democratically elected leaders and against policies formulated by its 
various formations. Yet, its support for the Young Turks, whose importance 
was exaggerated out of all proportion to thelr electoral impact, was one 
of the major contributory factors to the divisions within the Party. Its 
claim that it was the Party's strongest supporter was to be of short 
duration for when the civil was recommenced it continued its support, not 
for the Party, but for a certain faction within it. 
50. Die Burger, 10.11.73, Dawie: 'Uit my po1itieke pen'. 
51. Sunday Times, 15.8.71, editorial: 1 The Party that is losing its way'. 
It is generally regarded as having started, or drawn attention to, 
dissens10n within the Party. 
52. Sunday Times, 11. 11.73, 'U.P. Congress vindicates the Sunday Times•. 
53. IBID. 
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It had ceased to support the Party, or any section of it, by the time 
of its demise. There can be no escaping the massive role played by this 
newspaper in the affairs of the United Party and in the final analysis 
. . S4 1t was a negative one. 
The Sunday Express and to a lesser extent the Argus emphasized Graaff's 
role in making the congr,ess a success. The Express was of the opinion 
that it was the ordinary non-label led ~ajority of the U.P. which had 
achieved victory in Bloemfontein and that it was a triumph for Sir De 
Villiers rather than for the reformists.SS It, too, was optimistic for 
the future but for different reasons from those of its r i va I , the Sun~ 
Times. 
Provincial leaders such as Myburgh Streicher and Radclyffe Cadman re-
pudiated reports that any gro~p had been victoriousS 6 at the congress. 
Schwarz wrote to the Sunday ·Times requesting that the terms 'Young Turk' 
and 'Old Guard' be dropped as 1 we are all United Party members'. The 
newspape~ retorted that if the factions disappeared then the.terms would 
as wel I. 
For the United Party the year ended on an upswing with the expected and 
often predicted split not materializing. The Party was officially united 
and preparing for an early election, possibly in April. 
54. Interviews with Wiley~ Streicher and Horak. 
55. Sunday Express, 11.11.73, 1 Graaff Triumph'. 
56. Die Burger, 16--:-11.73, 'Geen groepe in V.P. 1 • 
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Unfortunately its highest expectations were dashed, the new year brought 
little goodwill and even less prosperity as it became enmeshed in a 
spiral of disasters culminating in the general election setbacks from 
which it was never to recover. Ther~ were dest.ined to be no more victory 
/ 
congresses for the United Party. 
/ 
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1 The 1973 National Congress ends the year on a high note• 
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CHAPTER VI I I 
1974: A DECISIVE ELECTION YEAR 
Notwithstanding the accord reached at the national congress the new year 
again brought all the simmering discontent to the surface. It was a sad 
reflection on the lack of party loyalty and di sci pl ine that it had to en-
ter an el~c~ion campaign in a dangerously divided state. One of ~he 
main reasons for this were the disputes concerning nominations, notabiy 
in certain seats on the Witwatersrand and in the Cape where the different 
factions manoeuvefed to have their candidates accepied. The reformists 
were particularly keen to have 1verl igtes 1 nominated in 'safe' seats in 
order to establish a power base in the parliamentary caucus where they 
had enjoyed 1 ittle support. If that objective were achieved they would 
be better placed to continue the struggle to capture the United Party 
from within. The 1 establishment 1 were as determined to maintain their 
strength in parlia1~ent. Consequently,an acriminous battle resulted. As 
the Young Turks were in control on the Witwatersrand they had more 
success there than in any other region. 
The nationalists, never slow to exploit a promising situation, played 
the two factions off against one another and frequently pretended doubt 
as to who really led the United Party - was it Sir De Villiers Graaff 
or Harry Schwarz? The Progressive Party which had languished in the 
political wilderness also exploited the United Party's difficulties to 
its advantage by appealing for support from the genuinely 'verl igte' er 
liberal voter. Thus the United Party, which had to fight on two fronts 
while simultaneously coping with its internal squabbles, lost support 
both to the government and to the Progressives. The pendulum had finally 
begun to swing against it in terms of electoral support and was thereafter 
to gain momentum. Up to the 1974 election the Party had not lost any 
significant support. 
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By-election results, if not spectacular, had en the whole indicated that 
the Party was holding its position and in some cases showing an improve-
. h d. . 1 1 ment.notw1t stan 1ng its many prob ems. The' 1974 results, however, 
suggested that the situation had altered and that opposition voters were 
not prepared to tolerate indefinitely ~ party divided against itself. 
Thereafter a swing away from the United Party accelerated to such a 
degree that Sir De Vill i~rs finally disbanded it in favour of a new 
dispensation which he hoped would 'save South Africa' for by that time 
(1977) the United Party assuredly was not capable of the task. 
1. The Mahlabatini Declaratlon. 
While the nomination wrangles were developing Harry Schwarz refocused 
attention, with startling clarity, on the brittle nature of the consensus 
reached in November. His actions forced Graaff to take the almost un-
precedented step of having publicly to reprimand his provincial leader 
for a breach of protocol. Early in January Schwarz took it upon him-
self to meet with Chief Gatsha Buthelezi in Zululand. The result of 
their conference was the so-called 'Mahlabatini Declaration' where five 
points of agreement concerning commom alms were reached. It was an 
attempt by Schwarz to promote dialogue with prominent black leaders and 
to create a blue-print for future inter-racial talks. It was also a 
follow-up operation to the Transvaal congress which had been addressed 
by three important black leaders. The general contents of the pact were 
sufficiently vague not to embarrass the Party and when Graaff's attention 
was drawn to the matter he concurred that they were in broad accord with 
U. P. po 1 i cy . 
1. For instance in Klip River and Vereeniging. 
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Schwarz's sojourn to Mahlabatini received wide pub! icity and the newspapers· 
which supported him lauded his initiative. The ~ttention which this issue 
received reopened the divisions which had been temporarily shelved at the 
Bloemfontein congress. Both Helen Suzman and the nationalists viewed the 
exercise as a transparently superficial gimmick to gain attention, which 
it certainly did_ do. The Burger,in addition predicted, correctly, that 
a clash between Harry ScJiwarz and the Party hierachy was.unavoidable. 2 
The reason for this was not so much the nature of the agreement but rather 
the manner in which Schwarz had conducted the operation as it raised the 
question of protocol and that of the party leadership. 3 Although Schwarz 
initially indicated that he had given Sir De Vil 1 iers warning of his 
4 intentions, he later agreed that he had not acted correctly. In any event, 
it remained the prerogative of the Party leader rather than a provincial 
one to initiate aggreements of this kind. The question which emerged 
was whether Schwarz was attempting to usurp the duties of his leader. In 
addition, as the meeting was held in Natal, it would also have been 
expected that the United Party in the province be informed of it. This 
procedure was not followed and Cadman was not notified of his colleague's 
intended visit. 5 
There can be little doubt that Schwarz had acted in good faith and in the 
best interests of the Party, as he understood them to be, but the matter 
did not end there. As the leading reformist he received both praise and 
criticism for his actions. 1Dawie1, of the Burger, wrote that the incident 
was an endeavour to place Schwarz in a good light and to reflect unfavour-
ably on those who had not acted earlier as he had done. 
2. Die Burger, 16.1.74, 'Botsing met Schwarz in V.P. onkeerbaar'. 
3. IBID., 25.1.74, 'A lei er laat horn lei I, 
4. Interview with Graaff 16.6.82. 
5. Interview with Myburgh Streicher, 5.5.32. 
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In any event, dialogue with homeland leaders was nothing new and, accord-
ing to 'Dawie', Schwarz's theatrical gesture was nothing more than 
'breaking in through an open door', which v.,iould have no positive results. 6 
The Sunday Express regarded his 'Declaration' as an act of political 
indiscretion which was inopportune on the eve of an election. Its leading 
article castigated Schwat-z for usurping hJs leader's position, of 
offendi11g the Natal leader, and for creating ill-will by meeting Chief 
Buthelezi a few days before pther U.P. leaders were scheduled to consult 
with him. 7 It concluded that Schwarz had not been authorized to nego-
tiate any pact and· that rather than having done the Party a service it 
was l ikley to lose it votes. 8 It so happened that Cadman was destined 
to lose the Eshowe (Zululand) seat to the nationalists following a 
campaign in which his opponents used the old stock-in-trade 'swart 
gevaar' tactics to exploit the 'Declaration' wh~ch his colleague had 
cemented with the Zulu leader. 9 
A week after having met his Transvaal leader, Sir De Vil 1 iers bleatediy, 
1 0 
but publicly rebuked him for the manner in which he had acted. Con-
sidering the refo~mist~ past record of provocative acts there was 1 ittle 
else he could do. He had stayed his hand to maintain the fragile Party 
unity but eventually had been forced to respond. In a statement, he 
made it clear that,'Mr Schwarz understands that I won't tolerate any 
infringment of my leadership no matter how unintentional'. 11 
6. Die Burger, 19.1.74, 'Dawie, uit my pol itieke pen'. 
]. Interview with Senator Horak, 8.6.82. · 
8. Sunday Express, 20.1.74, Editorial: 'Schwarz's U.D. I.'. 
9. Eshowe had also been unfavourably delimited for the U.P. 
10. Sunday Times, 20. 1.74, Uys: 'Farcicial reaction to Schwarz coup'. 
11. Rapport, 27.1.74, 'Die bitterste pi! vir Harry'. 
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While this was a fairly mild reprimand ~he Transvaal reformists were not 
prepared to let the matter rest there, and two days later, on January 24, 
held a meeting of the Witwatersrand General Council where a motion of 
confidence was passed in Harry Schwarz by 490 votes to 10. 12 Japie Sasson 
also declared himself totally in accord with the 'Mahlabatin! Declaration' 
which he said, mad~ it possible to talk to the outside world. He believed 
that Schwarz had acted cor~ectly. This defiant stand by the Transvaal 
seemed to indicate that ii cared 1 ittle for the Party as a whole or the harm 
it could do it. The Sunday Times considered the show of solidarity for 
Schwarz as a vindication of the Declaration and praised him to the hilt for 
having made it possible. 13 When Schwarz addressed the gathering he explained 
that it had not been his intention to.bypass Graaff or infringe on his 
authority but that he had done it in the interests of the Party. The meet-
ing was clearly dissatisfied with Graaff's reaction and it was only with 
reluctance that it supported a motion of confidence in him as well when it 
- d b F . Ob h 1 l I · 14 was propose y ranco1s er o zer, a party oya 1st. 
On January ~1 the matter was officially aired, for the last time, at a Party 
caucus meeting attended by Harry Schwarz. According to Catherine Taylor, 
the Transvaal leader was bitterly attacked by Radclyffe Cadman in what she 
referred to as the 'closest thing at an attempt at political murder' she 
h d . d 15 a ever w1tnesse . Schwarz apparently had to endure a sustained assault 
by the caucus which consisted mainly of conservatlves and which fully en-
dorsed Sir De Vil Jiers Graaff's earlier reprimand even after Schwarz had 
expressed his regret to the caucus and had apologized fo( his brea~h of 






Sunday Times, 27.1 .74, Serfontein: 
IBID., Editorial: 'What the fight 
IBID., 'Schwarz Triumph'. 
C.Taylor, If Courage Goes, p. 119. 
Roberton: 'Cadman emerges as U.P. 
Rapport, 3.2.74, 'Harry veg vir sy 
ed 1tor1 a I: 'Koukus sit Schwarz op 
'Schwarz triumph 490-10'. 
is all about'. 
Se~ also Sunday Express, 3.2.74, 
strongman'. 
pol itieke lewe'. See also Die Burger 
sy p 1 ek'. 
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For the sake of unity the Party had again closed its ranks, 17 but had there 
not been an election ap;:.iroaching Schwarz and his col leagues would probably 
have resigned at that point. As it was, the election offered the opportunity 
of returning to parl lament a number of reformists, including Schwarz himself, 
and there would thus be no profit in leaving. To have resigned or to have 
been driven out over the 1 Mahlabatini Declaration• would have achieved 
18 nothing positive for them. \ Consequently, Schwarz, who did not wish to 
split the Party, had to swallow his pride and apologize, and thus deferred 
the likely break for the time being. The Sunday Times was critical of the 
methods adopted by the Old Guard which it claimed had used the 1 Mah1abatini 
Declaration' as a pretext to force Schwarz out of the Party. That he had 
accepted his treatment from the ~aucus had enhanced his stature ~nd meant 
that he placed ihe interests of the Party first. 19 The newspaper wrote 
no word of support for the caucus nor did it mention the other issues 
involved. 
2. Nomination disputes. 
20 In February- John Vorster officially announced that the election would take 
place on Wednesday April 24. What had been expected had been confirmed and 
a long election campaign of two and a half months l6y ahead. It proved to 
be an arduous period for the United Party and considering the nomination 
and other traumas it had to survive it was surprising that it performed 
no worse than it did. 
17. Dr S. L. Barnard, 1Po 1 it i eke Ori entas i e1, pp. 382-396. 
18. Cape Times, 1 .2.74, Shaw: 'The Plot that failed'. 
19. Sunday Times, 3.2.74, 'Political Pi ranhas 1 • 
20. Hansard, 4.2.74, column 65. 
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Although the acriminous nomination contests were confined to the Witwatersrand 
and parts of the Cape chey captured the 1 imel ight, for in many ways they 
epitomized the struggle for the very soul of the United Party. The promotion 
of reformist candidates in certain seats represented an endeavour to infuse 
the U.P. with new and y6ung ideas. Every political party, particularly one 
which has been in opposition for many decades, could do with rejuvenation. 
Fortunately, or unfortunately, depending on the observers point of view, 
the traditional 'Sappe' regarded the Sasson-Schwarz direction as an attack 
rather than a positive contribution by people who had abrasive personalities 
and who had adopted brash methcds in the past to achieve questionable objectives. 21 
In addition, the changes advocated appeared to be of a liberal-radical nature 
which were unsuitable for a Pariy which had rejected Jan Hofmeyr in 1948 
and the Progressives in 1959. Sasson, with his chequered political back-
d 
22· d s h h h d l l f . h h p . . 1 959 groun , an c warz, w o a a most e twit t e rogress1ves 1n , 
were not considered to be part of the ethos of the United Party. To the 
traditionalists they represented a group who were progressive in everything 
but in name. 
21 .. It was generally accepted that Harry Schwarz had a quick temper which, 
as an example, was in evidence at the time of :1arais Steyn's defection. 
Rapport, 9.9.73, illustrated this by way of a cartoon and a short verse: 
By resigning an M.P. called Steyn 
caused the U.P. a great deal of peyn 
but Sir De Villiers Graaff 
found it hard not to laaff 
when Schwarz lost his temper again. 
I would like to add that my personal research confirmed that Mr Schwarz 
was often difficult to work with and did get annoyed easily. He, of all 
the people I spoke to, was the only one who broke an appointment for an 
interview and later refused to answer my written questions unless some 
of them were altered. See also Barnard, pp. 351, 370, 433. 
22. Japie Sasson was a ful 1-time U.P. organizer in the 1940's, joined the N.P. 
in 1950 and became an M.P. for S.W.A. before being expel led from the 
Party in 1959. In 1960he established the National Union Party which 
formed an electoral agreement with the U.P. for the electicn of that 
year. Thereafter he returned to the U.P. 
122 
Consequently, the United Party hierachy, particularly ln the Cape, .was 
generally not receptive to reform candidates and a bitter struggle 
developed at constituency level for ultimate control of the Party caucus. 
In the Cape, constituency nominations had to be approved by the Provincial 
Candidates Committee whose decisions were, in the event of an appeal, 
subject only to the Central Candidates Committee of which Sir De Villiers 
Graaff was the chairman. In addition, it consisted of the five pro-
vincial leaders (including South West Africa), the Party's chief whip, 
' Gray Hughes and its national general secretary, Senator Horak. Not only 
in the Cape, but elsewhere, nominations at constituency level which were 
supported by the local divisional committees consisting of branch 
delegates were in the normal course of events approved by the provincial 
body and such nominations_ became the official Party candidates for the 
election. Matters usually proceeded smoothly unless the Provincial 
candidates committee took exception to a nomination from a constituency. 
If an acceptable compromise could not be reached then the Central Committee 
made the final decision. But should an unpopular candidate be foisted 
on a constituency as occasionly happened, it created a great many problems 
which often had repercussions in other electoral divisions. 
In the Cape, the Candidates Committee consisted of its leader, Myburgh 
Streicher, the deputy leader, John Wiley and Senator Redi Louw. This 
triumvirate was regarded by the reformists as being almost reactiondry 
and was part of what the Sunday Times had chosen to call a 'verkrampte 
mafia'. Of the three, Wiley had been the most outspoken in his criticism 
of the reform movement and of the press which supported it. 23 
23. Interview with Wiley. 
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It was almost inevitable that he and the rest of the committee, would 
become involved in nomination tussles where reformists were put for\'1ard 
as candidates. 
The Young Turks had made some headway in the Peninsula fol lowing public 
meetings addressed by Harry Schwarz and visits by other of his 1 ieutenants, 
while the Young South Africans had been infiltrated and finally captured 
by the reformists. 24 ·This small but vociferous nucleus, which drew 
inspiration from the Witwatersrand, began a campaign to undermine the 
standing of leading United Party figures in the province which it saw 
25 fit to regard as verkramptes. Their efforts were sol idly backed by the 
local English language press with the Cape Times and Argus in Cape Town, 
the Herald and Evening Post in Port Elizabeth and the Daily Dispatch in 
East London all doing their best to keep the local reform movement alive. 
This meant that they wrote critically of the Party hierachy with whom 
they had 1 ittle in common. 
Although Party leaders were not normally opposed in their own seats, 
Wiley discovered, through the newspapers, that he was to be an exception 
26 and that a certain Dr Peter Penny was to seek nomination in Simonstown. 
Wiley thus became involved in the first nomination squabble in the 
P . 27 rov1nce. 
24. In 1973 Maans Kemp had been elected leader of the Party's youth 
movement in the Cape and thereafter had replaced Andre Fourie 
as its national leader. 
25. Interviews with Wiley, Streicher and Graaff. 
26. A Cape Town lawyer and economist. 
27. Cape Times, 25.12;73- 'Penny seeks U.P. nomination'. 
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D P f . 28 d 1 r enny was a re orm1st an a though he had no hope of winning the 
nomination had challenged Wiley in order to show 1 that John Wiley 
was not representative of the United Party'. He also believed that 
more Party leaders should have signed the agreement with Chief Buthelezi. 29 
Dr Penny, who had made known his plans shortly before Christmas, re-
ceived a tremendous amount of publicity for the next couple of weeks 
while the matter was being settled. The whole episode appeared to 
be a publicity exerclse to denigrate Wiley and boost the reformist 
cause. As it turned out, the challenger, who was a stranger to Simons-
. d . 1 30 f . 1 1 d. . . 1 town, receive not a singe vote rom tne oca 1v1s1ona committee 
but macle up for this by receiving extensive media cover~ge, which was 
unusual for a d8feated candidate in a nomination contest - few others were 
accorded even so much as a mention. What had made all the difference 
was that Dr Penny had championed the reformist cause against a leading 
conservative. Dr Penny, also contrary to his written undertaking, 
released to the press the text of his speech to the divisional committee. 31 
This conformed to the modus operandi of the reformists who at times re-
vealed the confidential affairs of the Party to the media and then 
denied that they had done so or else, as in the case of Dr Penny, 
maintained that it was necessary to do so in the interests of the Party's 
image. The 'Penny affair' was an unworthy 1 ittle episode, its sole 
objective being the embarrassment of an elected and therefore, presum3bly, 
representative party leader while simultaneously gaining publicity for 
the reformist-wing of the Party. 
Once the dust had settled in his own constituency attention was focused 
on a number of other vexing nomination disputes. 
28. Minutes of the 'GROW' organization, 27.4.74, revealed him to be 
closely associated with this refor~ist group within the U.P. 
29. Sunday Times, 20. 1 .74, 'Penny expiains challenge'. 
30. Cape Times, 22.1 .74, 'Wiley backed unanimously'. The vote was 30 
to nil. See Die Burger, 22.1 .74, 'Verligte Sap kry aapstert'. 
31. Argus, 22.1.74: 1 U.P. leaders rebuke disclosure by Penny'. 
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In the Peninsula the Wynberg const!tuency became the most controversial 
while Sea Point and Gardens also presented problems. In Port Elizabeth, 
both Walmer and Central became embroiled in the Party's factional 
differences while East London City became marginally involved. The 
unedifying wrangles were accompanied by unfavourable press comment which 
harmed the United Party's election campaign. Although the nomination of 
candidates was an internal and private matter it did not stop interested 
parties from revealing the course of events to the press. 
By the end of January the newspapers, both English and Afrikaans, were 
writing of a major crisis in the Party as the •nomination in-fighting 
rages•. 32 The Burger told of a •struggle to the death' in the United Party33 
while the Cape Times maintained that the activities of the Old Guard 
were wrecking the unity of the Bloemfontein congress. This all co-
incided with the problems Schwarz 1 s meeting with Chief Buthelezi had 
created. 
Before dealing with the disputes in more detail it is of interest to 
note some of the side issues which emerged because Party representatives 
had been labelled verlig or verkramp, Young Turk or Old Guard. Dr Jan 
Moolman, M.P. for East London City was at the time 72 years old but 
was still regarded as a Young Turk because he had been critical of the 
Cape leadership! David Graaff and Theo Aronson were both 32 but 
were unfavourably received because they had been identifi~d with the 
Old Guard and were opposing sitting members who were reformist in their 
thinking although much older than the challengers. 
32. Cape Times, 26.1.74, 'Party heads for major crisis'. 
33. Die Burger, 26.1.74, 1 Stryd tot die Dood bars los in die V.P. 1 • See 
also IBID., 28.1 .74, 1 Sappe se lang messe uit 1 • 
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The Sunday Times had, early in Febru2ry, expressed the hope that the 
United Party would nominate younger men and that the 1 dead wood should 
be axed 1 • 34 Apparently this did not always apply, as the yardstick to 
be used was whether a candidate was a reformist or not. This was an 
example of the type of inconsistency with which the Party had to cope. 
1 Kobus 1 van Eeden who was regarded as a verligte and was the favourite 
to win the Wynberg nomination had had a chequered political background 
(ref. later). As recently as 1968 he had held what could be construed 
as anything but enlightened views when he appealed to the voters of 
Caledon to support him, in a by-election, because he was 1 vir die witman 1 • 
No doubt he had since reviewed his political philosophy but what really 
counted in his favour was that he had become a supporter of the reformist 
movement and whether he held verligte or other views was of secondary 
importance. 
During the 1970 general election the Candidates Committee had intervened 
h . . • . • d h d . d . . . . 35 t ree ttmes 1n nom1nat1on issues an a not receive any cr1t1c1sm. 
Had all the United Party candidates in 1974 simply been regarded as being 
for the Party, as had been the case in the previous election, then the 
undignified in-fighting between different factions could largely have 
been avoided and, also, possibly, the decline of the Party. What, too, 
would have been avoided was the placing of Sir De Villiers in the un-
enviable position of having to appear to choose sides when he was called 
upon to decide between the final nomination of one candidate or another. 
Whatever judgement he made it was certain to be criticized by the 
supporters of the losing candidate. 
34. Sunday Times, 3.2.74. 
35. Interviews with Streicher and Wiley. 
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This was an intolerable situation b~t to his credit Graaff endeavoured 
to be the impartial medi~tor. 36 A lesser figure would not have been 
able to hold the warring factions together and it was largely as a 
result of his efforts that the Party went into the election as a single, 
if somewhat battered, entity. 
The Wynberg nomination epitomized the civil war in the Party. Whereas 
nomina~ion procedures generally passed uneventfully in Natal, the Orange 
Free State and South West Africa where a spirit of unity still prevailed 
a tactical battle was waged on the Reef and in parts of the Cape as 
competing candidates jockeyed for advantage. 37 Catherine Taylor's decision 
not to seek re-election in Wynberg following the Schlebusch episode and 
her growing disillusionment with party politics meant that a vacancy 
existed. Brian Bamford, the local M.P.C., was regarded as her logical 
successor before he was approached by the Candidates Committee to make 
himself available in the Rondebosch seat. Sir De Villiers Graaff was 
going to move to the new division of Groote Schuur and the United Party 
needed a 'verligte 1 candidate to oppose Prof van Zyl Slabbert who 
was to receive the Progressive Party nomination in the constituency. 
Bamford agreed to move and Wynberg, consequently, needed another candidate. 38 
The divisional committee nominated Kobus 'Yster' van Eeden, a pruminent 
politician from the Swellendam district and chairman of the Southern 
Cape Region of the United Party. He was a reformist and a follower of 
Harry Schwarz but he did not enjoy the confidence of the Cape hierachy, 
who favoured the nomination of Jae De Villiers, M.P.C. for Constantia, 
and leader of the U.P. in the Provincial Counci1. 
36. Interview With Senator Horak, 8.6.82. He said that Graaff went out of 
his way to accomnodate the reformists. 
37. IBID. 
38. Bramford agreed on condition that i:r1ere would be an open nomination 
contest in Wynberg, an undertaking which he believed he had received 
from Wiley before he agreed to move. There was later doubt con-
cerning this and resulted in the Cape Times, Editorial, 4.2.74, 
'Assurances and amnesia'. 
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De Vi 11 iers was I inked to the right-wing of the Party and had recently 
blotted his copy-book by having been the only delegate at the Bloemfontein 
Congress briefly to hav~ crossed swords publicly with Schwarz.39 
Notwithstanding various other gatherings and contradictory press reports 
the only official Party nomination meeting in Wynberg was held on January 
10 where the divisional committee put forward van Eeden as their choice 
for the election. The Provincial candidates committee, was however, not 
prepared to accept this decision, ostensibly because certain objections 
had been received regarding the validity of the composition of the 
divisional committee. The ~!ynberg division appealed to the Central 
Candidates Committee to uphold their choice but this was rejected. There-
after the Cape hierachy unanimously nominated De Villiers as the official 
Wynberg candidate. 40 Sir De Villiers Graaff also turned down a personal 
appeal by van Eeden. 
The apparently dictatorial methods employed by the Candidates committee 
to overrule the democratic rights of the constituency resulted in a 
sustained and blistering press attack which totally overlooked the fact 
that the Committee had acted constitutional ly. 41 Whether its decision was 
a wise one was debatable for it went against the wishes of the local 
supporters, a number of whom refused to campaign for Jae De Villiers while 
others joined Theo Gerdener's Democratic Party which decided to fish 
. bl d b . h 42 1n trou e wat~rs y contesting t e seat. 
39. Cape Times, 10.11.73, 'Angry Attack on Schwarz'. 
40. Cape Times, 4.2.74, 'De Villiers gets Wynberg'. 
41. IBID., 12.2.74, Editorial: 'Alienating support'. 
42. Argus, 4.3.74, 'Gerdener for city talks'. There were rumours that 
Taylor would stand for the D.P. See also Cape T:mes, 23.4.74, 
'Taylor may jo~n D.P., fight seat'. 
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There can be no doubt that the Wynberg nomination contest, and the ad-
verse publicity it received, affected the Party, for its majority was 
substantially cut as De Villier~ share of the vote dropped at the 
election. 43 It is equally certain that the Candidates committee had 
opted for De Villiers as he was a Party loyalist, and had rejected Kobus 
van Eeden because of his political track-record, particularly his more 
recent flirtation with the reformists. Previously he had left the United 
Party i~ the early 1950 1 s with the Bailey Bekker group to form the short-
lived Conservative Party which had regarded Adv Strauss, then leader of 
the U.P., as being too 'liberal 1 • Van Eeden returned to the U.P. via 
Japie Basson's National Union Party which formed an electoral pact with 
the U.P. for the 1961 general election. With such a discouraging past 
it could be more readily understood why the Candidates committee had 
played safe and nominated Ja~ De Villiers whose party credentials were 
impeccable. 
In the Gardens seat the sitting member, Harold van Hoogstraten, enjoyed 
constituency support but there was a strong move to have the son of the 
leader of the opposition, David Graaff, replace the sixty-two year old 
incumbant. Graaff was half his age and although an attempt was made to 
label him as being a verkrampte there was no concrete evidence to support 
such a claim. Van Hoogstraten was, however, the press favourite as he 
was a committed reformist. He also had the support of his divisional 
. 44 committee. 
43. H.du Toit, 1Die Parlementere Verkiesing van 1977', p. 130. In a 63 
percent poll the United Party majority dropped to 1.586 when the 
U.P. polled 4 354 votes, the N.P. 2 768 and the Democratic Party 
1 946. 
44. Dr S.L.Barnard, 1Politieke Orientasie•, pp. 408-430. In 1970 the 
~ivisional committee did not want him but the Party leadership 
did! 
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The Central Candidates committee was asked to consider the Gardens 
nomination but before a ~ecision was made the issue resolved itself 
when Dr Marius Barnard declared that he would no longer consider 
standing as a U.P. candidate. Sea Point had been earmarked for the 
'verl igte' doctor but with his withdrawal David Graaff was asked, 
by the local division, to stand in his place. 45 Consequently, van 
Hoogstraten's nomination was confirmed in the Gardens but not before 
a great deal of public· animosity had been aroused. 
This resolved the situation in the Cape peninsula but it was unfortunate 
that private and domestic differences within the Party had become 
the subjects of public debate and frequently as a result of inaccurate 
1 . 46 press specu at1on. In order to clarify the position, and to defend 
themselves, the Candidates committee was forced to reveal the reasons 
for some of their controversial decisions. This only complicated the 
issue and opened the door for further c~iticism as their explanations 
were not acceptable to the reformist newspapers. 
In February Dr Marius Barnard 1 isted his reasons for withdrawing from the 
contest. They included the Party's role in the Schlebusch Commission, 
its handling of the Schwarz-Buthelezi declaration and the nomination dis-
putes.47 
45. A memorandum signed by Streicher(undated) to the Central Disciplinary 
Committee in 1974 regarding Carlisle, mentioned that he and the Sea 
Point division initially were opposed to the candidature of David 
Graaff in December 1973. Only after Dr Barnard's unavailability did 
they support him. 
46. As for example in Wynberg. 
47. Sunday Times, 16.2.74, 'Barnard: Why I wit~drew as U.P. candidate'. 
\. 
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It is surprising that he was prepared to stand in the first place as he 
was fully aware of the Party's attitude to ~t least the Schlebusch issue. 
Nevertheless, he had put his finger on some of the causes for dissension 
within the Party and when a man of his publ le standing was not prepared 
to make himself available for election because of them, his decision 
d d · · -
48 I h h . d h amage its image. t may even ave cost t e Unite Party t e Sea 
P ' h. h b h P . 49 B . . d b bl 01nt seat w 1c was won y t e rogress1ves. ut 1t remains e ata e 
whether his ~lection to parliament for the United Party would in any way 
have helped heal the rifts within it, for on his own admission, he was 
a verligte and would have sided with the Basson-Schwarz wing of the Party. 
When the U.P. was disbanded he never became a supporter of its successor 
the N.R.P. and is currently(1982) the P.F.P. member of parliament for 
Parktown. In 1974 personalities such as Dr Barnard were being favoured 
by the reformist newspapers and they were dlff lcult to oppose because of 
their status although, according to Wiley, he was 'no more a U~ited Party 
h h • h I 50 supporter t an was t e man 1n t e moon . 
In Port Elizabeth two sitting members faced problems: Walter Kingwill of· 
Walmer and van Zyl Cill le of Central. Neither could be labelled verkramp. 
Cillie was destined to travel the same road as Kobus van Eeden. Having 
received constituency support he was rejected by the 'axemen' as the 
Sunday Times called the Provincial Candidates committee. 51 Kingwlll lost 
the Walmer nomination to his sitting M.P.C., Theo Aronson, at divisional 
level and although, In this instance, the reformist press were upset about 
it they could do little as democracy had run its course. They had predicted 
a win for Kingwill and were upset at the outcome. of the voting. 
48. Cape Times, 8.2.74, Editorial: 'Setback for United Party'. 
49. Interview with Wiley. He was of the opinion that it did. 
5~. IBID., -answer to question 40. 
51. Sunday Times, 17.2.74, 'U.P. hatchel:men slip up'. 
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When the Central Candidates committee upheld the decision rejecting Cillie's 
nomination Kingwill replaced him as the candidate for Central. 
'The activities of the Cape leadership harm the Party' 
The treatment meted out to van Zyl Cillie, who had won the seat back from 
the nationalists in 1970, was widely cri_ticized. It was regarded as 
having been motivated rather by personal animosity than by political 
differences although he was a reformist and therefore in the opposite camp 
from the leadership group. He had,however, incurred the displeasure of 
the Party leadership over various incidents. In November of the previous 
year he had struck Bert Meintjies, a U.P. organizer, who had laid a 
charge and claimed damages of R4 300. 52 
52. In a statement, 10.12.1973, van Zyl Cillie recounted the events leading 
to this incident. It emerged that Cil lie believed that Meintjies 
had the support of the Party hierachy who were using him to undermine 
his(van Zyl 's) position. 
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Meintjies apparently enjoyed the contidence of the Cape leaders and Cillie 
was convinced that Wiley was making use of the organizer to undermine his 
positioh in the Port Elizabeth reg·ion. When confronted with these 
suspicions Meintjies denied them, called van Zyl Cillie a liar and was 
then struck by him. 53 Distorted repor~s of this uned•fying incident, 
and its consequences, appeared in the press which left an unsatisfactory 
picture of the state of affairs in the Party in this region. 
Another matter, which did not reach the newspapers, but of which the Party 
leaders were aware, was that of the friction which existed between Cil 1 ie 
andMannie Goldberg, chairman of the Port Elizabeth Regional Counci I and 
confidant of the Cape hierachy. Following an argument between the two men 
in which Goldberg cast doubt on Cill ie's competence to handle the Party 
finances he stated in a letter to the Provincial secretary, Neil de Goede, 
that in future he would refuse to sit at the same finance table as van 
Zyl Cillie. He also indicated that if van Zyl Cill ie were not opposed at 
the next election, he would, himself, do so in the interests of the Party. 54 
The Cape leaders were also in possession of a statement from Frank Smith, 
then chairman of the divisional committe.e of Central, in which he expressed 
strong opposition to van Zyl Cillie who he maintained had publ iciy insulted 
him and his wife at a committee meeting where they were accused of being 
of no value to the Party. They had consequently withdrawn their support 
from him. Smith also brought attention to the manner in which the local 
branches were constituted to ensure that Cill ie would win any nomination 
contest. 55 
53. IBID. 
54. Pri'Vate letter, 6.11.1973, from Mannie Goldberg to Neil de Goede. 
55. Statement, 28.11.73, signed by Frank Smith. 
L 
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Wiley, in an interview, later confirmed that the branches were controlled 
by friends o~ relations of van Zyl Cill ie; 56 
There were obviously strong feelings between the Party leadership and 
Cillie but there were also reasonably strong grounds to dis~ual ify him 
from receiving the 1974 nomination. He had undoubtedly not acted in 
a manner calculated to win friends and influence the electorate. 
Cill ie, in his turn, was understandably annoyed at being 1 axed 1 by the 
Candidates committee who thereafter accepted Kingwill who had lost the 
constituency vote in Walmer. The manouevering within the Party in the 
Eastern Cape, which daily received adverse press comment, left it ill-
prepared for the approaching election according to the Herald and with 
a 'defeatist attitude' to boot. The public which had to base its opinion 
on inaccurate media reports were left largely ignorant of the factors 
which were considered before nominations were finalized. Nevertheless, 
the procedures followed were those laid down in the Party's constitution 
and were executed by democratically elected leaders who were invested 
with certain powers. Van Zyl Cill ie, amidst all types of speculation that 
he would stand as an independent or evenoppose Myburgh Strercher in 
Newton Park eventually refuted these rumours. He would continue to support 
the Party although he was dissatisfied with its decisions and would 
work to change its leadership at the next congress where there would 
be a chance •to elect enlightened men to lead the U.P. 157 
56. Interview with John Wiley, 5.4.82. 
57. Herald, 2.3.74, 'Axed M.P. is not standing•. 
135 
The rejection of Cill ie's nomination had a sequel when the former M.P. 
for Port Elizabeth W~st(later Newton Park), George Hayward, in an inter-
view published by the Herald demanded that ,'Streicher and his friends' 
58 be expelled from the Party. He also expressed disappointment with 
Sir De Villiers Graaff's leadership but praised Harry Schwarz. This 
outburst had followed an open letter in which he took the almost un-
heard of step, for a member of the Party, to call publicly on the voters• 
of Newton Park not to support Streicher whom he hoped would lose the 
seat. 59 These remarks inflamed the reformist~Old Guard dispute. They 
were exploited to the full by the nationalists and reformist supporting 
press to the detriment of the Party as a whole. Hayward was evidently 
very bitter about the_ctreatment meted out to van Zyl Cilliewho happened 
to be his son-in-law. Hayward's outburst could not be ignored and he 
was expelled from the U.P. 60 
These and other political squabbles bedevilled the Party as the election 
approached. While all political organizations experience_differences 
of opinion th6se in the United Party went beyond the bounds of accept-
ability and were too intense to lead to a satisfactory conclusion. Even 
had nomination procedures been more 'democratic' and the system modified 
as was suggested by both Schwarz and Sasson it was unlikely to have 
61 resolved the problem. If constituencies had the final right to approve 
the selection of candidates the factional battle would merely have been 
shifted to that level of authority and would in all probability have 
been more widespread than it had been. .: / .... 
53. Herald, 1.4.74, 'Get rid of Cape leader, says U.P. veteran.' 
59. Evening Post, 20.2.74, 'Haywa~d hits hard at Streicher'. 
60. Cape Times, 2.4.74, 'Ex-M.P. expelled for attack on Cape leader'. 
61. Die Burger, 21.2.74,'Basson gooi klip in V.P. bos'. See also IBID., 
24.2.74, 'Grootmond op Kleinmond' •. 
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No matter what nomination procedures were in operation there would stil 1 
have been problems because the trouble lay not with the procedures but 
with the United Party itself. 
There were other nomination incidents in the Cape which received their 
share of adverse comment. Dr Jan Moolman of East London City withdrew 
from the contest when it was intimated by the Candidates committee that 
they pr~ferred Harland Bell. Dr Moolman was 72 years of age but was 
regarded as a Young Turk supporter. He accused Streicher and Wiley 
of leading a verkrampte movement aimed at eliminating the verligtes. 62 
The official reasons for his unacceptability, however, were given as being 
his age and the fact that he had allowed the Party organization to deter-
iorate in his constituency. The other unpleasant dispute was in Green 
Point where the sitting_M.P.r. Sam Gross, a verligte, was ousted by 
Andrew Hudson a Party organizer. 63 In this instance the vote was a 
'democratic' one and Hudson was chosen by 29 votes to 25 by a specially 
64 constitued electoral colleg~. Gross rejected the decision as being 
invalid because he regarded the composition of the college as irregular. 65 
An appeal to the Central Candidates committee upheld the decision of the 
electoral college. Gross expressed his reservations in the local press 
which in this case sympathized with him notwithstanding their repeated 
demands for the acceptance of democratic decisions as should have been 
the case in Wynberg and Central. In this instance they would have been 
satisfied had the Central committee rejected Hudson, the party organizer, 
for Gross, the verl igte. The latter felt that many supporters would 
cross to the Progressive Party or abstain from voting. 
62. Cape Times, 26.1.74, 'Cape leaders accused'. 
63. Argus, 7.3.74, 'Hudson beats Gross at electoral college'. 
64. Convened by the Cape Peninsula Counril, it consisted of delegates 
from six Green Point branches , fro~ twelve other seats and rep-
resentatives of the Cape Peninsula Council itself. 
65. ·Argus, 8.3.74, 'Gross fights Party choice'. 
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He remained 'aggrieved at Gr,aaff' s dc:c is ion' while his wife resigned as 
chairperson of the Green Point women's branch. 66 
These were the main points of friction in the Cape although there were a 
few other less well publicized ones. Yet, notwithstanding the invective 
directed against the Candidates committee it had interfered directly 
in only three constituencies. 67 As Streicher pointed out, the powers 
exercised by the Committee had not been created by them but had been 
68 
inherited and had been used in the past without undue comment. If 
the Party had been free of factions it would have been unlikely to 
have faced any acriminous nomination contests. Instead, the whole un-
seemly exercise contributed to a loss of confidence in the Party as 
an effective political organization. 
In the Transvaal the boot was on the other foot as there Harry Schwarz 
was chairman of the Candidates committee which had even greater powers 
69 than its counterpart in the Cape. A different approach was adopted 
and reformists were favoured wherever nomination contests arose involving 
candidates with opposing views. 70 Rightly or wrongly the situation 
develope_d where Sir De Villiers Graaff and his Central committee were 
seen to be approving mainly 'verligte' nominations in the Transvaal while 
axing them in the Cape. Towards the end of January when Sir De Villiers 
was busy rejecting the appeals of Cape verl igtes71 he was simultaneously 
approving the n0minations of leading Transvaal reformists such as Dall ing, 
72 Enthoven and van Rensburg. 
66. Cape Times, 14.3.74, 'Nomination decision disastrous says Gross'. 
67. IBID., 25.1.74, 'Old Guard seek to oust verligte U.P. candidates', 
and IBID., 20.2.74, 'Cathy hits at Party machine', whom she(Taylor) 
referred to as a 'coterie of ruthless men'. 
68. Interview with Streicher, 5.5.82. 
69. IBID. 
70. SUriday Express, 27.1.74, 'Choosing candidates - method resented'. 
71~ Cape Times, 27.1.74, 'Decisions stay - U.P. leaders'. 
72. Argus, 9.2.74, 'Tough bargaining over nominations'. 
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Both the Burger and the Sunday__ E~.e_ress we re of the opinion that a 
tactical battle was being fought in certain Transvaal constituencies 
and that Schwarz was delaying the approval of some Old Guard nom-
inations such as that of Dr Fisher(Rosettenville) and Hendrik van Eck 
(Benoni) until he had secured the candidatures of certain verl igtes 
. h . . 73 1n ot er const1tuenc1es. A case in point was the nomination of 
Prof N 01 ivier in Edenvale. 74 A Stellenbosch academic, and recent 
United Party recruit, the professor received the nomination ahead of 
George 01 iver , a conservative, whose Kensington seat had disappeared 
at the most recent del imitation. 75 Although Prof 01 ivier won the 
nomination legitimately it was speculated by the Sunday Express that 
had he not received Edenvale then the nomination of Old Guard candidates 
would have been blocked on the Witwatersrand. The professor's nomination 
did create a good deal of comment for he had been selected ahead of 
local men such as 01 iver who were long standing members of the United 
Party. What made Nie Oliver acceptable on the Witwatersrand was his 
verligte image. Th . h d . : f 76 N . - . . . d 1s was t e ec1s1ve actor. o cr1t1c1sm was raise 
because he lived in Stel)enbosch and sought a Transvaal nomination. 
Yet, the Cape leader Streicher who 1 ived in Durbanville but represented 
a Port Elizabeth constituency was critized for this by the same sources 
which favoured 01 ivier's nomination! In the intriguing political power 
game no stone was left unturned to gain an advantage over an opponent 
no matter what inconsistencies were revealed in the process. In Wynberg 
both aspirant candidates were strangers to the constituency and con-
sequently the question of residence had never been raised. 77 
73. Interviews with Wiley and Streicher. 
7~. Dr S.L.Barnard, pp. 410-411. Dave Dall ing admitt2d to the author 
that they wanted verl igte candidates nominated ahead of Old Guard on~s. 
75. Burger, 11.2.74, 'Twis nou oor Olivier'. 
76. Dr S.L.Barnard, p. 416. 
77. Van Eeden came from the Swellendam 6rea, Jae De Villiers from Paarl. 
( 
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Reformists regarded Olivier's nomination as compensation for the loss of 
Wynberg. Thereafter the approval of certain Old Guard nominations could 
go ahead. Etienne Malan was a point in case. As a member of the 
Schlebusch Commission he had faced intense oppos~tion on the Reef. His 
was the very last nomination to be approved and then only because Sir 
De Vil! iers Graaff had insisted on his colleague receiving it. 78 ·The 
delay and uncertainty in Orange Grove contributed to Etienne Malan's 
d f b R L . f h p • p 79 e eat y upert or1mer o t e rogress1ve arty. Graaff had over-
ruled the divisional committee of Orange Grove and rescued Malan who 
had been doing an unpopular parliamentary duty for the United Party._ The 
Star referred to this as the 'unseemly nomination of Etienne Malan by 
Graaff' whil~ Hogart~de Hoogh of the Sunday Times, which had recently 
80 
claimed that it had the best interests of the Party at heart, wrote 
that Graaff had become the captive of his Old Guard, and would reap the 
whirlwind. 81 As it turned out, Malan faced the most slanderous campaign 
of denigration of any candidate in the election which included allusions 
to his supposedly anti-semitic past. The unsavoury nature of this 
criticism must have frightened all verl igtes and a good many verkramptes 
from voting for him. Yet, Malan was regarded by his colleagues as one 
of the hardest and most conscientious· workers in parl iament. 82 Conceiv-
ably, had a reformist candidate been nominated in Orange Grove, as the 
78. Interview with Senator Horak, 8.6.82, and with Sir De Viii iers Graaff, 
16.6.82. 
79. Dr S.L.Bar~ard, p. 422. Mervis of the Sunday Times would boycott 
Progressive candidates until the Party moved Lorimer from Bryanston 
where he was opposing the Young Turk reformist Horace van Rensburg. 
Once they had done so no leading reformist was opposed by the P.P. 
in the Transvaal. 
80. Following the November 1973 National Congress in Bloemfontein. 
81. Sunday Times, 3.3.74. 'Div. lets himself down over nominations'. 
82. Graaff regarded him as an outstanding member of the Party's parl ia-
mentary team. He had a brilliant academic record as a Rhodes 
scholar. 
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constituency committees had wished, ~he seat would have been saved as 
the Progressive Party tended not to contest divisions where 'known' 
United Party verl igtes such as Dall ing and Schwarz were standing. 83 
Had the desired nomination taken place it would not in any event have 
benefited the United Party because the majority of reformists who had 
won seats at the election had deserted the Party by 1975. 
3. The election. 
Once the nomination courts had sat on March 18 and the issue of candidates 
had been disposed of the United Party endeavoured, yet again, to "close its 
ranks and present a united front to the electorate. The ~crimony 
engendered by its nomination battles, however, 1 ingered and the press 
continued to exploit internal differences. The nationalists described 
in detail any contradictory statements and depicted the United Party 
as speaking with at least t\'JO voices, one for the 1 verligte 1 urban areas, 
the other for the more conservative constituencies. With few exceptions 
the English· language newspapers made no effort to foster Party unity 
and came out in support of candidates they considered to be reformist in 
outlook. A Cape Times editorial had already stated that it would not 
support United Party candidates opposed to the reformist movement. It 
84 would rather favour a verl igte nationalist than a verkrampte 'Sap'. The 
newspaper never did explain what a verl igte nationalist was and when 
challenged by Gray Hughes, the Party's chief whip, to reveal the basis 
on which it distinguished between verligte and verkrampte United Party 
candidates it was unable to do so but admitted that it was a matter of 
judgement rather than of fact. 85 
83. Dr S.L.Barnard, p. 423. 
84. Cape Times, 20.12.73, editorial. 
85. Letter to the Cape Times, 8.3.74, by Gray Hughes. 
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Notwithstanding this revelation the role piayed by these newspapers had 
a negative effect on the Party's performance which in certain constit-
uencies 1 ike Orange Grove was decisive. With the exception of the Sunday 
86 
Express they adopted an ambiguous position prior to the election. 
While they professed to support the opposition cause it was done in such 
a manner and with so many reservations that it created confusion. In 
their preoccupation with the shortcomings of the United Party the national-
ists were almost ignored. The Star87 and the Cape Times 88 would only 
support verl igte United Party candidates while the Sunday Times actually 
1 d . I b I f l . 89 Th. . . d d . h se ecte its est man team or par 1ament. 1s co1nc1 e wit a 
new ~rive to persuade the electorate to support the man rather than the 
Party. This meant ~~at policies and principles became a secondary con-
sideration. It was no longer good enough to vote for the United Party 
and its policies, more important was the person who was to interpret 
them. 90 The nationalists, on the other hand, had traditionally tended to 
support their Party as its policies were more important than the c<{ndid-
ates representing them. 91 If an elected member later disappointed the 
voters as a person they would at least have the satisfaction of knowing 
that they had voted for the Party and not the man. 
86. Sunday Express, 17.3.74, 'Vote for the Party', and its editorial 
of 31.3.74, 'Dont't be misled', warned against the folly of voting 
for the man rather than for the party. 
87. Sunday Times, 17.3.74, 'Star starts to twinkle'. 
88. Cape Times, 2.4.74, 'We support reform•. 
89. Sunday Times, 14.4.74. 
90. Sunday Express, 21.4.74, 'Fight the enemy'. It ridiculed the concept 
of voting for a 1 bestman 1 team. 
91. Burger, 16.4.74, Dawie: 'Om vir die man te stem'. 
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The other flaw in the 'vote for the ~an' slogan was that a very small 
percentage of voters in any constituency ever berame acquainted with the 
candidate. They had to rely to a )arge extent on the notoriously 
subjective judgements of the newspapers for an opinion as to his worth-
iness or otherwise. It was far more logical to support the Party and 
its policies. ~__!:.!.,commenting on this issue suggested that United 
Party supporters might as well be called upon to vote for Sir De Villiers 
Graaff 1 s smile. 92 
tn its 'best man' team the Sunday Times listed twenty-two desirable, 
enlightened candidates. It included eight from the United Party, eight 
f 
progressives, four nationalists and two democrats. Included among the 
U.P. favourites were Radclyffe Cadman and Andre Fourie both of whom 
in the past had been branded as conservatives. Fourie was later to 
join the National Party and currently represents them in parl iament(1982). 
Punt Janson was selected as a nationalist verl igte but a week after 
having this honour bestowed on him he made it clear that he w~s a firm 
supporter of the 180 day detention law. It can only be surmised as to 
the criterion employed by the Sunday Times to select this multi-Rarty 
side for it represented virtual)y the whole spectrum of political thought 
in South Africa. Yet, in some in~x~l icable manner they.would 1 do justice 
to their supporters and their country'. 
This was the type of jouranlistic advice that was being fed to the 
opposition electorate. Only the Sunday Express appealed to the United 
Party voters to support it on the basis of its policies without any 
other consideration being brought to bear. 
92. ·Rapport, 24.2.74, Pienaar: 'Hulle stem maar vir Div 1 s se glimlag'. 
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The undermining of the Party helped the Progressives who campai~ned 
for ihe reformist vote in those constituencies where Young Turks had 
not been nominated. They also exploited the 'vote for the man' 
syndrome in their propaganda which offered the voters a chance to 
elect a 'better and more effective opposition•. Their efforts were 
not without success for the same voters who returned Progressive Party 
members to parliament in three (nstances voted in United Party 
M.P.C. 's. 93 This rather unusual development meant that the same 
voters supported both United and Progressive Party policies simul-
taneously. Otherwise,they had fallen prey to the subjective judgements 
of political commentators Jn deciding who the best candida~es were 
on the basis of personality. 
The Progressive Party which had in 1970 performed dismally in terms of 
seats won and had been in the political wilderness since its establish-
ment in 1959 received a new lease on life ai the problems in the United 
Party gradually acceler~ted its declirte. The English press, which 
even in its darkest moments had treated it favourably, came out more 
strongly on its side as the election approached. This,coupled with the 
twin assets of ready money and good organizatio~ helped the Progressives 
to do well in 1974. It contested o~ly twenty-one selected seats and 
concentrated its efforts on ~hem. 9 4 Of this number two were against the 
nationalists, three car.didates were involved in three-cornered contests 
and in the sixteen other constituencies the United Party was the enemy. 
To all intents and purposes the Progressive Party was fighting the 
official opposition while ignoring the government. 
93• In Rondebosch, Parktown and Orange Grove the P.P. won the 
parliamentary contest while the U.P. held the provincial seat 
in ~ach inst~nce. 
94. J.Str~ngv.i'ays-Booth, A Cricket in the Thorn Tree, Helen Suzr.ian 
and .. tne Progressive Party(Johannesburg, 1'.376), p. 259. Had -
the P.P. not made headway in 1974 it may have dj~ban~ed. 
The Party ~ade a last and spe~ial effort to win mo~a se~ts in that election. 
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It was left to the United Party, even in its c~isorganized state, to con-
front the nationalists. The Progressives also dld not oppose Young Turk 
candidates in the Transvaal but difected their efforts towards dis]cdg1ng 
95 labelled Old Guard supporters such as Etienne Malan. - Many of the 
Progressive Party clai~s could not stand up well to close scrutiny. They 
could not create a better opposition in the sense of strengthening 
it numerically. But by distracting the United Party from its fight 
against the nationalists they could contribute to weakening the anti-
government forces in parliament and in that would produce a less effective 
opposition, for in the political arena, in the final analysis, only numbers 
count. The quality of the opposition is almost immaterial for if it 
was really so significant then it could be argued that the highly re-
garded Helen Suzman provided all that was required in that direction. 
Quantity is more important than quality in party politics though both are 
desirable, for given enough members ~he opposition would become the 
government which,presumably,is the prime objective of any serious opposi-
tion party. 
The Progressive Party, however, did play an effective role in weakening the 
United Party. It forced it to fight on two fronts and to spread its 
h . h . l . . d 96 I l . h rat er meagre resources more t 1n y over a w1 er area. t sp 1t t e 
opposition vote, in certain constituencies, to the advantage of the 
nationalists and was partly reponsible for the United Party adopting its 
'two-voice' approach on certain issues. Where it fought against progressive 
candidates it projected a more liberal image than it did elsewhere, notably 
in the rural areas. 
95. Dr S.L.Barnard, p. 421. The P.P. concentrated on a selected number 
of seats only. 
96. Horak interview, 8.6.82. The Party was always short of funds. 
145 
The Progressives capitalized on the United Party's misfortunes to become 
the main winners in the election,emerging with six seats. Suzman retained 
97 I ts 
Houghton while the other five were al] won from the United Party. 
successes were to continue after the election. It was also fortified 
by defections from the United Party as it later rushed toward extinction. 
The Progressive successes of 1974 played an important role in the United 
Party's decline, a process which strengthened both it and the nationalists 
.but numerically weakened the opposition as a whole. 
The 1974 election was the sixteenth since Union and, according to the prime 
minister, had been called early because of the uncertain times which the 
country was likely to face within the next five years. The government wanted 
to be free to deal with any issue which might arise. Vorster must have been 
well informed for on the day following the election Spinola overthrew the 
Portuguese government which, among other things, heralded the end of its 
colonial period in Africa with all its consequent problems for the Republic. 
It was the first time that both parliamentary and provincial elections were 
h 1 d h d Th D 1 . . ·. c . . 98 . d d . d h e on t e same ay. e e 1m1tat1on omm1ss1on na eterm1ne t at 
there would be 171 parliamentary seats, five more than in the previous 
Assembly. 99 The National Party fielded 135 candidates, the U.P. 110, the 
H.N.P. 50 , the Progressives 21 and the Democratic Party 7. There were 
eleven independents and others. lOO The death of Ossie Newton-Thompson in 
an aircraft crash in South West Africa reduced the United Party's number 
of candidates by one and created a vacancy in Pinelands which had to be 
filled at a later by-election. 101 
97. Parktown, Johannesburg North, Orange Grove, Rondebcsch and Sea Point. 
98. It consisted of judges PM Cillie, RP Erasmus and GP van Rhyn. 
99. Report of the Thirteenth Del imitation Commission, 8.2.74, Government 
Gazette. Transvaal 76, Cape 55, Natal 20, O.F.S. 14, S.W.A. 6. 
100. B.M.Schoeman, Parlementere Verkiesings 1910-1976, p. 510. 
101. Parliamentary Register Part II 1961-i980. Published by House of Assembly. 
The c~ash 0ccurred on 3.4.74, after nominations had closed . Consequent-
ly by-elecions had to be held in Pinelands and also in Karas, S.W.A~as 
the U.P. candidate G.J.van den Berg for this area was killed in t:1e same crash. 
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There was never any doubt as to the 0utcorne cf the e 1 ec ti on but the strong 
showing of the Progressive Party was not entirely expected. The final 
state of the parties was: National Party 122, United Party 41, Progressive 
Party 6. There were two vancancies, Pinelands and Wonderboom. The former 
was won by the Progressive Party and the latter by the nationalists 
at subsequent by-elections. 102 The United Party had lost ten seats, 
five to the Progressives and four to the nationalists. Progressive Party 
gains were made ln Johannesburg North, Orange Grove, Parktown, Sea Point 
and Rondebosch. The U.P. lost Florida, Turffontein, Eshowe and Port Natal 
to the nationalists but won Randburg from them. The National Party 
captured 55,4 percent of the vote, the U.P. 32,8, the P.P. 6,3 and the 
103 H.N.P. 4,0. The provincial results revealed that the United Party had 
lost nine seats, six to the nationalists and three to the Progressives. 
The resu'lts were a severe blow to the United Party but taking into account 
the divided state in which it had entered the campaign they should not 
have been entirely unexpected. The Party never recovered from these 
setbacks and the trend away from it was confirmed in later by-elections. 
The National Party had improved its performance by capturing a number of 
marginal seats although direct comparisons with the 1970 results were 
not possible as a result of delimitation changes. The much discredited 
Marais Steyn won narrowly against his former protege, Andre Fourie in 
Turffontein. Marais Steyn had been one of the most sought after speakers 
at nationalist ~eetings where he vigorously attacked his former party and 
blamed the reformists for 'white-anting' it from within. 104 
102. J.Swanepoel, Die Verkiesing van 24 April 1974, lnstituut vir Eietydse 
Geskiedenis, U.O.V.S.(June, 1974), p. 8. 
103. IBID., p. 9. 
104. Pro-NAT, April 1974, 'V.P. tot die dood toe siek'. 
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The Progressive successes were confined to the wealthier English speak in~ 
urban constituenci~s which had been exposed to the sustained press attacks 
on the United Party. Their gains were exclusively at the expense of the 
United Party in what had formerly been regarded as 1 safe 1 seats and 
they were against both 1 verl igte 1 and 1 verkrampte 1 United Party candidates. 
105 Etienne Malan was voted out of Orange Grove, not because he was an 
ineffective M.P. but because of his Old Guard connections. 106 His 
opponent was Rupert Lorimer. On the other hand, Dr van Zyl Slabbert won 
against the reformist, Brian Bramford while Col in Eglin defeated David 
Graaff, an attractive young candidate who was not at all verkramp although 
. 107 
an effort was made to_Jabel him as such. The conclusion reached was 
that if the electorate, in tertain seats, was confronted by two can-
didates both of whom were verlig they would then vote for the Progressive 
candidate. The election results also indicated that a fair number of 
opposition supporters had finally decided to switch their allegiance to 
the Progressive Party either out of conviction or else out of exasperation 
at the chaotic situation prevailing in the United Party. On the Witwaters-
rand leading reformists had won well but none of them had been opposed by 
Progressive candidates, and presumably their votes included many cast 
by Progressive supporters. 
105. Sunday Times, 31.3.74, Editorial: 'Freedom of Choice'. The 
newspaper came out strongly against Malan and the Schlebusch 
commission, and supported Lorimer of the Progressive Party. 
106. Interview with Senator Horak, 7,5,82. His provincial running-
mate, Alf Widman, a reformist, won for the U.P. indicating 
that the campaign against Malan had been effective. 
107. Cape Times, 17.4.74, Editorial: 'Whom to support?' It asked 
the electorate to vote for Prof van Zyl Slabbert and Col in 
Eglin as they would be 'better for the reformist movement'. 
-
148 
But of the 35 seats they had promised the United Party on the ~eef there 
was 1 . 1 . d 1 08 1tt e ev1 ence. Schwarz who had made certain predictions to 
the Sunday Times which were published three days before the election 
d b h d d 
. 109 prove to e one un re percent incorrect. In fact, the United Party 
fared worst in the Transvaal where the reformist::; were in control of the 
campaign. Instead of winning thirty-five seats they won eleven and in 
the process lost three seats to the Progressives and two to the nation-
al ists. Instead of revitalizing the Party the reformists appeared to 
have weakened it. Unfavourable comparisons were drawn with the advances 
made under the· leadership of Marais Steyn_in 1970. 
' 
The newspaper headlines following the election indicated conclusively, 
if any further evidence was still required, where.their sympathies 
really lay. They were euphoric about the Progressive Party advances 
and almost ignored the nationalists' victory by an increased majority. 
On April 25 the Cape Times proclaimed in bold-print: 'Progs. make 
inroads into U.P., the Argus: 'Big election blow to U.P. 1 , the Star: 
1 Progs. maul U.P.', and the Rand Daily Mail: 'Triumph for Progs.'. 
The United Party's troubles were far from over. Besides losing to the left 
and to the right its own caucus would in future be more divided as 
a result of an influx of new, reformist M~P.'s including Harry Schwarz 
the member for Yeovil le. The Young Turks had established another power 
base from which they could continue their efforts to reform the Party 
form within, failing which they were in a better position to split it 
in their endeavour to bring about a realignment in opposition politics. 
108. Sunday Times, 23.7.72, Dynamic young i~en ..• aim to win 35 Rand 
seats'. The U.P. in fact won 11 seat::; in the Transvaal. 
109. Sunday Times, 21.4.74. Among his predictions were that Boksburg, 
Spri~gs, Germiston district, Maraisburg, Rissik and Witwatersburg 
were within the grasp of the U.P. Not one was won. Randburg, 
which was captured, he did not mention. 
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Unlike the strong stand taken against dissident elements by Dr Malan llO 
in 1943 and Vorster, to a lesser extent, in 1970 Sir De Villiers Graaff 
had failed to take action to counter similar groups in his own party 
before the 1974 election. He had attempted to keep the factions to-
gether, for the Party had traditionally been one of compromise and 
consensus. But the clash of interests and personalities which had 
d h d b d h 1. . f bl lll D ' . . emerge a gone eyon t e 1m1ts o reasona eness. ec1s1ve action 
had been necessary if Party harmony was to be restored. This was not 
forthcoming and if the Party had made one mistake, according to Vause 
Raw leader of the New Republic Party, it was that it had waited too long 
. . . . l h . . 1 .bl 11 2 1n trying to reconc1 et e 1rreconc1 a es. Consequently.the post-
election situation in the United Party was a recipe for disaster. Dr 
Malan had declared war on the fringe groups of the 'Herenigde' Nasionale 
Party and had brushed them all aside - the Ossewabrandwag, Oswald Pirow's 
New Order, Laius Weichardt 1 s Greyshirts and Havenga's Afrikaner Party. 
The approach to the 1943 election had also been characterized by an 
opposition is disarray but Dr Malan had used the opportunity to deal 
with the troublemakers and although a small opposition had been returned 
to parliament it was united behind its leader and the policy of hJs party. 
Only thereafter had Dr Malan offered the olive ·branch to his opponents 
d b 1948 h N . . l p . 11 3 an y t e at1ona arty was :n power. John Vorster had acted 
swiftly to destroy the threat posed by Dr Hertzog's Herstigte Nasionale 
Party and had called the 1970 election partly to flush them out. Sir 
De Villiers, on the other hand, had led a divided party into the 1974 
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The election had resolved none of th~ United Party's problems. 
4. The Pinelands by-election. 
The exodus of opposition voters from the Party continued and it suffered 
a severe reverse at the Pinelands by-election which had been necessitated 
by the death of Oswald Newton-Thompson. The United Party had won the 
provincial seat fairly comfortably in April, although with a reduced 
majority, against the Progressives. Its failure to retain the parliamentary 
seat was indicative of the growing swing against it. During the post-election 
period the Old Guard-reformist battles continues unabated. There were 
differences of opinion regarding the nomination of candidates to fill 
the Party's quota of Senate seats while in the Cape there was a con-
certed effort by the reformists to depose the leadership clique at an 
early congress. 
' ' 
'Graaff contemplates his position as Party 1eader' 
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The Party's new federal pol icy remained a point of friction as varying 
interpretations were placed on its meaning while Sir De Villiers Graaff's 
leadership again came under the searchlight following his fifth con-
secutive defeat at the polls. 11 5 
Their successes in the general election encouraged the Progressive Party 
to make an all out effort to capture the Pinelands constituency. To 
strengthen their chances they discarded their original general election 
candidate, Eric Gettle, in order to enlist the services of the more 
glarrorous Dr Alex Boraine. He was a former leader of the Methodist 
Church in South Africa and consequently would be a strong protagonist 
of civil 1 iberties, an area in which the United Party had been judged 
and had ostensibly been found wanting. The Progressives were apparently 
also going to rely on their 'vote for the man' slogan used so successfully 
d . h A ·1 1 • 
116 ur1ng t e recent pr1 e ect1on. 
The United Party candidate was to be Miss Annette Reinecke the newly 
elected M.P.C.· for Rondebosch. Her nomination had not been without 
drama as her opponent was none other than the 'verl igte' Kobus van Eeden 
who, as was mentioned earlier, had been 'axed' by the Candidates 
Committee in Wynberg. 117 In order to enhance his chances of receiving the 
nomination three other reformists withdrew from the contest, namely 
Messrs Bamford, Carlisle and P.Myburgh. In a democratic vote, however~ 
the Pinelands divisional committee supported Miss Reinecke and her 
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Had van Eeden been chosen, there was little doubt, in the 1 ight of recent 
nomination squabbles, that his nomination would have been approved. Pine-
lands required a verl igte candidate and he would have fulfilled those 
requirements. Reinecke had managed to remain aloof from the Young Turk-
Old Guard fight and consequently had not been labelled in a~y way. Never-
theless, the reformists had been upset that their favourite, van Eeden, 
had not been nominated. The third candidate. in Pinelands was Dr Brian 
Peers, National Party, English speaking and Cathol le. His entry into 
the contest proved decisive. It split the more conservative vote to 
the detriment of the United Party and, as was to be the case in Durban 
North in 1976, demonstrated that in any three-cornered contest in a tradi-
tionally English speaking constituency the Progressive Party was 1 ikely 
to win. 119 In Pinelands all three candidates conducted an enlightened 
campaign each placing the most 1 iberal interpretation possible on their 
policies. 
The Burger predicted, with a certain degree of accuracy, that the Pinelands 
by-election would decide to which opposition party the future belonged. 
It depicted the United Party as directionless and battle scarred with the 
electorate unaware as to which faction it was voting for, while the Pro-
gressives, according to it, were simply perpetuating the old Unionist 
traditions with their uni] igual candidate. The Party was incapable of 
capturing a significant number of Afrikaner votes and was, it claimed, 
merely leading the English speaking electorate towards greater political 
• 1 . 120 1so at1on. 
In a following article the Burger claimed that the Unlted Party was losing 
its only real right to exist, namely its ability to draw supporters from 
widely differing backgrounds. 
119. Streiche~ interview, 5.5.82. 
120. Die ~urger, 6.6.7 1L Dawie: 'Uit my pol itieke pen'. 
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It was heir to the traditions of Botha and Smuts but the emergence ~f 
the reformists was destroying that character and making it a pale image 
of the Progressive Party with declining influence. This faction had 
done so much damage to its traditional image that it would never be 
able to rehabilitate itself as it entered a last ditch jingoistic 
I . d . S h Af . · l · l 
2 l h · strugg e against an expan 1ng out r1can nat1ona ism. T 1s news-
paper, though overstating its case, was laying the blame firmly on the 
reformists for the problems in the· United Party. It was correct in pre-
dieting that the Party would never recover and that the Progressives 
would come to represent a small number of English speaking constituencies 
outside the mainstream of white political thought. Judging by the 1977 
election results it could be argued that the Nat;onal Party had won so 
much support that it had come to represent the broad spectrum of South 
African political thinking which included the direction fostered by 
Generals Botha, Smuts, Hertzog and Sir De Villiers Graaff. 122 
In an attempt to demonstrate its unity of purpose the United Party assembled 
on the same platform Miss Reinecke, Japie Basson and, the Cape leader, 
Myburgh Streicher who was hardly given a hearing at the Rondebosch meeting. 123 
Basson, on the other hand, was cheered by the largely student audience. 
The merits of their respective speeches counted for nothing, their degree 
of purported verligtheid for everything. Streicher, however, was not to 
be intimidated and later returned to: the state of the Party in a contro-
versial speech made at Nuy near Worcester on June 5. It was a speech which 
could well have been made at a less sensitive time than the Pinelands by-
election for it was usec by his opponents against the Party. 
121. Die Burger, 10.6.74, '··n Party is sy naam'. 
122. Sunday Times, 5.5.74, Uys: •centre occupied by National Party today'. 
123. The meeting took place on 22.5.1974. 
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Streicher, himself, felt that no matter what he had said it would have been 
employed by a ·hostile press to discredit him. But he be 1 i eved, what he 
said had needed saying. 124 He took the English press task for the to 
role they had played in the affairs of the Party since 1970. They were 
attempting to push it in a so-called verl igte d1rection, failing which 
they would 1 ike to split it in order to direct the verl igtes towards the 
Progressive Party as the latter needed the kiss of 1 ife. Obstacles to 
these go~ls, which had to be removed, included Graaff and others who 
thought 1 ike him. Streicher then went on to name the journalists of the 
Sunday Times as the chief culprits in the newspaper campaign against the 
United Party. He also criticized those who intimated they were prepared 
to take over the leadership of the Party. This was an attack on Japie 
Sasson who had suggested that if he was required he would be willing to 
lead the United Party. In a later interview Myburgh Streicher admitted 
that he had nothing against Basson but what he objected to was his offer 
while Graaff was still leader of the Party and had never indicated that he 
125 was preparing to step down. The Cape leader threatened to resign if 
all the things done in the name of verl igtheidwere laid at the door of 
the United Party. 126 It was far bette~ he felt, to seek points of 
agreement with the government on certain issues. 
Streiche~speech, which had evoked the now familiar responses, had to be 
considered against the background of post-election comment which had 
again called for Graaff 1 s resignation 127 and his replacement by a verligte 
. 128 
such as Sasson. 
124. Interview with Streicher, 5.5.82. 
125. IBID. 
126. Di'eBurger, 6.6.74, 1 Streicher dreig om uit die V.P. te bedank 1 • 
127. Sunday Times, 12.5.74, 'Electorate blames Div. for poll losses•, and 
IBID., 2.6.74, 1 Call to make Japie U.P. deputy leader•. 
128. Die Burger, 28.4.74, 1 Jong Turke kie~ Japie 1 • 
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Graaff who had always given. journalists a good hearing and was not hostile 
129 
to them spoke bluntly of their slanted reporting and unfair criticism. 
Speaking on the United Party's electoral 1 3() setbacks he mentioned as 
an example the hours spent on attempting to explain to reporters_the_ 
Party's att i tuclc towa rcis the Sch 1 ebusch Commission but to no ava i 1. It 
seemed that the editors had decided that whatever Harry Schwarz said 
was verl ig but no m~tter what a John Wiley said it 0ould be verkramp. 
That, he said, was the approach adopted by the English newspapers to-
wards the Party. 131 
The Sunday Times had actually 1 isted the names of six United Party members 
132 it held chiefly responsible for the Party's defeat. Among them were 
Myburgh Streicher, John Wiley and Radclyffe Cadman who before the 
election had been included in the newspaper's 1 ist of the best available 
men to represent the country! As has already been explaineL, Sir De 
Villiers had rewon the confidence of English newspapers following the 
Bloemfontein 'unity' congress which had been interpreted as a victory 
for the verl igtes. But,following the election reverses and the Party's 
unimpressive showing in the Transvaal, where the reformists were in charg~, 
the same press turned its back on Graaff and the majority of his followers. 
Consequently,Streicher's speech was grist to their mill and received wide 
publicity both in the daily and in the Sunday newspa~ers. 133 None of it 
was favourable. His intended meaning was twisted and taken out of context 
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Streicher rejected the inaccurate reporting of his speech in a Jette::r to 
1 "4 the Cape Times but the damage had been done. ' Strei~her always denied 
that his speech had harmed the Party's chance~ in Pinelands. 135 But 
the media used it to create the impression that the United Party was 
opposed to enlightened po1icies and the 1verl igte 1 mood of the electorate. 
This was disadvantageous to Reinecke who, at all times, had fought a 
verligte campaign ,in Pinelands. 
In addition to the 'gathering storm' around Streicher's speech, Annette 
Reinecke had to contend with a number of other blows which damaged her 
' 136 chances. The verl igte-verkrampte feud had resulted in the resignation 
of George 01 iver 137 from all his posts in the Party as a protest against 
Schwarz's leadership in the Transvaal . 138 
In the Senate elections, label led verligtes such as Brian Bamford and Eric 
Winchester had received seats ahead of Old Guard candidates. 139 Dr Gideon 
Jacobs had also resigned as deputy leader of the Party in the Transvaal. 
And in another act of defiance the Cape Peninsula Council of the United 
Party had been summoned to a special meeting by its reformist members 
to discuss Streicher's speech and John Wiley's support for it This 
was in defiance of the expressed wishes of both Sir De Villiers and the 
chairman of the C.P.C., Tony Hickman. 140 This undisciplined act had a 
.~ 
sequel after the Pinelands poll but in the meantime, coupled with all 
the other problems, it created a bad press for Miss Reinecke who, in 
any event, had a tough fight on her hands. 
134. Cape Times, 6.6.74, Editorial, - 1 Streicher 1 s speech'. 
135. Streicher interview, 5.5.82, see also Argus, 7.6.74, 'Streicher 
defends Worcester speech'. 
136. Sunday Times, 9.6.74, 1 The Gathering Storm'. 
137. Former M. P. -for Kensington. 
138. Sunday Express, 9.6.74, 'Oliver taking legal advice'. 
139. Sunday Times, 9.6.74, 'Senate Blow to Conservatives'. 






Closing the by-election campaign Graaff appealed to the electorate 
to support the 'Bloemfontein initiative' where the Party had adopted a 
verligte direction. The' local Englishn-ewspapersafter their protracted 
criticism of the Party's affairs, made a belated and thinly disguised 
attempt to project a more neutral stance when they praised the 'out-
standing qualities of Dr Boraine' and thereafter appealed to the voters 
to make their own decision as to which candidate sought to 'promote 
. 142 
effective verligte forces'. The nationalist Burger attacked both 
the United and Progressive Parties with equal vigour. This meant that 
the U.P. was caught in the middle without media support. The by-election 
k l . . . b h d . . f 11 . 143 too pace 1n pouring rain, ut t e soun organ1zat1on o a parties 
ensured a percentage poll in excess of eighty. By a margin of thirty-
four votes the Pinelands electorate returned Dr Bora in~ to parliament, 
increasing the Progressive Party's representation to seven in the 
.144 
Assembly, '·· For the United Party it was another major setback that 
could only aggravate its internal differences. If it was unable to 
hold Pinelands then assuredly very few urban seats could be regarded 
as 1 safe 1 , particularly in any three-cornered contest which split 
145 
the more conservative vote. The swing against the United Party 
was accelerating and short of ending the civil war there appeared 
141. Dr S.L. Barnard, p. 437. It was the first time he had addressed 
a by-election meeting. 
142. Cape Times, 10.6.74, 'Over to Pinelands'. 
143. Interview with Senator Horak, 8.5.82. Hebel ieved the U.P. had 
lost because its supporters, by that time, had lost interest 
and because the heavy rain had kept some of them at home. 
144. B.M. Schoeman, Parlementere Verkiesings, pp. 486 - 90. Dr 
Boraine (PP.) 4921.votes, A. Reinecke (Li.P.) 4887, and Dr Peers 
1649. P.P. majority of 34. Percentage poll 81.S. Date of 
by-election 12.6.1974. 
145. Interview with Myburgh Streicher, 5.5.82. 
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to be no way of stopping, let alone reversing, it. 
'The Pinelands by-election poses a 
threat to the Party's future' 
In a post election comment Miss Reinecke referred to the 'sick 
146 soul 1 of the Party which she believed had influenced the result. 
Besides this condition an issue worth considering was: what role, 
if any, had personal and pol icy attributes played in the Pine lands 
Poll? Dr Boraine was portrayed as a glamorous candidate, but he 
lacked Reinecke's political experience who herself had been described 
as an attractive personality a short while previously. 147 With 
regard to policies, both candidates fought a 1verligte 1 campaign and as 
far as civil liberties were concerned both professed support for 
146. Cape Times, 14.6.74, 'On the Pinelands Result'. 
147. That is,during the provincial election in Rondebosch ln April. 
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the rule of law. Both the United and Progressive Party's racial 
policies could be heavily criticized as no yardstick existed by 
which the one could be judged superior to the other. The shift 
away from the U.P. could thus not be explained by the sudden attrac-
'' 
tiveness of its opponent~ policies for they had been in existence 
since 1959. The decline in the Party's popularity had to be sought 
elsewhere. 
It was rather a rebellion by English speaking voters against the 
apparent futility of supporting a Party with a loser's image and 
· 11B 
which was riddled with ever-deepening confl lets. That the ~i~ht 
of these voters to the Progressive Party represented the exchange 
of one politically declining power block for another i~potent one 
appeared to matter 1 ittle. The United Party was losing English 
speaking support to its left and Afri~aans speaking voters to the 
right. The very reason for its existence was being threatened as 
polarization took place among the white electorate. The broad 
South Africanism for which Botha and Smuts had striven was being 
whittled away. Since 1948 the United Party had steadily lost its 
Afrikaner support and in 1974 it had not ever contested platteland· 
seats like Caledon and Swellendam where it had always received 
strong backing. The general election of. 1974 had indicated that it 
was also losing English support. The Pinelands by-election had 
confirmed that trend. 
148, Cape Times, 13.6.74, Editorial: 'Significance of Pinelands'. 
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According to 1 Dawie 1 of the Burger three streams were discernible 
among opposition English speaking voters. Firstly, there were those 
who supported the Progressive Party. Secondly, there were the Young 
Turk reformists who were closer to the Progressives than to their 
own United Party traditions. Lastly, there remained the trusted 
but dying group which sought co-operation with Afrikaans members of 
the community. 149 It was a sound analysis and when the United Party 
finally disbanded in 1977 it became evident that the first two 
streams had merged while the majority of the third group voted for 
the National P~rty in-the election of that year, leaving a small 
core which made up the New Republic Party. The Pine lands by-election 
had pointed to this dispensation. 
5. 1 G.R.O.W. 1 contributes to party disunity 
The Pine lands reverse again focused attention on the prevailing 
power struggle in the Cape with particular regard to the leadership 
positions occupied by Messrs Streicher, Wiley and Hickman. The 
result was inte~preted , in certain quarters, as a major setback 
for them. The Cape Times called for an early congress in order that 
the reformists could take over and steer the Party away from Old 
Guard policies and so restore its flagging fortunes. l50 
The campaign to replace the Cape leadership had begun indirectly 
149. Die Burger,15.6.74, 1 Dawie 1 , Ult my Pol itieke Pen. 
150. Cape Times, Editorial, 18.6.74, 1 U.P. in Turmoil 1• 
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as a movement to foster the reformist cause in the Cape. It had 
developed secretly into a carefully planned scheme, known as 1 GROW 1 , 
to oust John Wiley. Get Rid of Wiley (GROW) was, however, just the 
code name, and its main objective was the replacement of all conserva-
tives in leadership positions from constituency level upwards. 151 It 
was significant that by the end of 1974 Wiley had resigned as deputy 
leader, Hickman had not stood for re-election as chairman of the Cape 
Peninsula Council and a number of reformists had been expelled from 
the Party for disloyalty. A bid to replace Streicher failed narrowly 
at the Cape Congress in November, but by then the Party had been 
virtually split into two irreconcilable factions in the Province. 
Reformist influence in the Cape on an organised basis can be traced 
to the activities of Robin Carl isle, who had unsuccessfully contested 
the Vasco constituency for the Party in the 1974 general election. 
He had formerly been a Progressive who had joined the United Party 
on the Witwatersrand in March 1972. He was a strong supporter of 
Harry Schwarz and was one of those who had made the United Party their 
home following its 1970 electoral successes. Carlisle transferred to 
Cape Town and in the latter half of 1973 built up his Intermediate 
Group which,initialfy,was a political discussion forum. Its mem-
bers, who were invited to join, later became prominent in reformist 
politics and were involved in many of the clashes with elected Party 
leaders. l 52 
151. Minutes of 'GROW' meetings,27.4.74 and 4.5.7L, 
152. Interview with Horak 8.6.82. He told of Carl isle's apparent 
enthusiasm to work for the U.P. 
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Carl isle became an important figure in the Peninsula and in the 
affairs of the Party in the region. It was suspected and later 
claimed that he was involved in meetings with the press, with whom 
he had a close rapport, and that he provided them with confidential 
Party information. He became deeply involved in the leadership contro-
versies in the Cape and worked actively for a change at the top. 153 
His ~ntermediate Group gradually evolved into the organization 1 GROW 1 , 
a reformist clique, which wanted to alter the Party radically from 
within. There was hardly an unpleasant incident in the United Party 
i~ the Peninsula which did not involve Carlisle 1 s group during the 
period of its existence. Each incident received wide publicity. One 
such example was the press coverage of an unofficial meeting arranged 
by the Intermediate Group with the Western Province Council of Churches 
to discuss, among other things, the role of the United Party in the 
Schlebusch Commission. 154 Although no reporters had been present, 
the meeting nevertheless received wide coverage and the articles 
intimated that the U.P. delegates present had agreed with the attack 
made by the churchmen on the Schlebusch Commission.155 This was later 
confirmed by the ministers present, but denied by the United Party 
representatives. l5b 
The Carlisle group was most active in the Sea Point and Gardens 
constituencies where prominent reformists gained control of the 
153. A memorandum submitted by Myburgh Streicher in 1974 to the Cen-
tral Disciplinary Committee included evidence of this. 
154. Cape Times, 3.10.73, 1 U.P. and Churchmen for meeting•. 
155. IBID., 5.10.73, 1 Churchmen against U.P. on Schiebusch 1• 
156. TBID., 6.10.73, 1 U.P. men deny attack on Schlebusch 1 • See also 
D'i'eBurger, 6.10.73, 1 Schlebusch - berig laat V.P. skarrel 1 • 
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branch structure. New members were enrolled and these committees 
became numerically strong. New branches were initiated in other 
constituencies while attemps were made to transfer members to exis-
ting, but weak, committees. 157 This was, however, contrary to the 
Party's constitution which stipulated that members had to belong to 
branches in the electoral divisions where they resided, except in 
'exceptional circumstances'. Consequently, the request of some 
thirty Young Turks to be transferred to other branches was blocked 
on this technicality. l58 Although this was strictly a domesLic issue 
~etails were 'leaked' to the newspapers which commented unfavourably 
on the attempts by the Old Guard to curtail the activities of the 
-reformists. 159 In the light of later developments there was 1 ittle 
doubt that Carl isle's reformists were intent on capturing the Party's 
branch structure and from that base extending their influence thr~ugh 
strong delegate representation to the Cape Peninsula Counci/l, the 
· 6U chairman of which was Tony Hickman. 1 Such a development was not 
viewed with enthusiasm by the Party establ is~nent and consequently 
the request for transfers by reformists was rejected. At the Annual 
General Meeting of the C.P.C. in August 1973 their influence was 
thus still limited and Hickman was re-elected chairman although 
Carlisle and other verligtes also gained seats on the executive. 
As will be demonstrated the position had altered by the following 
A.G.M. where the Carlisle group captured control of the Cape Penin-
157. Interview with Senator Horak, 8.5.82. Carlisle, after arr1v1ng 
from Johannesburg, approached him and requested to become active 
in the Party. He was advised to form a branch in Sea Point, 
whic~ he did. 
158. Sunday Times, 9.6.73, 'Transfer rule angers U.P. men'. 
159. Cape Times, 11.6.73, 'Confrontation looms in U.P.' 
160. Interview with Horak, 8.5.82 and Wiley, 5.4.82. 
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sula Counci 1. 
While the activities of the Young Turks were not conducive to Party 
harmony, as disturbing to its future well-being was the lack of loyalty 
demonstrated by those individuals who provided information of a domes-
tic nature to the me'Clia and whose subsequent reports in the words of 
Hickman were 'pot-pouris of little fact and much fancy'. Speaking 
to the Boland Regional Committee in Malmesbury on June 11 Myburgh 
Streicher accused the press of 'exploiting anything just to embarrass 
the U.P.' He emphasized that party loyalty was a qualification for 
party membership. It was a vain appeal, for the undermining continued 
as did the 'fabrications of some newspaper writers'. 
Following the Pinelands by-election the ~un~ay Express came into the 
possession of copies of documents which exposed the secret campaign 
of the Cape reformists to replace the Party leadership there.1~ 
As has been mentioned the campaign was known as 'GROW' and was, in 
truth, the final product of Carlisle's original Intermediate Group. 
The documents~ which were minutes of meetings, revealed that the 
chairman of 'GROW' was Philip Myburgh 1 ~ (unrelated to the Philip 
Myburgh of Oudtshoorn by-election fame who was to resign from the 
Party because of the activities of the reformists). His Director 
of Operations was none other than Carlisle and if any doubt still 
existed regarding rhe role of the press in the fortunes of the 
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officer was Hans Strydom of the Sunday Times, the outspoken critic 
of the Old Guard leaders in the United Party. Other prominent mem-
bers of the group included ~obus van Eeden and Tiaan van der Merwe. 
Minutes of 'GROW' meetings were undoubtedly kept, although Myburgh 
preferred to refer to them as informal notes. Those made at the time 
of the general election indicated that it was the intention of the 
group to oust both Streicher and Wiley in order that van Eeden could 
be elected leader of the Party in the Cape. They also intended to 
work for an early congress to achieve this goal . 164 Judging by 
similar demands which appeared in the press, following the el~ction 
setbacks, it would seem that the group's rapport with the newspapers 
was particularly good at the time. The minutes also revealed that 
van Eeden would be promoted as a candidate in the Pine lands by-election. l65 
As it happened the Party leadership refused to hold an early congress 
while van Eeden lost the Pinelands nomination to Miss Reinecke. 
These reverses irked 1 GROW 1 s 1 Director of Operations and at a meeting 
on May 4 at Joostenberg (Myburgh 1 s farm) Carlisle suggested ccnfron-
tation with the establishment at every opportunity. These minutes 
also indicate that 1 GROW 1 had contact with the Democratic and Pro-
gressive parties both of whom, however, regarded the reform movement 
in the U.P. as being dead. l66 Carlisle, whom even his opponents 
regarded as an excellent organizer 1,67 , thereafter directed the group's 
plan of action towards having verligtes elected at the Cape Congress. 
164. Minutes of meeting held in the Newlands Transite hotel, 27.4.74. 
165. Die Burger, 19.8.74, 11 GROW 1 se planne onthul'. 
166. Minutes, 4.5.1974. 
167. Interviews with Streicher, 5.5.82 and Senator Horak, 8.6.82. 
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To enlist support, office bearers of the Party would be approached, 
new reformist branch committees would be established while the 
Party's youth wing and women's divisions were to be captured. It 
was planned to get rid of Tony Hickm~n as chairman of the C.P.C. 
and to attack Sir De Villiers Graaff's leadership. 168 In short, 
the reformists' cause was to be encouraged at every possible oppor-
tunity. With the support of the local English newspapers an atmos-
phere favourable to the reformists was created and many of the aims 
listed in the minutes were achieved. As an example, the Boland and 
Peninsula Women's Council 163 was captured by the reformists. 170 'GROW' 
also had plans for the Port Elizabeth region where the aftermath of 
the divisive nomination disputes made it fertile ground for reformist' 
activities. Theo Aronson, M.P., 1<1ho was elected unopposed in Walmer, 
kept a meticulous record of the activities of the local reformists 
and the role played by the Port Elizabeth English newspapers in 
supporting them and undermining the elected Party leaders. His 
record of press cuttings and other documents revealed a picture of 
undermining and disloyalty similar in nature to that which existed 
in the Cape Peninsula, on th~ 'Witwatersrand and elsewhere, but on 
a smaller scale. 171 The reformists in Port Elizabeth and in 'GROW' 
wanted Wally Kingwill to replace John Wiley as deputy leader of the 
168, Minutes, 4.5.74. 
169, There had been an unpleasant foter-party fight between Mrs 
Gross, a Young Turk, and Miss Reinecke of the establishment 
for the chairmanship of the Council in July and August. 
170, Cape Times, 3.8.74, 'Women re-elect verligte chairman'. Mrs 
Gross was favoure~ ahead of Miss Reinecke. 
171, Aronson Papers. These include 26 annexures ar.d private letters 
detailing the activities of reformists in the Eastern Cape and 
the role played by the Evening Post and Herald in the Party's 
affairs. These are in my possession. 
167 
Party at. the next congress. In this instance they achieved their 
objective although Wiley had by that time made himself unavailable 
for re-election. 
'GROW' was well organized and its plans were carefully considered. 
Re~ormists were appointed in each Peninsula constituency to look 
after their interests and to campdign for the van Eeden-Kingwill 
ticket at the Congress. The movement was to be kept secret at· all 
costs and when its existence was exposed Myburgh, speaking at Swellen-
dam on August 25, maintained that it was a justifiable campaign which 
wanted the best leaders elected in a climate which would be favourable 
to the re-orientation of opposition political parties. 172 Myburgh 
Streicher, in an interview, rejected 1 GROW 1 as an unde,11ocratic 
development which operated in secret and which created a party within 
a party.173 
'GROW' enjoyed a certain degree of success. van Eeden was re-
elected, albeitly narrowly, as chairman of the .South Cape region 
of the Party while the reformists also captured control of the 
Cape Peninsula Council in August when Ryk Merkel replaced Hickman 
as its chairman who, however, had not made himself available for 
another term of office. 174 John WI ley did not have to face the 
possibility of defeat at the Cape congress as he had resigned as 
deputy-leader before the time. This had made it easier for Kingwill 
to replace him. During the course of these events Old Guard 
172. Die Burger, 26.8.74, 1 Myburgh oor 1 GROW 1 toegejuig'. 
173. Streicher interview, 5.5.82. 
174, Argus, 16.8.74, 'Reformists take over U.P. in Peninsula'. 
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strategists reacted and various Young Turks were suspended and later 
11 d f h P f h . . . . 175 expe e rom t e arty or t e1r act1v1t1es. There seemed to be 
no end to the feuding between the two factions. 
Carlisle and van Eeden were the first to be suspended in June for 
di~loyalty to the Party. 176 Both appealed to the courts to have 
their suspensions set aside. 177 Streicher, who had originally 
acted against them, did not oppose their applications as he felt 
that it would not be in the interests of the Party to debate domes-
tic issues in public. Tiaan van der Merwe, another member of 1 GROW!, 
represented Carlisle at the hearing. The court ruled in favour of 
the Young Turks, maintaining that they had, for procedural reasons 
been incorrectly punished. 176 Streicher retaliated by reimposing 
h . d" f h . . . 
173 t e suspension pen 1ng urt er 1nvest1gat1ons. The Central 
Disciplinary Commlttee had been established in June following 
recommendations made at the National Congress in Bloemfontein 180 . 
It would hear the appeals of Carlisle and van Eeden and would also 
decide on what action should be taken against those who had been 
responsible for convening the meeting of the C.P.C. prior to the 
Pinelands by-election in defiance of the wishes of both Hickman 
and Sir De Villiers Graaff. The Disciplinary Committee eventually 
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Die Burger, 15.6.74, 1 Kaapse Sappe vat twee hoe Turkevas! 1 
Minutes of tl-.e Action Committee (leadership group of the Cape 
U.P.), 14.6.74. 
Die Burger, 18.6.74, 1 Gesk6rste Sappe wil hof toe 1 • ·Se~ also 
Cape Times, 1 Another suspended reformist decides to take court action'. 
Die G~rger, 20.6.74, 1 Eerste skorsings nietig verklaar deur hof~ 
Cape Times, 20.6.74, 1 U.P. men again suspended'. 
Letter from Graaff to the general secretary, Sen. Horak, dated 
19.6.74 confirmed the establishment of such a disciplinary commi-
ttee. He appointed Gray Hughes to be its chairman. Graaff :lso 
reaffirmed the power of suspension vested in provincial leaders 
pending investigation by the Central Disciplinary Committee. 
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called the Peninsula Council meeting while the suspens·ion of Car.lisle 
and ~an Eeden were also set aside. It was a compromise decision as 
charges against various reformists and conservatives facing disci-
pl inary action in the Transvaal were also dropped. Myburgh Streicher, 
thereafter, explained that he was withdrawing the suspensions of the 
, 181 
two reformists in the interests of Party unity. He wanted a new 
start on a clean slate. 
6. Resignations and expulsions 
Unfortunately these decisions did not have the desired results and 
were followed by the resignations of leading conservatives from the 
Party. 182 On August 10 John Wiley resigned as deputy leader in the 
Cape. 183 It was a protest against the lack of discipline and loyalty 
in' the Party. His position, he maintained, had become untenable in 
the face of constant attacks while he was dissatisfied that disci-
plinary action against the reformists had been set aside. l84 Wiley 
pointed out that the Cape Times had, during the course of the first 
six months of the year, published over fifty leading articles re-
lating to the ~treicher-Wiley faction• and had never yet been able 
to clarify the differences in principle held by the reformists and 
conservatives in the Party nor had it been· able to explain how they had 
run a 'fierce campaign• to hold back verl igte advance. Wiley's 
181. Sunday Times, 1.7.74, 'Streicher capitulates?' See also the 
Argus, 20.7.74, 1 U.P. men: complaints dropped!' 
182. Rapport, 2. 7. 74, 1 Sappe word na skeur i ng ! 1 
183. Cape Times, 12.8.74, 'Wiley resigns as deputy leader•. 
184 Letter from Wiley to the Cape Head Committee, 17.9.74. In 
it he explained his reasons for resigning, a decision he had 
taken on 30.7~74, but had only made public after the Umhla-
tuzana by-election. 
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resignation was regarded as a victory for the reformists but, in truth, 
it was another defeat for the United Party. 
Philip Myburgh, a former M.P.C. for Wiley's constituency of Simonstown, 
.whom the Sunday Times referred to as 'Volstruis Myburgh' l9.) either because 
they considered him to be a verkrampte with his head in the sand or else 
because he had contested the unfortunate Oudtshoorn by-election, not only 
left the Party but retired from politics altogether. 1ffi In an open letter 
to Sir De Villiers Graaff, which the Burger published, he set out his 
reasons for resigning, 187 They were very much a summary of the ills 
which had beset the Party. 'Reformists', he contended, spoke with an 
accent 'foreign' to South Africa on matters of partiotism. The question-
ing of the Party's role on the Schlebusch commission had cast a shadow 
over this patriotism. He also attacked the lack of respect shown by 
certain M.P. 's towards the Afrikaner, which undermined an established 
principle of the United Party to promote co-operation between the two 
h . lB8· w 1te races. General Louis Botha had, 60 years previously, made 
contact with the same problem when he had said: I Ek werk vir samewerk-
ing, maar Mnr Merriman moet my nie te ver druk nie'. My burgh be 1 i eved 
that if the present Merriman's of the Party could be tackled it would 
not fall apart. He was referring to the stand taken by pub 1 i c rep re sen-





Sunday Times, 20.6.74, 'U.P. 's 'Volstruis' Myburgh breaks truce'. 
See also Die Burger, 28.6.74, 'V.P. g'n satelliet van P.P. nie, 
se Myburgh '. 
Cape Times, 1.8.74, 'Philip Myburgh quits U.P.' 
Myburgh resigned on 31.7.74 and his letter appeared in Die Burger, 
5.8.74, 'Myburgh se waarom hy bedank'. 
Myburgh was referring to the 'boerehaat' campaign of the Oudtshoorn 
by-election and the subsequent row over the need for bilingual 
candidates from which certain M.P. 1 s like Eric Winchester emerged 
without honour. 
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Party candidates had to be bilingual, Myb~rgh als0 professed to have 
·.doubts concerning the place of \~hite leadership in the new federal pol icy. 
It had been a principle which had been prop~gated with success over the 
years yet suddenly anybody who stood by it was 'verkramp'. 
The manner in which Sir De Villiers Graaff had handled the disloyalty 
~vident in the Party had displeased him as well. Action had been promised 
against dissidents but nothing had been done to discipline those who had 
'leaked' information to the press or who had expressed publicly their 
lack of confidence in the elected leaders of the Cape. Graaff had let 
these people down wi1en he should have supported them. Some, such as 
And~e Fourie and Etienne Malan, paid the price and had been defeated at 
the polls. The Party underminers were not disciplined and the Young Turks 
were accommodated at the expense of leaders, like Streicher, who were 
forced to capitulate to restore peace. 189 Peace, he claimed, always 
reigned when those who stood· by Party principles were 'destroyed'. The 
United Party was becoming ineffective because Graaff was trying to keep 
together those who did not belong together. 
Myburgh's strong attack on Sir De Villiers Graaff and the Party's 
shortcomings reflected concisely the feelings of the conservative or 
moderate-wing of the United Party. His resignation on. the day prior 
to the opening of the new parliament could not have inspired the U.P. 
with much confidence, coming as it did immediately after the Umhlatuzana 
by-election result. It was a further shock, this time from Natal, where 
189. IBID. See also Horak interview, 8.6.82. 
' > 
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its support had remained strong. Cadman, the Provincial leader, had 
scraped home by thirty votes .in a 'safe' seat found for him after 
his recent defeat in Eshowe. This time his opponent was Theo Gerdener 
JOO 
of the Democratic Party. J The result clearly indicated that the U.P . 
. had not resolved any of its problems and that the swing against it 
continued unabated. The low percentage poll of 51.1 also reflected 
voter apathy or poor organization, or both. 
The Burger regarded the recent events as an on-going process with trusted 
leaders being discredited. As the U.P. dissolveda'new opposition' emerged 
which would be anti-Afrikaans and would lack evcu the United Party's ideal 
f . 1 . 191 o nat1ona unity. The Cape Times rejected its opponents 'negative 1 
attitude and expressed confidence in the composition of the new parlia-
ment. Gerald Shaw believed that it stemmed froff, a fear of Afrikaner 
verligtes moving across to the opposition. This wish never materialized 
to any extent but the United Party did continue to disintegrate. 
Resignations continued to flow in and in September, Advocate Percy Niehaus, 
leader of the Party in South West Africa, joined the 1 ist. As a conserva-
tive, he was unable to accept,any longer, the state of affairs in the Party. 
He had already lost his Senate seat to the 'verligte' Eric Winchester, 
who had to be accommodated after his own defeat in Port Natal by the 
Nationalists. Niehaus' leadership position WdS also being challenged 
190. B.M. Schoeman, Parlementere Verkiesings 1910 - 1976. (Pretoria 
1977), pp. 486-90. The result was: 
R.M. Cadman (U.P.} 3288 
T Gerdener (D.P.} 3258 
U.P. majority ---ro 
% pol 1 51 • 1 --
B 1. Die Burger, 2.8.76, editorial,'Politieke ontbinding'. 
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in S.W.A. by another Young Turk, Brian O'Linn. 192 
The biggest blow to the Party establishment, however, was the resig-
nation of M.A. Johnson as editor of the Sunday Express. His departure, 
in September left a gap which would never be adequately filled. He 
had unswervingly supported the Old Guard cause and that of the United 
Party throughout all its tribulations. He had been their only mouth-
piece. Johnson, who had been the newspaper's editor since 1961 would 
not reveal publicly his reasons for resigning. It became knovm, however, 
that he had left because an undertaking which would have made him editor 
19~ 
of the Sunday Times had been broken. 5 He was the senior newspaperman 
among Sunday journalists and was in 1 ine for the post on the Times. 
When this became known the political journalists on that newspaper, 
Messrs Uys, Serfontein and Strydom, circulated a petition opposing his 
appointment and th~eatening resignation should Johnson become its editor. 1 ~ 
Had Johnson been given the post there is 1 ittle doubt that the resigna-
tions would have been accepted! The campaign v1as a success, the directors 
1°5 of S.A.A.N. withheld his appointment in favour of Tertius Myburgh J 
who continued the newspape~s political support for the reformists in the 
same manner that Joel Mervis had done. 
Johnson's resignation had a significant political impact for whoever 
South African Associated Newspapers appointed in his place he was 
unlikely to be a supporter of the Conservative-wing of the Party~ His 
departure was a major victory for the reformists in their ideological 
battle with the Old Guard. Thereafterthe reformists and the Progressive 
1S2. Die Burger, 11.9.74, 'Niehaus se bedanking verras nie'. 
193. See Chapter V .5 
194. Interview with Wiley, 5.4.82, Senator Horak, 8.6.82 and Sir De 
Vi 11 iers Graaff, 16.6.82. 
-195, Then Editor of the Pretoria News. 
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Party enjoyed the support of the entire English language press. A 
national front between the opposition, excluding the Old Guard, and 
the pryss which had last existed in the days of General Smuts had 
1% been created. The loss of their only reliable mouthpiece was a 
bitter pill for Sir De Villiers Graaff and his supporters to swallow. 
By the end of September the conservative-wing of the Party had been 
considerably weakened by resignations, each one of which resulted in the 
f . t h . h . . . 197 re orm1s s strengt en1ng t e1r pos1t1ons. The resignations were 
all related to the activities of the reformists and were a protest against 
the undermining ar.d disloyalty evident in the Party'5 affairs. While 
identifiable Old Guard supporters were leaving voluntarily, the expulsion 
of reformists did not cease and at the beginning of October the Cape 
Head Committee announced the departure of a further five for thelr part 
in the 'GROW' movement. Those expelled included Robin Carlisle,yet 
again, P.A.M. Myburgh and T. van der- Merwe. 198 The Committee had taken 
a strong stand and had rejected a milder motion requesting an apology 
from those involved. All five indicated that they would appeal against 
their explusion from the Party which had resulted in a violent, if not 
unexpected, reaction from reformists quarters. The smouldering bitter-
ness within the Party was again brought to the surface. 
1~. Hansard, 25.10.74, Columns 6507 - 6158. Analysis by Wiley of the 
ownership of the English newspapers. 
197. By the end of September the fo 11 owing had either resigned from the 
Party or from positions of power within it: G. Oliver, G. -Jacobs, 
A. Hickman, P. Niehaus, P. Myburgh, M. Johnson, J. Wiley. They 
were all associated with its conservative-wing. 
1~. The Head Committee which had met on Saturday, September 28, had 
expelled Messrs Carl isle, Myburgh, T. van Der Merwe, J. McNaughton-
Davis and J. W!lson. The vote was 64 in favour and 48 against. 
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James Ramsay, leader of the Transvaal Youth Movement, wanted them 
reinstated while Elias 01 ivier, a new recruit from Theo Gerdener's 
Democratic Party and the U.P. organizing secretary on the Witwaters-
rand questioned the Party's ~ight to exist in its present form. 199 
Harry Schwarz criticized the 'small group within the U.P.' which 
opposed liberal changes in a speech at Eerste River in the Cape on 
200 
October 4. The Reformer, which w2s the official publication of the 
Witwatersrand Young Turks led the attack on the Cape leadership201 
while the two political commentators of the Sunday Times, Strydom 
and Serfontein, who were strongly committed to the reformist cause, 
predicted a 'show-down' with the verkramptes fo!lowed by an inevitable 
202 split in the Party. Its leading article of the same edition blamed 
the Old Guard for wrecking the United Party while the Pretoria News 
of October 7 called on the Young Turks to leave the Party for a new 
political home. The Eastern Cape newspapers also contributed their 
criticism of the Party and its 'misuse of power•. 203 
What contributed to the dissatisfaction and the suspicion of political 
opportunism was that the Cape Head Committee had taken its decision to 
'axe' the five only after Sir De Villiers Graaff had left the meeting 
for Johannesburg. He was, therefore, apparently unaware of what was to 
follow his departure. 204 , The Sunday Time~ suggested that the expulsions 
were a manoeuvre 
-~ - • -·>;lo. . .,. . .,. ... ,.,...__,,J 
to weaken the reformist presence at the tape Congress 
193. Argus, 1.10.74, 1 Ramsay shocked at expulsions'. 
200. Die Burger, 5.10.74, 'Jong Turke val Kaapse Ou Garde woes aan~ 
201. The Reformer, September 1974, 'Axing shocks Y.S.A. boss'. See 
also 'Crisis of conscience says Ramsay'. 
202·. Sunday Tirnes, 6.10.74, 'Reformists are set for action'. See 
also its editorial, 'Party in Travail'. 
203. E.P. Herald, 2.10.74, 'U.P. conservative leadership under the 
Whip'. 
204. Graaff interview, 16.6.82. He confirmed that this was correct. 
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in November where the Party leadership would be c2lled to account for 
itself. 
The official explanation for _the expulsion of the five was that their 
activities in 'GROW' were 'in conflict with the best interests of the 
Party'. They were accused of furthering the candidatures of selected 
persons in the Cape; of co-operating with journalists hostile to the 
United Party; of collecting funds to further their objectives and of 
forming parties within the Party. These activities had undermined the 
Party's discipline and the unity for which Streicher had re~eatedly 
205 called. The expulsions did nothing to help achieve that objective 
either. But they did detract from the good performance its parliamentary 
team was delivering at the time. It was most unfor,tunate that the 
P~rty 1 s extra-parliamentary affairs tarnished thii sound effort and 
dominated the political headlines. 
As the chairman of 1 GROW 1 , Myburgh regarded its activities as legi-
timate politics to achieve desirable goals and he refused to apologise 
for what had taken place. What must have mystified and probably dis-
turbed him was how the minutes, or informal notes as he called th~m, had 
found their way into the unfriendly hands of the Sunday Express which 
exposed the secret movemert and so prevented the achievement of its 
objectives by stealth. Investigations have been unable to reveal the 
real source of the 'leak', but it would appear that one of the members 
of the movement had had second thoughts and had mailed the minutes to 
2QS the Express. Whatever the t"ruth of the matter, it was a sad com-
205. Cape Times, 30.10.74, 'Move explained by hierarchy'. 
206. John Wiley in an interview, 5.4.82, ~]aimed that a member of the 
U.P., unfriendly to 'GROW', had been invited to join the group 
aod that this person had sent a copy of the minutes to the Sunday 
Express. He had also been sent a copy. 
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mentary on the state of intrigue which existed even among party members 
committed to clandestine activities. 
A special caucas meeting on October 3 agreed that it had no constitutional 
right to i~terfere with decisions made by the Cape Head Committee and 
suggested that any appeal by the five should be directed to the Central 
Head Committee of the Party. This, in fact, occurred but as a result 
of certain other developments the appeals were withdrawn before any judge-
ments were handed down. 
The United Party was suffering from many afflictions simultaneously, 
but its failure, with rare exceptions, to make any meaningful headway 
against the National Party was the chronic debilitating illness which 
resulted in episodes of self-mutilation. An inability to define or to 
agree on the real causes of the rift within its ranks made it virtually 
impossible to find a cure and the palliative measures to which it 
resorted satisfied neither the reformists or the conservatives. 
7. The Cape Congress 
207 The Cape Congress, held between November 5 and 7, was the occasion 
for the next round of fisticuffs between Party antagonists. A clash 
had been predicted since before the general election when the nomina-
tion disputes had captured the attention of political commentators. 
The congress would ostensibly be where the reformists settled their 
outstanding accounts with the Cape leadership and restored to the Party 
the enlightened image which it had destroyed. It was the best attended 
207. It was held in the Weizman Hall, Sea Point, Cape Town, November 
1974. 
congress in years, a sure indication of the intense lobbying which must 
have taken place by both factions in order to secure the presence of 
the maximum number of their respective delegates. 
Unfortunately for the Party, democratically reached decisions were not 
accepted with good grace at the congress by certain delegates. Thus. 
one of the prerequisites for Party ur.ity, and democracy in general, 
was to a noticeable degree absent. One of the biggest shocks for the 
reformists was the re-election of Myburgh Streicher to lead the Party by 
2o8 an estimated 56 votes out of some 726 cast. Van Eeden and his sup-
porters had suffered another def~at but the election of the 'verl igte' 
Wally Kingwill as deputy leader, was some consolation. 2o9 The Party 
had again managed to reach a compromise solution at the leadership level 
although the ten delegates elected to represent the Cape on the Central 
Head Committee were virtually all of the centre or right-wing of the 
210 Party. 
It was significant that many delegates, the majority of them reformists, 
left the congress following the announcement of the election returns. 
The goodwill necessary to end the feuding was lacking and the results of 
the voting would only perpetuate the differences. Following van Eeden's 
defeat there were rumours of mass resignations and only an appeal. by 
Harry Schwarz, who was present, to accept de111ocratic decisions restored 
208. 
209 
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Volkstem, November 1974, 'Kaapland kies leier en Streicher wen 
weer'. 
Burger, 3.11.74, 'Koos Yster gaan Streicher pak', and Ibid, 6.11.74, 
1 Strei cher 1• 
Delegates to the Head Commiitee were: Messrs P. Swanepoel, 
W. Kingwill, J. Wainwright, W. Deacon, J. Wiley, L. Murray, Boet 
van den Heever, H. Bell, T. Aronson and M. Streicher. 
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a superficial calm. In addition to the rancour created by the elections 
there were many bitter exchanges and contentious motions which fanned 
the flames of discontent. Norman Osburne, a delegate from the Gardens 
constituency, wanted placards pertaining to white leadership removed 
from the hall as they raised doubts concerning the Party's commitment 
to power sharing.
211 
Simon Jocum of Green Point, who was on record as 
'Gesien John Vorster wil ses maande he, Streichertjie? Lyk my 6ns gaan 
minstens ses jaar nodig he' 
~1 Interview with Streicher, 5.5.82. He maintained that 'white 
leadership' as such was never officially abandoned by the U.P. 
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having criticized his M.P., Lionel Murray, for his role on the Schlebusch 
Commission, admitted that he had worked against Streicher and would con-
tinue to do so until things changed. 'Boet' van den Heever, M.P. for 
Kingwilliamstown, spoke out strongly in favour of Party discipline and 
demanded that those who had rejected it or its elected leaders should 
be told to 'gee pad uit hierdie saal 1 • It was Graaff's responsibility to 
act against such people, he said. 
A motion of confidence in Streicher was met with silence from a section 
of the delegates although the majority accepted it. Sir De Villiers Graaff 
who, in his opening and closing speeches steered a middle course, sought to 
promote the e1usive spirit of party unity. He stated that he was not 
interested in factions and warned against attempts by pressure groups of 
the left or of th~ right to hijack the Party. He reprimanded the press 
for the paucity of balanced reporting and for its extreme partisanship. 
He believed that each outburst of provactive journalism had a cumulative 
effect and evoked a corresponding reaction until people who agreed on a 
political philosophy, but differed only on detail of method or of pace 
thought they had a duty to destroy each other. This was a perceptive 
observation on the state of affairs in the Party for invariably both 
factions claimed to adhere to its P,Ol icies. When Schwarz left to estab-
1 ish his Reform Party in 1975, he had little success in formulating an 
alternative policy to that of the U.P. In closing the conference, Sir 
De Villiers appealed for unity among those who shared the same fundamental 
philosophy and warned that the Party could do without those who were 
unable to accept democratic decisions which did not favour them. Never-
theless, he was of the opinion that the congress had smoothed over divi-
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sions in the interest of placing national concerns first. 
The press regarded the congress in a less optimistic 1 ight, depicting 
it as part of the on-going power struggle in which the reformists had 
come off second best. The local newspaper headlines between November 6 
and 8 told the story: 
Argus: 'Cape Reformists suffer setback' 
'Tensions still high' 
'Gra3ff warning .to U.P. extremists' 
Die Burger: 'Sap stryd vlam op' 
'Reformiste delf weer onderspit' 
'Streicher herkies - Skop vir Reformiste' 
'Reformiste lek wonde na Baklei Kongress' 
The Cape Times, though Graaff had not mentioned it by name, rejected 
his criticism of the press and claimed that it reflected events but 
did not create them. In the same article, however, it admitted that 
it did influence public opinion and then proceeded to attack the forces 
212 of reaction within the United Party. Yet, this same newspaper which 
agreed that it had the power to influence political thought was unable 
or unwilling to clarify the differences which it believed divided the 
verligtes from the conservatives, when challenged to do so. 213 While 
the pre~s may not have created the original divisions within the United 
Party it played a major role in embellishing and exaggerating them. 
2~. Cape Times, 8.11.74, editorial. 
213. Letters were sent by Gray Hughes on 8.3.74 and by Wiley on 24.6.74 
to the Cape Times challenging it to clarify its position with regard 
to the verl igte-verkrarnpte debate. 
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The issue of the five expelled reformists was also discussed at the 
congresswherea compromise was again reached. It was decided that if 
they apologised to Streicher and his lieutenants and agreed to rel in-
quish any office they had formerly held they would be readmitted to 
the Party. The creation of this loophole for their return did not 
impress the five while a conservative delegate, Fritz Myburgh, from 
the Southern Cape handed in his resig~ation in protest against the 
lack of discipline evident in the Party. 
The Cape Congress had resolved none of the Party's problems. The 
reformists had failed in their bid to replace the Party leadership 
although Kingwill was thereafter the se~ond-in-command. 214 The 
•closing of ranks' did not materialize for the irreconcilacle elements 
were still present to foster disunity. The great pity was that the 
'silent majority', that broad middle group of Party supporters, was 
·unable to exert a greater influence on events. Had the centre held, 
the United Party might have survived the activities of its extremists 
to the left and to the right; In the mid-1920's the poet W.B. Yeats 
• 
expressed his thoughts on a similar situation in Germany where the weak 
but well-meaning Social Democratic government of the Weimar Republic 
was being undermined by the extremes of national socialism and com-
mun ism: 
Things fall apart; 
The centre ca~not hold 
The best lack all conviction, 
While the worst are full 
Of . . . 215 passionate 1ntens1ty. 
214. Argus, 6.11.74,.'Cape.reformists suffer setback'. 
215. W.B. Yeats, The Second Coming. 
·' 
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This was the plight of the United Party. 
8 .. The tiew senate 
The electoral setbacks of 1974 had a further sequel when the new Senate 
was constituted on May 20. The reduced number of public representatives 
returned by the United Party meant fewer senators when the various elec-
toral colleges met to fill their pro~incial quotas. The verl igt~-




In Natal, where the Party had remained virtually untouched by internal 
problems, Eric Winchester received a senate seat. He had lost the Port 
Natal constituency to the National Party by 20 votes. A contributory 
factor may well have been his questionable stand on the issue of bilin-
gualism which was given wide publicity and was a sensitive matter in an 
electoral division with a fairly high percentage of Afrikaans speaking 
voters. 217 Winchester was the only prominent labelled 1 verligte 1 in 
h P . d h . d h . . . h d f P N . h 
2 lS t e rov1nce an e receive . 1s senate nom1nat1on a ea o ercy 1e aus, 
the conservative South West African leader who had previously occupied a 
219 Natal senate seat. , The Party in Natal was, however, in difficulties. 
In the past, two of its six senate seats head been reserved for Niehaus 
and Herman Oelrich, the ·o.F.S. leader of the Party, as neither of them were 
able to win a parliamentary seat in their own regions. To complicate mat-
ters Cadman had lost Eshowe in the face of a racial istic campaign which 
216. Cape Times, 20.4.74, 'Another threat to U.P. unity'. 
2Q. The constituency was also unfavourably delimited for the United 
Party. See also Chapter IV. 
218. Burger, 28.5.74, 'Niehaus kry trekpas 1• 
219. Sunday Times, 2.6.74, 'Triumph for verl igtes in Natal U.P. 1 
had exploited the Schwarz-Buthelezi agreement. A seat had to be found 
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for the Natal leader and J.S. van der Westhuizen created a vacancy 
by resigning from Umhlatuzana which he had won at the general election. 
Cadman, as has been mentioned, later scraped a win by thirty votes 
against Theo Gerdener. Van der Westhuizen was compensated for his 
generous gesture by being given one of the senate seats. The final 
choice for the remaining seat lay between Winchester and Niehaus. The 
former received the Party nomination and Percy Niehaus' public career 
came to an end. Soon thereafter he resigned his post as leader of the 
·Party in S.W.A. Eric Winchester did not remain in the United Party 
much longer for in the follo~ing year he, ~nd senator Brian Bamford of 
the Cape, both joined Harry Schwarz's new Reform Party which later 
merged with the Progressives. From the Uni.ted Party's point of view 
it would have beer; better had these defeated 'verl igte' parliamentary 
candidates not been given senate seats. 
The changes in Natal had been, to a degree, unavoidable and had not 
strictly been the result of factional struggles. Winchester was, after 
all, a Natali an whereas Niehaus came from S.W.A. In the Transvaal, 
however, those elected to the Senate were reformist sympathizers and 
their success was regarded as a slap in the face for the Old Guard. 
Experienced senators such as Abe Getz and 'Suitcase' Gert du Preez~ 1 
were not renominated while parliamentarians defeated at the recent 
222 election and who had conservative connections were also overlooked. 
220 Cadman had succeeded Douglas Mitchell as leader of the Party in 
Natal at its Provincial Congress in December 1972. 
221 . 'Sui tease' (du Preez) because of his readiness to pack and 1 eave 
at a moment's notice to contest seats anywhere for the United Party. 
221. These included Messrs Emdin (Parktown), E. Malan (Orange Grove), 
D. Marais (Johannesburg North), A. Fourie (Turffontein) and 
G. Oliver (Kensington). 
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Instead, three verligtes were nominated, Anna Scheepers, Laurie Poorter 
and Henry du Toit. Had the Progressives not supported the United Party 
at the electoral college then the combined opposition would have 
been entitled to only 1wo seats. The Progressives on their own did not 
command sufficient support to have representation in the Senate. The 
nomination of a third senator depended on the goodwill of the Progressives 
which explains the reason for Mrs Scheeper's success. She was regarded 
as enlightened and was consequently acceptable to the Progressives. Had 
the U.P. nominated a conservative as its third candidate it is doubtful 
whether Progressive support would have been forthcoming. 
While the Senate elections in the Transvaal were hailed as a reformist 
victory which strengthened their power base in the Party caucus, they 
did not please its conservative-wing which had ~itnessed the eclipse 
of loyal and experienced politicians in a move interpreted as favouring 
the reformists rather than the Party. George Oliver was particularly 
disillusioned and resigned as the Party's Director of Information and 
as the editor of it.s publication Volkstem. This was a protest against 
Schwarz's leadership in the Transvaal. 223 He publicly claimed that 
Schwarz had reneged on an agreemen~ initiated by De Villiers Graaff, 
224 that he would receive a senate seat. Sir De Villiers wanted him 
in parliament because of the important posts he held in the Party. 
Oliver maintained that the special appeal which Schwarz had undertaken 
to make on his behalf to the electoral l 225 co lege never eventuated. 
223. Horak interview, 8.6.82. 
224. Burger-;-1!.6.74, 'Oliver daag Schwarz in skerp V.P. twis'. 
225. Argus, 3.6.74, 'Oliver: major row brewing in U.P. circles'. 
' ' 
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Although neither Schwarz or Graaff had the authority to bind the 
Transvaal caucas to elect Oliver, had such an appeal been officially 
d. . t 1 d h b h d d . h b .. 22.6 ma e 1 wou ave een ee e 1 n t e est 1:nte.ras::ts of the Party 
and there would, in all probability, have been no difficulty in 
securing his nomination, at least for one of the two seats which 
227 did not rely on Progressive support. 
Both Sir De Villiers and Harry Schwarz remained silent on Oliver's 
allegations but the whole matter of the Transvaal senate elections 
228 left an unfavourable impression which created widespread comment. 
In many ways the situation in the Cape and the Transvaal made an interes-
ting comparison. Whereas the Cape leadership was kept busy suspending 
reformists, in the North the action was directed against the conserva-
tives. · George Oliver's resignation was badly timed as it coincided with 
the closing stages of the Pinelands by-election campaign. This was 
further ammunition for the Progressives when painting a dismal picture 
of division within the United Party. 
The election reverses of 1974 had again led to speculation concerning 
Sir De Villiers Graaff's future as Party leader. This was hardly 
unexpected in the wake of his fifth election setback but the media 
used the opportunity to sponsor the claims of Japie Basson, the spiri-
tual leader of the reform movement. A Durban newspaper predicted that 
2'6. Interview with Graaff, 16.6.82. He was disappointed that 01 iver 
had not been elected. 
277, Interview with Senator Horak, 8.6.82. He felt that one method Graaff 
could have used to have certain candidates elected was to make the 
issue.a.matter of confidence in himself. 
228, Sunday Times, 19.5.74. Serfontein: 'Electoral snub 
0 liver'. 
for Div. and 
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he would lead a 'new look United Party' following the resignation of Sir 
De Villiers Graaff which was shortly expected. 229 This type of mis-
chievous reporting was pure speculation calculated to promote the ever 
present discontent within the Party. Graaff had recently been unani-
mously re-elected at the national congress and had given no hint of re-
tiring from politics. Japie Basson tentatively kept alive the specula-
tion during the Pinelands campaign when he said that he was available to 
230 lead the Party if he was ever proposed and the post was vacant. 
Although he was replying to a hypothetlcal question put to him by the 
Sunday Times, which in no way challenged Graaff's position, his qualified 
answer was given banner head! ines and it was imp! ied tha't it was a 
desirable event. The Cape Times felt that he was well suited for the 
post because he had prepared the way for the reform movement in the 
Transvaal under Schwarz. Not only was he a desirable leader for the 
United Party, asserted the Times, but also a potential South African 
• • • 2·., 1 
pr 1 me m 1 n 1 st er . · 
Basson's ~vai !ability' to lead resulted in reactions like that of 
Myburgh Streicher's at Worcester which helped to create the spectacle 
of a party in travail before an important by-election. Those voters 
not strongly committed to the U.P. and who relied heavily on the news 
media for political information could HaVe &een only negatively influenced. 
Basson's 'offer' was construed as a challenge to Graaff's leadership 
229. Daily News, 28.4.74, 'He's the man when Graaff resigns'. 
230, Sunday Times, 26.5.74. 'Japie ready to lead'. See also Sunday 
Tribune of the same day, 'Basson launches bid for U.P. leadership'. 
231. Cape Times, 28.5.74, editorial, 'A potential Prime Minister'. 
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during a difficult period in the U.P. 1 s· history. 2~ Although the left-
wing was pleased the Old Guard were angered that his position should be 
undermined. The Burger wrote of the civil war having come out in the 
open but predicted that even if Basson took over he would only split the 
Party and end up leading the pseudo-progressive section.
2D 
These issues, which pre-dated the Pin~lands poll, must have influenced 
the result and were an indictment of the unprofessional behaviour of 
party members which provided its opponents with material damaging to it.
2
34 
232. Cape Times, 1.6.74, Shaw: 1 Japie Basson - will a crisis bring his 
chance 1 • . 
233. Die Burger, 27.5.74, 'Burgeroorlog in die V.P. 1 See also~., 
13.4.74 'As Graaff loop'. 
234. Sunday_ times, 7.6.74, 'Basson: I will criticize'. 
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CHAPTER IX 
1975: THE REFORMIST SPLIT 
The year 1974 had not ended on a high note for the Party. Both the 
Transvaal and Natal had held their provincial congresses where Schwarz 
and Cadman had respectively been re-elected to lead ·the Party. But 
whereas the situation in Natal remained calm the position in the Trans-
vaal was volatile. The reformists themselves were becoming divided and 
a measure of impatience with the provincial leadership had become evident. 
One group resigned from the Party and formed a new 'Realignment Movement• 
the objective of which was the establishment of a •new verligte dispensa-
tion' which would attract those of all parties who were tired of the 
political logjam in the Republic} The leading figure in this organisation 
was Martin Stephens, a former M.P. for Florida, who resign~d from the U.P. 
in November 1976. 2 
This development indicated that certain sections within the reform 
movement were losing faith in Schwarz 1 s ability to assert their point of 
view and simultaneously bring about reconciliation within the United Party. 
The conservative element had also managed to regain lost ground on various 
provincial bodies and at Head Committee level clashes took place with the 
leadership group. Andre Fourie, the former M.P. for Turffontein, was 
the most prominent member of the Old .Guard to feature in the disputes. 
He expressed his lack of confidence in the Party's Transvaal leadership 
in letters to Sir De Villiers Graaff and he also had reservations concern-
ing the emphasis placed on aspects of the Party's new federal policy by 
1. Dr S.L. Barnard, 'Pol itieke Orientasie~ pp.450 - 51. 
2. Other leading figures were Elias Olivier, former U.P. organizer on the 
Witwatersrand and Mike Smuts, Chairman of the U.P. in Krugersdorp. 
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the reformists. 3 In an interview with the Vaderland he was, in addition, 
critical of Stephens' 'verligte alliansie' which would discover, he main-
tained, just as the reformists had done,· that the majority of U.P. supper-
ters were conservative in outlook. He was generally displeased about the 
way things were going in the Transvaal. He did not believe that Schwarz 
was able to bridge the ever-widening gap in the Party or that the men in 
h bl f 1 • • d f . . 4 c arge were capa e o pacing 1t on a soun coting again. 
Consequently,the old year ended with the reformist-verkrampte issue as 
unresolved as it was destined to remain for most of 1975, particularly 
in the Transvaal where breaking-point was reached. The same personalities 
who had initially been involved in the struggle for power withi~ the Party 
were prominent in the final rounds of the fight. These verl igtes' finally 
broke with the Party; the same United Party that they were going to save 
and reform was abandor.ed as a lost cause. 5 Their departure was a body 
blow from which it was never able to recover. The civi 1 war in the Party, 
which was largely of their making, left wounds too deep to be healed. 
The Young Turks had played a decisive role in the decline of the United 
Party. It was significant that on their own they were unable to remain 
a viable movement as there was imply not sufficient political room between 
the United and Progressive parties for yet another opposition group. As 
had frequently been predicted, they were destined to merge with the 
Progressives with whom they had much in common. Their sojourn in the 
U.P. had been marked by noble objectives but they had achieved little 
that was constructive.· Instead they had become a powerful force for 
3. Letter from Fourie to Graaff, 10.9.74. Reply by Graaff, 25.9.74. 
4. Die Vaderland, 6.12.74, 'Andre Fourie praat sy hart uit~ 
5. Die Burger, 17.2.75, 'Dis die Harry wat V.P. so red'. 
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destruction which,agruably, contributed not only to the demise of the 
United Party, but also to the subsequent weak and fragmented state of 
the opposition in South Africa. 
1. The departure of Dick Enthoven 
Matters came to a head early in February with the expulsion from the 
parliamentary caucas of Dick Enthoven, M.P. for Randburg and one of 
the leading Transvaal reformists. His dismissal was as a result of 
disloyalty. Harry Schwarz, his provincial leader, was soon thereafter 
to ~uffer the same fate following his decision to leave the House of 
Assembly rather than to vote against an amendment introduced by the 
prime minister, John Vorster, during the no-confidence debate. These 
events heralded the final p·hase of the disintegration of the United 
Party. 
Enthoven, the Director of Finances in the Transvaal, who had never 
raised the amounts of money predicted on his behalf by the reformist 
6 press, became the centre ·of a controversy when he initiated a 
pub! ic pol 1 which unfavourably compar-ed the support enjoyed by 
Graaff and the Party vis-a-vis the reformists. 7 The Pegasus Poll, 
as the survey was called, was conducted by a group, Market Research, 
whose impartiality was doubted when the results became known and 
. 8 
also the name of its sponsor. The United Party wasshown up in a 
very poor 1 ight while widespread support was revealed for the reformists. 9 
6. Horak interview, 8.6.82. See also Sunday Times, 6.8.72, 1 U.P. pledge 
to raise R.2m by November•. But IBID, 24.6.73, 'Have raised R250,000, 
want Rlm ever five years', tells TtSown story. 
7. Sunday Times, 2.2.75, 1 U.P. torn by nevJ row•. 
8. Interview with Horak, 8.6.82. See also the Argus, 16.1 .75, which 
claims its newspapers commissioned the poll. 
9. Die Burger, 1 . 2. 75, 1 Ou Garde e is Jong L. V. 's se kop '· 
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~arry Schwarz found the results of the poll •very interesting•, a view 
shared by few in the caucas. 10 
. ~ 
The upshot of the issue was that Enthoven, who had commissioned the 
poll, and who refused to apologize for having done so, was expelled 
from the Party caucas on February 4, the first such expulsion since 
the early 1950 1 s when the BaiJey Bekker group of conservatives received 
. . 1 11 s1m1 ar treatment. His conduct was regarded as a deliberate act of 
disloyalty which was 'incompatible with cpntinued membership of the 
United Party•. Although expelled by the caucas it did not have the 
authority to rescind his membership of the Party and Enthoven intimated 
that he had no intention of resigning. 12 
Sir De Villiers Graaff regarded the expulsion as a disciplinary matter 
unrelated to the aims and principles of the Party. Harry Schwarz, for 
the time being, refrained from commenting but he had been placed in an 
invidious position for Enthoven 1 s activities would inevitably be con-
sidered at various levels of authority in the Transvaal. The question 
of whether the province would also discipline him was fraught with 
problems. While his leader remained silent other reformist~ and the 
press gave the incident enormous attention which had serious reper-
c~ss ions for Party unity. 13 The five Young Turks who had previously 
been expelled in the Cape informed Sir De Villiers that they would no 
longer seek readmission to the Party. Maans Kemp, who had re~lac~d 
Andre Fourie as leader of the Young South Africans in 1973, announced 
10. Argus, 21.1.75, 'Results deserve study - Sc~warz'. 
11, Sunday Tribune, 2.2.75, 'Old Guard gunning for Enthoven over poll'. 
See also Die Burger, 4.2.75, 'Enthoven dalk uit vandag'. 
12, Cape Times, 5.2.75, 'Enthoven Axed' and also IBID, editorial: 
'Expulsion of M.P. 1 ~~ 
13. Argus, 16.1.75, 'U.P. faces biggest crisis, vote survey shows•. 
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that the Party was 'stagnant, ineffective and irrelevant to the South 
African political scene'. He resigned from the United Party, a move 
which represented a fairly typical reformist reaction to the Enthoven 
incident. Kemp had allowed a strong youth organization under Fourie's 
direction to deteriorate dramatically. The only A.G.M. he had 
attended during his term of office was the one which had engineered 
h . . . I 1 . 
14 A h d b h . h h ts or1g1na e ect1on. s a een t e case wit t e Young Turks 
. on the Witwatersrand whose electoral predictions had failed miserably, 15 
similarly under· Kemp's verl igte guidance the Young South Africans had 
produced nothing but dramatic press headlines. From a viable party 
organization it had been reduced to impotence. 
Other resignations followed swiftly and it appeared as if all the better 
16 known reformists had decided that the time had arrived to leave. 
Virtually the whole membership of 'GROW' cut its ties with the Party, 
including Charles Plumbridge, Peninsula youth leader, and six of his 
branch chairmen. 17 In future they would work for a 'verligte dispensa-
tion' in South Africa involving verligtes of all parties. By their 
statements it became apparent that they were of the opinion there was 
no future for verligtheid, as they understood it, in the United Party. 
Harry Schwarz faced an unenviable task for it would be left to the 
Party in the Transvaal to di sci pl ine Enthoven and to consider his 
future in politics. Speaking in parliament, Schwarz had made it clear 
14. Interviews with Streicher, 5.5.82, and Horak, 8.6.82. 
15. They had predicted that they would v.Jin thirty-five Witwatersrand 
seats at the 1974 election, but only won eleven. 
16. Die Burger, 7.2.75, 'Jong Sappe bedank op streep'. 
17, The youth chairmen of the following constituencies resigned: Sea 
Point, Gardens, Vasco, Bellville, Constantia and Green Point. 
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that he would not be the 'executioner' of his friend and said that he 
would rather go into the political wilderness than drive him out of the 
18 Party. Although Enthoven had been found disloyal to his leader, 
colleagues and Party, it was evident that Schwarz did not consider him 
to be so. On the fo 1 lowing day Gray Hughes, chairman of the caucas, 
spelt out clearly as an answer to Schwarz the Party's objections to the 
Pegasus survey. Firstly, it contained 'loaded' questions to establish 
'reformist' strength in the event of a break-away. Secondly, it created 
the illusion that the leader, and the Party's effectiveness under him, 
were being challenged by rival candidates and thirdly, when the desired 
responses were obtained the Argus Group was approached to give wide 
publicity to the results. 19 
Enthoven had not even approached his own provincial leader with regard 
to the po11 20 or to the dissemination of the results. He had also 
expressed no regret at the harm he may have caused. As far as the United 
Party's parliamentary caucas was concerned, it was an instance of gross 
disloyalty. 
Sir De Villiers who, at the time, was wrest I ing with the unrewarding task 
of leading his floundering Party in the no-confidence debate against the 
united ranks of the governmen~ issued a stern warning to the mavericks. 
18. Hansard, 6.2.75, Columns 335 - 336. 
19. The poll claimed that the Young Turks would receive support from 
41 percent of the. Witwatersrand opposition voters should they break-
away from the U.P., which would thereafter receive only 28 percent. 
It also indicated that Graaff was preferred by 26 percent of those 
pol led but was closely fol lowed by Eglin (24) and Schwarz (23) for 
leadership of the U.P. See also Dr S.L. Barnard, pp. 452 - 454. 
20. The constituencies involved in the survey were Bryanston, Jeppe, 
Yeovil le and Rosettenvil le. 
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He would not allow the Party to be 'hijacked by any clique, group or 
• • 1 f . • I 21 unconst1tut1ona ormat1on • Their narrow approach would harm the 
broad appeal of the Party and place a ceiling on its support. The 
accord, he said, which had been reached at the Bloemfontein Congress 
(1973) was being eroded by personal differences which resulted in 
disloyalty to colleagues and to the Party. He maintained that no 
group had attacked the aims and principles of the Party but attempts 
had been made to manufacture policy differences.
22 
Resignations and adverse publicity seemed to indicate that the final 
break was close at hand and that the chances of restoring even a sem-
blance of peace were things of the past.~ 3 The Sunday Times criticially 
considered the issue of loyalty. It questioned whether any was due to 
Graaff who had led his Party to disaster and who would have done it a 
service had he stepped down years before. This was at least the third 
time that the Times had changed its opinion of Graaff, but what it did 
not alter was its strong support for the reformist cause which it backed 
24 to the hilt against the Old Guard over the Enthoven poll. It pre-
dieted that the urban vote would go to the reformists and that Enthoven's 
expulsion would result in a regrouping of reformist forces outside the 
United Party. Japie Basson was regarded as a potential leader of an 
alliance between the Young Turks, Progressives and Democrats. The 
'verl igte alliance', which the reformist press had propagated with 
varying intensity since Basson's 1971 congress speech, seemed a distinct 
possibility. While the reformists had been unable to capture the Party 
from within, enough dissension had been generated to ensure a split, 
21. Argus, 7.2.75, 'Graaff threatens to act on disloyalty'. 
22. IBID. 
23. Argus, 7.2.75, 'Final split in U.P. forecast'. 
24. Sunday Times, 9.2.75, 'Who is the U.P. 1 and 'Reformist D-Day near'. 
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with the strong possibility of· the disaffected elements seeking ~olace 
outside the parent body in a ·new party formation. During this process 
the United Party had been irreparably damaged. 
2. The establishment of the Reform Party 
The climax to these divisive issues was reached in the early hours of 
February 10 when the Reform Party was officially established. The 
very choice of the name indicated that, notwithstanding earlier protests 
by Schwarz and other leaders that there were no factions within the 
Party, there was definitely a section, a reformist-wing, which could no 
longer remain a part of it. In many ways the break was similar to that 
of the progressives in 1959 except that the reformists did not have a 
clearly defined political issue on which to leave the United Party. It 
was a culmination of personal differences rather than of policy matters. 
The aims and principles of the United Party had been accepted by all the 
groups within it although differences regarding their manner and pace 
of implementation had existed. 
The birth of the new party followed secret talks between Harry Schwarz 
and certain Transvaal M.P.C.'s led by Alf Widman. The Provincial leader 
had flown to Johannesburg after having discussed his positicin in the 
Party with Sir De Villiers Graaff on Monday. 25 What emerged from 
those talks was that Graaff no longer wanted him in the Party. His 
failure to support Graaff's opposition to the prime minister's amend-
ment in the no-confidence debate had been the last straw, although 
Schwarz maintained that his action was a result of a misunderstanding 
. 26 
and did not warrant expulsion from the Party. Having ascertained 
25. Argus, 12.5.75, 'Schwarz had earlier talks with Graaff'. 
26. Interview with Graaff, 16.6.82. Sir De Vil lier~ agreed that there 
co~ld have been a misunderstanding. 
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what the position was he undertook not to oppose his expul_sion but 
I 
instead hurried to the Witwatersrand to meet the reformist members of 
the provincial and tity councils to thrash out the details of the new 
party, in what was probably a premeditated move but which had to be 
implemented more rapidly than was planned. 27 
Following the meeting Alf Widman, and nine other United Party ·M.P.C. 1 s, 
announced their resignation from the U.P. in order to establish the 
28 
Reform Party. Widman was to act as its caretaker until such time as 
Schwarz was able to assume the mantle of leadership. Th1s dramatic 
move had with a single stroke of the pen made the new party the official 
opposition in the Transvaal Provincial Council. 29 The United Party had 
been left with three members. At parliamentary and provincial level the 
United Party had almost ceased to exist in the Transvaai. 30 These events 
clearly indicated the strong power base which the reformist-wing of the 
United Party had established in the province. 
The coup in the Transvaal had been conducted with a degree of secrecy 
and intrigue eminently in keeping with the long history of the Old 
Guard-Young Turk dispute. 31 Neither Sir De Villiers nor Francois 
Oberholzer, leader of the U.P. in the Provincial council, had been 
informed of the reformists• plans. 32 As had been the case with so 
many other manoeuvres the media were the first to be informed. Ober-
holzer had the dubious pleasure of hearing the news over his car radio 
27. Cape Times, 8.2.75, 'Harry flouts Old Guard'. 
2 8 • Argus , 1 1. 2 . 7 5, Ed i tor i a 1 : ' A shatter i n g b 1 ow 1, 
29. IBID, '10 U. P. men form new opposition'. 
30, Messrs Oberholzer, Epstein and Opperman were all who remained. 
31. Horak interview, 8.6.82. 
32. Interview with Graaff, 16.6.82. 
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en route to a council meeting. The bitterness engendered by the manner 
of the break was reflected in a speech by Oberholzer to the coun~il 
that morning (February 11) when he referred to the matter: 'As u mooi 
kyk, Mnr Voorsitter, sal u sien hoe die bleed van my rug afdrup'.33 
The United Party in the Transvaal had indeed been stabbed in the back. 
Schwarz and Widman issued similar statements explaining their decision 
. . 34 
and which also reflected the degree of collusion between them. 
Schwarz revealed what had long been widely suspected as the source of 
confl let between the reformists and the rest of the· United Party. He 
questioned the worth of the U.P. propagating a verligte public image 
while acting differently b~hind closed doors. He accused members of 
paying 1 ip-service to the ideals of the enlightened 1973 Congress, but 
interpreting them in a way which caused endless disputes particularly 
. h d h . d l d h . f d. . . . 35 wit regar to t e te era concept an t e question o 1scr1m1nat1on. 
Schwarz also asserted, for the first time, that differences were not 
only as a result of personality clashes but were related to direction, 
philosophy and pol icy as well. He felt that the drive to oust the 
reformist elements in the United Party would continue indefinitely cmd 
for that reason 'I hope to find a political home with people that 
h . , 36 s are my view ..• 
He concluded that as he had been blamed for causing the feuding within 
the Party, his departure should create the opportunity for it becoming 
33. Die Burger, 12.2.75, 'V.P. Steier na dramatiese skeuring!' 
34. IBID, 'WlJman se waarom hulle verlaat het'. 
35. O'feBurger, 13.2.75, 'V.P. verkramp se Schwarz'. 
36. Cape Times, 13.2.75, 'Reformists hit at U.P. double standards'. 
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a united force, although he doubted it and predicted a continuation of 
the double-talk as new reasons would.be found for quarrelling. In this 
he proved correct, but according to Streicher and others, the reason 
was that not all the reformists had left, some had remained within the 
United Party. 37 
Alf Widman explained that 'differences in the Party over ideology and 
policy had reached breaking-point'. Yet over the years this had been 
repeatedly denied by all groups as a source of friction. Its policies 
were what had kept the divergent segments together. In sketching the 
road ahead, Widman could do little better than declare that the reform-
ists would support the broad policies and principles which the United 
Party had adopted in 1973. Its federal 'dispensation' would henceforth 
be propagated with honesty and there would be no double-talk. 
The stand taken by Widman was not a new development in South African 
politics. Dr Albert Hertzog in 1569 and Dr Treurnicht in 1982 had 
both left the National Party because, in their opinion, it had fore-
saken the true path of Afrikaner national ism. The reformists, accord-
ing to Widman, had broken with the United Party in order to propagate 
its policies in the spirit of their formulation. 
It is difficult. to escape the conclusion that the disputes between 
the United Party and the reformists rested on personality differences 
37 lnt~rviews with Streicher, ~orak and Wiley 
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which may originally have aiisen as a result of varying policy 
interpretations which in their turn could be traced to different 
'Geluk met julle He!·stigte Reform Committee hier op die Rand. My vriend 
Jameson het vir jou h vlag gebring' 
philosophical outlooks, namely conservative or liberal. Once the 
break had been made it became important to emphasize that there were 
policy differences, although they were never cle~rly defined, in order 
to establish an identity for the Reform Party as an entirely separate 
and recognizable political force. 38 The reformists never did convinc-
ingly manage to draw. up a distinct programme of principles which could 
distinguish them from the United Party and relied for their proposals 
on Schwarz's Act of Dedication. The direction of their thinking was, 
however, more compatible with that of the Progressive Party, a charac-
teristic which facilitated the merger of the two within the following 
five months. 
Sir De Villiers issued a statement on February 28 reviewing the role 
played by the reformists in the United Party. Knowing what he did, 
it is surprising that he had tolerated their presence for so long 
and had allowed them to d~mage the Party as they had done. 39 He 
referred to them as a we1: organized minority which had since the 
1970 election attempted to hijack the Party while pretending devotion 
to it. As they had failed in this they had turned to wrecki~g it. 
Graaff confirmed that the break was over personalities and discipline, 
not principles to which the Schwarz group had protested their loyalty. 
He also rejected the reformist claim that they were responsible for 
verligte thought in 
enlightened views. 
the United Party which had always held modern and 
40 Changes which had occurred after 1972 had not 
b d h 1 h h h d . 1 . d h . 41 een ue to t em a t oug t e me 1a c a1me ot erw1se. Graaf f pre-
dieted, correctly, that in order to establish an identity ideological 
differences, which had not existed, would have to be manufactured. 
38. Sunday Times, 16.2.75, 'Graaff Slams Reformists'. 
39. Interview with Senator Horak, 8.S.82. He said that Sir De Villiers 
went out of his way to placate the reformists. 
40. As an example, the new federal policy was being investigated before 
1972. 
41, Interview with Graaff, 16.6.82. 
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Disaster awaited the new party as the reformists were political 
mavericks who lacked deep-seated convictions and were incapable of 
42 functioning cohesively. 
From the United Party's point of view it was unfortunate that Sir 
De Villiers had not acted firmly,to eradicate the reformists before 
they had done any real harm. 43 Once the split had been made no 
words or actions could heal the wound. Many of the dissidents were 
,. ensconced in formerly safe United Party seats where they were able 
to entrench their positions. None resigned to test their popularity 
in by-elections among the electorate which had originally returned 
them to parliament as United Party representatives. Verligte action 
apparently did not go to those lengths, although using the 1977 
election results as a guide they would in all probability have re-
tained their seats as the N.R.P., successor to U.P., was unable to 
win a single parliamentary division in the Transvaal. 
What also emerged from this United Party debacle was the damaging and 
inconsistent role played by the press. This was not a new development 
but illustrated the difficulties with which the Party had to contend. 
Schwarz had received wide acclaim for his constructive move in notopposing 
Vorster's amendment in the no-confidence debate. 44 Gerald Shaw wrote 
42. See also Hansard, 24.2.75, column 1278. 
43. Interviews with Graaff and Horak revealed that there was a point 
prior to the 1974 election when a concerted attempt was made by 
members of the Central Head Committee to block all Young Turk 
nominations in the Transvaal, but Graaff overruled this move. 
44. Die Burger, 13.2.75, 'Schwarz se hoekom hy nie gestem het nie'. 
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of his 'moral courage' and of his being a 'light in the U.P. gloom•. 45 
When the United Party, however, had supported certain government mea-
sures, which it frequently did, it recei~ed nothing but condemnation. 
Over the years the Sunday Times had regarded support for the Bantustans 
as constructive and so had the Young Turks, but at the time it had not 
been U.P. policy. Federalism was well and good if it involved the 
phasing out of the white parl lament for a multi-racial federal one as 
desired by the reformists though not by the conservatives. Support by 
the United Party for ~he Schlebusch investigation in what it believed 
was the national interest was not regar.ded as constructive and was 
er it i c i zed by every Eng 1 i sh newspaper save for the Sunday Express. To 
win the support of the opposition press had become ir.creasingly more 
dependent not on what a person did, but rather on who the person was 
who did it. The reformists had this support and their departure from 
the United Party was praised as another constructive move. 
The United Party was falling apart but the pace of ~is integration was 
accelerating. Both the Progressive and Reform parties had once been 
part of it. As was the case with the progressives, the reformists' 
growth potential lay not in the appeal of its political message, which 
·was' in any event never clearly formulated, but rather in the fortunes 
of the United Party. Should the latter stage a revival, then the 
reformists had no hope of success, but should the U.P. collapse, as 
did happen, then limtted progress was possible but only in the form 
of a merger with the progressives. The reason was simple enough -
all three 9roups appealed to the same section of the electorate for 
45. Cape Times, 8.2.75, Shaw's political survey. 
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support. 
By February 12 Messrs Dal ling, Bamford and Schwarz himself had all 
been expelled from the United Party while Horace van Rensburg had 
resigned. 46 All were from the Transvaal and were the original Young 
Turks who had started the reform movement. Various city councillors 
had joined the new party, including fifteen from Johannesburg and 
47 four from Randburg. It was estimated by one source that fifty 
percent of those actively involved with the United Party on the Rand 
48 were sympathetic to the Reform movement. . In the Cape, Senator 
Brian Bamford became the leader of the Party and was supported by 
other reformists such as Norman Osburne (Gardens) 49 and Simon Jocum 
(Green Point), all of whom had clashed with the Party leadership. 50 
Those members of 'GROW' who had been expelled or had resigned from 
the U.P. also joined the new party. Included among the resignations 
from the Eastern Cape were Maans Kemp and van Zyl Cillie, the dis-
grunt led ex-M.P. for Central, who in a letter to the Sunday Times 
detailed his reasons for leaving. He critic!zed Graaff's weak 
leadership and blamed him for being the main obstacle to a verligte 
- . S h Af . 51 consensus 1n out r1ca. The membership list included the 
·great majority of those who had been publicly asso~iated with the 
reform-wing of the United Party. The swiftness with which Schwarz 
was able to establish the new party indicated that it was a well 
46. Argus, 12.2.75, 'Graaff expels Schwarz from U.P.' 
47. Burger, 13.2.75, 'V.P. skeur verder in dag van skokke'. 
48. Sunday Times, 16.2.75, 'The week thal shook the Party', 
49. Divisional chairman of the U.P. in the Gardens electoral district. 
50. Argus, 14.2.75, 'Drive for members'. 
51. Sunday Times, 16.2.75, 
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organised movement - a party within a party - which could be mobilized 
at short notice if the occasion arose. The reformist break-away al~o 
reflected the degree to which its members had been able to build a 
power base within the United Party over the years. 
Two prominent 'verl igtes' who did not leave the U.P. at that point 
were Japie Sasson and Prof Nie Olivier. Neither were able to see any 
ideological reason for doing so nor did they believe that the splinter-
ing of the opposition would achieve anything positive. Commenting in 
the Sunday Express on the establishment of the Reform Party, Sasson 
contradicted many of Harry Schwarz's claims when he said: 'I'm against 
sheer opportunism in politics. A party must be built around clear 
principles. The United P~rty objectives provide the rallying point for 
any realignment•. 52 Sasson and Olivier kept alive the verl igte thinking 
within the United Party and their presence contributed to the continua-
tion of the civil war. 
The reformist split left the opposition in disarray with no Tielman 
Roos available to act as a catalyst to bring the scattered fragments 
together in a new party. 53 The harm done by the reformists to the 
United Party was clearly evident. Their brief stay had left a trail 
of destruction. Schwarz, who had deposed Marais Steyn in order to 
52. Sunday Express, 16.2.75. 'Another lone stand by the great survival-
ist'. See also Hansard, 24.2.75, column 1238. Sasson said there 
was no need for another party to be formed. 
53 Roos was a former N.P. leader in the Transvaal and Minister in Hert-
zog's 'Pact' government before being made a High Court judge. He 
returned to politics during the Depression years, demanding the 
formation of a coalition government. His activities contributed to 
Smuts and Hertzog coming together to form a coal it ion government in 
the interests of South Africa in 1933. 
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revitalize the Party and bring it to power by 198S had achieved the 
opposite result. Its back had been broken and it was infinitely worse 
off than when the reformists had made their bid for power. The United 
Party had not been made a better opposition, but rather a weaker one. 
While the departure of the reformists could conceivably have provided 
the opportunity for the United Party to become more unified, this did 
not materialize. Others still remained within its ranks to continue 
the feudS 4 while those in the caucas previously considered to be centrists 
tended thereafter to fill the vacuum left by the reformists.SS Contrary 
to the conviction expressed by Graaff that the war was over the Party 
was unable to make a new start. 
The confusion over the departure of the reformists had hardly begun 
to subside when John Wiley ignored the wishes of his caUC\JS to comment 
publicly on the issue at a divisional meeting in Simonstown. Following 
a strong attack on the reformists he ~ppealed to the traditional supporters 
of the Party to return, 'now that the alien elements have been or are 
being driven out 1 .S6 He praised Streicher for exposing the disloyal 
elements and attacked the English press for driving 'good men' out of 
the Party in an endeavour to replace them with reformists and Progres-
sives. Wiley also maintained that the U~ited Party was one of 'moderate 
conservatives' and that the reformists had left because of policy 
S4. Interviews with Wiley, S.4.82, Streicher, S.S.82 and Horak, 8.6.82. 
SS.Parliamentarians such as Hymie Miller, Graham Mcintosh and Derick 
De Vil) iers would be included in this group. 
S6. Cape Times, 19.2.75, 'Wiley Attack'. 
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differences. 57 
His address disturbed those 'verl igtes' still in the Party and 
Senator Winchester threatened to resign if Wiley were not expelled in 
the same manner Dick Enthoven had been, following his political survey. 58 
His misgivings were expressed in a letter to the caucus from which he 
had voluntarily withdrawn as a protest against the lack of discipline 
exercised in the case of Wiley over a long period. 59 There had been a 
standing grudge between the two dating back to Wiley's criticism of 
his colleagues' stand regarding the matter of bilingual candidates in 
1972. 
The par 1 i amen ta ry caucus had again been p 1 ac~d in an awk\-Ja rd position 
for it did not wish to be accused of being sympathetic to conservatives 
while the reformists had been punished. Wiley had also been in error 
when he spoke of the U.P. being attached to moderate-conservative views 
whereas both Sir De Villiers and Basso~ had said that it was committed 
to verligte policies. In addition,he had contradicted the Party leader-
ship by stating that the reformist split was over pol icy differences. 
Graaff believed that personali~y differences had been the main reason. 
The Cape Times touched on these problems in an editorial and demanded 
to know why 'right-wingers' always appear~d to survive. 60 Wiley 
escaped possible disciplinary measures planned by his opponents by 
58. ·Die Burger, 19.2.75, 'Nuwe twis dreig oor Winchester'. 
59. Cape Times, 19.2.75, 'Senator leaves U.P. caucas'. 
60. Cape Times, 27.2.7-S, editorial,'The Incredible United Party'. 
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apologizing to the cauQJ..s for certain misunderstandings' his speech 
61 may have caused. 
Peace in the Party was unlikely to last and Senator Winchester as an 
example, was never reconciled to the prevailing state of affairs. He 
resigned to join the Progressive Reform Party . A 62 1n ugust. Tensions 
remained because the verligte section of the Party, increasingly referred 
to as the Basson group, were committed to a political direction which 
the conservative-wing would never accept. The situation assured the 
continuation of the civil war for although there had been a divorce 
in the family the United Party still represented an unhappy marriage. 
Speaking in the House of Assembly towards the end of February Sir De 
Villiers Graaff predicted that the Reform Party had no future. The 
question, he said, 'is simply who is to swallow them?' His answer, 
'they will be swallowed by the Progressive Party. 1 Dr Jacobs: 'very 
indigestible'. Further interjection: 1 It is a like swallowing a 
porcupine (Bill Sutton). •63 Sir De Villiers' analysis of its prospects 
proved accurate. The Reform Party did not survive as a separate 
entity for longer than six months. Its appeal was restricted to a 
very limited section of the electorate and although it did not lack 
leadership material who were constantly making news, it remained a prime 
61. Die Burger, 28.2.75, 'Poging om John Wiley uit koukus te dryf misluk'. 
62. Argus, 9.8.75, 'Winchester also joins PRP~ 
63. Hansard, 24.2.75, Column 1278. 
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example of a movement where there were too many chiefs and not enough 
lndians.
64 
It never contested an election so its popularity was never 
accurately determined but the very fact that Schwarz agreed to merge 
with the Progressive Party65 suggested that he realised that there was 
no viable future for another splinter group to the left of the United 
Party. 
The merger which took place on July 26 followed protracted negotiations 
which had begun in May. The reformists, as predicted by Graaff, were 
swallowed by the Progressives and had to accept the bulk of their 
policies, including the qualified franchise which, until recently, had 
. 66 
been rejected by Schwarz. The party, which he had referred to as 
'a political circus' had become acceptable to him, just as the National 
·Party had become attractive to another former leader of the United 
Party in the Transvaal, Marais Steyn. Ray Swart, chairman of the 
Progressive Party, and himself a former United Party M.P., was sat is-
fied that the agreement reached in no way diluted the principles of 
his party, 'otherwise I wouldn't have been party to it'. 
Harry Schwarz was also pleased with the proposed merger, 'a home for 
all true verligtes', which he forecast would make a great impact on 
the political scene. He had made similar predictions for the United 
Party following his triumph in 1972 when he had ousted Marais Steyn. 
64. Horak interview, 8.5.82. 
65. Cape Times, 19.5.75, 'Progs. and Reform Party agreed to merge'. 
66. Cape Times, 14.5,75, 'Reform Party accepts Prog. pol icy~ 
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His hopes were not realized and his new political home which was later 
to become the Progressive Federal Party made a very modest impact at 
the 1977 election although by then the United Party had disbanded, a 
development which should have boosted the new party's chances. Schwarz 
also predicted, this time more accurately, that the merger meant the 
end of the U.P. 67 although it was the Party itself rather than the 
P.R.P. which was responsible for its demise. In addition, he stressed 
that the merger would have a new name and a new policy. 'It will not 
simply be a new P.P.' The word 'Reform' was added to Progres~ive and 
that was the most visible contribution of the Schwarz group to the 
new party besides adding to it the services of a number of accomplished 
po 1 i t i c i an s • 
The merger, which followed congresses by both parties, brought together 
68 two former splinter groups of the United Party. The main participants 
had all once been U.P. supporters. Col in Eglin was elected leader and 
Harry Schwarz would be the P.R. P. 's na·t i ona 1 chairman. The English 
press wrote with enthusiasm of the event and the CaQe Times referred to 
the 'dynamic verligte leadership' of the new party. 69 In his final 
address to the Reform congress, Schwarz called for loyalty to the leader 
of the proposed party. Possibly, he found this appeal necessary in 
the light of his own disloyalty to Graaff and that of the reformists 
in general towards the elected leaders of the United Party during their 
sojourn in it. It was interesting to note that Joel Mervis, the former 
67. The Star, 19.5.75, 'Merger will be death knell of the U.P.' 
· 68. Argus, 12.7.75, 'Prog. merger inevitable says Schwarz'. 
69. Cape Times, 28.7.75, 'Merger and After'. 
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editor of the Sunday Times, was a delegate at the Reform congress and 
was elected to the executive of the Progressive Reform Party. Follow-
ing the merger this newspaper proclaimed that it was the intention of 
the P.R.P. to replace the United Party. 70 It referred to the merger 
as the 'wedding of the year'. Uys and Serfontein in their articles 
had finally admitted what many c6nservatives, and later also .Sir De 
Villers Graaff, had believed to be their intention from the start, 
that was if they were unable to capture the Party from within, to 
wreck it and build a new one from the various 'verl igte' splinters. 
In this way the political logjam would be broken and a new alignment 
in South African politics initiated. 
By the end of i975 two opposition parties were thus represented in 
parliament. The P.R.P., which was a coalition of former United Party 
'verligtes' and which had as its main political objective the replace-
ment of the U.P. rather than of the government; and the United Party 
itself, which still professed to be an alternative government but 
which was in reality declining rapidly as it wrestled unsuccessfully 
with internal problems. Its task would thereafter become that more 
difficult as the challenge from the left had been strengthened while 
the National Party remained as monolithic as ever. 
3. The final Le Grange Reports 
The tabling of the final reports of the Le Grange Commission (formerly 
Schlebusch) on the Christian Institute (C. I.) and the University 
70. Sunday Times, 27.7.75, Uys and Serfontein: 'New Party's target is 
LJ. p • I 
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Christian Movement (U.C.M.) in June 1975, continued to trouble the 
United Party. The Reports had been presented to parliament at a time 
when the reformist group ~as strengthening its position and they made 
use of the opportunity to take an unequivocal stand against them, 
something which the U.P. was unable to do. Mike Mitche11 71 explained 
his Party's attitude towards the rule of law.72 . It was no different 
from that which he had used in previous debates on the Schlebusch 
Commission when he had said 'one cannot speak of the rule of law or 
of recourse to the courts if one does not have as a fact in one's 
country a state of law and order•. 73 The difficulty for the Party, 
he said, was to strike a balance between human rights and the public 
interest. Individual liberty could only exist in a framework of law 
and order which was more difficult to maintain during times of insta-
bility. Legislation which abrogated the rule of law was only accept-
able when the security of the state was endangered. This was the 
attitude adopted by the U.P~ towards security and laws pertaining to 
the safety of the state. 
This point of departure explained the attitude adopted by the Party 
to the Le Grange reports on certain organizations. It was a matter of 
state security and ultimately of patriotism. As the C. I. and U.C.M. 
were found to be undesirable organizations, legislation to curtail, 
74 within reason, their activities should be supported. On this issue 
71 • Mi tche 11 was the M. P. for Durban North and the Party 1 s spokesman 
on legal matters. 
72. Cape Times, 21.6.75, Mitchell: 1 Rule of law: What it means•. 
73. Hansard, 8.3.73, Column 2266. 
74. Cape Times, 5.6.75, 'Role of U.P. in C. I. Report defended'. 
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the Party's right-wing stood closer to the government than to its 
verligte members such Japie Basson and Prof Olivier who, among 
others, were presumably more attached to the rule of law. Consequently, 
the Commission tended to polarize opinion in the Party. 
The English newspapers maintained that the great divide in South 
African politics at that time concerned civil liberties while their 
Afrikaans counterparts regarded patriotism as the cardinal priority. 75 
Those U.P. commissioners still serving on the Commission, Messrs Murray 
and Sutton, were being castigated, virtually as traitors to the oppo-
sit ion cause, by the English language press for co-operating with the 
government on issues of national security. These two had signed the 
final Le Grange reports without submitting any minority recommendations. 
Certain members of the Party's parliamentary caucus had expressed mis-
givings about the wisdom of having acted as they had done and had thus 
perpetuated the long standing dispute which had originated with the 
appointment of the original Schlebusch Commission in July 1972. 76 
There is no doubt that the United Party suffered as a result of its 
association with the Le Grange Commission, but it was unfortunate 
that so few of the electorate ever read the various reports or were 
ever in a position to judge for themselves the merits of the case 
against the organizations under investigation. The English press had, 
75. Cape Times, 6.6.75, editorial: 'The Great DiviJe 1 • 
76. Argus, 5.6.75, 1 01 ivier, Basson regret C. I. findings•. 
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from the start, with the exception of the Sunday Express, adopted a 
negative approach as it ha.d decided that civil liberties were under 
attack and never once admitted that the security of the state was 
sufficiently threatened to warrant executive action against citizens 
without recourse to the courts. 77 Having adopted this approach the 
English newspapers were prepared to suppress the unsavoury e~idence 
revealed by the Le Grange investigation or else to interpret it in 
the most favourable light. One example was the manner in which a 
speech by Cadman was handled when he discussed the U.C.M. and the 
role played by Dr Alex Boraine in its activities. On the basis of the 
evidence Cadman contended that the U.C.M. ·could be faulted on moral 
grounds for its actions were at times both disgusting and blasphemous. 
Its activities at Wilgespruit, he said, were anything but Christian 
while, politically, it advocated revolution and Black power. It 
received funds from abroad to finance its radical activities which 
included the rejection of all white political parties and the capitalist 
free enterprise economy in favour of a Marxist-Socialist state. Dr 
Boraine, the Methodist representative to the U.C.M. conference in 
1968, had not objected to the activities of the Organization but had 
even congratulated the editor of its magazine which included the 
controversial leading article, 'One for the Road 1 • 78 
Dr Boraine responded by denying that he had necessarily supported every 
article of the U.C.M. 1 s publication and that he had resigned in 1969 
77. Cape Times, 4.6.75, 1The amazing C.I. report'. 
78. Hansard, 16.6.75. 
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h h b 1 h . d. . 79 wen e was una e to c ange its 1rect1on. He regarded the · 
Commission as having wasted its time investigating an organization 
80 that had since become defunct. 
The Cape Times, among others of the S.A.A.N. and Argus group, did not 
irutially report Cadman 1 s speech. His words were suppressed and later 
only partly reported when Cadman had pointed ihis out in other news-
papers. The English speaking voter was consequently not readily afforded 
the opportunity to read the more damning evidence which appeared in the 
Le Grange reports. They were fed only a certain diet of com~ent which 
suited the editorial viewpoint. They were not given the chance to 
decide on the evidence available whether the United Pa~ty was perhaps 
correct to have served on the Commission. With regard to Dr Boraine, 
it was possibly considered politically expedient to minimize his 
association with the discredited U.C.M. He had, in addition, been 
their first choice in the Pinelands by-election of the previous year 
and he was a member of the party which they supported. 
It was in the face of this type of media exposure, or lack of it, 
that the U.P. had to make itself heard. lt never did succeed in 
placing its viewpoint clearly before the electorate. 
The Afrikaans news~apers, on the other hand, strongly supported the 
work of the Commission as being in the national interest. They felt 
79. Cape Times, 11 .6.75, 1 Boraine denies he was pleased'. 
80. ~' 27.6.75, 'Charges answered'. 
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that the U.P. commissioners had done their duty by endorsing the 
findings. It had been a patriotic act but it was a pity that the 
'verligtes' in the U.P. and the 'English press' had adopted a stand 
81 contrary to the best interests of the country. Although the Afri-
kaans newspapers reported extensively on the findings of the Commission 
and put an entirely different interpretation on them from that of its 
English language competitors, this did not help the United Party for 
its support was concentrated largely among English speaking voters who 
seldom read the Afrikaans publications. Consequently, Jt' can be con-
eluded that the damage done to the United Party by serving on the 
Commission was partly due to its inability to inform the electorate of 
its role in the investigations or to make public much of the evidence 
which had motivated the nature of its response. 82 Bill Sutton was of 
the opinion that a thread of radicalism ran through all the organizations 
investigated with. the exception of the Institute of Race Relations. The 
Christian Institute, however, he regarded as a danger to the state. It 
meddled in politics and was financed largely from abroad. He supported 
the statutory action recommended by the Commission against it. 
The result of the Le Grange recommendations was that the Christian 
Institute was declared an affected organization in terms of the appro-
. 83 d · f d . d N . pr1ate act an its overseas un s were terminate . o action was 
taken against the U.C.M. as it had previously been disbanded. Although 
it was the government which had acted against the C. I. the U.P. was 
81. Die Burgert 5.6.75, 'Toets vir patriotisme'. 
82. Schlebusch commissioner and United Party M.P. for Mooi River. 
83. Affected Organizations Act. 
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again held jointly responsible by its opponents. In this they were 
supported by the attitude of Japie Basson and Prof Olivier both of 
whom disassociated themselves from the findings of the Report and also 
rejected the executive action taken against the Christian Institute. 
Although never intended as such, their reaction was construed as a 
rebuff for the U.P. commissioners which could start another upheaval 
34 in the Party. Gray Hughes, its chief whip, issued a statement on 
June 7 which denied that there was a split in the caucas over the 
Le Grange reports and which explained that the Party was opposed to 
declaring the C.I. an 'affected organization' but agreed that its 
foreign funds should be terminated. Differences of opinion, he said, 
had been expressed over certain conclusions reached on the evidence 
examined but this was permissible within_ the Party as such opinions 
were based on fact and were distinct from party policy. The Party 
was, thus, not divided on fundamental principles as had been alleged 
f . h. 85 or misc 1evous reasons. 
As the United Party had been seen to be co-operating with the government 
on the Schlebusch and Le Grange commissions over a period of three 
years a new round of speculation concerning a possible coal it ion had 
followed the final reports. 86 The prime minister had rejected the 
suggestion as nonsense. This was hardly surprising as there could be 
no possible attraction for the government in a merger with a declining 
party. Nevertheless, the issue, which was never a serious proposition, 
84. Die Burger, 6.6.75, 10nmin in V.P. oar C.I.' 
85. Cape Times, 7.6.75, 'Caucus spi it denied'. 
86. Sunday Times, 8.6.75, 'Coalition rumours'. See also~. 15.6.75, 
Uys: 'New 1 ine up for S.A.? 1 
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received the consideration of political commentators, who used the 
opportunity to draw attention to the failing health of the United Party. 
Gerald Shaw criticized Bill Sutton for having co~operated with the 
government to undermine the rule of law and suggested that the M.P. 
for Mooi River belonged in the National Party. He maintained that the 
U.P. could no longer survive in its present form and that conservative 
members, who were adverse to the political advancement of Blacks, 
should join the government while those who favoured 'power sharing', 
the 'verligtes', should join the Progressives in a •new powerful 
opposition party•. 87 
Shaw had again propagated the mythical 'verl~gte front' at the expense 
of the United Party. A front, consisting of splinter groups with no 
defined policies and which had all originated from the same parent 
body where they had failed to find consensus in the first place! 
How they were expected suddenly• to co-operate in a 'verligte' realign-
ment was never spelt out by those political observers who favoured 
the move. 
'Dawie 1 of the Burger regarded co-operation between the main parties 
on the Commission as a growth point for a broader nationhood and 
therein, he suggested, lay the reason for the 'hysterical 1 attack 
by the opposition press, for on ~o account were the Engli~hseen 
to beworking with the nationalists. Stanley Uys rejected the idea 
87. Cape Times, 7.6.iS, Shaw: 'Talk of Coalition•, and~. 14.6.75, 
'The Real Division•. 
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of coal it ion but called for those who belonged together to go to their 
'real home~'. H~ saw no end to the United Party's troubles which, he 
predicted, would continue to lose support to both the left and to the 
I • • 
right. Its fall from grace he attributed wholly or partially to its 
participation in the Schlebusch commission. 88 
4. Erosion of support continues 
The stark realisation remained that while the Party had acted from 
sound motives its sojourn on the Commission, in the words of Prof 
Olivier, had placed 'an albatross around its n~ck 1 • 89 It had encouraged 
the growth of a hew opposition• mainly of English speaking citizens 
who wished to dissociate themselves from the National Party. Con-
versely, others had simultaneously joined the latter for patriotic 
reason~. This polarization was at the expense of the U.P. which 
increasingly occupied a shrinking middle-ground in the political 
milieu. This trend was reflected in the results of an opinion poll 
published in Rapport on July 13. Support among the main parties 
in percentages was: 
National Party 58.7 
Progressive Reform Party 12.8 
United Party 11. 7 
Democratic Party 3. 1 
Herstigte Nasionale 
Party 2.0 
These figures indicated a loss o.f support for the United Party. The 
survey also revealed that 21.8 percent of English speaking voters 
88. Sunday Times, 15.6.75, Uys: 'No ~ime for Draadsitters 1 and also 
'Schwarz was the catalyst•. 
89. Cape Times, 18.6.75. 
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supported the N.P., 24.8 the U.P., and 32.2 the P.R.P. The 1977 
general election was to confirm this trend and clearly demonstrated -
how small the political centre in white politics had become to which 
the United Party and its succes'sor, the New Republic Party, directed 
its appeal. 
By-elections dur1ng 1975 had also demonstrated the declining influence 
of ihe U.P. in the rural areas' where its traditionally loyal Afrikaans 
speaking following was deserting it, not it would seem for the National 
Party, but to the H.N.P., which had be~n increasing its share of the 
vote in a number of low polls. The Middelburg parliamentary by-election 
in the Transvaal towards the ~nd of May resulted in the U.P. ending last, 
in a three-way contest, behind the H.N.P. which had begun to replace 
90 it as the main opposition on the platteland. This trend is discernible 
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In August the U.P. vote also declined in the Caledon parliamentary 
b 1 
. 91 y-e ect1on. This was a seat in which it had always performed 
solidly in the past. The swing against the Party in the·Transvaal 
and the O.F.S. rural areas, in particular, continued.until it had 
become a totally ineffective organization even prior to its offici~l 
demise. Its offspring, the N.R.P., has ~ince made no progress in 
those areas whatsoever, nor has the Progressive Reform Party or its 
successor, the P.F.P. Instead of a 1verl igte 1 opposition emerging 
in the rural areas and in the industrial constituencies of the cities 
a more right-wing extremist group has s~epp~d in to fill the vacuum 
left by the U.P. There the •new opposition• is conspicuous by its 
absence. The attemp:s to 1 liberal ize 1 the United Party had led to a 
backlash on the platteland and in certain urban seats.~2 For.the more 
sophisticated city electorate the policy changes proposed by the U.P. 
over the years had been insufficient to retain their support but for 
the rural voter they had been too radical. 
At the end of the year Sir De Villiers admitted that it had been a 
difficult period for his party but that it had weathered the storms 
and that the setbacks at the polls were of a temporary nature. He 
said that he had no intention of resigning or of forming a national 
government with Vorster.93 
91. ~. Caledon 
6.8.75 
J.P. de Villiers (N.P.) 
S.J. Delport (U.P.) 
6730 
3467 
N.P. majority 3263 
The N.P .. majority was 2034 in the 1972 parliamentary by-election. 
David Graaff (U.P.) had then polled 4020 votes. 
92. Sunday Times, 6.7.75, Uys: 'White backlash'. 
93. Cape Times, -3.12.75, Copeland: 'Graaff speaks his mind'. 
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Superficially the Party was still united but the undercurrents remained 
and 1976 was to bring no message of hope concerning its future pros-
perity. Japie Basson had become the new provincial leader in the 
Transvaal , 94 its third in as many years. Together with his colleagues 
Messrs Streicher and Cadman he undertook to promote the unity of the 
Party and to enforce discipline within it. 




1976: THE DECLINE GATHERS MOMENTUM 
In many ways 1976 was a watershed year for the country. South African 
troops invaded, then withdrew from Angola while Cubans and other Russian 
proxies propped up its marxist regime. Southern Africa became increas-
' ingly part of the East-West struggJe. The South West Africa question 
became more intractable, there were signs of an economic recession while 
four months of internal unrest followed the Soweto riots. The Theron 
Commission submitted its report on the position of the Coloured people 
and Transkei received its independence. Against this background the 
United Party struggled on as the official opposition, but its fortunes 
continued to decline until a point was reached when Sir De Villiers 
Graaff initiated a campaign to •save South Africa• which, he be! ieved, 
would also preserve something of the character of the Party in a pro-
d d
. . 1 pose new 1spensat1on. What must have spurred Graaff 1s search for 
a new beginning were two disastrous by-election results which clearly 
indicated that a crisis had been reached in the Party. 
1. Alberton and Durban North 
In 1948 the discredited Marais Steyn had won the Alberton seat against 
Dr Ver\'1oerd. In 1970 the U.P. had polled 2,616 votes, in the 1974 
general election 1 ,719 and in the by-election of 31 March 1976 a mere 
952. 2 This put it into third place behind the H.N.P. The Progressive 
1. Interview with Wiley, Streicher·and Horak. 
2. B.M. Schoeman, Parlementere Verkiesings, pp 486 - 490. 
C. Ligthelm (N.P.) 6801 
D. de L. van Staden (H.N.P.) 1004 
A.S. Fourie (U.P.) 952 
N . P . Major i t y 
Percentage Poll 58.6 
5797 
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Reform Party had not considered it worthwhile contesting the election. 
The Middelburg trend of the previous year had been repeated. On the 
Transvaal platteland the United Party had ceased to be a meaningful 
political force. 3 The result was also a major setback for Japie 
Basson who had recently taken charge of the Party in the Transvaal, 
.. 
and of whom much was expected. Following this result Dr Alex Boraine 
of the P.R.P. appealed to Sasson and other 1verligtes 1 still in the 
United Party to join them, 4 a·n offer which was rejected because Sasson 
still believed that his party remained the best framework for the 
strongest verl !gte front in South Africa. 5 
This optimism must have been dashed soon thereafter when the United 
Party suffered yet another traumati& defeat, this time in the urban 
Natal constituency of Durban North. Here the loss of support was to 
the left. In a seventy-six percent poll Harry Pitman of the P.R.P. 
polled 4243 votes to the U.P. 1 s 3919 and the National ist 1 s 3139. 
This gave him a majority of 324 votes in the by-election created 
by Mike Mitchell 1 s unexpected retirement from active politics. 6 Had 
he too perhaps had enough of the civil war within the Party?7 The 
result had confirmed Myburgh Streicher's contention that in a three-
3. Die Burger, 3.4.76, 1Alberton 1 • 
4. Cape Times, 6.4.76, 'Soraine asks Japie Basson and De Villiers 
to join P.R.P 1, 
5. Argus, 6.4.76, 'P.R.P. call to U.P. rejected by Sasson•. 
6. S.M. Schoeman, Parlementere Verkiesings, pp 486 - 490. 
S P i tma n ( P. -=-R-. -=-p -. ).---------.4--=2'-,--4 3 
W Reynolds (U.P.) 3919 
D Wo r r a 11 ( N. P • ) 31 3 9 
P . R. P . major i t y 
Percentage Poll 76 
7. Interview with Graaff, 16.6.82. 
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way contest involving the N.P. the United Party would lose to the 
P . 8 rogress1ves. 
'Durban North was another by-election setback for the U.P.' 
The Burger wrote of the outcome as a 'political earthquake' which· 
underlined the United ~arty's image as a loser with no prospect of a 
rescuer in sight. The wealthy English speaking voter had abandoned 
it for a party with limited growth and sectional appeal. 9 In another 
editorial the Party was described as being punch-drunk, with the only 
escape from its misery being the knock-out blow. Whether it turned to 
the left or the right it had lost all credibility, claimed the newspaper. 10 
8. Interview with Myburgh Streicher, 5.5.82. 
9. Die Burger, 7.5.76 'Pol itieke Aardskuding'. See also 'V.P. swartgall ig 
oor toekoms 1 • 
10.Die Burger, 10.5.76, Editorial: 1 Polarisasie 1 • 
226 
The English press which had worked so hard, particularly in Durban, 
to achieve a P.R.P. victory and which had all but ignored the U.P. 
candidate was ecstatic over the result. The Daily News interpreted 
it as a rejection of white 1 baasskap 1 even in the verl igte form pro-
pagated by Dennis Worrall of the National Party. It claimed that the 
P.R.P. would be a strong opposition and that it was pegging• the 1 imits 
11 of government action and was preparing for power! The lessons of 
white opposition politics since 1948 appeared to be entirely lost on 
the political correspondents of the Daily News and others who commented 
in the same vein. Setting aside the unrealistic remarks of these opinion-
makers what remained incontestable was that the United Party had suffered 
another paralysing reverse. Sir De Villiers regarded the result as a 
matter of 'grave concern' and promised a special meeting of the caucas 
to examine the reasons for the setback. He believed that it confirmed the 
trend towards polarization and the politics of confrontation which would 
lead to a stronger National Party and a smaller less effective opposition. 12 
His fear proved demonstrably accurate if the 1977 election results are 
studied. 
The prime minister asserted that the Durban result indicated that the 
U.P. had lost the right to exist, 13 and predicted th~t its dtsintegrati6n 
would thereafter take place more rapidly. As so often happens in the 
case of a loser the United Party lacked the good fortune which frequently 
separate~ success from failure. It had lost Durban North and Pinelands 
11. Daily News, 7.5.76, 'Message is Expl icit 1• 
12. Argus, 7.5.76, 1 Graaff not to resign•. 
13. IBID, 1 U.P. has lost right to exist•. 
14. ~Vaderland, 6.5.76, 1 0ombl ik van waarheid 1 • 
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. by the narrowest of margins, and in both instances on a split vote. 
Had the National Party not contested the seats there could have been little 
doubt that the ~nited. Party would· have retained them at that time. 
In 1977 Ron Miller of the New Republic Party actually rewon the 
Durban North constituency from the P.F.P., but then there was no 
third candidate to divide the more conservative vote. 15 The U.P. 
was also unfortunate that these by-elections were held in generally 
wealthy English speaking areas where the media strongly supported 
the policies and personalities of the Progressive and la~er Progressive 
Reform parties. This contributed to the weaker performance by the 
U.P. Circumstances, however, alter cases as was demonstrated by 
the result of the provincial by-election held in East Griqualand on 
the same day as the Durban North contest. In this far-flung rural 
constituency the power of the press was substantially less through 
the sheer magnitude of the distances involved and the result of the 
voting was notably different; for the United Party candidate gained 
' 16 a convincing victory over his Progressive Reform challenger. This 
result was announced well after that of Durban North and was virtually 
ignored, intentionally or otherwise by the newspapers which were 
engrossed by the 'verl igte' triumph in Durban. Consequently, a much 







N.R.P. majority 167 
Percentage poll~1 
Rural areas are also traditionally 
have influenced the vote as well. 
Government Gazette, 21 ,5,76, was: 
D.J.N. Malcomess (U.P.) 
E. Spring (P.R.P.) 
more conservative which could 
The result recorded in the 
3490 
971 
2419 U.P. majority 
Percentage poll 53.1 The election was held on 5,5,76. 
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needed morale boosting win by the Party in East Griqualand was over-
looked .. What remained impressed on the minds of the electorate was 
the U.P. defeat in Durban North, a formerly 'safe' seat. 
Prof Kleynhans of U.N. l.S.A., who had in the past been optimistic 
about the future of the U.P. reassessed its position in the light of 
recent events and concluded that voters 'pounced' on parties which 
were doing badly and that such a situation created openings for the 
National and Progressive parties. 17 Tertius Myburgh, the editor of 
the Sunday Times, wrote of the electorate forging new loyalties as 
the U.P. faced imminent collapse under its uninspired leadership .. 
He derided its attempts to 'bestride the mythical centre' and described 
it as a 'tired defeated party' w~ich was being banished to 
I 1 d f • k' I 18 a waste an o rts own ma 1ng . Japie Basson accepted that the Durban 
North setback was the fault of the Party and not that of an unsympathetic 
press. He was, however, apprehensive that a lack of statesmanship could 
· h ..... d h system •·•'1th 'it. 19 rurn t e oppos1L1on an t e two party " 
These and other comments all ~t~uched on points pertaining to the de-
20 cline of the Party. It had always attempted to occupy the middle 
ground in white politics with all the inherent pitfalls of having to 
21 
compromise on sensitive issues in order to raach consensus. It had 
17. Sunday Tribune, 9.5.76, 1 U.P. seats in danger~. 
18, Sunday Times, 9,5,76, 'Goodbye to old Politics'. 
19, Sunday Tribune, 9.5.76, 'We're to blame - Japie Basson'. 
?O. Cape Times, 8.5.76, Shaw: 1 Voters opt for verl igte change'. 
21, Interview with Horak, 8.6.82. The Party, he claimed, died when 
its members were no longer prepared to compromise which meant that 
antagonists had to give up some of their views and accept those of 
their opponents in order to reach consensus. 
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left itself open to attack on both flanks and with its decline, 
polarization became more pronounced, a development mentioned 
repeatedly as a probability by 'Dawie 1 of the Burger. Whereas its 
political moderation was criticized by its adversaries it became 
increasingly evident that once the centre was weakened more extreme 
groups moved in to occupy the vacant ground. While the decline of 
the United Party was never primarily a result of its centrist politics, 
they did lend themselves to exploitation during times of crises. 
Before Sir De Villiers addressed the Central Head Committee on the 
recent setbacks, the Party suffered two further blows when Kent Durr 
and Annette Reinecke abandoned it, the former for the National Party 
and the latter for the cross-benches of the Provincial Council as an 
independent. Miss Reinecke was no longer prepared to endure the 
constant friction within the Party while Durr had left as a result 
of its weak response to the long awaited security legislation based 
on the recommendations of the Le Grange Commission. The Party had 
decided not to support the bill to establish a permanent security 
commission but rather to compromise by requesting that it be 
referred to a select committee for improvement. This was a setback 
for the right-wing which wanted to support the principle of the bill 
but a victory for the left which had been vociferous in its condem-
. f h f" 1 d . f h L. G C . · 22 nation o t e 1na recommen at1ons o t e e range omm1ss1on. 
Eventually the United Party, which had absorbed more than its share 
of debilitating criticism because of its Schlebusch connections, voted 
22, Die Burge~, 12.5.76, 'Regses in V.P. kry pak oor Wet'. 
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with the P.R.P. against the principle of the proposed new security 
bill. This received the approval of the English newspapers but 
was criticized by the Afrikaans ones which regarded it as a defeat 
for the right. It had also driven Durr into the arms of the National 
. 23 
Party. 
Durr's decision indicated that as the Party lost momentum it would 
Jose support, not only to the P.R.P., but also to the National Party 
and this included English speaking voters. The 1977 election results 
illustrated clearly the degree to which polarization had taken place 
among them. 
-. 
It was against this background that Sir De Villiers addressed the 
Central Head Committee, which next to i~s National congress, was 
·24 the Party's highest P?licy-making body. He spoke seriously of the 
problems facing it, their causes and the Party's future. 'We have 
come together', he said, 'to discuss nothing less than the fate of 
the United Party itself'. He detailed the reasons for its loss of 
support as originating not from a lack of sound.policies but from 
massive and hostile press campaigns, the clever marketing of candi-
dates, intensive canvassing and house meetings, the twisting of 
pol icy issues and the denigration of the United Party, its leaders 
and candidates. These factors had converted people who were obi ivious 
23. Die Burger, 22.5.76, 'Hoe die Prog-Refs help om Kent Durr Nat. te 
maak' 
24. Division of Information and Research, Graaf f's address to the 
Party's Head Committee, 20.5.76 (Johannesburg, 1976). 
.. 
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of the real issues involved. Sir De Villiers used as an example the 
Durban North by-election where both daily newspapers as well as the 
Sunday Tribune and the Sunday Times had either ignored or denigrated 
the Party's candidate and had supported Harry Pitman. Reynolds' (U.P.) 
speeches were frequently not reported while sometimes his presence on 
a pub 1 i c p 1 at form was not even mentioned. The Dai 1 y News had 'been 
the most partisan and 'had done the whole cause of press freedom a 
disservice'. While the P.R.P. victory had received banner.head! ines 
the United Party's resounding win in Griqualand East had elicited 
scant attention, the Rand Daily Mail tacking it on to the end of a 
political article by Bernadi Wessels which only the most 'assiduous 
readers of political news' would have noticed! 
Sir De Villiers believed that the voters who had switched to the P.R.P. 
had been kept ignorant of its policies for a common-roll franchise 
and Black majority rule would not attract v6tes. The activists of the 
'new left' and the partisan journalists who supported them, 'argue not 
• 
in terms of policies but of images'. Hebel ie~ed ~hat they sought to 
destroy the credibility of the Party in order to ~nlist support for 
a new and more effective opposition. Graaff vowed that he would have 
nothing to do with such a disastrous al ignment. 25 
The feuding and public recriminations among party members resulted 
from a lack of confidence which itself had led· to a loss of support. 
25. IBID . 
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The key to future success therefore, lay in the Party's ability to 
regain this confidence on the basis of a moderate political approach. 
Success for the P.R.P., ·Graaff said, would leave the English voter 
isolated, and frustrated, in a smaller opposition which would be 
forced to seek common cause with the Blacks. The result of such 
polarization in white politics was inevitable confrontation. Con-
ciliation was only possible through the United Party which was suffi-
ciently broadly based to achieve this desirable objective. Graaff 
therefore asked 'moderate South Africans' to support the U.P. in order 
to preserve the democratic system in the Republic and to prevent the 
development of a virtual one-party state'. Support for the Party 
would take the country back from the perilous road to totalitarianism 
which would be the inevitable result of confrontation cctween left 
and right-wing extremes'. Graaff ended his twelve page address op-
timistically when he admitted that the Party had 'lost a few skirmishes 
26 but would yet win the war'. 
Sir Devilliers had made an important analysis of the state of the 
Party but it was not destined to regain the .confidence he mentioned 
as necessary for its revival. The writing was on the wall, it was 
not going to win any war but was, instead, on the verge of drawing up 
its own surrender documents. 27 
26. IBID. 
27. unTted Party Papers, U.N. l.S.A. Vause Raw, Chairman of the Division 
of Organisatio~ reported to the Central Executive Committee on 
14.9.76 that 'in the present situation' the Party would not be able 
to fight even a minimum of 50 priority seats at a general election. 
Financi~l and manpower potential was lacking while too few public 
representatives were 'involved on a broad scale with their con-
stituents'. This was important for the candidate had become a ma-
jor factor where once the party used to be the dominant one. R~w 
reported that i~ the majority of U.P. held seats organization 
existed only on paper and that the 'stalwarts' who were still in-
volved were becoming discouraged and old and they could not provide 
the 'spark' needed for new growth. 
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2. The Graaff initiative. 
Three months later Sir De Villiers Graaff set in motion a sequence of 
events which were to end with the demise of the Party and his retirement 
from active politics. At the Cape congress of the United Party in East 
London Sir De Villiers came out strongly in favour of power-sharing 
with the protection of minority rights while laying before the delegates 
a federal alternative to the government's pol icy of separate develop-
28 
ment. Hebel ieved that the government's policies had broken down on all 
fronts. The Soweto riots and the subsequent unrest had left it unmoved. 
He revealed that he ha~ a week previously, spoken with Vorster29 but 
that the government was not prepared to alter its position even if it 
meant that it would receive United Party support for any courageous 
moves which it introduced. 30 In the face of such an intransient 
attitude, during a difficult period of the Republic's history, it was 
essential to have a strong opposition to save the country. Following 
this preamble Graaff declared himself willing to mobilize a united 
opposition which would offer a federal alternative to the policies of 
the National Party. His proposed realignment would not be a merger -
'not a united verl igte front' - of the U.P. and P.R.P. that would 
1 d 
. 31 exc u e conservatives. 
I~ the light of subsequent misunderstandings it should be made absolutely 
clear that what Graaff wanted was a new, more broadly based, opposition 
which could accommodate disillusioned nationalists who were prepared to 
share power with Blacks while group identities were maintained. 32 The 
28. Argus, 13.8.76, 'Graaff spells it out'. 
29. Interview with Graaff, 16.6.82. 
30. Daily Dispatch, 17.8.76, 'Graaff: Vorster won't alter policy'. 
31. Daily Dispatch, 19.8.76, 'U.P .. - Progref merger not enough - Gr~aff'. 
32. Interview with Graaff, 16.6.82. 
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domination of one race over another had to be avoided. South Africa 
needed a strong alternative government, not merely an 'effective' 
opposition. Nor could it afford a divided opposition which was 
unable to attract disenchanted nationalists. A merger between the 
U.P. and the P.R.P., if possible, would achieve nothing and would 
simply return the opposition to square one. Sir De Villiers was 
prepared to sacrifice the United Party, if necessary, to form a new 
party which could challenge the government. He appealed to opinfon-
makers, businessman and the existing opposition forces as well as 
to disillusioned nationalists to join his campaign to 'save South Af-
rica•.33 
Graaff 's initiative, launched in East London, was a brave attempt to 
break the political logjam and to extricate a divided opposition from 
the cul-de-sac into which it was inexorably moving ever deeper. Had 
he succeeded, many of the cherished ideals of the U.P. would have been 
preserved in the new alignment. Unfortunately, the campaign made no 
noticeable impression on the nationalists while the deep-seated ani-
mosity among opposition politicians doomed the exercise to eventual 
failure. In the process the U.P. shed further support to both the left 
and to the right and when it went into voluntary 1 iquidation the rump 
of what remained of the once powerful political party of Botha, Smuts 
~nd Hertzog was the small New Republic Party, whose electoral per-
formance at parl iamP.ntary level suggested that it was unlikely to 'save 
South Africa' and would have to battle for its own political survival. 
33. Daily Dispatch, 17.8.76, 'Graaff plan to save Republic' 
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Graaff 1s speech attracted praise from opposition quarters 34 though, 
predictably, none from the nationalists. But even among the well-
wishers there were those who did not view the initiative in the manner 
Graaff had intended. Myburgh Streicher, the vii lain of many •verligte-
verkrampte 1 battles, supported th~ campaign and was convinced that the 
philosophy of the United Party would be retained in any new alignment. 
However, he expressed reservations about the P.R.P. for he believed that 
Col in Eglin was interested only in an effective opposition and not in 
an alternative government. 35 Japie Basson regarded Graaff's offer to 
stand down, if it was required, akin to the statesmanship of General 
Smuts when he stood back for Hertzog in 1934.36 Basson also rejected 
a merger with the P.R.P. although he was destined to join them in the 
followingyea~. 37 Eglin, who welcomed the plan which would bring 
•genuine verl igtes together• was, however, of the opinion that the 
inclusion of conservatives would serve no purpose. 38 Harry Schwarz 
expressed similar sentiments. Notwithstanding these reservations, Sir 
De Villiers stood firm on the issue of cohservatives. 39 Yet, from the 
very start it was apparent that positions were being taken up that 
boded ill for the success of the intiative. Conditions were being 
set regarding the eligibility for membership of the proposed new party. 
Both the Argus and the Cape Times questioned the wisdom of a new 
34. Argus, 23.8.76, 'Wide backing for campaign'. 
35. Daily Dispatch, 19.8.76, 'Streicher backs Divs. new plan'. 
36. Hertzog became prime minister of the fusion government in 1934 
with Smuts as his C8puty. 
37. Argus, 18.8.76, 1Basson - praise for Graaff speech'. 
38. Cape Times, 28.8.76, 'Eglin: We'll talk to U.P. 1 See also Argus, 
19.8.76, 'Eglin welcomes Graaff plan'. 
39. Argus, 20.8.76, 'Graaff firm on conservatives•. 
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alignment which included conservatives, particularly those from the 
United Party who were branded as 'ultra-rightists• and 'reactionaries•.
40 
Success depended on the exclusion of this group. 41 lronically,this 
group was even less enthusiastic to be associated with any realignment 
42 involving the Progressive Reform Party. 
Sir De Villiers ·kept the initetive alive by contacting leading business 
figures including Messrs Harry Oppenheimer, Len Abrahamse and Frans 
Cronje, all of whom expressed an interest in it. At the Transvaal con-
gress43 he again referred to the plan and called on members of the 
P R P . . . . d" "d 1 b . 
44 ... to JOln 1t on an 1n 1v1 ua as1s. He rejected Egl in 1 s pro-
posal for the creation of a verl igte front. Eglin had, from the outset, 
adopted an obstructionist approach,for as a potential leader of the 
opposition he did not approve of Graaff stealing the 1 imelight at a 
time when the United Party was disintegrating and stood a good chance 
of being replaced by the Progressive Reform Party. By emphasizing 
the desirability of a verligte front he hoped to attract reformists 
still in the United Party. This ploy would ensure the exclusion of 
conservatives and hasten the decline of the United Party. In this 
manner the P.R.P. would make gains without sacrificing anything. 
Graaff, on the other hand, wanted a new party which would be above 
old divisions. 
40. Cape Times, 19-8.76, editorial: 1 Graaff 1 s offer•. See also IBID, 
21.8.76, Shaw: 1 Graaff 1 s Plan - can it save South Africa•. ~~ 
41, That i~ the Streicher-Wiley group. 
42. Die Burger, 9.10.76, 'Wiley verwerp P.R.P. front'. 
43. Held or. the 17 and 18 September, 1976 
44. Sunday Times, 19.9.76, 'Div. urges P.R.P. to join him as individuals'. 
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In October 1976 both the P.R.P. and Theo Gerdener 1 s Democratic Party 
agreed to co-operate with the United Party to set up a committee to 
investigate the establishment of a unified opposition. 45 Col in Eglin 
still insisted that it should be a union of compatibles and that the 
46 principle of power-sharing should be accepted. Graaff was critical 
of Egl in's comments for even if they were valid they were anticipating 
the work of the steering committee. 
'Eglin will co-operate in the •save South Africa• campaign• 
The nationalists viewed progress differently. They predicted trouble 
should the U.P. merge with the- P.R.P., although this was misrepresenting 
45. Argus, 30.8.76, 1 Gerdener supports initiative'· 
46. Cape Times, 18.6.76, 'I'll co-operate with U.P. and D.P. 1 
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Graaff 1s intention. The Burger thereafter quoted members of the United 
Party's right-wing as being totally opposed to any such co-operation. 47 
'Doubts regarding co-operation between Eglin and Graaff 1 
Vorster used the opportunity to appeal to the conservatives, who saw 
f . h U P . . . h h. 
48 ~h B l d. d no uture 1n t e .. ,to Join wit 1m. 1 e urger a so pre 1cte 
the failure of Graaff's plan as it was started from a position of 
weakness by a leader who was close to the end of his political career. 
47. Die Burger, 9.10.76, 'Opstand broei in V.P. oor smeltery'. It 
quoted the views of parliamentarians Wiley, Streicher and Van Den 
Heever 
48. ~. 14.10.76, 'Korn Loop Saam•. 
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The final product would be a further shrinking of the opposition. 
Other than the government, only the P.R.P, which wanted Graaff removed 
in any case, would benefit by strengthening its position in certain 
urban seats which would be 'stolen' from the mother party. 49 
Ten weeks after Graaff had made his 'save South Africa' speech a steering 
committee to investigate the feasibility of creating a new party was 
. d 50 appo1nte . This followed recommendations made by Graaff's committee 
of business and academic leaders who intimated that they would sponsor 
such a conference if the three parties involved could find common 
ground. South Africa, they believed, could not afford the luxury of 
opposition parties fighting each other. The appointment of a steering 
committee was the first step in this direction. 51 A former judge, 
broederbonder and nationalist, Kowie Marais was to chair the committee 
of eight which would: 
seek and define the area of common purpose which will 
command the support of all who recognize the need for fundamental 
change in South Africa•.52 
The Committee would convene on November 17 in order to hear proposals 
from the political parties involved as well as evidence from outsiders 
including black and brown leaders. On the basis of the evidence gathered 
the Steering Committee would make its recommendations which would then 
49. IBID, 6. 10.76, 'Div. se mislukte inisiatief'. 
50. lJnlted Party Paper~, U.N. I .S.A. Report of the Steering Committee 
thanked Messrs C. Saunders, A. Louw, L. Abrahamse and H. Middelman 
for requesting that it should be appointed to undertake such an 
investigation. 
51. The Steering Committee consisted of: Messrs J.F. Marais, M. Borkum, 
F. Bradlow, F. Cronje, D. Kriek, P. Nel, F. Robb and J. Steyn. 
52. Argus, 27.10.76 'Kowie Marais' Blueprint for a new S.A. 1 
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be accepted or rejected by the parties involved. 
An air of uncertainty preceeded its first meeting as reformists and 
conservatives contested the right of the other to be part of any new 
party. 53 Graaff, however, insisted that the door should be left wide 
open and that no group should be excluded. A week before the Marais 
group met the Head Committee of the U.P. in the Cape gave the Graaff 
initiative its unanimous support but only after the leader had allayed 
certain fears and had assured members that he was in favour of a new 
54 party and not a merger with the P.R.P. · Natal also backed the plan 
but wanted the retention of group identities as a pre-requisite for any 
political real ignment. 55 Ray Swart of the P.R.P. insisted on the 
Steering Committee accepting certain non-nesotiables while _the English 
press continued to misrepresent Graaff 1s intention by writing of a 
merger between the opposition parties as opposed to the creation of a 
56· new one. 
Graaff had explained to the Cape Head Committee that the negotiations 
he had undertaken had been done by him in his individual capacity ~nd 
not as a party representative. The Steering Committee 1s terms of 
reference were to examine the feasibility of creating a new party and 
not of unifying the existing opposition. He had thus reprimanded 
53.,Cape·Times, 9.10.76, 1U.P. split on unity move•. 
54. IBID, 10.11.76, 1Cape Head Committee backs Graaff 1, 
55. TBTD, 13.11.76, 1Natal U.P. give full backing to Graaff'. 
56. Argijs, 27.10.76, 'Talks to merge three opposition parties'. See 
also the Sunday Times, 31.10.76, 1This marriage must work'. 
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Kowie Marais for speaking of agreements between the U.P. and P.R.P. 
because they were not part of the terms of reference. Graaff said 
that he would examine the recommendations· of the Steering Committee 
and thereafter decide whether to submit them to the United Party, 
which was not obliged to endorse them. 
Sir De Villiers had assumed the role of the 'honest broker'. The establishment 
of the Steering Committee was mainly his work and he was prepared to 
give it a chance before any other decision regarding the U.P. was 
taken. The Party, he felt, had nothing _to lose by supporting his initia-
tive, as its options remained open. Should the Steering Committee 
make unacceptable proposals there was no complusion to accept them. 
The Committee held its first meeting on schedule and heard evidence 
from interested parties. On the following day Sir De Villiers gave a 
wide ranging interview to Tim Patten of the Argus, in which he reviewed 
a number of relevant issues pertaining to the United Party since he 
had become its leader in 1957:
7 
He admitted that he knew from the 
start that it would be a major task to keep the Party together and after 
the 1970 successes its fortunes had declined as a result of internal 
difficulties which had been aggravated by certain journalists. Yet even 
during the most trying times he had not considered stepping down. He 
was a 'servant of his congresses', and if they wanted him he was prepared 
to serve. He believad that the Party's biggest success was to revive the 
57. Argus, 18. 11 .76, 'Graaff: The Years behind, the years to come'. 
federal concept in South Africa within which framework future consti-
tutional changes would be made once the Westminster system had been 
abandoned. 58 
The U.P. had also been responsible for constructive opposition and 
did not protest simply for its own sake. The government had accepted 
many of its proposals, for instance in matters regarding Black diplo-
mats and sport. The role of some crusading journalists had, however, 
disappointed him in their efforts to oust him in order to split the 
Party. He ended the interview by saying that he was prepared to serve 
under another leader if a new party was brought into existence as a 
l f h . . . . . 59 resu to 1s 1n1t1at1ve. 
Graaff 1 s comments concerning sections of the press were similar to those 
which had appeared in a Burger editorial a few da,ys previously. It 
laid the blame for the splintered opposition squarely in the lap of the 
English newspapers. Now that the opposition had been sapped of its 
energy or growth potential the same newspapers were attempting to 
rebuild what they had destroyed. These newspapers, admonished th~ edi-
torial, should have learnt to build and not just break down. 60 
The rebuilding process took a hesitant step forward when the P.R.P.'s 
national congress 61 endorsed an opposition realignment although many 
58. The President's Council made similar proposals to the government 
in 1982 • 
59. IBID. 
60. ~Burger, 12. 11.76, editorial: 1 Magteloos om te bou•. 
61. Met in November, 1976. 
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delegates believed that it would be an exercise in futility. Pre-
conditions were set for the Party's co-operation and these included 
the abolition of political discrimination, consultation with Blacks 
62 and a sharing of power. The December issue of Progress, the Party's 
propaganda journal, also warned that it would not compromise on pr in-
. l h . . . 63 c1p es or t e1r 1nterpretat1on. Three days later the Central Head 
Committee of the United Party al so backed the plan and wished "the 
Marais committee well in its work. Graaff remained optimistic that 
the principles and poli·cies of his Party wo~ld be provided for in 
the steering committee's recommendations. Conservatives, such as 
Streicher, were overruled when they urged that negotiations with the 
64 P.R.P. on the Mar~is committee should stop. 
After having heard evidence from a wide variety of sources the 
Steering Committee released its report on December 20. Prior to 
this, however, the United Party received a severe shock when yet another 
leading figure expressed his dissatisfaction by withdrawing from the 
activities of the Party. Myburgh Streicher, while remaining a member 
of the U.P., resigned as its leader in the Cape. He was not prepared 
to accept responsibility for his Party in the Province with regard to 
its association with the Marais committee. In a press statement he 
expressed grave doubts as to whether the Marais committee was able to 
produce a blueprint for an alternative party?5 The approach of the P.R.P. 
62. Sunday Times, 21.11 .76, ~de Vil Jiers: 'Wary P.R.P. backs the new 
party'. 
63. Progress, December 1976, 'Realignment Warning'. 
64. Citizen, 9.12. 76, 'U.P. heads for showdown'. 
65. Cape Times, 11.12.76, Copeland: 'Streicher quits as Cape U.P. 
leader'. See also Die Burger, 11.12.76, 'Streicher tree uit as 
V.P. se Kaapse leier'. 
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at its recent national congress had made it clear to him that 
irreconcilables could not be reconciled. He expressed the fear of 
the United Party conservatives everywhere when he said that for the 
'Streicher dissociates himself from further negotiations with the Progressives as 
the likely outcome would be unsatisfactory' 
two parties to communicate the U.P. would hav~ to dilute its policies 
'so that the leftist element could be accommodated 1 • The P.R.P. were 
integrationists whose platform would lead to Black majority rule. 
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There was no future for the U.P. in such a direction. 66 
Possibly Streicher's action had been premature and he should have 
waited for the Marais Report- before acting as he had done. 67 As 
it turned out the two parties did, in the end, interpret the recommen-
dations differently and were unabie to reach agreement on the formation 
of a new party. The Streicher revolt had, however, been brewing for a 
long time and had followed years of 'verl igte - verkrampte' in-fighting. 68 
The prospect of having to co-operate with those responsible for so much 
of the damage to the U.P. was anathema ~o the conservatives and, con~ 
s~quently, they made a final attempt to preserve the Party. Streicher 
made it clear that he still supported its philosophy and had the highest 
regard for Sir De Villiers Graaff. When it later became evident that 
consensus with the P.R.P. on the basis of the Marais Report was not 
possible, as had been predicted by Streicher 1 it was too late for the 
conservatives to do anything about it for they had already left the 
Party and had reconstituted themselves as the Independent United Party 
(1.U.P.). 69 This group proposed to continue to uphold the true prin-
ciples of the Party and in this they could be compared to Dr Malan's 
'purified' nationalists who refused to follow Hertzog into the Fusion 
Government of 1934. They were, however, not destined to enjoy the same 
success. Prior to this, Copeland of the Cape Times, asserted that the 
United Party's right-wing would, in fact, sit as a 'purified' group and 
66. Argus, 11.12.76, 'Streic.her statement: Resigneci as Cape U.P. leader'. 
67 Interview with Graaff, 16.6.82. 
t 
68. Rapport, 12.12.76, 'Chaos sak op V.P.' 
69. Parliamentary Register Part 11, 1960 - 1980, published by the House 
of Assembly. The I .U.P. was established on 26.3.77 and the S.A.P. 
on 28.5.77. 
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that some of them would eventually join the national ists. 70 He 
believed, however, that Streicher•s resignation would not necessarily 
endanger the Marais committee•s attempts to form a new enlightened 
party but that it would make a split in the U.P. more probable: Cope-
land's prognosis of the situation was destined to be proved largely 
correct. 
The Transvaler put forward a different interpretation claiming that 
Streicher had been driven to resign by the Party 1s left-wing which was 
still determined to eradicate the conservatives in order to clear the 
71 way for a verl igte front with the P.R.P. V 1 . 72 .• t 1 . d er 1gtes, c a1me , 
had known all about Graaff 1 s •save South Africa• campaign while con-
servatives such as Wiley and Hickman had been kept in the dark until 
the East London congress and had consequently been unprepa~ed to meet 
the challenge. The 1 Bassonites 1 , said the newspaper, had achieved what 
the Young Turk reformists had failed to do, namely to defeat the Old 
Guard in the United Party. 
The Argus wrote that Streicher•s resignation would damage Graaff 1i 
initiative particularly as he still remained a member of the Party. 
The Burger, on the other hand, regarded Streicher 1 s move as a last 
warning to Graaff 'to come home• and to stop capitulating to the P.R.P. 
whose future growth prospects were so limited. 73 Streicher, it asserted 
70. Cape Times, 13. 12.76, Copeland: 1 Streicher:spl it possible in U.P. 1 
71. Die Vaderland, 14.12.76, 1V.P-. Linkses het Moorde Beplan 1• 
72. Such as Japie Basson and Derick De Villiers. See also Horak inter-
view, 8. 6. 82 . 
73. Tt-placed them at approximately 30 in the urban areas. At present 
the P.F.P. has 26 elected members (1982). 
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/ 
had written the first sentence in the last chapter of the history of 
the United Party. The following step would be dissolution leaving the 
National Party as the only nationwide political party, just as the 
United Party had once been. It then, again, blamed the English press 
for the destructive role it had played in the affairs of the United 
Party when it found it was unable to make any headway against the 
N . 1. 74 at1ona 1sts. 
In an earlier editorial, The Citizen wanted to know why Graaff had 
ever started his 1nitiative for if there was to be a merger the United 
Party as such was finished and if there was not,it would split. The 
conservatives would not accept the Marais hybrid and if Graaff did not 
stop the initiative they would leave the Party, but if he did, the 
1 Bassonites 1 would go. There was no doubt, it asserted, that the Party 
d . ·11 . d d . . d d . 75 was 1s1 us1one , espa1r1ng an y1ng. Rapport concurred that if 
Graaff went ahead with his plans the result would be nothing less than 
the disbanding of the Party. 76 The Sunday Times predicted a right-wing 
split and regarded Streicher's resignation as a declaration of war on 
Sir De Villiers. His move, however, would facilitate the establishment 
of a more viabletmodern opposition as it would exclude conservatives. 77 
Both Graaff and Kowie Marais blamed Streicher for acting prematurely 
as they expected the Report to be acceptable to most P.R.P.and U.P. 
74. Die Burger, 11.12.76, 'Streicher uit 1• 
75. The Citizen, undated, comment: 'A Dying Party'. 
76. Rapport, 12.12.76, 'Chaos Sak op V.P. 1 
77. Sunday Times, 12.12.76, F. De Villiers: 'U.P. breakaway looms on 
right'. 
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members. Whatever the outcome, the Marais committee's deliberations had 
led to a great deal of controversy and comment which did not bode well 
for the establishment of a new opposition.78 
Streicher's resignation and those who were to follow his example had 
far-reaching consequences and heralded the final chapter, at parl ia-
mentary level, of the disintegration which was already well advanced 
among rank and file supporters of the Party. Sir De Villiers was gra-
dually losing more and more of his most trusted followers, men who had 
carried the United Party message to the furtherest corners of the Re-
public. Without conservative support, however, it was not possible 
for any opposition party to progress. The U.P. had found it difficult 
enough to attract the Afrikaner vote, which was traditionally a con-
servative one, notwithstanding its faithful core of 1bloedsap 179 rural 
members. The chances of a new alignment grouped around the P.R.P.to 
make any headway with its urban '1iberal 1 image were even more remote. 
The final outcome would be a larger National Party, strengthened by 
U.P. conservatives, and a smaller opposition with limited growth poten-
tial. In this process of realignment the United Party would be squeezed 
out of existence. 
3. The Marais proposals 
On December 20 the Marais Committee presented its proposals to the public. 
78. IBID, 'Shake out in U.P. 1 
79. S:L:'" Barnard, 'Pol itieke Orientasie in die Suid-Afrikaanse Opposisie 
sedert 1958 1, unpublished thesis, D.Phi 1, University of the O.F.S., 
1979, p. 9. 1 8loedsappe 1 refers to those supporters of the U.P. 
dating back to the days of Botha and Hertzog. They were the conserva-
tive Afrikaner elements. Sappe, en the other hand, were supporters 
of the South African Party (1910- - 1934). 
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They were widely framed, consisted of fourteen points, and were osten-
• b 1 f h b . f . . d · . 80 J d M · s1 y to orm t e as1s or a new unite oppos1t1on. u ge ara1s 
had found that very little difference existed between the interested 
·parties on matters of prfnciple although difficulties regarding pol icy, 
f d . h 81 orm an approac were present. Personality clashes and past feuds had 
also played a role in keeping the parties apart. 
The next step was for the Party leaders to ascertain the reaction of 
their organisations82 to the proposals although three days after the 
Committee had revealed its Report the respective national leaderships 
. 83 
had all tentatively approved the recommendations. It soon became 
apparent, however, that this approval was based on differing interpre-
tations which were more in accord with the 0bjectJves of the various 
parties concerned. The issue of a common as opposed to a plural society 
in which group identities were recognized became an obstacle to the 
84 formation of a new party. The concept of power-sharing created 
similar problems. The U.P. and P.R.P. were both of the opinion that 
the Marais proposals encompassed the.ir particular approach to these 
matters. This was not entirely unexpected as the in-exactness of 
the Report, almost a prerequisite for agreement among political adversaries, 
lent itself to this. 85 Should consensus be reached on the main objective 
the details could alwyas be finalized later. But agreement would remain 
an elusive dream if the necessary goodwill among the participants was 
lacking. This was destined to be the fate of the Marais Report. 86 
80. See appendix E, p. 354 
81. Cape Times, 21.12.76, 'A good start'. 
82. Cape Times, 22.12.76, 'Opposi~ion meetings'. 
83. IBID, 'Party leader? accept Marais findings'. 
84. Tnterview with Senator Horak, 8.6.82. 
85. The seven point plan on which Hertzog and Smuts had agreed in 1933to 
bring about a coalition government had been as innocuous. 









·~Mens wonder hoe dit sal gaan wanneer ons eers afsak grond toe! 1 
Streicher, and those who thought as he did, immediately expressed their 
dissatisfaction with the proposals as they excluded the principle of 
white leadership. 87 Basson responded by attacking these conservative 
views as being more in accord with the thinking of Ehe Herstigte Na-
87. Argus, 20. 12.76, 'Streicher expre~ses misg1v1ngs about proposals'. 
See also the Cape Times, 22.12.76, Copeland: 'Wiley attacks Marais 
Report as leftist-1 iberal '. 
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• 1 p t h. h h ( d h . h 1 d . . 88 s1ona e ar yw 1c , e suggeste , t e1r proposers sou JOln. 
This resulted in a letter from John Wiley to Gray Hughes, the Party's 
~hief whip, to raise Basson 1 s attack on himself, Van Den Heever and 
Streicher at the first caucus meeting of 1977. He regarded it as a 
breach of caucus discipline and of the code of conduct to which Party 
members subscribed. 89 
It was already evident that even before the various parties had examined 
the 'fourteen points' that differences existed, not only among the 
participants but within the United Party -itself. When the U.P. Central 
Executive met .on December 22 to consider the Marais Report it was 
attended by Dr J Steyn, a member of the Steering Committee, to ensure 
that the proposals were correctly interpreted. The meeting decided 
that the interpretation by it of the fourteen points agreed with that 
put on them by the Marais Committee and consequently recommended that 
when the Party's Head Committee met in January it should authorize 
Graaff to continue with his initiative to form a new party as had been 
suggested by the Steering Committee. 90 
88. Argus, 24.12.76, 'Basson hits at critics of U.P. move'. See also 
Rapport, 26.12.76, 'Min vrede rondom Kowie plan'. 
89. United Party Papers, U.N. l.S.A. At the Executive Head Committee_ 
meeting, 22.12.76, Basson raised the question of Myburgh Streicher 
and Wiley's pub! ic statements and wanted steps to be taken. It was, 
however, decided that no action would be taken before the new year. 
90. IBID, committee meeting, 22.12.76. Dr Steyn pointed out that the 
concept of group identity (the major obstacle to agreement between 
the U.P. and P.R.P.) was inherent in the Kowie Marais proposals 
although the word was not mentioned by name. 
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CHAPTER XI 
1977: THE DEATH OF THE UNITED PARTY 
1. The Consequences of the Marais Report 
Prior to the meeting of the Central Head Committee 1 Dr Gideon Jacobs 
made a comparative study of the Marais proposals and the ~olicy of 
the United Party. He concluded that the fourteen principles did not 
clash with those of the Party and were almost a restatement of existing 
~ 2 
policy. In recommending their acceptance he insisted, however, that 
there were certain principles from which the U.P. would not deviate. 
These were that there would be no compulsory integration, that group 
identities would be retained and domination rejected and that South 
Af . 1 1 . d 3 r1ca was a p ura society an not a common one. Jacobs was of the 
opinion that the Marais proposals incorporat~d these principles. 
This document was made available to the leaders of the United Party a 
few days befor~ the Central Head Committee meeting. Sir De Villiers 
Graaff recommended that his committee accept his motion to form a 
new party. He iioted that the Marais Report did not propose a common 
roll franchise or an open-ended commitment to create a common-roll 
geographical federation. While he accepted an equitable sharing of power 
it had to be on a responsible basis and this excluded the concept of one 
4 man one vote. 
1. The Head Committee meeting was scheduled for 18.1.77. 
2. Paper by G.F.Jacobs, 12.1.1977, 1 Recommendations of the Marais Com-
mittee and the position of the United Party'. 
3. Cf. to point 5 of Marais proposals. 
4. Interview with Graaff, 16.6~82. 
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The meeting which lasted the entire day of January 18 eventually 
endorsed Graaff's motion5 but there were six dissenting votes. Sir 
De Villiers believed that they should have abided by the majority 
decision and should have refrained from publicly criticizing it. 
The conservatives had felt otherwise and their move had meant that 
they had formally declared themse1ves opposed to the initiative to 
form a new party. The United Party was on the brink of another 
split and this even before the proposed new party had been launched. 
Following the Central Head Committee decision the parliamentary 
caucus of the Party met to discuss the events of the previous day. 
The dissidents argued their case but it became apparent that they 
would not change their minds nor would they remain silent on the 
matter. As a result of this attitude they were expelled from the 
6 Party caucus. The initiative to form a new party was looking 
decidedly frail while the United Party had suffered another blow 
to its morale, and that on the eve of the no-confidence debate in 
the Assembly. Graaff, nevertheless; remained optimistic, ciaiming 
that 1 ••• one cannot win a war without losing men'. Unfortunately 
for the U.P. it was destined to lose too many men to be able to 
win any battle. 7 
5. The Central Head Committee issued a statement, 18.1.77, endorsing 
the Marais recommendations provided that the points raised by Dr 
Jacobs were ob?erved. 
6. Par] iamentary Register Part I I 1961 - 80, Published by House of 
Assembly. They were Messrs Wiley, Streicher, Hickman, Deacon, Van 
Den Heever and Aronson. 
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A further jarring note to the 'save South Africa• campaign was Eglin 1 s 
statement that while the P.R.P. •s Federal Executive approved of the 
Kowie Marais proposals it would only consider a merger of the parties 
8 
involved but would not itself disband to form a new party. This was 
8. Argus, 15.1.77, 1 P.R.P. approval of Kowie proposals expected today'. 
See also~. 10.1.77, 'Eglin: P.R.P. will merge, not disband'. 
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contrary to the whole spirit of Graaff 1s original initiative. Mean-
while, Francois Oberholzer, leader of the United Party•s remaining 
three members in the Transvaal Provincial Council, vowed to have 
nothing to do with the P.R.P. 9 Senator Horak appealed for moderate 
centrist policies to be supported in the country in order to ward off 
the growth of extremist groups. He believed that moderates, who com-
prised the 1silent majority•, suffered because of their apathy and 
tolerance. Graaff 1s campaign was an attempt to prevent polarization 
and to mobilize moderate opinion, initially among whites, but later 
also among non-whites. The Marais proptisals should be supported for 
these reasons, he believed.lo 
Prof Kleynhans of U.N.1.S.A. remained unimpressed by the efforts to 
establish a new opposition. He was of the opinion that it was not 
the proven policies of the United Party which had let it down but 
rather its uninspired leadership. He also criticized the Party for 
failing to contest the municipal elections in Randburg, an electoral 
division which the Party had won in the 1970 provincial poll and in 
the 1974 general election. It was a vivid example of the declining 
11 influence of the United Party. 
The United Party did, however, contest the Johannesburg municipal 
9 . IBID, 13. 1 . 77, 1 No co-operation says U. P. M. P. C. 1 
10.TBTD, 15.1.77, Horak: 1Moderates have a vital dut/ to S.A. 1 
11.IBID, 13.1.77, 'Kleynhans slams U.P. 1 
•. 
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council elections where the campaign was conducted by Francois Ober-
12 
holzer or 'Mr Johannesburg' as he was called. He was no friend of 
the reform movement and adopted a right-wing approach which upset 
both the P.R.P. and Japie Basson who accused him of presenting emo-
tive issues in a 'racist and verkrampte' fashion. 13 His so-called 
'Black Manifesto' did nothing to promote co-operation among parties 
which were at that time searching for common-ground on the basis of 
the Marais proposals. Oberholzer's manifesto appealed for support on 
a platform which opposed racial. integration at local level. 
Nothwithstanding these and other problems it appeared certain that 
14 the conservatives in the United Party would form their own party. 
Such an event would reduce the United Party'~ representation in the 
Assembly to 30, seventeen less than it had been in 1970. It would 
also represent the fourth split since 1948, and the largest since 
the Progressives had broken away in 1959. 
The Cape Times E:xpressed pleasure at·the expulsion of 'the six who, 
over the years, were regarded by it as a stumbling block to necessary 
reform. 15 Their departure 16 wo~ld -0pen the way for 'enlightened men' 
17 of all parties to get together. This prediction never did materialize 
to any extent but the decline of the U.P. ~ontinued, as did the frag-
12.0berholzer is currently ({982) chairman of the Johannesburg 
management committee, the most influential position on the Counci 1. 
13. The Citizen, 17. 6. 77, 1 Speak Up' • 
14. Sunday Times, 16.1.77, 'U.P. won't die - Streicher'. 
15 Cape Times, 20. 1 .77, Copeland: 'Six U.P. M.P. 's expelled from Caucus'. 
16: Parliamentary Register. They were expelled from the U.P. on 19. 1.77 
and the I .U.P. was established on 28.5.77 under Myburgh Streicher's 
leadership. 
17. Cape Times, 20.1.77, editorial: 'Inevitable'. 
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mentation of the opposition. The six right-wingers were officially 
expelled from the Party on January 19 prompting Streicher to comment, 
during the non-confidence debate, that it was 'strange that those who 
wished to hold on to the original principles of the United Party 
should be expelled and those who wished to deviate from them and dis-
band the Party should be retained in it 1 • 18 He could see no reason 
to depart from the principles on which he had been elected while he 
had frequently warned that negotiations with the P.R.P. would result 
in the eel ipse of the United P~rty. l9 The dissidents thereafter sat 
20 in the Assembly as the Independent United Party. 
Graaff had been ieft in a quandary for he had gone beyond the point 
of no return. He had to proceed with the ir.~iative but appeared to 
be at the mercy of the P.R.P. He was committed to disbanding the 
United Party yet Colin Eglin was only interested in a merger which was 
unlikely to appeal to many in the U.P. It was also doubtful whether 
any nationalists would be attracted, which was surely the main 
objective of bringing about an opposition realignment. 21 
Eglin was placing his Party's interests ahead of the creation of a 
broadly based opposition, and he was in a sound position to make 
appreciable gains. As Graaff intended to dissolve the U.P., Eglin 
18, Hansard, 25.1.77, columns 123 - 125. 
19, Cape Times, 26.1.77, Streicher: 1 l.U.P. won't sacrifice principles•. 
20, Argus, 20. 1.77, 'New Party for expelled M.P. 's. Streicher to 
lead 1• 
21, Die Burger, 22.1.77, 1 Dawie 1 - Uit my politieke pen. 
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needed only to wait, with a little patience, to gather up at least 
some of the pieces. His party fully supported him whi.le the U.P. was 
·in disarray. If Sir De Villiers made overtures to heal the break with 
the conservatives he would lose the suppo~t of those reformists still 
in the United Party. He appeared to be in a 'no-win' situation while 
Eglin remained in a strong position no matter what developments material-
ized. 
Dr D 22 Worrall, commenting on events, felt that the P~R.P. had never 
been serious about a new party as they ~ere moving away from the white 
elector~te towards an alliance across ethnic 1 ines. He illustrated 
this contention by quoting Ray Swart who had two weeks previously 
stated that his party had retained a credibility among blacks which 
was a priceless asset and 'which mustn't be jeopardized by doing 
deals in the exclusive arena of white opposition politics which became 
more and more irrelevant as each day passes'. This thinking, he 
believed, was unacceptable to the United Party as were the various P.R.P. 
congress resolutions such as the on~ favouring compulsory mixed school-
ing. 23 The differences between the parties were so unbridgeable that 
the possibility of their finding common·ground was highly improbable. 
The P.R.P. had, he believed, entered the negotiations for ulterior and 
cynical motives, realizing that the longer the debate lasted the greater 
would become the disunity within the U.P. with its eventual collapse 
24 favouring both Eglin and the National Party. 
22. Defeated N.P. candidate in the Durban North by-election and later 
M.P. for Gardens (1977). 
23. Taken at the P.R.P. Transvaal Congress, September 1976. 
24. Rapport, 23.1.77, 'Dennis Worrall on the U.P.' 
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Eglin steadfastly refused to disband the P.R.P. for the proposed new 
party25 and what, therefore, remained to bring about its formation 
would consist of. those still in the U.P., when it was dissolved, and 
those in Theo Gerdener's small Democratic Party.
26 
Eglin could hardly 
be blamed for being somewhat disdainful of the Graaff initiative which 
had been made from a position of weakness at a time when the P.R.P. 
was enjoying a certain measure of electoral success. The 'save South 
Africa• campaign could, to a 1 progref 1, appear more 1 ike an attempt to 
save something of the declining U.P. Its misfortunes, as mentioned 
earlier, resulted in progressive successes 27 which, if continued, 
would culminate in a new official opposition. This appeared to be 
Eglin 1 s immediate objective rather than the creating of, a new party 
which could possibly challenge the nationa1;sts as an alternative govern-
ment as Sir De Villiers desired. 
With the expulsion of the six United Party conservatives the opposition 
28 had been fragmented into three groups. A vote of no-confidence in 
the opposition would have been a more appropriate motion in the Assem-
bly at that time especially as it appeared that the disorder would 
29 
increase before any stability was restored. 
In response to the mounting criticism Sir De Villiers suggested that 
it might be necessary to adopt a different approach in order to bring 
25. Interview with Graaff, 16.6.82. 
26. Gerdener had previously promised to JOln the proposed new party. 
See Die Burger, 29.12.76, · 1 D.P. sal vir nuwe party ontbind 1• 
27. See the results of the 1974 general election, Chap. VI 11, 3_. 
28. Sunday Times, 23.1.77, 'Shambles in Opposition'. 
29. ~. 1 Opposition in Chaos•. 
'An opposition shambles 1 
about the creation of a new p~rty. He therefore. tentatively recommended 
the formation of a board of trustees which would appoint a secretariat· 
to carry out a defined programme of action based on the Marais recommen-
dations.30 The proposed secretariat would draw up a new constitution 
30. Die Burger, 21.2.77, 'Einde in sig vir Nuwe Party'. See also The 
Citizen, 3.2.77, 'Back my new bid - Graaff ~ 
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.which would be discussed at a national conference attended by the 
interested parties who would then return with it to their respective 
f . "d . 31 congresses or cons1 erat1on. 
It appeared as if Graaff was moving away from the earlier joint decision 
by Party leaders to bring about a new opposition dispensation. The P.R.P. 
expressed surprise at not having been informed of Graaff 's latest plans 
and made a final offer that the two parties consult on the Marais pro-
posals. Consequently, further inter-party talks were agreed on in order 
to sort out problems arising from the interpretation of the 'fourteen 
points'. The meeting between the three Party leaders, each assisted by 
two advisers, and once again under the chairmanship of Ju_dge Marais, 
took place in Cape Town on February 12 and iasted a day and a half. 
At the end of the meeting it was evident that no agreement had been 
possible between the United and Progressive Reform Parties, although 
Theo Gerdener still supported Graaff. 32 Sir De Villiers thereupon 
intimated that he would seek an alternative government without Egl in's 
assistance. He would pursue the iritiative through the proposed board 
of trustees and secretariats. 33 
Sir De Villiers and Eglin failed to agree on the recognition of 
h . . ' S h Af . 34 et n1c groups 1n out r1ca . The latter refused to accept that 
. 31. United Party Papers, U.~!. I .S.A The Central Executive Committee 
considered a draft proposal for the formation of a new party, 
25.2.1977, 
32. Cape Times, 14.2.77, 'Talks collapse'. 
33. United Party Papers, U.N.l.S.A. Statement by Graaff to the 
Central Head Committee on his iniative, 19.2.77. 
34. Interview with Graaff, 16.6.82. 
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they should be recognized within a common society. He maintained that 
the key issue at the talks was Cadman's insistence on the separation of 
power on the basis of race at all levels of government. Cadman re-
jected this interpretation of his approach by referring Eglin to the 
Party's federation plan. 35 He, in turn, accused Eglin of being pre-
pared to accept Black majority ru?e at all levels of government with 
the only safeguard a bill of rights, which he believed was no safeguard 
at all. Graaff was also critical of Eglin's allegedly unrealistic 
approach to prevent Black majority domination. Together with Judge 
Marais, Eglin, however, remained convinced that many would support the 
I l • h d I • • f h M • . . 1 36 en 1g tene 1nterpretat1on o t e ara1s pr1nc1p es. 
The talks broke down because existing party philosophies coloured the 
·interpretation of the Marais Report while the negotiators lacked flexi-
bility and the necessary goodwill to reach agreement. Graaff eventually 
broke off the negotiations when it became evident that they were lead-
ing nowhere. This did not mean, however, that his initiative was dead. 
An interesting and somewhat surprising development followed the latest 
impasse, when Judge Kowie Marais was apparently 'captured' by the Pro-
gressive Reform Party. He and Eglin issued a joint statement, the 
object 1 of which wast~ mobilize enlightened political forces in a new 
dispensation. The ~rstwhile neutral chairman of the Steering Committee 
35. Argus, 14.2.77, 'Majority rule issue ruined talks - Cadman'. 
36. Sunday Times, 13.2.77, 'New Party plan founders on Marais' 14 
principles 1• 
263 
had chosen sides with the P.R.P. to pursue another 'save South Africa' 
. . . . J d M . b l l d l . 37 1n1t1at1ve. u ge ara1s was su sequent. y e ecte to par 1ament as 
a Progressive Federal Party representative, an event which could only 
raise doubts as to where his sympathies lay when he was chairman of 
the Steering Committee seeking the basis for a new party. The prime 
minister, John Vorster, likened these strange developments to a 
'divorce before marriage' and predicted that it was only a matter of 
time 38 before the Bassonites would also join the P.R.P. 
'Judge Marais lends his support to Eglin' 
After the collapse of the talks the United Party caucus issued a 
37. He won the North Rand constituency in the 1977 general election. 
38. Die Burger, 14.2.77, 'Nuwe opposie stort in duie'. 
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'unanimous' statement thanking Sir De Villiers for his effort5 while 
urging him to proceed 'on the broadest possible basis to bring about 
a new dispensation in South Africa by drawing together a real alter-
native government•. 39 Japie Basson, who had been disappointed at the 
breakdown of the inter-party talks, had also supported the caucas 
statement. Judging by the length of the meeting (3~ hours) some very 
40 direct talking must have taken place. 
The Citizen wrote that the collapse of the talks was expected, for 
how, it asked 'could irreconcilables by reconciled?'. It regarded the 
'save South Africa' campaign as an exercise in futility. The editorial 
scathingly attacked the fourteen principles as the ' .•• Bible of the 
opposition, according to the new Moses, Kow!e Marais' which was so 
inspiring that all three parties were able to interpret them to suit 
their own objectives. According to the newspaper the opposition exer-
cise had foundered on the Marais report and with it Graaff had killed 
his political career and should retire. The United Party would never 
be the same as its stalwarts had ab~ndoned it while 'fly-by-nights' 
had been courted. Mr Basson and his supporters, prophesied the Citizen, 
would still join the P.R.P., a party which 'deserved them and which they 
41 
deserved'. 
Although written in strong language the editor, M.A. Johnson - formerly 
of the Sunday Express - had shown rare insight, for his predictions were 
39. Argus, 15.2.77, 'Graaff to go ahead for neiV Party' 
40. Cape Times,- 14.2.77, 'Divided U.P. cauc~s'. 
l11. The Citizen, 15.2.77, Editorial: 'Ending a farce'. 
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to be realized within the next few months. A further farce was the 
spectacle of both Sir De Villiers and Col in Eglin proceeding separately 
to form a new party which they were unable to start together. The 
objective of another party had, in any event, become somewhat academic 
once the talks had failed because the United Party, by another name, 
would hardly be any different with a few Democrats added nor would the 
P.R.P. be with the infusion of the Bassonites. The chances of attrac-
ting disfllusioned nationalists, verl ig or otherwise, to a shattered 
opposition which was unable to save itself, let alone South Africa, 
seemed highly improbable. 
2. Municipal elections in Johannesburg 
Added to his other problems Sir De Villiers had the further mortifica-
tion of seeing the chairman whom he had appointed to the Steering 
Committee, Judge Kowie Marais, throw his weight behind the P.R.P. in 
the Johannesburg council e.lections which were scheduled for March 2. 42 
The Judge by then regarded the United Party as irrelevant and although 
not officially a member of the P.R.P., shared various platforms with 
its candidates. As both parties were seeking support from the rate-
payers on the basis of the fourteen points Judge Marais' activities 
could only enhance the chances of the 'progrefs' at the expense of the 
U.P. which, it would be inferred, had mis:nterpreted the proposals and 
consequently had been responsible for the collapse of the inter-party 
d
. . 43 1scuss1ons. 
42. Municipal elections on the Witwatersrand, particularly in the Jo-
hannesburg area, were traditionally fought on a party political basis. 
43 ~The Citizen, 27.2.77, 'Kowie's 15th principle, vote P.R.P.' 
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The results of the municipal elections on the Witwatersrand and of the 
provincial by-election in Durbanville, which were held on the same 
day, clearly demonstrated that the opposition as a whole had lost 
ground to the National Party. In Durbanville both the U.P. and the 
P.R.P. forfeited their deposits but the latter did better than the 
44 United Party which ended third in a sixty-seven percent poll. In 
Johannesburg the United Party lost control of the council for the 
first time in thirty-one years. It won only eleven of the forty-seven 
seats. The P.R.P. won an additional two, increasing its representa-
tion to 19. 45 This meant that it was the largest single party, but 
was still short of an absolute majority in the council. The National 
Party doubled its number of seats to fifteen while an independent 
46 nationalist also took a ward. In Randburg the National Party won 
eight of the ten seats and the P.R.P. the remainder. The message 
from those results was abundantly clear - the United Party was still 
losing support on a massive scale both to its left and to its right. 
The P.R.P was improving its position vis-a-vis the United Party but 
it remained a gradual process. Overall the opposition was in a 
parlous state. 47 The U.P. was left with little vitality and its 
44. Durbanville result: N.P. 7848, P.R.P. 543, 
U • P . 1 2 8 0 . N . P . ma j or i t y of 6 3 0 5 • 
This represented a 6.8 percent swing to the N.P. In the pre-
vious election the U.P. had polled 3314 votes. 
45. Cape Times, 3.3.77, 'P.R.P. top party in JHB'. 
46. Johannesburg mcnicipal results (March 2, 1977)! 
N.P. 15 P.R.P. 19 
U.P. 11 Ind. "-i.P. 1 
Vacancy 1 (later won by P.R.P.) 
Tota 1 47 
See also The Argus, 3.3.77, 'Nat. gains'. 
47. Sunday Times, 7.3.77, 'The cluttered opposition'. 
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demise could only be a matter of time while the P.R.P., which was re-
placing it, appeared to be anything but the dynamic force presented to 
the public by the English newspapers. Its rather lack-lustre performance 
in strong opposition areas reflected its general unattractiveness and 
while it would, in all probability, become the official opposition it 
would not be able to take the place of the U.P. as a once broadly based 
48 opposition enjoying support from all sections of the electorate. It 
had become apparent that while Graaff and Gerdener continued their search 
for a viable opposition the political tide had turned against them and 
the P.R.P. was destined to form the nuc·leus of any future opposition 
. 49 grouping. 
·Shortly following the announcement of the J~hannesburg results which 
left no single party with a majority, the United Party, which held 
the balance of power, struck a deal with the nationalists to retain 
control of the powerful management committee under its leader, Francois 
Oberholzer. 50 This effectively excluded the P.R.P. from exercising 
any power in the Council. The city·would continue to have a United 
48. The 1977 and 1981 general election results confirm this contention 
as does the Johannesburg municipal council poll of 1982 where the 
P.R.P. was sti 11 unable to capture control although it remained 
the-strongest party. 
49. Sunday Times, 6.3.77, 'Back to the ·drdwing boards'. 
50. United Party Papers, U.N.l.S.A. The Central Executive of the Party 
regarded the decision as an administrative arrangement which would 
enable the U.P. to ensure responsible management of the day-to-day 
affairs of Johannesburg. The 'deal' was made only after the P.R.P. 
and subsequently the N.P. had rejected a U.P. proposal of propor-
tional representation of the three parties by two members each on 
the management committee of the council and the election of the 
Chafrman by a free vote. !assen did not agree with the decision 
and voted against it at the meeting on 21.3.1977, 
268 
Party mayor (Powell) but his deputy would be a nationalist (Otto). 
The United Party caucus on the city council had been allowed to 
decide for itself the course of action it would adopt regarding an 
understanding with the other parties. 51 Its decision to co-operate 
with the nationalists enraged the P.R.P. and upset the Bassonites 
still in the United Party. At least two factors motivated the Jo-
hannesburg United Party to act as it had done. One was the retention 
of effectiv~ power in its hands, and the other was to take revenge on 
the P.R.P. for the harm it had caused it. The events leading to the 
refor~~ breakaway were still fresh in the memory of the U.P. council-
lors. Apparently anything was better than co-operating with their 
former colleagues, including coming to an arrangement with the national-
ists - traditionally their political enemy. Had they co-operated with 
the P.R.P. it was most unlikely that they would have been able to 
strike such a favourable agreement as they had done. 52 
The Johannesburg situation led to sharp differences among United Party 
parliamentarians and when the Central Executive Committee endorsed the 
decision of the members on the city council the position of Japie Basson 
became more uncertain. 53 He was strongly opposed to what he regarded 
as an· unprincipled manoeuvre by the Party's councillors in Johannesburg, 
but the party leadership was not prepared to support his stand. 54 
Consequently,as a p~otest, he resigned his post as leader of the United 
51. IBID. 
52, TiITiL The P.R.P. wanted exclusive control of the Management Committee. 
53. Arg'Lis, 23.3.77, 'Japie Basson's position i1, balance'. 
54. Die Burger, 23.3.77, 'Sasson, hierargie van V.P. bots' • 
. '; 
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Party in the Transvaal. He handed in his resignation at the Provincial 
executive meeting at the end of March.SS Prof Nie 01 ivier also left 
the executive while Messrs D De Villiers, L Poorter and Senator Du 
To it agreed to work with Sasson for the establishment of a new oppo-
sition based on the Marais proposals. This decision raised speculation 
that the inter-party talks would be reopened, a move which was favoured 
by Sasson. Ironically, Japie Sasson was replaced as leader in the Trans-
vaal by Oberholzer, the man primarily responsible for his resignation . 
. He was the fourth provincial leader in the Province since Marais Steyn 1 s 
defeat in 1972, a situation indicative ~f the turmoil which had contri-
buted to the Party's decline. 
The situation in the Transvaal, as far as t~e Party was conce~ned, was 
critical. It was in complete disarray. Prior to Basson 1 s resignation 
two leading conservatives had also left before their probable expulsion. 
Andre Fourie, .the former M.P. for Turffontein and Koos Darvel, cha1rman 
of the Platteland Regional Council, had criticized the party leadership 
and had resigned because of the confusion and irresolution prevailing 
56 in its affairs as well as the incompatibility ~mong its members. 
They associated themselves with the Streicher group. 
SS. Argus, 1.4.77, 'Sasson quits post, new talks possible'. See 
also The Cape Times, 1.4.77, 1 Bass0n quits as U.P. Transvaal 
leader 1 • 
S6. Die Burger, 11.3.77, 1 Nog twee bedank 1 • 
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'Japie was maar altyd h Jona. Dit kan net beter gaan sender horn• 
Graaff had, in the meantime, proceeded with his initiative and had 
appointed a board of sixteen trustees shortly after the Johannesburg 
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Council elections. 57 , Theo Gerdener had agreed to act as its executive 
trustee. The trustees would be responsible for establishing a main 
secretariat in Cape Town with smaller ones throughout· the country to 
pursue as their objective the establishment of a new party. A special 
sub-committee would formulate policy and report to the trustees. The 
fourteen principles of the Marais Keport would again provide the start-
ing point of the exercise. Sir De Villiers Graaff tentatively named 
June 25 as the day on which a 
following a national congress 
3. The final months 
new opposition would be established 
58 in Johannesburg. 
In May a further attempt was made to reopen negotiations between the 
59 U.P. and the P.R.P. These talks, which cc~tinued on a sporadic basis 
into June, again explored the possibility of finding some form of 
opposition unity. They were not destined to succeed. For this exer-
cise the United Party appointed a three-man committee under Dr G Jacobs 
I 1 h . b. 1 • f . d . h G ff . . . I 60 to exp ore t e poss1 1 1ty o w1 en1ng t e raa 1n1at1ve . The 
P.R.P. 's tea~
0
was led by Dr van Zyl Slabbert while Theo Gerdener was 
61 the senior Democratic Party delegate. The talks began on an opti-
mistic note and there was speculation that the P.R.P. would be prepared 
to disband and merge with elements of the United Party to form a new 
62 one. The divisive issue still revolved around whether the country 
should be seen as a plural or common society. 
57. Argus, 5.3.77, 'New Party: Business leaders join board'. 
58. Cape Times, 2.4.77, 'Div. names Day'. 
59. Interview with Senator Horak, 8.6.82. 
60. Argus, 12.5.77, 'U.P. and P.R.P. to Reopen Talks 1 • 
61. IBID., The U.P. team consisted of Messrs Jacobs, De Villiers a;1d 
Raw; the P.R.P. delegates were Van Zyl Slabbert, Borkum and Bamford 
while Gerdener was supported by McMinn and Prof de Crespigny. 
62. Argus, 24.5.77, 'P.R.P. now likely to disband for merger'. 
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Meamvhile, towards the end of May while these negotiations continued 
some two hundred former and current members of the U.P. had met in 
63 Pretoria to establish a new party. Consequently, o~ the 28th, the 
South African Party was born. It consisted of members of the lndep-
dent United Party and was, essentially, a right-wing movement which had 
rejected the Marais initiative. 64 It had six M.P.'s and five M.P.C. 's 
all from the Cape Province. 
Streicher was its leader and John wiley was his deputy. The break 
with the United Party was complete, yet "the South African Party claimed 
that it was, in fact, continuing with the original policies of the 
U.P. Unlike it, and the P.R.P., the S.A.P. rejected the fourteen 
points of the Marais Report as a basis for a11y new opposition realignment. 
Its policy was based on the six principles of the United Party which had 
been accepted at the 1973 national congress. 65 It was strongly in 
favour of patriotism and emphasized the imp6rtance of the leadership 
role played.by whites in the political arena. 66 It supported the govern-
ment on matte~s of internal security and, in general, did not differ to 
d . h h . 1 . l . d . . 6 7 Wh . l any great egree wit t e nat1ona 1sts over po !CY 1rect1ons. 1 e 
·it was the right-wing of the U.P. which had established the Party, its 
members regarded themselves as moderates or moderate conservatives. 68 
63. Argus, 28.5.77, 'More U.P. men may join new party'. 
64. H. Du Toit,'Die Parlement~rP Verkiesing vAn 1977, an unpublished mas-
ters thesis, Univ. of Pretoria (May 1979J, pp. z7 - 28. 
65. IBID . 
66. See also Streicher's article in The Citizen, 18)1.77, 'A lifetime in 
politics - now the challenge'. 
67. Streicher in Die Vaderland, 4.4.77, 'So verskil ons met die N.P. -
so stem on saam'. 
68 .. Interview with Myburgh Streicher, 5.5.82. 
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The S.A.P. appealed to both English and Afrikaans speaking South Afri-
69 cans for support on the basis of its moderate approach. Its growth 
potential was, however, not large and as with the Reform Party, it dis-
covered that there was simply not enough political space for another 
party, this time to the right of the U.P. Nevertheless, for a short 
period it did provide a political home for those who disagreed with the 
road being followed by the United Party yet were, for emotional or tra-
ditional reasons, unable to support the nationalists. 
The negotiations with the P.R.P. were frnally abandoned as a failure by 
the United Party caucus in June. Gray Hughes announced that the talks 
to form a joint opposition had once again collapsed. 7° Further discuss-
ions would be fruitless because the parties !nvolved were still unable 
to agree on certain fundamental issues. Consequently,the United Party 
had decided to proceed with the Graaff initiative. Four M.P. 's were, . 
however, not prepared to abandon as futile the talks with the P.R.P. 71 
Messrs Japi~ Sasson, D De Villiers, N 01 ivier and H Miller were opposed 
to the continµation of the Graaff pl.an without the support of the P.R.P. 
They felt that no proposed new party could affo1d to exclude them. 
The opposition was in a state of paralysis. It was hopelessly divided 
and helpless to influence the government. The United Party was on the 
69. Cape Times, 31.5.77, 'New Sap party confident of support', 
70. Argus, 10.6.77, 'U.P. talks with P.R.P. fail'. 
71 . ~. 1 4 U. P. men reject new party'. 
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verge of yet another split, for the Bassonites were unlikely to join 
a new alignment which ignored the 1 progrefs'. Graaff, who had begun 
his initiative to promote, among other things, a str.onger opposition 
which could become an alternative government, discovered that his en-
deavours had instead become a catalyst for additional disintegration 
among the opposition. Al 1 that he ~"as left with was the support of 
Theo Gerdener with whom there had also at times been differences. A 
Graaff-Gerdener party without the 1 Bassonites 1 and 1 progrefs 1 fell far 
short of Sir De Villiers' original plan. Such a party would also be 
much smaller than the U.P. which was to be dissolved to make its forma-
. "bl 72 t1on poss1 e. 
In the week prior to the United Party's demise a last ditch stand was 
made to save it. A 1 Committee against Dissolution' was established 
by a certain Justus van Zyl who felt that any new party would be a 
disaster and certainly no better than the United Party which was being 
disbanded for insufficient reasons. Graaff should rather abandon his 
'exercise in self-deception' and hand over the leadership of the Party 
to someone else. 73 This effort to save the U~P. came to ~othing and 
on June 28 both the United and Democratic parties held their final 
congresses prior to the establishment of a new party. At the U.P. 
congress Dr Jacobs laid the blame for the failure of the inter-party 
talks squarely on the shoulders of the P.R.P. Graaff also announced 
to the delegates that he had come to the end of the road as leader of 
72. Die Burger, 22.6.77, Dawie: 'Hierdie politiek is af van die spoor 
van-gesonde verstand'. 
73, Sunday Times, 1 Transvaal Group in Bid to get reprieve for U.P. 1 
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74 the Opposition, an office he had held for twenty-one years. The 
congress decided to disband the United Party after forty-four years 
service to South Africa. 75 The Party of Hertzog and Smuts had ceased 
. 76 to ex1 st. 
'The United Party is abandoned by Graaff' 
74. United Party Pa~ers, U.N. l.S.A. At a Central Executive Committee 
meeting, 23.6.77, Graaff indicated that he was only available as 
interim leader of the new party and recommended that Cadman be 
elected its parliamentary leader. 
75. IBID., Congress Resolution to dissolve the U.P. taken 28.6.77. 
76. L.Gorden et al, A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 
(Pietermaritzburg 1978), p.75. 
I 
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'An uncertain future awaits the new party' 
On the following day 700 delegates met to establish another party and 
thus fulfil the original objective of Graaff's 'save South Africa• 
campaign. The New Republic Party was formed on June 29. Both Sir De 
Villiers Graaff and Theo Gerdener were elected as its honorary life 
presidents. Sir De Villiers would be the interim leader of the Party 
until a permanent choice was made. Radclyffe Cadman became its parlia-
277 
mentary leader. 77 At that point the N.R.P., with 23 M.P. 's, was still 
the largest opposition group in the Assembly. It also had nine senators 
and controlled the Natal provincial counci1. 78 
The Basson group79 did not, however, support the establishment of the 
80 new party and following talks with the P.R.P. merged with them to 
81 form a 'verligte' opposition group based on the Marais proposals. On 
September 5 another new party, the Progressive Federal Party, came into 
existence. Its leader was Colin Eglin. Judge Kowie Marais officially 
joined thi~ Party. The P.F.P. with 18 M.P.'s had become the second 
1 • . . 1 • 82 argest oppos1t1on group 1n par 1ament. 
4. The 1977 election 
If any further proof was required that the death of the United Party 
had strengthened the National and to a lesser extent the Progressive 
Federal Party, a cursory examination of the snap general election of 
1977 would provide it. Vorster took advantage of the disarray among 







Cape Times, 25.6.77, Scott Haig, 'Requiem for a great party'. 
He likened the U.P. 's composition to a choir of different singers 
and also posed the question of whether it was born too soon or 
whether it lived too long? 
H. Du Toit, 'Die Parlementere Verkiesing van 1977~ pp. 19 - 27. 
United Party Papers, U.N. I .S.A., The Central Executive Committee, 
29.6.77, suspended Sen. LPoorter and Messrs Basson, Miller, 
Olivier, van Hoogstraten and Mcintosh. 
Argus , 1 5 . 7 . 77 , ' Ba s son an d P . R . P . me e t to c l i n ch de a l ' • 
L. Gordon, S. Bl ignaut, S. Moroney, C. Cooper, fr Survey of Race 
Relations in South Africa,· 1977, South African institute of Race Rela-
tions (Johannesburg, 1978), p. 19. 
H. Du Toit, Die Parlement~re Verkiesin~, p. 17. 
1 Is the new opposition any different from the old?' 
called to allow the voters to express an opinion on foreign interference83 
by both the West and Soviet Russia in the internal affairs of South Af-
rica and to decide on the government~s new constitutional plans.for the 
- 84 country. 
83. The.Citizen, 9.11.77, 'The patriotic election•. 
84~ Cape Times, 10.11.77, 1What the election is ~bout•. 
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It was to be a short campaign. The election was announced on September 
21, nomination day was October 20 and voting would take place on November 
30. 85 All three opposition parties faced similar problems. They had to 
make the public aware of their new identities and at the same time had to· 
place their respective party organizations on an election footing. The 
N.R.P. and S.A.P. had a particulary difficult task as they lacked media 
support and had inherited the moribund U.P. branch structures where they 
st i 11 existed. 
In a 11 , 321 candidates were 







There were forty-four uncontested seats, forty-two of which went to the 
N.P. and two to the P.R.P. The governing party's number of unopposed 
divisions was to be substantially lajger than the total number of seats 
won by the combined opposition! The N.R,P. fought on a very narrow 
front failing to put up candidates in rural areas where the U.P. had 
once enjoyed a strong following and also in certain urban constituencies 
which it had won in the 1974 general election.
87 
What made the opposi-
85. H. Ou Toit, 
86 . I BI 0, p. 75. 
87. TBiD, p. 77. 
Simonstwon, 
p. 100. 
These included Bryanston ,Newton Park, Randburg, Sandton, 
Walmer and Yeovil le. 
280 
tion's task more difficult was that in three or four-cornered contests 
as for example was the case in Albany, its vote would be split to the 
advantage of the N.P. 
The result of the election was an overwhelming triumph for the National 
Party and a humiliating defeat for the fragmented opposition. In terms 
of seats won the position was as follows (the numbers in brackets 
indicate the state of parties before the election):
88 
National Party 134 ( 116) 
Progressive Federal Party 17 ( 18) 
New Republic Party 10 (23) 
South African Party _3 (6) 
164 
One vacancy, Springs, was caused by the murder of the N.P. candidate, 
Dr Robert Smit, during the campaign. In the subsequent by.election the 
~ 
National Party ~lso won this seat which pushed its total to 135, the 
largest number ever won by any party in South Africa's political 
history. its majority over the combined opposition was 105, another 
record. The Progressive Federal Party with 17 seats became the smallest 
ff . . 1 . • 89 ever o 1c1a oppos1t1on. 
The combined opposition totalled thirty seats, stark testimony to the 
88 . I B I D , p. 11 7 
89. The P.F.P. had appealed to the electorate to vote for 'an effective 
opposition' and placed advertisements to this effect in all the 
major English newspapers as for example in the Sunday Times, 27.11.77. 
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disintegration within its ranks. In 1970 the United Party had won 
47 constituencies, in 1974 it took 41 and in 1977 it had not participated 
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'Hoekom lyk dit vir my die kroon word al hoe groter?' 
in the election. Its successor, the N.R.P., which w~s to 'save South 
Africa', had won but 10. 
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CONCLUSION 
Except for a brief renaissance in 1970 the United Party had declined 
steadily since 1948, and although it is correct to state that even when 
at its weakest, following the 1966 and 1974 elections, the United Party 
had still been stronger than the P.R.P. after its best performance in 
1981, 1 it had nevertheless reached a point from whlch it no longer had 
h ·. 1. 2 t e vita 1ty to recover. The in-fighting, di.sloyalty, indiscipline 
and lack of responsibility which had characterized its declining years 
were probably inherent in the nature of its original compositio~. 3 The 
wide spectrum of opinion represented by the Party required strong leader-
ship in order to maintain the type of consensus politics associated with 
its moderate image. Its heterongeneous character meant that if differ-
ences within it became too marked it would face the very real threat of 
4 a breakaway by one group or another. The Party had always been a coa-
:lition of diverse interests and when the need for reform became an insis-
tent demand during the 1970's it was unable to achieve unanimity as to 
the direction ar.d pace of change required. Personality clashes developed 
between the factions and deep-seated philosophical differences were re-
vealed. The loss of English media support was something the Party had 
not experienced before 1970 and the role of the press in undermining the 
1. Following the 1966 election the U.P. had 39 seats, after 1974 41, while 
after the 1981 pol 1 the P.R.P. had 26 elected M.P. 's plus a nominated 
one. 
2. Interview with Senator Horak, 8.6.82, 
3. Die Burger, 29.6.77, 'V.P. victim of acute frustration'. 
4. Interview with Bi 11 Horak, 8.6. 82 
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United Party should not be underestimated. 5 
Although it can be argued that Graaff disbanded the Party prematurely 
there can be little doubt that following the electoral reverses of 1974 
and after, that its days of active political life were numbered. 6 It had 
lost it~ rural support to the National and Herstigte parties while it 
stood only the remotest chance of defeating the Progressives in the 
majority of English speaking urban constituencies, particularly in three-
cornered contests. 7 The process of ~olarization in whit~ politics had 
advanced to a point where moderate centrist parties had become ~almost 
irrelevant. 
Dr E. G. Malherbe, a former principal of Natal University, co~menting on 
the.demise of the United Party pinpointed some of its shortcomings. 8 
After the Second World War he had already written to Smuts that the 
U.P. 'was finished' •9 Its war record had been its strongest point 
but the Party had not been equipped to handle the post-war dislocation. 
Young people, he said, were not inspired by the United Party nor were 
they attracted to it. A party which lost its youth would not survive. 
The P~rty's leaders, excluding Smuts, no longer had any strong appeal 
to the majority of South Africans and the Party had lost its capacity 
5. See Chapter V.5. 
6. Interview with Horak. It had to be faced, he said, that by 1977 the 
United Party was finished. 
7. Interview with Myburgh Streicher, 5.5.82. 
8. Article by E.G. Malherbe in The Sunday Tribune, 27.6.77, 1 A Long Time 
Dying'. 
9. Contained in a letter to Smuts, 8.9. 1948, and quoted in Hancock, Fields 
of Force, pp. 512 - 514. 
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for rejuvenation. Malherbe also felt that Jan Hofmeyr was an embarrass-
ment in any effort to unite the majority of the United Party with the 
10 moderate elements Havenga would be able to bring with him from the 
nationalists ranks should a Smuts-Havenga agreement eventuate. Follow-
ing the defeat of Smuts in 1948 there had been speculation of such a 
possibility as it was reported that Havenga was unhappy in Malan's govern-
ment. According to Malherbe, Havenga was popular with the English and 
had Smuts co-operated with him the nationalists would not have made the 
same rapid progress, for the United Party would have been able to 
attract Afrikaner moderates. 11 
The heirs to Hofmeyr's liberal politics in the United Party had been 
the Progressives, Reformists and Bassonites who had all made it diffi-
·cult- for Afrikaner moderates to join the Party while they were partly 
responsible for driving out those who were already supporters of it. 
As hai been demonstrated, they were a nucleus around which crises developed 
with monotonous regularity. 
: ,-
MalheTbe also believed that all inspiration and imagination ha'd go~e 
out of the United Party's leaders. Following the death of Smuts in 
1950 there was nobody able to cope with the strains placed on it by 
its liberal and conservative elements. Smuts had been able to do so 
10. Minister of finance at the time of fusion and later leader of the 
Afrikaner party which had concluded an electoral pact with Malan's 
nationalists for the 1948 election. 
11. Hancock, Fields of Force. pp. 512 - 514. 
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12 but his successors, Strauss and Graaff were not. The strong moderate 
English and Afrikaans leaders needed by the United Party were conspicuous 
by their absence and this was a factor symptomatic of the malady which 
killed the United Party. 13 As has been mentioned, the Transvaal alone 
had four different provincial leaders between 1972 and 1977. 
Professor Kleynhans has also convincingly explained the demise of the 
14 U.P. It was due, he wrote, not to a lack of a dynamic platform; on 
the contrary the Party's policies were realistic, moderately verl ig 
and politically relevant. But the majo~ defects, in his opinion, were 
anC)absence of inspired leadership on most levels, and a lack of an 
~fficient broadly based party organization which was necessary to mobil-
ize support. The nationalists were always well organized with an active 
branch structure while the United Party was frequently searching for 
candidates and offices at election time. There had also been an 
inability to exploit the successes of 1970 - 1972, which instead of 
revitalizing the Party had led to internal dissention and to a lack of 
djscipline and loyalty which had demoralized its popular support. This 
resulted in a loss of seats. Then there was the poor registration of 
voters because of the lack of card carrying members to do the work. 
Before the 1974 election the nationalists registered 50,000 voters on 
the Witwatersrand, the U.P. 6,000. Graaff had also been misguided in 
12. Adv. J.G.N. Strauss led the U.P. from 1950 to 1956 when he was re-
placed by Sir De Villiers Graaff in a 'palace revolution' at the 
national congress of that year. He remained head of the Party 
unti 1 its demise in 1977. 
13. Sunday Tribune, 27.6.77 
14. Article by Prof Kleynhans in the Argus, 25.6.77, 'U.P. disregarded 
basic rules and so it died~ 
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sacrificing the United Party for what he thought was a broader based 
opposition when the U.P. had always had the broadest base. Further, 
a lack of public information to inform the voters of its verl igte 
message and an endless number of crises involving among other matters, 
nomination and leadership disputes had all contributed to its demise. 
To these past and more recent problems must be added the negative role 
played by the press during the final years of its political life, par-
ticularly that of the English newspapers which were more widely read 
by its supporters. By and large they denied the Party a public plat-
form and what attention it did receive was usually of a most unflattering 
nature. The power of the press was intentionaliy used to denigrate and 
destroy the United Party, as has been demonstrated in Chapter V. 
The party also tried too hard to be all things to all men simultaneously. 
Consequently, it fell short even pleasing most of the voters some of 
the time. This combination of factors led to its gradual decline and 
abrupt demise in 1977. Smuts' 'best work' had itself become the victim 
of the evolutionary political process in South Africa and had gone the 
same way as other parties before it. 
A P P E N D I X 
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(A) INTERVIEW ON 16 JUNE 1982 WITH SIR DE VILLIERS GRAAFF 
LEADER OF THE UNITED PARTY FOR TWENTY-ONE YEARS. 
Question 1. To what do you attribute the electoral successes of the United Party 
in 1970? 
Answer. Government blunders played a role but ·think more important was the 
fact that we were able to attack as a united party consisting of 
people who had worked together for a considerable time, who knew each 
other and complemented one another. 
Question 2. As the Party had really only won back what it had lost in 1966 was 
it accurate to speak of a breakthrough? 
Answer. In terms of seats it only regained what it had lost in 1966 but if 
you look at the voting figures for the various constituencies you 
will see that we gained a great many votes and know from my per-
sonal knowledge that the Nats. were very worried indeed after the 
1970 election. So there was an advance. 
Question 3. What attracted the so-called reformists to the Party after 1970 or 
were they already present? If already there what spurred them on to 
greater activity? 
Answer. Most of them, I think, were already in the Party but I believe they 
thought they could exploit the successes of 1970 by applying what they 
regarded were new methods, new systems and new forms of publicity 
but without much experience. They did, however, have the support of 
the Sunday Times and in the early part of their campaign they made 
quite an impressicn. 
Question 4. As all public representatives presumably adhere to the same policies 
where then were the main areas of difference between the Old Guard 
and the reformists, or were they m6re of a personal nature? 
Answer. 
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I do n 1 t believe there were any real policy differences except over 
the Schlebusch commission at the time and the ideas of power sharing 
on one side and white baasskap on the other. You see Mr Schwarz 
challenged Marais Steyn very early on for the leadership of the Trans-
yaal and was successful and there were bitter feelings because it 
was a very narrow victory and one which owed a great deal to a high 
degree of organization. As a result,attempts were made to find 
ideological differences between the two but I do n 1 t think that they 
succeeded in finding them for before his defection Marais Steyn and 
Harry Schwarz had agreed to the question of white leadership and what 
it meant in practice. So as far as pol icy differences were concerned 
they were minimal. 
Question 5. Do you know where the terms Young Turk and Old Coard originated? 
Answer. I think they were press terms, probably the Sunday Times had a lot to 
do with it. 
Question 6. Who was the leading figure/s behind the reform movement? 
Answer. I think, at the outset, Dick Enthoven, Horace van Rensburg, Dall ing, 
Schwarz and to an extent Basson. Mr Basson was a philosopher and on 
occasions made provocative statements but in the fifteen years I 
worked with him he always remained loyal to me. 
Question ]. What essentially were the objectives of the reformists? 
Answer. Well, differences were not policy diffe;ences. I think they felt 
they could run the Party better than anyone else and they tried to 
hijack it from within. Schwarz had taken over in the Transvaal and 
had his people in there. But their supporters \'Jere always trying 
for 11take-overs 11 in other provinces,for instance they tried to un-
seat Myburgh Streicher. Then there was the suggestion that a new 
party should be formed although there were no pol icy differences. 
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Question 8. Was there any single event which could be cited as a point at which 
they became a more cohesive force within the U.P.? 
Answer. I think it was more a drift which was given momentum by various events 
such as the attacks on our Schlebusch commissioners, the behaviour of 
Wits. students and the meeting of the Witwatersrand General Council 
where I had to step in to keep the peace among people many of whom 
weren't members of the Council. 
Question 9. Did the Sunday Times play an important role in the defeat of Marais 
Steyn and in the fortunes of the reformists generally? 
Answer. Yes, it did. It did a demolition job on Marais Steyn. 
Question 10. Do you think the Young Turks and the Sunday Times were in collusion 
or did they simply propdgate similar views? 
Answer. Well, I believe they had pretty regular meetings and Lad close contact. 
Question 11. Was there an identifiable conspiracy among the English newspapers· 
to destroy or weaken the U.P.; especially the Old ~Llard? 
Answer. No, not a conspiracy as such. 
Question 12. Why did the U.P. do badly in the Oudtshoorn by-election of 1972 after 
having done well up to then? 
Answer. I think we completely misjudged the constituency and Streicher was the 
only one who was right when he said we should not have contested it. 
From my own experience I knew that it was hard to establish branches 
there and that they always tended to fade away. The type of voter 
was also easily excited and susceptib~e to emotional appeals whi~h 
were made to him by the nationalists. 
Question 13 .. Was the "boerehaae• campaign in Oudtshoorn by the nationalists an 
election ploy or was there substance to the allegations? 
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Answer. It was more a useful ploy at that point. 
Question 14. Do you think the Party spoke with two or more voices depending on 
the speaker or the audience? 
Answer. No, I don't think so. This argument is exaggerated. 
Question 15. Why did the Cape find it necessary to introduce a resolution on the 
need for bilingual candidates at its provincial congress in 1972? 
Answer. This was an issue wh•ch came up year after year in congress. 
think everyone appreciated the desirablity of it yet if you had 
an outstanding candidate you could n't knock him out if he was not 
so good in the other language. 
Question 16. Natal did not follow the Cape example and Eric Winchester objected 
to the idea of a similar bilingual resolution being adopted there. 
Do you think it harmed the Party, for instance, in the approaching 
Klip River by-election? 
Answer. I don't know whether it harmed the Party but Mr Winchester could not, 
of course,really speak Afrikaans. 
Question 17. So was the bi~ingual argument really just a storm in a teacup? 
Answer. Yes, although propaganda could be made out of it. My advice wai for 
people not to enter politics until they were bilingual. 
Question 18. Why did the Party serve en the Schlebusc:1 commission? 
Answer. It is the duty of the opposition to participate. We served on the 
select committee and when it was converted into a commission we con-
tinued to serve. Our commissioners kept us informed. If we had not 
participated we would have to have relied on ethers for information 
which may have not been entirely adequate. 
Question 19. Looking back do you think it was a good decision to serve on the 
Commission? 
Answer. I think so for it had important political implications. 
Question 20. Could the Schlebusch commission and the adverse press publicity 
surrounding the Party's association with it be regarded as one of 
the main causes for its decline? 
Answer. What was important were the recommendations by the Commission which 
were unacceptable to many of our people, nor did we support the ac-
ti on of the government but the press did its best to give the imp res-
sion that we were part and parcel of the whole deal. 
Question 21. Did the press misrepresent the Party's role or intentions on the 
Commission? 
Answer. I can n't really say although it did appear to be so at times. 
Question 22. In 1973 at a meeting in Rondebosch you made use of part of a statement 
by Cathy Taylor which had previously been withdrawn at your request 
from being made public through the newspapers. When you were 
challenged by a student to read her entire statement you refused 
Answer. 
as you said you did not have her permission. She later denied this. 
Was it a genuine misunderstanding between the two of you or did you 
not wish to read something which placed the students in a favourable 
light? 
Well, he had a copy of her statement which he tried to read out. He 
did not have her permission to do so nor did the Ca~imes which later 
pub 1 i shed it. could have used the entire text but was not prepared 
to publicize that section which was unfavourable to us. 
Question 23. Did the U.P. commissioners know before hand that N.U.S.A.S. lead~rs 
would be restricted but \vere prepared to support a unanimous report 
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in return for an undertaking that action against them would be less 
harsh than otherwise planned? 
Answer. No, I don't think there was any kind of a deal. 
Question 24. Was Senator Horak's letter of appreciation to the Sunday Express a 
unanimous decision by the Party? 
Answer. Yes,in the sense that no vote was taken and no objections were noted 
at the meeting. 
Question 25. Did you and Mr Schwarz ever reach an accord over the Schlebusch 
commission and matters pertaining to it? 
Answer. Yes, of course there was. In the debate in the House we both spoke 
and it was a most successful debate in which we destroyed the criti-
cism there had been. 
Question 26. Do you think there was a planned campaign to oust Andr~ Fourie from 
the leadership of the Young South Africans? 
Answer. Well, there was no doubt that there had been lobbying behind the scenes. 
Question 27. Did Marais Steyn leave the Party at a point calculated to harm it, 
that is when there were attempts being made to reconcile differing 
points of view? 
Answer. No. think it had to do with th~ feeling between him and Harry Schwarz. 
They were starting to look for points of pol icy difference and Mr Steyn 
might have realized that he would not again get the Transvaal nomi-
nation. 
Question 28. How did you feel about his defeat at the hands of Harry Schwarz and 
his later defection to the N.P.7 
Answer. I was very sorry for him as I thought he deserved better but he had 
let the Party organization go slack and although ! had warned him I 
don't think he realized what was coming his way. When I heard of 
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his resignation I was on holiday but made every effort to persuade 
him to change his mind and to retract the statement he had issued 
to the Sunday Express. He was upset but I could n 1 t move him to 
change his decision. 
Question 29. Was the 1973 National congress really a unity or peace congress as 
claimed or were the cracks simply being patched over? 
Answer. No, it was a successful congress. There were certain statements that 
had to be approved and Harry Schwarz was always a difficult man to get 
to approve anything that had to be drafted. The ordinary Party sup-
porter had heard that Schwarz was going to oust me and they came to 
make sure that that did n't happen and, in fact, in the end I had to 
protect Schwarz as so many were gunning for him. 
Question 30. Did the reformists actually emerge victorious from that congress as 
was made out by certain press reports? 
Answer. No. 
_Question 31. Were there ever attempts at various levels or times to expel or force 
Schwarz from the Party, for instance, after the Buthelezi meeting in 
1974? 
Answer. There was a very strong feeling against him indeed and his Buthelezi 
visit was discussed at depth in caucus where he had to defend himself. 
But there was no movement to expel him and the caucus did not have the 
power to do so. 
Question 32. Was the introduction of the new federal policy in the 1973 no-
confidence debate poorly handled by Mike Mitchell? 
Answer. He was part of the constitutional committee which had made certain 
recommendations but he was a chap who could get flustered and Mr 
Vorster caught him out an~ made him look a bit silly over the prc~osals. 
Question 33. With regard to the federal policy and power sharing. Was it in all 
sincerity possible to place different interpretations on its meaning, 
with the conservatives placing more emphasis on the future of the white 
parliament and the reformists on the proposed multi-racial federal 
assembly? 
Answer. There was def intely no doubt in my mind that the federal assembly would 
become the senior body. Once the federal assembly was established it 
would take over. The white parliament would be the regulator of 
change. 
Question 34. Was "white leadership" part of an official statement of pol icy or was 
it more of a slogan and was it ever abandoned? 
Answer. It developed over the years as party policy. When I first went to 
parliament people 1 ike Smuts talked of "white leadership with justice" 
and "white guardianship 11 but with the passage of time it became more 
and more realized that there wouid have tu be a sharing of power and 
that in that sharing the Whites could play a very big role. And that 
is why wh~n dete.nmining,tl-econstitution it was decided that it would 
not ~epend on numbers but probably on the contribution of a particular 
section of the population to the gross national income. 
Question 35. With regard to the nomination of candidates in 1974. Was there a 
power struggle in progress, particularly in the Cape and the Transvaal 
to consolidate the position of the different factions in parliament? 
Answer. There was no doubt that there was a struggle going on. The reformist 
group had control in the Transvaal and they pushed their candidates to 
the detriment of some very good and experienced ones while in the Cape 
there is no doubt that Wiley and Streicher were pushing for certain 
other people. 
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Question 36. Were Old Guard nominations like that of Etienne Malan withheld in 
the Transvaal until certain verligte ones had been confirmed? 
Answer. In the case of Etienne Malan the excuse was that his divisional com-
mittee did not want him. Eventually I insisted on his nomination. 
I thought he was an invaluable member who had been discriminated 
against because of his membership of the Schlebusch commission. He 
was a most useful M.P. and I needed him as a part of the parliamentary 
team. He was a most brilliant scholar and we needed his abilities. 
Question 37. Did the Central Candidates Committee have to approve all nominations 
or only those involved in disputes? 
Answer. Technically all nominations came to us but they received automatic 
approval unless there was something funny ~bout them. 
Question 38. To what did you attribute the Party's setbacks in the 1974 elections? 
Answer. The reverses were almost entirely a result of the feuding i~ the Party 
over such issues as nominations. 
Question 39. Were the same reasons applicable to the defeat in the Pine lands 
by-election? 
Answer. Possibly. But Miss Reinecke did n 1 t get the support Ossie Newton-
Thompson would have got. She was also involved in a nomination con-
test but by then the tide was flowing against us following the 
fighting earlier on in the year during the election. The press was 
also dead against us. 
Question 40. Did the reformists in the Cape attempt to capture the branch structure 
of the Party there as a stepping stone to greater things? 
Answer. Yes, I've no doubt they tried. 
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Question 41. Was there any connection between the Witwatersrand Young Turks and 
those reformists, such as Carlisle, who operated in the Cape? 
Answer. Oh yes, very close connections. 
Question 42. Had you already left the Cape Head Committee meeting when five of the 
Cape reformists were expelled from the Party for their activities 
Answer. 
in "GROW'? 
The meeting took place in the Verwoerd building and I knew nothing 
about the planned expulsions. !twas a peaceful meeting but once I 
had left they got stuck in. 
Question 43. Do you think Mr Schwarz engineered his departure from the U.P. follow-
ing the Enthoven poll and his refusal· to vote against the prime 
minister's amendment in the 1975 no-confidence debate? 
Answer. No, I don't think so. I think he heard Vorster's amendment but 
wished to see his son off to the army. The division bells rang 
and I don't think he realized that by not voting he would be 
accepting the nationalist non-white policy. I asked him to sit down 
but .he got up and walked out. That was the reason as far as I was 
concerned. 
Question 44. Do you think that the establishment of the Reform Party was well 
planned? 
Answer. No, I do n't think so. 
Question 45. Were you informed that it was going to be established before the 
event was made public? 
Answer. No. It was a last desperate attempt by Harry Schv1arz to salvage 
something for himself. 
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Question 46. Why did the U.P. remain divided after the reformists had left? 
Answer. There was very little friction in the Party after they had left. 
There was more unanimity after the departure of Schwarz but in 1976 
there were the Soweto riots and other disturbances and there were 
increasing calls for the establishment of a new party to bring in 
moderate Nats. and Progs. It was obvious that we couldn't win an 
election and so I started seeing various business and other people 
to form a committee to look into such an initiative. We got 
Gerdener and Marais on our side 2nd other outstanding chaps whom we 
thought had a chance of attracting Nat. votes. But the problem 
was the Progs., we couldn 1 t get anywhere with them. And then when 
Marais brought out his report it was ambiguous and people I ike 
Wiley and Streicher would on no account have anything to do with 
the Progs., while others were prepared to accornmodatethem. The 
former broke away and when we had our congress in June only a hand-
ful led by Japie Sasson were not prepared to accept the new policy 
and went over to Colin Eglin. It was rather sad 1 for the principles 
we finally adopted would have been acceptable to Wiley and Streicher. 
Question 47. Did Japie Sasson possibly r-ema'in in the Party when the reformists 
left because he expected, in due course,to become its leader? 
Answer. There is not the slightest doubt that many saw Japie as a possible 
successor. He was a most able speaker but never had the support 
of the grassroots. 
Question 48. Did the defeat in the Durban North by-election in 1376 spell the 
end for the U.P. and did it possibly encourage you to embark on 
the "Save South Africa" campaign? 
Answer. No. Worrel L's standing split the vote against us. But the "Save 
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South Africa" campaign began at the Cape congress after I had seen 
Vorster in Pretoria to discuss the situation in the country and 
where I had made certain proposals to him which, however, he was 
not prepared to consider. 
Question 49. Was the "Save South Africa 11 initiative not more of an endeavour 
to preserve something of the U.P. 's policies and traditions if 
Answer. 
not the Party itself? 
No. What had bearing on my thinking was the serious situation in 
the country and that if there wasn't a change of direction there 
could be dire consequences. 
Question 50. Why were the conservatives in the U.P.· not prepared to co-operate 
with the P.R.P.? 
Answer. It was a question of personalities although they also thought 
that the policies of the P.R.P. were too far to the left and 1 iberal. 
Question 51. Did Col in Eglin ever indicate that he would disband the P.R.P. for 
a new party? 
Answer. No. 
Question 52. Why did the whole initiative really ·fail in the end? 
Answer. We couldn 1 t agree on policy. The issues of group identities, local 
option and whether S.A. was a plural of common society were stumb-
1 ing blocks. The representatives of th~ P.R.P. on the one hand and 
the U.P. and D.P. on the other couldn't find agreement. We broke 
off the discussions in the end and went on on our own. We could 
not establish a rapport with them. 
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~uestion 53. How did you see your own role in the conservative-reformist quarrels 
over the years? Looking back do you feel you should have acted 
differently? Do you think you were too lenient with the dissidents 
of both factions? 
Answer. My role was that of referee,· it was not a question of appeasement. 
Each group enjoyed support; Schwarz in the Transvaal had everything 
his way since the defeat of Marais Steyn while Streicher was opera-
ting in the Cape where he was aware that others were trying to re-
place him without there being any real difference in pol icy. If 
anybody had put a foot out of 1 ine pol icy-wise I could have chucked 
them out as I laid down pol icy. Knowing what I know now and with 
hindsight I may have acted differently. There were unfortunately 
irreconcilables in the Party but then ·smuts had held together a 
motley team and I too had some very strange characters. 
Question 54. Nevertheless, were reformists more likely ~o be disclpl ined than 
conservatives? 
Answer. No,I don't think so. 
Question 55. Were you aware that the 1975 Enthoven poll was to take place and 
do you know who really paid for it? 
Answer. I think he commissioned it himself, and no, I was not informed that 
it was to be conducted. 
Question 56. Did you know that Mr Schwarz was going to meet chief Buthelezi in 
Mahlabatini at the beginning of 1974? 
Answer. I was aware that he wanted to speak to him but before he did so he 
was to tell me which he dicn't do. 
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Question 57. Before the 1974 election was there a move within the Party to prevent 
the Young Turks from the Transvaal contesting seats and thus going 
to parliament? 
Answer. Yes there was but I overruled these demands. 
Question 58. What happened in the case of George Oliver and the Senate seat he 
expected to receive in the Transvaal in 1974? He did not receive the 
nomination although he was under the impression that you were going 
to intercede on his behalf with Harry Schwarz to secure his election? 
Answer. In the past a nomination which I wanted would be approved by the 
committee which dealt with it. Oliver was nominated but was voted out. 
I had expected him to receive the nomination and was disappointed when 
he did not do so. 
Question 59. Did the weak finances and inadequate branch structure of the U.P. 
contribute to its decline? 
Answer. Unless you have an active, hard working member or chairman of a division 
the branches always go to pieces and the collection of money stops. 
This was an endemic problem for as long as I knew the U.P. 
Question 60. Did the Young Turks ever restore the finances of the Party on the Rand 
as they claimed they would do? 
Answer. No. 
Question 61. Were the reformists responsible for any of the verligte changes in the 
U.P.? 
Answer. No. In so far as there were any changes it was a question of consensus 
and then only if I approved of them. 
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Question 62. Why did Mr Johnson resign from the Sunday Expr~ss in 1974? 
Answer. He did not get the editorship of the Sunday Times which, as the 
senior editor in the country, he had expected. He had given years 
of service to S.A.A.N. and he felt it was owed to him. 
Question 63. Did the Reform Party ev·er draw \Jo a· pol icy dfa·tinct from that of the 
U.P.? 
Answer. No, I don't think they did. 
Question 64. Do you know why Mike Mitchell resigned and by so doing created the 
by-election in Durban North? 
Answer. I think he found he was spending more and more time on his practice 
and that he could do better at the bar than in politics. To an 
extent I think he had also lost his enthusiasm. 
Question 65. Did you at any stage suspect that Judge Kowie Marais was siding with 
the progressive elements in your initiative before he actually joined 
them? 
Answer. At one point in Cape Town he told me tha.t he had been to Eglin to 
promote some meetings in furtherance of the cause to 'save South Africa 
1 
But he didn't tell me he was going to join them. 
Question 66. Do you think the press wished to break the U.P. and then push the 
reformists in it to join with other verl igte groups to form a so-
called verl igte front? 
Answer. It is hard to know what t~e press wanted because they never acted 
unitedly. 
I 
had devoted support from certain newspapers from 
beginning to end and was very grateful for it. But there were some 
which for publicity or their own ideas kept breaking 1 ine, so to 
speak. 
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Question 67. Did you possibly prematurely disband the U.P.? Surely the voters 
should have given the final verdict or had it reached a point where 
it wouldn't have survived cinyway? 
Answer. It was not a question of surviving. The fact of the matter was that 
while the U.P. existed no Nat. would vote for it. We wanted to put 
forward something new before the electorate that would attract both 
the left and the right. We had also been advised that because of 
the state of the voters rolls there would be no hope of an election 
in 1977. This advice proved to be wrong,and there was an election. 
We didn't have a chance to establish the new party and what happened 
was that the press saw this as an oppotunity to ignore us entirely 
and push the claims of the P.P. 
Question 68. The press and your leadership. Did Joel Mervis of the Sunday Times 
make certain demands of you before he requested your resignation as 
leader of the Party in 1973? 
Answer. I cannot remembe1 exactly when, but he at one point suggested that 
we accept apartheid. I hounded him on that and said nothing of the 
sort would happen. He then climbed down. Thereafter he came to 
listen to the 1973 no-confidence debate which disappointed him. 
He then saw me and suggested that I might like to resign. But 1. had 
the congresses behind me although if there was somebody who could take 
over from me with congress support I was not looking for staying on in 
the job. He then went off and had this thing of 13 reasons why I 
should go published and took the 1 ine that I had agreed to stand down. 
I know he had Japie Basson in mind as my successor but ·he wouldn't 
have received congress support. Later again the r:mes changed and 
wrote that Graaff must stay! 
Question 69. What do you think was the main reason/s for the rapid decline of the 
U.P. after 1972 or had it simply come to the end of its useful political 
1 i fe7 
,'\nswe r. 
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The main reason was the internal squabbling. People were frustrated 
from being in opposition for many, many years. They realized that 
there was a crisis in the country and they we~e looking for an 
opportunity to make headway against the government. 
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(B) INTERVIEW ON 8 JUNE 1982 WI TH SENATOR BI LL HORAK 
FORMER GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE UNITED PARTY 
Question 1. Can the election successes of the United Party in 1970 be attributed 
to its pol icy, to its better organization or tci problems which faced 
the government? What, in fact, accounted for the increased number 
of seats won by the U.P.? 
Answer. Tne mistakes of the government obviously played a part, such as the 
Agliotti land deal, loans to Minister Haak and similar things. But 
it was more a bread and butter election than an ideological contest. 
It was also the first time the new prime minister had to face the 
electorate, while among his own people. the Herstigte s~lit had crea-
ted problems. Nevertheless, it was pleasing that the U.P. improved 
its position. 
Question 2. Was the euphoria misplaced, for after all, the U.P. had more or less 
only won back what it had lost in 1966? Was it accurate, therefore, 
to speak of a break-through? 
Answer. The euphoria whic~ h~d originated on the Witwatersrand with Harry 
Schwarz and his so-called Young Turks and later with Mervis of the 
Sunday Times who believed the electorate were voting ideologically 
for a more liberal direction was, I be! ieve, misplaced. But certain-
ly the res~lts·were encouraging and we felt they provided a platform 
on which to build and to hit the government on bread and butter pol i-
tics where they were more vulnerable than on their nationalistic 
ideologies which had a very powerful appeal. 
Question 3. What attracted the Reformists to the United Party or were they al-
ready there after the 1970 successes? 
Answer. Some were already there. Harry Schwarz was their leader. They were 
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impinging on parliamentary territory and aimed to hijack the Party. 
They believed it was on the way up and, mistakenly, that there had 
been an ideological break-through. They wished to get rid of the· 
older members and take over the party. 
Question 4. If already there, what spurred them to greater activity, for up to 
about 1970 they had been fairly dormant? 
Answer. Not all that dormant. They were represented in the Transvaal Provin-
cial Council but I think what spurred them on was their misinterpre-
tation of the reasons for the Party's gains. They thought that the 
millennium had arrived and that everyone was now 1 iberal. 
Question 5. As all representatives, presumably, adhere to the same principles 
an9 policies where then were the main areas of difference between 
the Reformists and the rest of the Party or were they more of a 
personal nature£ 
Answer. Sets of principles can be interpreted differently. Treurnicht, 
for instance, remained in the N.P. after 1977 when the power shar-
ing concept was mooted. Broad statements of principle are capable 
of many interpretations. Personal ambition also played an impor-
tant role in party differences. 
Question 6. Was there a leading figure(s) in the reform movement? 
Answer. Yes. I would say Japie Basson and Harry Schwarz, although Basson may 
have been hijacked into it. The Sunday Times helped by writing of a 
Schwarz-Basson axis and of the verkrampte mafia which surrounded 
Graaff. Basson tended to be the ideological leader and Schwarz the 
organizational driving force. 




at which the Reformists emerged as a recognizable force within the 
United Party? 
I am not sure about a single event. It was rather a process brought 
to public light through the Sunday Times when it started speaking of 
the Young Turks as a vital force in the U.P. 
Who was actually interpreting party policy and traditions correctly, 
the establishment or the Reformists? 
The establishment, most definite!~. It was Graaff, Marais Steyn, 
myself, Vause Raw and others. 
Do you agree that there were definite divisions within the Party? 
Oh yes. There was a left-wing, a sol id centre, and some on the 
right-wing. 
uestion 10. Where did these terms 'Old Guard', 'Young Turk' originate? 
They came from the fertile brain of Joel Mervis as far as I know, 
and Stanley Uys, his political correspondent. 
Would you say the Sunday Times played an important role in the 
defeat of Marais Steyn and in the fortunes of the Reformists generally? 
Indeed, yes. Very much so. 
Was there an identifiable conspiracy among the English newspapers to 
weaken or destroy the U.P., particularly the Old Guard within it? 
don't think they were trying to weaken it, but were rather mounting 
a hijack operation to give it a more liberal image and to motivate it. 
The Sunday Express, of course, adopted a different approach from that 
of the Sundcy Times. 
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uestion 13. Were the Young Turks and Sunday Times in collusion or did they simply 
propagate the same views? 
Eventually they certainly were. 
uestion 14. Why did the U.P. do so badly in the Oudtshoorn by-election after hav-
ing done so well up to then? 
I said we couldn't expect advances in the rural areas which I referred 
to as the 'deep platteland', not in a derogatory manner, but to indicate 
that people there were more conservative. Oudtshoorn reflected the 
obvious disunity in the Party. The conservative U.P. did not like what 
they saw of the Young Turks and voted nat. Further, P.W. Botha and 
the Burger managed to construct a good 'boerehaat' campaign in which 
we were depicted as a party which hated the Afrikaner. 
Was 'boerehaat' just an election ploy or was there substance to the 
campaign? 
As a neutral observer would have thought there was some substance 
to it, thatthere was this anti-Afrikaner attitude in certain circles. 
16. Did the Party speak with two or more voices depending on the speaker 
or the audience, rural or urban? 
Yes, every politician likes to please his audience but only within 
the framework of the principles of the Party. 
Did the U.P. start changing to its new federal policy after the Oudt-
shoorn setbacks, particularly as its old pol icy of a mixed parl lament 
had been strongly attacked? 
Not really. The federal approach had originated in the 1960 1 s when 
Graaff directed Marais Steyn to produce a race federation. Thereafter 
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it simply developed and was refined. Then a constitutional com~ittee 
was appointed under Mike Mitchell to elaborate. So its origins lay in 
the past and the 1973 pol icy was a culmination of the process. Oudt-
shoorn was not the catalyst, as it was happening anyway. 
uestion 18. Why was it necessary to introduce a motion at ihe Cape congress in 
1972, which insisted that election candidates should be bilingual? 
To counter the 'boerehaat' image and to show that the Party was truly 
a South African party and that it was bilingual. 
19. Do you feel that Natal was wrong not to have followed suit, when a 
similar motion there was withdrawn? 
It was difficult for Natal, for the urban areas were English speaking 
and that was the core of the United Party support. They did not have 
much chance to be bilingual. The Natal attitude was based on practi-
cal considerations but there certainly were some jingoes in the pro-
vince. 
20. Did the actions of Eric Winchester H.P., who threatened to leave the 
Party if a bili~gual resolution was passed in Natal, harm it? 
I should rather not comment on Mr Winchester. I believe he was a 
jingo - a type of left-wing labourite if he lived in England. There 
is no way of really telling whether his differences with Wiley and 
others over bilingualism affected the Kl ip River result. 
Was the bilingual issue just a storm in a teacup or did it adversely 
affect the Party's image? 
It was really a manifestation of attitudes which had existed in the 
Party since theUnion1~ts had joined it. It was not so important an 
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issue as such, but the attitude towards it which allegedly reflected 
un-South Africanism by some U.P. supporters, and perhaps a lack of 
respect towards Afrikaner traditions \"1as more serious. This attitude 
still existed in certain quarters. 
22. Why did the Party decide to participate in the Schlebusch Commission? 
Because it felt very strongly about subversion and the maintenance of 
law, order and stabi 1 ity. It was prepared to play a part in these 
investigations into subversive organisations in spite of opposition 
from the so-called Young Turks. It was a genuine manifestation of 
the Party's South Africanisrn. 
Looking back, do you feel it was a wise· decision considering all the 
trauma it created for the Party? 
Yes, I do. 
Would you say that the damage done by serving on the Commissior. was 
the single most important reason which contributed to the decline of 
the Party? 
don't think it was the most important cause. The trouble was that 
a faction of the Party wanted to take it over and push it in its own 
direction with the support of an important section of the press. The 
Schlebusch reports and the student bannings were exploited by the 
reformists to attack the •establishment•. If there was no Commission 
the process would have still continued. it was used as an fnstrurnent 
to hijack the Party. 
Did the English press, excluding the Sunday Express, misrepresent the 
Party's rol~ or intentions on the Commission? 
Yes. And they are still doing it. 
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Q~estion 26. Was it wise to 'gag' parliamentarians, such as Catherine Taylor, from 
commenting on the Schlebusch reports? 
Answer. I am not too clear on Mrs Taylor, but I don't believe she was such a 
force in the Party although she had a good way of putting things 
across. It was standard practice that on delicate issues the leader 
or the chief representatives on a commission should comment and not 
every backbencher. In the causus they can freely have their say. 
Question 27. Cathy Taylor tended to ignore this ruling and wasn't disciplined. 
Answer. 
Do you think her actions harmed the Party? 
I think she overestimated her importance in the scheme of things 
although her actions had an effect in the Wynberg constituency. 
Question 28. Harry Schwarz returned from overseas and had a meeting with Sir De 
Villiers over the Schlebusch issue, with which he was not satisfied. 
The meeting produced an accord between the two - was this in fact so? 
Answer. It was unlikely that Graaff would make a unilateral agreement_ with 
one .man. He did not operate like that and I have no record of such 
an agreement. To state that Schwarz had reached such an understanding 
which excluded the other senior provincial leaders is, I think, to 
aggrandize Schwarz's position. 
Question 29. Did the U.P. Schlebusch commissioners make a deal with the nationalist 
members that if they agreed to an unanimous report there would be less 
harsh action taken against the students? 
Answer. I doubt it. Mr Schlebusch didn't work that way. 
Question 30. The U.P. was criticized for not originally submitting a minority report 
·yet before the 1974 election when another interim report of the Commi-
ssion was tabled they did in fact do so. Was this a result of public 
pressure? 
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nswer. I'm not an expert on this, but the commissioners probably felt they 
had been pressurized and should explain themselves. 
uestion 31. Was your letter to the Sunday Express of June 1973 thanking it for its 
support a result of a unanimous Head Committee decisio~? 
nswer. Nobody in the meeting objected to it. I think Schwarz and the others 
were caught napping. No votes were taken and nobody got up and said 
no. At a later meeting it was agreed that there had been no objections. 
32. Why were there objections to the letter? 
Because the Young Turks disliked the Express as Johnson, its editor, 
supported the estabtishment. This thing was really a civil war with 
the reformists on one side and the est~blishment on the other with 
the Sunday Times supporting the former and the Express the latter. 
Those involved were personally objectionable to each other. 
-Question 33. Following your letter, the Transvaal Young Turks sent their own one 
to the Express attacking its political reports. Was this not indica-
tive of a lack of discipline in the Party? 
Answer. Absolutely, yes. There was no discipiine then, none at all at that, 
level. 
Question 34. Was Andre Fourie also ousted as leader of the Young South Africans 
in a planned coup? 
Answer. Oh yes. 
Question 35. Did Maans Kemp, his successor, contribute much that was positive to 
the youth movement? 
Answer. I don't think he did much, but in all fairness to him it was diffi-
uestion 36. 
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cult to do anything in a situation of indiscipline and faction fighting. 
But I think he was rather ineffectual. 
Was the 1973 National Congress a 'peace' or 'unity' congress as re-
ported, or were the cracks simply being patched over as there was an 
election on the horizon? 
I can say something about that. At the Head Committee meeting before 
the congress there were grave difficulties over the nature of the 
agenda and Schwarz threatened to go back to the Transvaal with his 
delegation. Graaff as leader, and for reasons of his own, got Dr 
Jacobs to intercede and he persuaded Schwarz to remain. This sur-
prised me but I think Harry's vanity had been assuaged or else he 
was afraid of the consequences of his move which would leave him 
open to the accusation of having destroyed the unity of the Party. 
So, superficially there was unity, but it was a patched over congress. 
Schwarz used the platform at every opportunity to push his own image 
and although Sir De Villiers made it clear that the congress was a 
victory for the Party and not any section of it, the Sunday Times 
disagreed and hailed it as a triumph for the Reformists. Why, I 
don't understand, as there were no pol icy changes at all. 
Why did Harry Schwarz decide in 1972 to oppose Marais Steyn for 
the leadership of the Transvaal? Do you feel it was his own 
decision or was he a front-man for a movement or group within the 
Party? 
It was his own decision; Harry always makes his own decisions. But 
he was part of a group, in fact, its leader. They ran a well organised 
iampaign, so well controll~d that Graaff was able to get Schwarz to 
have Dr Jacobs elected as deputy leader in the Transvaal once Steyn 
had lost his post. Schwarz was able to use his influence among the 
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delegates to have Jacobs elected ahead of Japie Sasson. 
uestion 38. Do you think Graaff should have intervened to save Marais Steyn from 
defeat? 
It is easy to speak now, but I feel he should have done so. He 
could have made the election of Marais Steyn a matter of confidence 
in his leadership. This would have been one course of action. 
uestion 39. Did Marais Steyn leave the Party ln 1973 at a point calculated to 
harm it, that is, at a time when efforts were being made at recon-
ciliation? 
nswer. I don't think he wanted to harm the Party. He asked me to go along 
with hi~. He was just sick and tired of being persecuted. After 
his defeat at the Transvaal Congress, at what was really a rigged elec-
tion within the law, Schwarz didn't leave him alone. The vendetta 
continued. As he wasn't being given sufficient protection, he left 
and I sympathized with him. The two of them were antagonists. 
uestion 40. Were there attempts at certain times to force Schwarz out of the 
Party, for instance after his meetings with Chief Buthel2zi? 
nswer. No, not to force him out, but he wa~ rebuked time after time for 
acting on his own initiative and defying the establishment. He was 
rebuked in caucus for seeing Buthelezi, for going there over Cadman's 
head, the Natal Provincial leader. Members of the U.P. were scheduled 
to see Chief Buthelezi a few days later in any event, but I don't know 
whether Schwarz knew of that. 
uestion 41. 
I 
Was the federal policy and the question of power sharing in all 
sincerity cpen to different interpretations, with the conservatives 
placing their faith in the white parliament and the reformists in the 
nswer. 
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proposed multinational federal one? 
No, actually the federal plan produced by the Mike Mitchell constitu-
tional committee agreed to power sharing unanimously through certain 
constitutional mechanisms. There were later differences over the 
question of the phasing out of the whi~e parliament, how and at what 
point. It is interesting that Harry Schwarz has never signed the re-
port of that constitutional committee although he was a member of it 
and agreed to it. 
42. Was the pol icy of white leadership ever officially abandoned? 
No, not officially but 'white leadership with justice' was really a 
slogan used when the need arose. But the Party's principles remained 
the same. 
With regard to the 1974 election. Was there a power ~truggle in 
progress at constituency level in the Cape and elsewhere? Did the 
Cape Candidates Committee object to certain nominations like van 
Zyl Cill ie because they were Reformists? Was this a method to 
consolidate the strength of the different factions in parliament? 
I was not directly involved but I have no doubt that that was what 
was happening. There was, of course, a Central Candidates Committee 
which also met to consider nomihatibns and at one of these meetings a 
formal motion was proposed by one of the conservatives to veto the 
nomination of Schwarz, who was at the meeting, of Horace van Rensburg 
and a whole string of other reformists. No formal vote was taken but 
the majority were clearly in favour of the motion. Then at the per-
sonal intercession of Sir De Villiers their candidatures were approved 
but no vote was taken. 
' 
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Question 44. A similar sort of thing seemed to exist in the Transvaal where· 
Schwarz withheld certain Old Guard nominations 1 ike that of Etienne 
Malan until verligtes such as Prof 01 ivier had their nominations 
confirmed. Did that sort of situation exist? 
Answer. Yes, that sort of thing did exist, no doubt about it although 
was not involved at that level. Malan had a difficult time. He 
lost the seat to a Progressive, yet Widman won the provincial e1ection 
for the U.P. His chances were hampered by the late confirmation of 
his candidature. 
Question 45. After the 1974 election was there a move to oust the Cape leadership 
of the Party? 
Answer. Yes, there was. The reformists wanted Streicher out and van Eeden 
and Bamford in. Th~s move failed. 
Question 46. To what do you attribute the loss of the 1 s3fe 1 Pinelands seat at the 
by-election following the general election of April 1974? 
Answer. Well, there was the rainstorm that kept our people away but secondly 
I don't think that Miss Reinecke was the best candidate in the circum-
stances although I'm not sure who would have been. The other reason 
was that he U.P. people had lost their enthusiasm at that point. Ossie 
Newton-Thompson would have made it as he had a good p~bl le image in 
Pinelands. 
Que~tion 47. Do you know much about this organisation 'Grow' and the activities 
of Robin Carl isle in the Cape? 
Answer. I don't know much about 'Grow' which was simply one facet of the 
Young Turk~ operation. But what Carl isle did was to approach me on 







he lived in Sea Point I said he should form a branch there and then 
help to establish branches elsewhere. For very good reasons nobody 
without special permission may belong to a branch outside the area 
where he was registered. Well, Carl isle formed a branch of Young 
Turks in Sea Point who came from all over in contravention of the 
constitution and thereafter they began setting up branches in other 
constituencies. It was a calculated strategy to gain control of the 
Party by dominating the divisional committees. They also succeeded 
in gaining control of the Cape Peninsula Council, but their methods 
were unconstitutional. 
Did you get the impression that Carl isle was sent from the Transvaal 
to the Cape? 
Oh yes, I got a very strong impression that he was transferred here. 
He later, of course, returned to the Transvaal where ~1e became a 
Progressive M.P.C. for Von Brandis, I thin~. 
Could the Transvaal reformists have been behind the Young Turk move-
ment in the Cape? 
Oh certainly. This was a concert. They popped up all over. 
What role d!d Graaff play in this whole conservative-reformist battle, 
or civil war as you call it? Did he give strong leadership? Did he 
favour one faction above the other; could he afford to do so in his 
position? 
He favoured no faction. He was a tremendously fair-minded man, a man 
of peace and notof war. Although his heart was clearly with the 
establishment, he tried to treat the reformists with absolute impar-






peace-maker. He went to absurd lengths to placate Schwarz on various 
things, but you cannot do deals with these people - they always reneged 
on them. But these were honest attempts by Graaff to make peace and 
because of them he was seen to be pandering to the reformists which 
led to criticism of his leadership by the con~eivatives in the 
Party. Personally, would not have tolerated these people. feel 
Sir De Villiers could have exercised stronger discipline over the 
reformists. I doubt whether Cadman would have tolerated them, for 
instance. 
Do you think Schwarz engineered his departure from the Party 
following the Enthoven poll and his refusal to vote against the 
prime minister's amendment in the 1975 no-confidence debate? 
Graaff, by then, had made up his mind that he could no longer live 
with these chaps and he acted decisively and they were forced out of 
the Party. It was traumatic. We spent hours on this on-going con-
flict. Enthoven h3d also comm1ssioned his poll through a firm 
with w~ich he had connections and the whole thing suggested it was 
a rigged survey. 
Was the establishment of the Reform Party well planned? Although it 
was formed over a weekend the whole thing appeared to be well 
organised - virtually all those involved in the Transvaal reform move-
ment were present, while neither Graaff nor Oberholzer, leader of the 
Party in the Transvaal provincial council, apparently knew anything 
about it. Was that normal polltical practice? 
It depends on what sort of personality you are. A cloak and dagger 
individual would tell nobody. It would be more usual to inform your 
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leader of the fact that you could no longer agree politically and that 
you were making the break. Schwarz told nobody. I think its estab-
1 ishment was a contingency operation. Having failed to take over the 
Party from within they resorted to this strategy. 
Question 53. Do you believe that the reformists, wanted to hijack the Party~ failing 
which they wished to wreck it and unite the reformist elements with 
progressives and others in a new 'verl igte' party? 
Answer. Yes, this ls a fact of political life. Absolutely. 
Question 54. Why did the U.P. remain divided after the reformists had left it? 
Answer. Certain reformists were still there - a residue remained either as 
agents or because they did not want to break with the Party at that 
point. 
Question 55 .. Did the by-election defeat in Durban North i~ 1976 possibly spell the 
end for the Party and did it encourage Graaff to embark on his 'save 
South Africa' campaign? 
Answer. That, and the Soweto riots. At the time of the riots the constitutional 
committee decided that I and Derick de Vil I iers should, on behalf of 
the committee, suggest to Graaff that he go and see Vorster and offer 
him the Party's co-operation on a certain basis. This was the only fu-
ture the Party had, we believed. Graaff did go and see the prime mini-
ster, but he was not interested. If we wanted to co-operate we had to 
join the National Party, for we had no bargaining power to strengthen 
our case. So that failed. But it was obvious that the U.P. had to 
broaden its base. Eventually we had negotiations with the Progressives 
and with Theo Gerdener while dissatisfied nationalists were also approached. 
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campaign or did Graaff do it off his own bat? 
Yes, there was consultation although it was possible that people such 
as Myburgh Streicher were not informed of the actual initiative until 
the East London congress because they were not members of the 
constitutional committee which had advised Graaff just prior to the 
Cape congress to make attempts to broaden the base of the opposition. 
Graaff used to consult people, like his provincial leaders and Derick 
de Villiers while there was a sort of inner drafting circle which 
drew up press statements and so on. 
Question 57. Was this initiative not also an endeavour to save something of the 
United Party's policies and traditions, if not the Party itself? 
Answer. Yes, definitely. 
Question 58. Why were conservatives in the Party not prepared to co-operate with 
the P.R~P: 1fithis 'save South Africa' campaign? 
Answer. Because they probably read the P.R.P. correctly, that they were really 
un-South African in outlook and that there was no way one could co-operate 
with them. And it turned out like that in the end. Cadman, and others, 
spent lots of time negotiating on an informal basis with Progressive 
leaders, but could come to no philosophical agreement. Talks broke 
down on the preservation of group identities. The conservatives simply 
anticipated this result, but Graaff insisted that the attempt to find 
common ground should be made. 
Question 59. Was Graaff possibly premature in disbanding the Party? Should not the 
electorate have been given the chance_at a general election, to make 
the final decision regarding its future? 
Answer. Lets face it, we were broke at that stage. The initiative \vas an :ittempt 
to find a way out, to broaden the Party. The old U.P. would have been 
given the coup de grace at an election. 
Question 60. Were the Progressives not aware of this and consequently reluctant to 
negotiate as the chances of becoming the qfficial opposition must have 
been fairly good? 
Answer. Maybe, but I didn't know what they were thinking. 
\ 
Question 61. What do you feel were the major reasons for the rapid decline of the 
United Party after 1972, or had it simply come to the end of its 
useful political 1 ife? 
·Answer. No, I don't think it had come to the end of its useful life. Had it 
not been for the terrible internal strife engendered by the Young Turks 
and by ambitious men like Harry Schwarz it would, after 1970, have con-
tinued to fulfil a useful role as the official opposition. What killed 
it was the disunity caused by the Young Turks. It was torn apart and 
- could no longer survive. 
Question 62. It has been suggested that by its nature the U.P. was never united. 
It c6ntained so many shades of political opinion that the potential 
for conflict was always there and this resulted in the many splits. 
Comment please. 
Answer. This is endemic in the structure of all politJtal parties, one only 
has to refer to the history of the N.P. and also to the Progressives 
today. The art of leadership is to find consensus among the wings and 
differing opinions. This did not just apply to the United Party. But 
when an element is determined to have its own way, and not consensus, 
then the party must split. We had it with Harry Schwarz, and Eglin 
before him. When the proponents of a particular 1 ine refuse to seek 
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consensus and demand their own way, then you have friction. 
in fact, stayed together quite well, and for a long time. 
The U.P., 
It lost 
little groups when they were not prepared to find consensus, and 
that means being prepared to sacrifice a bit of your own view and 
accept a 1 ittle of the other man's opinion. 
Question 63. Were personality clashes more mar.ked than pol icy differences between 
the conservatives and reformists? 
Answer. Yes, personality clashes. But at the beginning I didn't think that 
basically there were any pol icy differences. Personality clashes, and 
clashes of ambition, those were the problems. 
Question 64. Did the Young Turks put the Party on a sound financial footing, 
particularly in the Transvaal as often claimed in the Sunday Times? 
Answer. That was all nonsense. It was part of their technique, these huge 
promises. They never raised that sort of ~oney and when they left 
the Party they left it with a big deficit and an overdraft. Ad-
mittedly finances didn't get any worse under them, but they never got 
any better either. The way the Sunday Times wrote of their exploits 
was counter-productive as it discouraged the ordinary voter from 
making contributions to a party which apparently had so much money. 
The financial statements by the reformists were also never properly 
presented and this annoyed people 1 ike Wiley and Streicher, among others. 
Question 65. Was finance a problem in the U.P.? 
Answer. Oh yes, always a problem. It is easier for governments to get money 
than for opposition parties. 













Of course. But you can't see this in isolation. It is tied u~ with 
the lack of finance, with motivation and enthusiasm. The lack of 
confidence to win played a part. 
Why did the reformists do badly in the Transvaal in the 1974 general 
election, in a region where they were in control and for which they 
had promised much? 
There was a reaction to them there as well. They did not have the 
sort of support to win 35 seats. It was a manufactured support. Too 
many chiefs, not enough Indians. 
Why did the Sunday Express support the Party establishment? 
Largely because the editor, Mr Johnson, had a high regard for Sir De 
Villiers. He was totally sincere in his support of the U.P. 
Why did he resign as editor of the Express in 1974? 
Because he was not made editor of the Sunday Times. He was very 
disappointed in the Board of S.A.A.N., for he was the senior Sunday 
editor in the country and expected to get the appointment. He 
resigned on principle in objection to Tertius Myburgh being given 
·the job ahead of him. 
Did the reformists really want Graaff as the leader of the United Party? 
think they wished to hijack the Party including the leader, but with 
a pistol to his head. They wanted Graaff as a fi9ure-head-as he had 
public appeal. 










Because Schwarz never did anything to secure his nomination although 
there was an understanding emanating frcm Graaff that he would do so. 
Also, I think it was a protest against Graaff's inability to get elec-
ted to the Senate those people whom he wanted there. 
Why was the name Reform Party selected? 
I think ~imply because the name had been associated with this move-
ment in the United Party. 
Did the Reform Party ever really draw up a separate set of principles 
and pol icles to that of the U.P.? 
No, not rea 11 y. 
Were reformists more likely to be disciplined than conservatives in 
the Party? 
Yes, I think so. Maybe because the conservatives usually played within 
the rules. 
.,. 
(C) -INTERVIEW ON 5 MAY 1982 WITH MYBURGH STREICHER ·1HE FORMER 
LEADER OF THE UNITED PARTY IN THE CAPE, AND THEREAFTER OF~ 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN PARTY. 
Question 1. To what did you attribute the electoral successes of the United Party in 
1970? To its policy and organization or to govern~ent mismanagement and 
the Herstigte split? 
Answer. It was a mixture of both. There was better organization, and policy'was 
put across more clearly, that is white leadership with reasonableness and 
justice. Government mismanagement played a role and the Herst[gte split 
definitely helped the U.P. This should be emphasized. 
Question 2. Was there really a breakthrough as the U.P. had merely won back what had 
been lost in 1966? Was the public euphoria misplaced? 
Answer. No, not really misplaced but it would have been wrong to put too much 
emphasis on an optimistic f11ture. There were signs that the U.P. was 
getting its views across and there was also evidence, in certain seats, 
that nationalists of 1966 had now voted for us. So there was a glimmering of 
hope for the U.P. 
Question 3. What attracted the so-called reformists to the U.P. or were they already 
present after the 1970 elections? If already there, what suddenly spurred 
them to great activity within the Party? 
Answer. Enthoven, van Rensburg, Schwarz and others were already there. They had 
been members of the youth movement for many years. The 1970 successes, 
perhaps, influenced them to make their presence felt.· To them the 
successes meant that the U.P. was in a position to become an alternative 
government and they wanted to be in Influential positions when that happened. 
That is why they tried to control the Transvaal. They also believed that 
a sudden air of verligtheid had appeared in South African politics and that 
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they should be associated with it. But it was, I think, just 
people thinking along solid, moderate lines. There was no real spirit 
of liberalism or verligtheid about. They misjudged the mood of the public. 
Question 4. Presumably all public representatives adhere to the same party principles 
and policies. Where then lay the major areas of difference within the 
U.P. or wer~ they more of a personal nature? 
Answer. I don't think differences in the Party were really because of personal 
problems and though members learnt to be tolerant it was not always possible 
·to appreciate each others shortcomings. There we~e those in the U.P., 
however, who should have broken away with the Progressives in 1959. 
Thereafter they lay dormant but they didn't honestly accept the Party's 
views of white leadership with justice -:they regarded it as baasskap 
They were thinking along the lines of the Progressives. This is where the 
problem lay. 
Question 5. Were there definite Old Guard-Young Turk divisions· in the Party or was 
it a 11 fantasy? 
Answer. It was not a fantasy. The Sunday Times and the press generally tried to 
label us. The Old Gaard, to them, were more than conservative and were 
portrayed as reactionary which was re~lly nonsense. We were moderates 
as opposed to those who took a more radical view to solve the country's 
race relations issues. But the divisions were there. 
Question 6. Was there a leading figure/s or influence uehind the reformists? 
Answer. In ·the end Harry Schwarz was chosen to lead. He became the obvious figure. 
He was to replace Marais Steyn and so get into a position of authority. 
I believe Japie Basson played an important role behind the scenes though 
he was never an out-and-out liberal, more a pluralist as subsequent 
events have shown. 
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Question 7. Was there any single event which could be cited as the point at which 
the reformists emerged as a r~cognizable force in the U.P.7 
Answer. Yes, in 1972 with the demise of Marais Steyn as a political leader in the 
Transvaal. They had organized well to beat him. New candidates and 
branches had been formed and dormant ones revived. 
Question 8. Who was actually interpreting policy and party traditions correctly, the 
conservatives or reformists? 
Answer. I prefer to call them moderates (the conservative~) and they were clearly 
in touch with the voting public at large in South Africa. The r-eformists 
were in touch with those voters in the northern suburbs of Johannesburg 
and parts of Cape Town. 
Question 9. Did the Sunday Times play an important role in the defeat of Marais Steyn 
in 1972 and in the fortunes of the reformists in general? Do you think 
there was an identifiable conspiracy between the English press to destroy 
or weaken the U.P.; particularly its Old Guard? 
') Answer. Yes, definitely. They gave the reformists terrific publicity. Serfontein, 
Uys and Strydom all sided with the reformists. It is interesting to note 
that Serfontein and Strydom had both been supporters of Japie Basson's 
National Union rarty before they became Sunday Times journalists. There 
was close contact between them and they played and important role In 
harming Marais Steyn in the articles they wrote. According to them he 
was not doing his job and as a protaganist of white leadership he was 
seen by them as'a supporter of 11 baasskap. 
Question 10. Were the Young Turks and the Sunday Times in collusion or did they simply 
propagate similar views? 
Answer. Yes, I know they were. They ciused trouble - as for instance in the 
campaign to get rid of Graaff •. Thirteen reasons for him to resign were 
• 
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listed but were all virtually variations of the first one. I believe, 
and it was later proved, that the long term view of the Sunday Times 
was that they wanted a reshuffling in the opposition. They wanted a 
faction to leave and join the Progressives whom they did not want to see 
die. The Progressives only had one seat at the time (Suzman•s) and the 
Party was kept alive by the English pre~s. They supported the Young 
Turk philosphy because this would lead to a break in the U.P. and those who 
left would move in the direction of the progressives. 
Question 11. Why did the U.P. do badly in the Oudtshoorn by-election after having 
done well in earlier ones like Brakpan? 
Answer. The first mistake was that we ever decided to fight it. The indications 
were there that we should not have done ~o. The nationalists had register-
ed many new voters and would make a special effort to counter the recent 
setbacks suffered in the Transvaal. Those of us in the know advised the 
party leadership against contesting the seaL but this was overruled as 
others thought it would repeat the trend set in Brakpan. I also think 
that because the Young Turks had already stuck their heads out there was 
talk of division in the press and this harmed the campaign. 
Question 12. Was 11 boerehaat11 just an Oudtshoorn election ploy or was there substance 
to the allegations? 
Answer. The nationalists had to make a special effort to prove that they were 
the real Nats. for they were facing a threat from the right. But there 
were some people, not many, who created the impression that they did not 
think much of bilingualism and that the Afrikaners were leading South 
Africa down the drain. We pointed out, in parliament, that those people 
were mainly in the Progresslve camp and did not include prominent members 
of the U.P. What signs of 11 boerehaat11 could bt:: detected in the Party 
eminated from some old-time jingoes in Natal, not in the Cape. 
Q~estion 13. Did the U.P. begin to change to its new federal policy as a result of 
the Oudtshoorn setback? 
Answer. At the time a constitutional committee under Mike Mitchell was already 
investigating a new pol icy. This was another reason why the Party 
should not have contested the seat. Pol.icy was in a state of flux. 
The U.P. had to take cognisance of the fact that the N.P. was not going 
to change and certain things like its homeland pol icy was becoming a 
fact. This made it necessary for the U.P. to review its policy. 
The new federal policy was being investigated and the Oudtshoorn result 
showed that the Party could no longer continue with a pol icy which 
offered limited non-white representation in parliament. 
Question 14. Do you feel the Party spoke with two or more voices depending on the 
speaker or the audience? 
Answer. Not necessarily deliberately. Some candidates in hopeless seats at 
times lacked politic~l acumen and put the i~correct interpretation on 
policy which embarrassed us. For instance, they would say too much was 
being spent on Black education, but important leaders in the Party never 
said anything like that. These errors usually occurred in rural seats 
but not exclusively so. 
Question 15. Why was it felt necessary to introduce a resolution on the need for 
bilJngu~l candidates at the Cape congress of the Party in 1972? 
Answer. It originated because there were not enough bilingual candidates. It 
would have helped to present an image of South Africanism v1hich would 
have assisted the U.P. The Party needed more speakers who could appear 
before both rural and urban audiences. 
Question 16. Do you feel Natal was wrong in not following your example in the Cape? 
Answer. Yes, defintely. It created an anti-South African feeling against lhe 
Party which was a pity. 
~uestion 17. Do you feel that the negative approach towards bilingualism by Eric 
Winchester harmed the Party, for instance at the Klip River by-election? 
Answer. No doubt about it. But the Party was not insisting on fully bilingual 
candidates - it would judge the merits of each case. The opposition 
to the bilingual motion in Natal harmed the broad, moderate image of 
the United Party. 
Question 18. Was the bilingual issue a storm in a teacup or did it adversely affect 
the Party's image? 
Answer. Yes, it did do harm, for a party building a spirit of broad South 
African ism had to promote bilingual ism. 
Question 19. Why did the Party decide to participat~ in the Schlebusch Comm1ssion? 
Answer. Because as far as security legislation was concerned the U.P. felt 
that it couldn't be soft on the issue. It was also a parliamentary 
duty. The Party had participated in many ~ommissions so why the par-
ticipation in this one created such opposition, I still don't under-
stand although it did emanate from leftist elements in South Africa 
such as N.U.S.A.s.·which felt that the rule of law would be threatened and 
free expression curtailed. 
Question 20. Looking back do you think it was a good decision? 
Answer. Oh yes, despite what Harry Schwarz and others said or the .attacks by 
the English press. It remains the duty of the parliamentary opposition 
to participate in commissions. 
Question 21. Would you agree that the damage done by the Schlebusch Commission was 
the single most important cause in the decline of the United Party's 
fortunes? 
Answer. No, I do n't think it was the main reason. The issue was used by the 
press to cause a split in the U.P. ~nd so keep the Progressive Party 
a 1 i ve. 
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Question 22. Did the press misrepresent the Party's role or intentions on the 
Commission? 
Answer. Certainly. It was never put across that we were performing a duty. 
Question 23. Was it wise to "ga.g" M.P. 's such as Catherine Taylor from commenting 
publicly on the Schlebusch reports? 
Answer. It was wrong to publicly discuss the matter while our commissioners 
were still participating. Certain undisciplined members did not help 
by criticizing when they knew thtir colleagues had been given a job 
to do. They gave the impression that party discipline was lacking. 
Question 24. Cathy Taylor ignored the "silence rule" and was not disciplined. Was 
it becuase of her public standing or because there was an election 
approaching? 
Answer. I don't clearly recollect but she was definitely spoken to and the 
matter was dealt with by the leader. I think by then Mrs Taylor had 
decided to go her own way and she was not concerned .about the con-
sequences of her actions. It was the prelude to her exit from _ 
pol it i cs. 
Question 25. Did Mrs Taylor's activities harm the Party, particularly in the Cape? 
Answer. Yes, I think so. She was rather undisciplined within the Party. She 
had her own views and expressed them publicly. She gave the impression 
of not being altogether happy with party policy. 
Question 26. Did Sir De Villiers Graaff and Harry Schwarz ever really reach accord 
over the Schlebusch Commission; over matters such as binding the Party 
to its recommendations and the establishment of a ?ermanent security 
commissior!? 
Answer. I don't think so. Schwarz was not in favour of a permanent com~ission 
or of everi serving on the schlebusch commission. 
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Question 27. Did the U.P. commissioners know beforehand that the N.U.S.A.S 
students would be restricted? Was there a deal with the nation-
alists - a unanimous report in return for less harsh action against 
the students? 
Answer. It is difficult to say. The U.P. was worried about N.U.S.A.S. 
activities but I did not, get the impression that there was a deal. 
If they had to be dealt with then it had to be done. 
Question 28. Why did the Party eventually submit a minority report but not after 
the fir~t interim reports? Was it as a result of public pressure 
before the 1974 general election? 
Answer. By then the fellows on the Commission were getting cold feet because 
of public reaction. They started waterin~ down the U.P. 1 s general 
atitude on how to deal with violence and subversive activities. 
That was the reason. 
Question 29. Was Senator 'Horak's letter to the Sunday Express of June 1973 
a unanimous Head Committee decision? Japie Sasson denies he 
supported it. 
Answer. Yes. I was there and was surprised when the motion was moved that 
there was no reaction from some q·uarters. No objections were raised. 
No vote was taken or called for. When the chairman asked if anyone 
was against it there was no response. So it was unanimous. 
Question 30. Why were there, later, objections to the letter? 
Answer. Because the Express was supporting the moderates in the Party and this 
was a reflection on the Young Turks, so they objected. 
Question 31. The fact that the Transvaal caucus of the Party also sent a letter 
expressing its displeas~re with the Sunday Express seemed to in-
dicate a breakdown of discipline. Where was this point of break-
down? 
Answer. It was not really a matter of discipline but more of the Young 
Turks wanting to get back at the newspaper as individuals because 
it had attacked certain members of the Transvaal caucus 
them to act as they did. 
This prompted 
Question 32. Why did you object to the Transvaal's '~ct of Dedication'' being accepted 
by the Cape Youth congress in Port Elizabeth in 1973? 
Answer. Because at the time the U.P. was investigating whether it should reframe 
its principles for the 1973 national congress. Transvaal Young Turks 
arrived in Port Elizabeth and handed out their Act and got somebody 
to move that it be incorporated into the principles of the U.P. 
objected to that, not to the Act itself, as there was a sub-committee 
investigating the Party's pripciples at the time. It was up to them 
and not for the Cape Youth congress to tell them what to do. If they 
had suggest~d that the Act be placed before the investigating committee 
with a view to the national congress accepting it there would have been 
no objection. 
Question 33. Were Horace van Rensburg and Jonathan Schwarz entitled to attend the 
Port Elizabeth Youth congress? 
Answer. Usually they would be invited. N6rmally a provincial leader would 
attend and make a short speech. These two arrived, however, with a 
certain objective in mind. 
Question 34. Was there a planned campaign to replace Ar.dre Fourie as national leader 
of the youth movement? 
Answer. Yes 1 most definitely. 
Question 35. Did Maans Kemp contribute anything constructive to the youth movement 
during his term of office? 
Answer. 
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As a teacher he did not have the time to devote to it. And the way 
he was elected, pushing out a man who was doing very well, created a 
terrific division in the youth movement which he was not in a position 
to hea 1. 
'Question 36., Was the 1973 National Congress really a unity or peace congress as 
claimed or were the cracks simply being patched over? 
Answer. No it was not. Yet the amazing thing was that the six principles 
adopted there were a unifying factor. But because the Young Turks 
had already decided upon their strategy, namely to eventually break 
up the U.P. and to link up with the Progressives, it was only a matter 
of time before they would again be differing with the Party. In that 
regard it was not a unifying congress. 
Question 37. Did the reformists actually emerge victorious from th~ Congress? 
Answer. Yes, that is, their press made it out to be so. They had a wonderful 
rapport with the newspapers which put their story across. I think they 
were then still going for a take-over of the Party from within. This 
was all.-part of their strategy. 
Question 38. Did Marias Steyn leave the Party at a point (1973) calculated to harm 
the attempts at reconciliation then taking place within it? 
Answer. I think he left because he had had enough of what was going on in it. 
He had been a very important figure in the Young Turk-Old Guard fight 
and I believe he was terribly disappointed because he was not really 
supported by the leader in the true sense of the word, and he had been 
a faithful lieutenant. He did not leave at the point for the reasons 
suggested in the question. 




Refer back to answer 32. We did n1 t want the National Congress to be 
bound to a certain direction while the principles of the Party were 
being investigated. 
Question 40. Were there attempts at various levels and times to expel or force 
Harry Schwarz from the United Party, for instance after the Buthelezi 
meeting? 
-Answer. Never by evoking certain disciplinary clauses in the constitution. 
But at various levels he was spoken to in a most straight-forward 
manner. By 1974 we had had so much of the Young Turks that the whole 
executive of the U.P. and the Central Candidates Committee had re-
commended that they should not come to parliament. As leader, Graaff 
overruled this and felt that by having them there he would be able to 
control them. This proved incorrect, they could never be controlled 
as they were philosophically at variance with the Un!ted Party. 
Schwarz was strongly .attackfil:I. at the Central Executive meeting over 
the Buthelezi declaration by the Natal leader Cadman and others. 
said to him that it was only political etiquette that the provincial 
leader be informed of his intentions and receive clearance. Why did 
he not go and see his own Black leaders in the Transvaal and sign a 
declaration with them? It was done for publicity. Buthelezi was the 
central figure in Black politics. I would be very surprised if Graaff 
ever knew about the meeting in advance. 
Question 41. Was the introduction of the U.P. 's federal pol icy in the 1973 
no-confidence deb~te poorly handled by Mike Mitchell? 
Answer. The first error was that the pol icy was leaked out before-hand. 
Secondly, it was badly handled although I do not hold Mike Mitchell 
completely to blame. Nevertheless, it was important that the 
presentation of a new policy should be immaculate. 
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Question 42. The question of the federal pol icy and power sharing - was it in all 
sincerity open to different interpretations, for instance the con-
Answer. 
servatives laid emphasis on the white parliament, the reformists on ' 
the proposed multi-racial federal assembly? 
Yes, but there were two parts to it. In the intial stages parliament, 
as the only sovereign constitutional body, had to keep a firm hand on 
developments leading to the establishment of the federal assembly. 
No step which could harm the security of the state would be taken 
without ·first holding a referendum or an election. The idea was that 
the white parliament would be the regulator and controller of this 
constitutional developement. So the policy could not be explained 
unless both aspects were emphasized - those which controlled develop-
ments and the final federal dispensat'ion. I believe that the inten-
tion was that the white parliament would remain the regulator for a 
very long time· to protect the rights of minorities and so on. The 
regulator would watch the situation carefully and remain in power if 
the policy was not working. But it was a-difficult issue and a 
different emphasis was placed on the pol icy by different groups like 
the reformists. 
Question 43. Was the policy of white leadershi~ ever officially abandoned? 
Answer. No, never officially abandoned. It became part of the revised 1973 
principles again. 
Question 44. Was the opposition to the nomination of certain candidates 
in 1974,constituency choices 1 ike van Eeden and van Zyl Cill ie which 
was led by you and John Wiley,because they were reformists? In other 
words, was it part of a power struggle to consolidate the different 
factions in parliament? 
Answer. 
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Senator Redi Louw was also a member of the Candidates Committee. 
It must be remembered that power was vested in us by the provincial 
congress and we also had the confidence of the national leadership. 
I believe nominations were judged on merit. For 'example, van Eeden 
who we knew was a reformist was a very good candidate but we had 
the power to overrule him and decided that Jae de Viii iers, who was 
leader of the Party ~n the Provincial Council, was a better choice. 
In the past similar decisions had been made and had not caused the 
same outcry. But yes, our ac~ions created a lot of trouble. 
Question 45. In the Tra~svaal, did Schwarz withold Old Guard nominations, possibly 
in retaliation for your actions in the Cape, until certain verligtes 
such as Prof OJ ivier had been confirmed as candidates? 
Answer. It could well have been part of Harry Schwarz's tactics. His 
Candidates Committee had mori power than ours did in the Cape. 
Question 46. What was the attitude of the Port Elizabeth vigilance committee towards 
you and the nomination procedures? 
Answer. It was a reformist-type body, and although not happy with the pro-
cedures, had ~o real say in the nominations. 
Question 47. Following the 1974 election was there a move to hold an early Cape 
congress with a view to unseating you and other 11verkrampte 11 leaders? 
Answer. There was definitely an attempt to unseat us but the Congress was held 
at the normal time notwithstanding demands in the press to hold an 
early one. 
Question 48. Was your speech near Worcester on the eve of the Pinelands by-election 
attacking Basson's leadership aspirations,among other things, 
correctly reported and do you think it influenced the voting there -
possibly costing the United Party the seat? 
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Answer. The speech did not only deal with Japie Sasson who had publicly made 
himself available to lead the Party. was not opposed to his can-
' didature but I criticized that he pu~l icly offered himself, something 
which should be left to the Congress. The leader had also not in-
dicated that he was retiring or that he was not available for re-
election. Sasson created the impression that the Party was not 
• happy with Graaff's leadership - my speech indicated that we were. 
It was a necessary speech. Another point raised was the general di-
rection in which the Party had to move. I said unless we were pre-
pared to assist the government in solving the colour issue while 
allowing also for the protection of white interests I would not be 
prepared to serve as a leader of the Party. When fighting the Progs. 
as in Pinelands, I felt that we could.not afford to throw overboard 
our moderate approach. That's why I made my speech. It was not badly 
timed. bie Burger gave it good coverage but even had said nothing 
the English press would have taken it out of context as that was their 
intention. 
Question 49. To what do you attribute the Pinelands defeat, a formerly 11 safe11 
seat? 
Answer. There was already a swing to the Progressives in the 1974 election. 
Even had Newton-Thompson stood, his vote would have been reduced 
though he may not have lost. The same thing happened in Durban 
North in 1976. In three-cornered contests the Progressives were 
likely to win. The defeat had nothing to do with my speech - there 
was a trend against the Party because it was hopelessly divided bet-
ween so-called Old Guard and Young Turk factions. Another mistake 
was made by Graaff himself when he indicated that the U.P. would be 
happy to have Coloureds back in parliament, r.his was contrary to the 
1973 policy and created confusion in the minds of many. 
• 
Question 50. Who was the instigator of "GRO\.J"? 
Answer. The Get Rid of Wiley move was inspired, I believe, in the Transvaal 
but received support in the Cape peninsula. The reformists wished 
to get rid of hi~ because of his attacks on them and his outspoken 
criticism of the English press • 
Question 51. Were its (GROW) members at fault or were they legitimately canvassing 
Party support to change the Cape leadership? 
Answer. There would have been no objection had they operated in a democratic 
manner but they were forming a party within a party. They did not 
canvass democratically; secret meetings were held and stories were 
spread reflecting on the leadership of the Party. 
Question 52. How did the minutes of "GROW" fall into the hands of the Sun~ 
Express? 
Answer. I don't really know but possibly from one of their own members who 
had second thoughts about the matter. 
Question 53. Did its members campaign to capture the branch structure of the U.P., 
particulary i~ the Peninsula and then from that base expand further 
to gain control, for instance, of the Cape Peninsula Council? 
Answer. Yes, definitely. 
Question 54. Do you think "GROW" had connections with the Young Turks on the Reef? 
Answer. Yes. 
Question 55. Could the Transvaal reformists have been behind their emergence in the 
Cape, for instance, was Carl isle planted here? 
Answer. 
/ 
There were many rumours and it was certainly possible. Robin Carl isle 




Answer. Yes, it did have a lot to do with it. 
Question 61. Were the provincial leaders consultea concerning Graaff's initiative 
or did others advise him? 
Answer. Certainly not me and I would have advised him to follow another di-
rection, that of approaching Mr Vorster to seek consensus on certain 
issues, and so avoid a sterile debate over them between two strong 
parties. Such consensus would also have prevented three-cornered 
contests and the United Party would not have lost them. 
Question 62. Was the 'save South Africa'campaign not an endevour simply to save 
something of the United Party's policy and traditions, if not the 
Party itself? 
Answer. Possibly, but the fault lay in the manner the plan was developed 
through the Marais steering committee. It could only result in a 
game of musical chairs among the opposition groups. 
Question 63. Why were you and other conservatives or moderates not prepared to 
co-operate with the Progressive Reform Party? 
Answer. Because of philosophical differences. They wanted the sharing of 
power at all levels, even school i.ntegration. No former United Party 
supporter, or nationalist would be attracted to such a policy. 
Question 64. Were you and other Independent United Pc;irty members justifiably 
expelled from the caucus, or did you leave of your own accord? 
Answer. We did not leave of our own accord. We did not want to disband the 
Party and its six principles for the 14 Marais principles which 
everyone had to accept before proceeding with the proposed merger. 
We could :imply have sat apart from the U.P. What was the point 
in throwing us out when the Party was preparing to disband in the near 
future? 
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Question 56. What role did Graaff play in this whole refc~mist-conservative 
quarrel? Did he give strong leadership? Did he favour any faction? 
Was the Party discipline too weak? 
Answer. It was a combination of all these things. There was a lack of dis-
cipline which he did not stamp out. He should have taken a strong 
line against the reformists. The Party would then have been more 
unified. But.instead,the philosophical differences always reappeared. 
He was more a chairman than a leader. 
Question 57. Did you think Schwarz engineered his departure from the United Party 
following the Enthoven poll and his own refusal to vote against the 
prime minister's amendment in the 1975 no-confidence debate? 
Answer. There could have been some planning but I think Schwarz had come to 
the end of the road in the United Party. At heart he was a Prog-
ressive. These actions h?d put the Party in a bad 1 ight but he 
would have found some pretext over which to break with it. 
Question 58. Was the establishment of the Reform Party well planned, that is, 
in advance? 
Answer. It could have been because Schwarz has strong support in the Transvaal. 
This made it possible for him to act so quickly when it became 
necessary for him to do so. 
Question 59. Why did the U.P. remain divided after the departure of the reformists? 
Answer. That was simple - they had not all left. 
Question 60. Was the defeat in Durban North in 1976 the event which finally spelt 
the end for the U.P., and which may have encouraged Graaff's 'save 
South Africa' campaign? 
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Question 65. Did you believe there was any real future for the South African 
Party? 
Answer. We wanted it to be a Party with a positive a.ttiitude in parl lament 
which would help the government solve the racial problems and those 
of internal security. The'1977 election came too soon for us to 
really get organized and I think the electorate indicated that they 
wanted the National Party and us to get together. 
Question 66. Do you think Graaff ~cted prematurely to disband the United Party? 
Answer. 
Surely the voters should have had the final say in its future, for 
rnstance, at an election? 
. I disagreed with the tactics. He should rather have handed over to 
another leader but he was within his ~ights to act as he did, by 
working through the Party machinery .. He did not have to ask the elec-
torate to decide the future of the Party. 
Question 67. Do you think the press wished to break the U.P. and push the 
reformists to join up with other 11verligte 11 groups to form a so-
called "verligte front"? 
Answer. Yes. 
Question 68. What do you think the major reason was for the rapid decline of the 
U.P. after 1972 or had it simply reached the end of its useful 
Answer. 
po 1 i t i ca 1 1 i fe? 
The white-anting factions which were pushing it in the direction of 
the Progressives. You could n't have a party within a party. A 




(D) INTERVIEW ON 5 APRIL 1982 WITH JOHN WILEY, THE FORMER DEPUTY 
LEADER OF THE UNITED PARTY IN THE CAPE 
Question 1. Were the United Party's electoral successes of 1970 attributed to its 
policies or to government mismanagement and the Herstigte split? 
Answer . Careful planning after the 1966 disastrous results played a part. Graaff 
•• instructed provincial leaders to improve the Party machine which conse-
quently became far more effective at all levels of the organization. 
The U.P. also concentrated on the confusion in government pol icy which 
led to the Herstigte split and which had an adverse effect on nationalist 
morale. Maladministration and corruption by the government were high-
lighted, including extraordinary fishing concessions being made to 'busi-
ness buddies' on the West coast which were depleting the industry. The 
Agliotti land deal revealed unacceptable practices by senior officials 
in the Department of Planning which were never satisfactorily cleared up. 
The Bell-Makatini Flats and Babalatakis-Faros shipping affairs were also 
highlighted. 
Question 2. Was there a definite breakthrough in 1970 or was the euphoria misplaced; 
after all, the U.P. really only won back what it had lost in 1966? 
Answer. Yes, the Party did win back what had been lost but there were additional 
gains and the scene was set for further progress which was reflected in 
later by-election results. The 1970 gains indicated a firm basis for 
optimism - not of winning power, but of becoming sufficiently strong to 
be a real factor on the political scene, possibly leading to a coal it ion. 
Question 3. What attracted the so-called reformists to the U.P., or were they already 
present after the 1970 elections? 
Answer. They were already present in the Transvaal provincial council representing 
Witwatersrand seats. Some were Progressives in disguise and others sympa-
thetic to them. They were in a position to exert control in the province. 
They took over from within. Thus some were already in the Party while others 






If already present, what suddenly spurred them to greater 
activity within the Party? 
The 1970 election results. The U.P. appe~red to have a 
chance to improve its position, and many of the reformists 
11 scented power". 
Presumably all public representatives of the U.P. adhered 
to the same principles and policies. Where, ,then, were the 
major areas of difference or were they mainly of a personal 
nature? 
Differences arose over interpretationof pol icy. But there 
were substantial differences of approach and philosophy which 
surfaced when interpreting policy. Personality clashes 
appeared once the other differences became marked. Differences 
were deliberately used by certain groups to discredit the 
existing establishment. When the undermining started, per-
sonalities became prominent. 
Question 6. Was there a leading figure or influence behind the reformists? 
Answer. Yes. Harry Schwarz was chosen to lead the assault. Enthoven 
was the chief schemer assisted by van Rensburg and Dall ing. 
Japie Basson was their political adviser, he gave the movement 




replace Graaff as national leader. Harry Schwarz was the 
interim leader who had to replace Marais Steyn in the Transvaal. 
Was it easy to recognize or categorize a reformist? Schwarz, 
for instance, denied the existence of Old Guard - Young Turk 
divisions in the Party. 
Yes, there were divisions. Al 1 over the Witwatersrand the 
reformist groups met secretly to undermine the Party. They 
d i ff e red on po l i c y i n t er p re ta t i on on such ma t t er s a s w h i t e 
leadership, which eventually, for them, would make way for 
"black" rule. Schwarz only played to the gallery when 
s a y i n g t h e r e we r e n o 0 1 d G u'a r d - Yo u n g T u r k d i v i s i o n s . T h e 
newspapers supporting him clearly gave prominence to them. 
Was there any event which could be regarded as the point at 




Defintely - 2 July 1972 was the day the press (at first the 
Sunday Times) began a correlated, well pl~nned and orchestrated 
campaign to break up the United Party and turn it into some-
thing completely different. Before that J~pie Sasson had, 
with various speeches, in 1971 set the political climate for 
this campaign. He distanced himself from the traditionalists 
in the Party. His speeches and h.is Sunday Times articles were 
always slightly different from those of his leader yet not 
seriously so. He could in this regard be compared with 
Dr Treurnicht and the role he played vis-a-vis the prime 
minister P.W.Botha. 
Question 9, Who was actually interpreting party pol icy correctly? The 
reformists or the conservatives within it? 
Answer. The traditional leadership around Graaff. They were 
responsible for the interpretation of pol icy. The reformists 
came in and gave it an entirely ·different slant from what 
was intended. 
Question 10. Were nomination procedures at fault in 1970 which allowed 
11 rebell ious 11 elements to gain elect1on? 
Answer. Yes, but only in retrospect. The U.P. leadership did n 1 t 
then know that groups would form to undermine democratically 
elected Party leaders. 
Question 11. Would you agree that the Sunday Times ~layed an important 
role in the ousting of Marais Steyn as Transvaal leader and 
in the fortunes of the U.P. in general? 
Answer. Yes, it set the climate for the whole campaign and, w~ek 
after week, brought out 11 news 11 of what was happening in the 
U.P., always discrediting the Old Guard and building up the 
Young Turks (its phraseology). 
/ 
Question 12. Were the "Young Tyrks 11 and the Sunday Times in collusion 
or did the newspaper simply share the same views as them? 
Answer. Yes, in complete collusion. Secret meetings were held. 
Joel ~ervis, Stanley Uys, Hans Strydom and Hennie Serfontein -
the quartet, were hand-in-glove with the reformists. 
\ 
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Question 13. Was there an indentifiable conspiracy among the major English 
newspapers to destroy or weaken the U.P., particul~rly the 
Old Gu~rd, or was the whole thing just a f~ntasy? 










Why ~id the Party do badly in Oudtshoorn after having done 
well in other recently contested by-elections? 
The N.P. threw everything into that election. It was 
excellently organized and had the full support of 
Die Burger. P.W.Botha put his finger on the U.P. weakness -
its claim to be a broadly l:iased South African party, yet 
it fell down badly on bilingualism, so much so that many 
of its M.P.s could not be invited to address meetings there. 
This wa::. not 11 boerehaat 11 but reflected the factual situation, 
which the English press and unil ingual politicians called 
''boerehaat 11 • 
Was 11 boerehaat" merely an election ploy or was there 
substance to the campaign? , 
Yes, there was substance to it. There was still a jingo 
element in the U.P.; the old jingo-liberal group which 
only paid 1 ip-service to party policies like that of bi-
1 ingual ism. 
Did the Party change to its new federal pol icy as a result 
of the Oudtshoorn reverse? 
Yes, possibly. Although the Oudtshoorn campaign was not 
fought on a verkrampte platform but strictly according to 
Party pol icy. Its failure there was grist to the "verl igtes" 
or Young Turks in actual fact. 
Do you feel the U.P. spoke with two voices depending on 
the speaker or the audience? 
This argument is overdone but depending on whether it is 
a rural or urban audience a speech would deal with matters 
of interest to them. The matter of pol icy interpretation 
again emerges if the speaker is conservative or reformist 
i n o u t l o o k , f o r i n s t a n c e , a Ha r r y S c h w a r z o r a My b u r gh 
Steicher, a Japie Basson or a John Wiley or a Tony 
Hickman. 
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Q1_.•estion 18. Why was it necessary to introduce a resolution on bilingual is::: 
at the Cape congress in Port Elizabeth in 1972? 





believed that the Party should practice what .it preached. It 
was no good having excel lent policies without the troops to 
sell them to the electorate in a language they could under-
stand. 
Do you feel Natal was wrong not to follow the Cape's example? 
Yes, it was. They shou'ld have been forced to do so. 
Do you think that the negative approach to bi lingual ism 
of Eric Winchester M.P. harmed the U.P. - for instance in 
the Klip River by-election? 
Unquestionably. The N.P. made the most of his stand on 
bilingualism and exploited it during the by-election 
campaign. 
Question 21. Was bi 1 ingual ism, as an issue, a storm in a tea-cup or did 
it adversely affect the Party's image? 
Answer. It adversely affected the image of the Party from top to 
bottom because it showed up the hollowness of the claim to 
bei~g a truly South African part~1of national unity. 
Question 22. Why did the U.P. decide to participate in the Schlebusch 
investigation? 
Answer. It was first a select committee. It is the duty of an 
opposition to participate in and not to boycott parliamentary 
institutions. Then ,it became a commission after the session 
ended. 
Question 23. With hindsight do you think it was a good thing to have taken 
part? 
Answer. Yes, although as with bilingualism, the question of whether 
to participate or not, showed up the deep divisions in 
philosophy and outlook on political strategy in the United 
Party. 
Question 24. Would you agree that the damage done by the Schlebusch 
commission was the single most important cause in the 













It brought to a head the smouldering differences in the Party, 
but it was only one of the many internal problems. 
Did the pres5 misrepresent the Party 1 s role or intentions 
on the Commission? 
Yes, the press seized on the issue to drive a deeper wedge 
into the Party and to discredit the Old Guard. 
Was it necessary to 11 gagJ 1 M.P.'s such as Catherine Taylor 
from commenting on the Schlebusch reports? 
There was a certain amount of confusion which did not help 
the Party and people 1 ike Mrs Taylor were out of step and 
wanted to change the direction of the Party. 
Cathy Taylor ignored the silence rule and escaped being 
disciplined. Was this because of a possible election or 
because of her popular standing with the public who would 
not have taken kindly to her being disciplined? 
Possibly. Also the leadership was being weakened and 
undermined by the pressure from the reformists and the press, 
and could take no strong stand without offending one or 
other section. 
Did her (Mrs Taylor) activities harm the Party? 
Yes. She played an undermining role through her own desire 
for publicity. 
Schwarz was another who had misgivings about the U.P. 's 
role on the Commission. Did he and Sir De Villiers ever 
really reach accord over the matter? 
No, because Schwarz always wanted more once he had achieved 
something. He was never staisfied. If he achieved one 
objective he set himself another. 
348 
juestion 30. Why did the U.P.'s commissioners later submit a minority 
report but not after the first interim reports of Schlebusch 
commission - was it because of public pressure? 
Answer. Yes, partly. Press and thus public pressure played a role 
and the Young Turks had got at the Party leadership and had 




If the English press was controlled by the Argus group how 
was it that the Sunday Express for so long adopted a 
"verkrampte" point of view, at variance with all the other 
English newspapers? 
The Express was nbt verkramp, it put across the viewpoint 
of the Party leadership. In the 1970's there was n't the 
same control by Argus over SAAN as there is now. There was 
greater editorial independence. The Express supported the 
U.P. The rest all came to follow the Sunday Times which 
set the example - its surrogates followed suit. The Express 
resisted the bandwagon effect. Its editor,Johnson,for years 
had been a U.P. supporter and believed it reasonalbe and 
just to support democratically elected leaders. He opposed 
the undermining methods of the Young Turks tu whom he took 
a personal dislike. 
~uestion 32. Was there any sinister reason for Mr Johnson's retirement 
·Answer. 
in 1974? 
Yes. He was, as the senior Sunday newspaper editor in the 
country, in 1 ine for a post on the Sunday Times. But Uys, 
Serfontein and Strydom, three of the quartet of conspirators 
who backed the Young Turks, were determined that he would 
not get the editorship. They circulated petitions against 
him and went out of their way to ensure that he would not 
get the post. The campaign succeeded and he did not. 
~uestion 33. Was Senator Horak•s letter of appreciation to the Sunday 
-l\nswer. 
Express a unanimous descion of the Party caucus? 
denies that he supported it. 
Mr Basson 
Yes, it clearly expressed the feeling of the caucus.I 
was therP. and so was Basson. He only spoke up after the 
Express had published the letter. 
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Question 34 •. The fact that the Transvaal caucus thereafter sent a letter 
exp re s s i n g d i s p 1 e a s u re w i t h t h e n e w s p a p e r's po 1 i t i c a 1 re po r t -
ing indicated a lack of discipline. Where was the point of 
breakdown? 
Answer. It was evidence of the fact that factio~s had already formed. 
The Young Turks were in charge in the Transvaal and they were 
displeased that Johnson was exposing their tactics. 
Question 35. The national congress of 1973 was referred to as a unity or 
peace congress. Do you agree or was it merely a patching over 




Very definitely, yes. The prospect of an election played a 
role but it was Graaff 1 s desire that unity be restored that 
was decisive. l,and others who thought like me, still had the 
strongest reservations about accommodating the Young Turks. 
Did the reformists actually emerge victorious from that 
congress? 
Yes, they were accommoda_ted at every turn and the rank and 
file who did not appreciate what was going on wanted unity and 
an end to factions. 
Question 37. Was Marais Steyn's resignation an attempt to wreck the spirit 
of conciliation which was being rebuilt at that time (1973)? 
Answer. No. He was a realist and saw that there was in fact no unity 
and felt that he had been very badly let down by Graaff and 
' 
other U.P. leaders. 
Question 38. Why were you and others opposed to the Transvaal's Act of 
Dedicati«>n? 
Answer. We were opposed to the Young Turks and their position in the 
U.P. It was one of their publicity stunts to indicate that 
they were the only ones doing something, the only ones 
moving forward in the U.P. Their attempt to get the Act in-
corporated in the party's program of principles or federal plan 









The question of the federal pol icy and power sharing created 
problems. Was it in all honesty open to varying inter-
pretations, all of which could have been correct? The 
conservatives appeared to put their faith in the white par-
liament whereas the reformists favoured the future of the 
Federal Assembly. 
It did allow one group to say orie th~ng and another group 
another. White leadership with justice had been Smuts' pol icy 
in 1948; later white leadership was regarded as the regulator 
and controller of the pace of change in South Africa. The 
term was never ditched, and Schwarz should have been expelled 
from the Party when he said the words would never cross his 
lips. The federal pol.icy was interpreted differently depending 
on the outlook of the person concerned. 
There was opposition to the nomination of c~rtain candidates 
in 1974, such as van Eeden. and van Zyl Cillie in the Cape 
although they were constituency choices. Was this because 
they were reformists? In other words,was there a power 
s t rug g 1 e to · cons o 1 i date the d i ff e re n. t fact i on s i n pa r 1 i amen t ? 
Yes, there was undoubtedly a power struggle. In both cases 
mentioned the nominations were supporters of the Transvaal 
. I 
Young Turks but were not necessarily 1 verlig 1 • Van Zyl Cillie, 
in addition, controlled the branch structure in P.E. Central 
through members of his family or their friends. It was hardly 
democratic. There were also few branches in the Wynberg 
constituency. In other constituencies 1 ike Sea Point men such 
as Dr M Barnard were being favoured. He was no more .a 
U.P. supporter than was the man in the moon but he was 
difficult to oppose because he was such a well-known public 
figure. The Young Turks thus used his candidature to their 
own advantage and at the last minute Dr M Barnard withdrew and 
ga~e Sea Point to E~l in on a plate. 
I n t he T r a n s v ci a 1 d i d Ha r r y S c h w a r z w i th ho 1 d 0 l d G ii.a r d n om i n a t i o n s 
until certain verligtes such as Prof N Olivier had been 











Yes, absolutely. He lost us three of four seats on the 
Witwatersrand including that of Etienne Malan who was the 
last nomination to be confirmed. He was a hard working 
M.P. who served on the Schlebusch Commission and so incurred 
the displeasure of the Young Turks. Prof 01 ivier was 
given Edenvale on a plate. 
To what do you attribute the defeat of the U.P. in the 
Pinelands by-election - formerly a 'safe seat'? 
The disrupti~n caused by the Young Turks and the setbacks 
in the recent general election. Pinelands was a blow 
to the Party, in fact one of the straws that broke the camel's 
back. Durban North was the final one. 
Who was the instigator of 11 GROW 11 ? 
Carlisle, Myburgh, Tiaan van der Merwe and certain journa-
lists were the instigators. 
Do you know how the minutes of 11 GROW' 11 meetings fell into 
the hands of the Sunday Express? Were they genuine minutes? 
Yes they were a genuine record of proceedings. I was given 
a copy too. A party member who was approached to join 11 GROW 11 
- and disliked their undermining activities - handed it to 
the press. 
Was the aim of 11 GROW 11 to capture the U.P. branch structure 
in the Peninsula? . \ -~ . 
Yes, it wished to get rid of me and others in leadership 
positions. It aimed to gain control of al 1 levels of the 
Party organization. It captured the Cape Peninsula 
Council leadership, Branches and Divisional committees were 
all infiltrated. 
Question 46. Do you think 11 GROW 11 had connections with the Young Turks 
in Johannesburg? 
Answer. Yes. They were hand-in-glove. Nothing was sacred. Carl isle 
was prob~bly planted in the Cape to promote their cause. 
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Question 47. What role did Graaff play in all these conservative-
reformist issues? Did he give a strong lead? Did he 
favour any faction? Was discipline too weakly enforced? 
Answer. There was no obvious replacement for Graaff and he w~s 
popular so the Young Turks did not dare oppose him too 
openly. He tried to reconcile the irreconcilable. 
•Question 48. Was the establishment of the Reform Party well planned? 
Answer. 
It was preceded by Enthoven 1 s public opinion pol 1 and 
Schwarz•· refusal to oppose the prime minister•s amend-
ment i n the Ass em b 1 y ( 1 97 5 ) . 
I don't think so - they did not think they would be 
kicked out. The Old G;uard led the fight-back and the gross 
disloyalty of the Young Turks turned the middle of the 
readers against the~. 
Question 49. Why did the U.P. remain divided after the departure of the 
reformists? 
Answer. Some of the reformists remained behind, such as Japie Basson 
and his supporters, van ~oogstraten , Dericl< de Villiers, 
'01 ivier and company. 
Question 50. Was the Party's defeat in the Durban North by-election the 
final straw which spelt the end for the U.P. and which may 
have encouraged Graaff to start his "save South Africa 11 
campaign? 
Answer. It was a major setback. But Graaff never consulted his 
provincial leaders before embarking on his new initiative 
to 11 save South Africa 11 • 
Question 51. - Was the campaign not really an endeavour to save something 




I am not s u re whether G r a a f f ha d no t by t hen l o s t touch w i t h 
events - he clutched at any straw and was badly advised 
esp e c i a l 1 y by Derick de V i l l i e rs . 
Question 52. Why were you and other conservatives not prepared to co-




Answer. Because so far from saving South Africa, it would bring 
demise of the U.P. 
Question 53. Did you break caucus directives by attacking the pr~ss at 
different times and so contribute to Party disunity? 
Answer. No caucus di~e~tives were broken. Someone had to hit back 
at the press. The English press was trying to break the 
u. p. Yes, it did contribute to tensions, because some U.P~ 
were using the press against their colleagues. 
Question 54. Was it true that only 11 verligtes 11 were punished while 
conservatives escaped party discipline? 
Answer. No, the Old Gili~rd held leadership positions and were in a 
position to discipline the Young Turks and even to expel six 
of their ringleaders in the Cape. 
Question 55. Did the English press really wish to break the U.P. and 
rejoin ·parts ··of···it.with··other·· 11 verl igte 11 elements in a 
Verl igte Front? 
Answer. Yes, that was the whole purpose of the plan. 
Question 56. What do you feel was the major reason for the U.P. 's rapid 
decline after 1972 or had it simply come to the end of its 
useful political life? 
Answer. Faction-ridden, leaderless and losing support to the right 
(N.P.) and to the left (P.P.). It could not have survived, 
in retrosp~ct. 
Question 57. was Graaff premature in disbanding the U.P. without allowing 
the voters to decide on the matter at an. election? 
Answer. Yes, he did a terrible thing to disband the only broad based 
moderate party in South Africa. He effectively set it on the 
course of self-destruction when iie tried to negotiate a new 
opposition party with the Progs. and the Democrats through 
an act ion . comm i t tee u n de r t he ch a i rm a n s h i p of J u d g e 
Mar a i s - now a P . F . P . me m be r of pa r l i amen t . 
• 
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{E) THE FOURTEEN PRINCIPLES OF THE MARAIS COMMITTEE 
1. God is acknowledged as the ultimate authority in the destiny of all 
-• nations. 
2. All South Africans have an equal right to full citizenship and citizen-
ship rights, either in a federation or confederation, which can only 
be realized in a country where there is no discrimination -On the 
grounds of race, colour, religion or sex. 
3. Full citizenship is the basis for loyalty towards the State. Only with 
this loyalty can the State effectively discharge its duty to maintain 
an orderly society and the security of the country at all times and in 
all circumstances. 
4. Political rights must be shared by all South African citizens on an 
equitable and responsible basis, and all systems which could lead to 
racial domination are rejected. 
5, In a plural society like that of the Republic, a constitution and an 
entrenched Bill of Rights guaranteeing the rights of individuals and 
minorities are essential. These must be guarded over by a Judiciary, 
appointed by an independent authority. 
6. All citizens have the right to an equal opportunity to share in the 






maintain and develop. 
The party stands for a democratic system of government and rejects 
all totalitarian or authoritarian systems, such as communism or facism. 
Except in the case of a duly declared state of emergency or war, 
every individual has the right to the protection of his life, 1 iberty 
and property. In the protection of these rights, access to the judi-
ciary must not be denied; 
9. The party guarantees the right of all our people to maintain their 
religious, language and cultural heritages, as well as the right to 
develop ~hese heritages, provided that this does not ~ncroach on the 
rights of others. 
10. All educational systems must provide equal educational opportunities 
for citizens of all races. 
11. All inequitable forms of statutory or administrative discrimination 
on the grounds of race, colour, religion or sex, are unacceptable in 
the ideal society.for which the Party will strive, and shall be subject 
to the testing rights of the judiciary. 
12. The party accepts that certain geographic areas are being developed as 
economic and political growth points for certain sections of the popu-





with such developments towards increasing se,lf-determination, the 
Party will respect their wishes in terms of its broad pol icy. No 
compulsory removal of populations will, however, be permitted and the 
general welfare will be thoroughly taken into account. In particular, 
there will be no possibility of any person being compelled to become 
a citizen of an area other than the one in which he is permanently 
resident . 
. 13. The Party will endeavour to have all the above principles, as well as 
.other guarantees, incorporated in a constitution for the Republic 
which will be drawn up after joint consultation and decision-making 
by the representatives of all citizens of the country. 
14. As an inseparable part of the continent of Africa, the Republic 
accepts that peaceful relations with the states of Southern Africa, 
in the first instance, must be brought about and that technological, 
economic and political co-operation must be encouraged where possible 
by way of institutional arrangementsr 
.. 
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(F) DIE UNIALE ORGANISASIE F.N DIE STRUKTUUR VAN DIE :-ROVINSIALE 
EN SENTRALE AFDELINGS \'.\N DIE VERENIGDE P.'.RTY 1 ·• 
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(typescript copies of these interviews appear in the appendix) 
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Fourth Interim Report of the Commission, R.P •. 33 - 74 
Fifth Interim Report of the Commission, R.P. 62 -
Sixth Interim Report of the Commission, R.P. 64 
Final Report of the Commission, R.P. 44 - 75 
Government Gazette, 21.5.76 
Parliamentary Register Part I I 1961 - 1980, published 
by House of Assembly, n.d. 
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Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates (Hansard). 
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July 17 - October 2 vols. 29 - 30 
1971 January 29 - June 16 vols. 32 - 34 
1972 January 28 - June 1 3 vols. 37 - 39 
1973 February 2 - June 15 vols. 42 
1974 February 1 - February 27 VO l. 47 
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1975 January 31 - June 19 vols. 55 
1976 January 23 - June 25 vols. 60 
1977 January 21 - June 24 vols. 66 
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the National Union, 12.8.61 
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U.P. Division of Information, The Constitution of the United South 
African National Party, November 1963 '-
U.P. Division of Information, The aims and principles and constitution 
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U.P. Division of Information, The United Party pol icy of white 
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U.P. Division of Information, Election results: 1958 - 1965, 10.5.65 
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U.P. Division of Information, Policy statements as presented at Congress 
by Sir De Villiers Graaff, 1969 
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U.P. Division of Information, The answer, you want it' we have it' n.d. 
U.P. Division of Information, Brief van Graaff aan die kiesers, 6.4.70 
U.P. Division of Information, 
6.4.70 
Verkiesing pamflet, Sir De Vi 11 iers Graaff, 
U.P. Divisic:i of Information, 1970 General Election Results, 29.4.70 
U.P. Division of Information, Die V.P. sa l Ban toes tan skraap, n.d. 
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November 1971 
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U.P. Division of Information, Verklaring van die Universiteit van die 
Witwatersrand, 8.6.72 
U.P. Division of Information, The United Party and student protest, n.d. 
Intermediate Group, Minutes, 14.8.72 
U.P. Division of Information, V.P.: Vooruit met die Jong Suid-
Afrikaners, n.d. 
U.P. Dlvision of Information, United Party's federation of South African 
peoples 5.9.72 
U.P. Division of Information, WorR for the U.P. and Win for South 
Africa, 1972 
U.P. Division of Information, The United Party's federal plan for South 
Africa, n.d. 
U.P. Division of lnformatlon, United Party's federation of South African 
peoples Part Ii, 11 .10.72 
' U.P. Division of Information, Sege/Victory, April 1973 
U.P. Division of Information, Work with Wood, Umhlatuzana by-election, 
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U.P. Division of Information, The United Party and the Schlebusch Commi-
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U.P. Division of Information, The Act of Dedication, 1973 
U.P. Division of Information, Graaff's opening speech at the Transvaal 
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U.P. Divisior. of Information, The United Party, Transvaal Congress, 
·17 - 18.8.73 
U.P. Division of Information, Parliament 1973, n.d. 
U.P. Division of Information, Graaff Speaks, n.d. 
U.P. Division of lnforn1ation, United Party's Witwatersrand Financial 
Report, 1972 - 1973, n.d. 
U.P./ .... 
Agenda, Nineteenth National Congress of the United Party, Bloemfontein, 
November 1973 
U.P. Division of Information, A message from Sir De Villiers Graaff, 
27.11.73 
U.P. Division of Information, Kode van onderl inge vertroue, November 
U.P. Division of Information, Dit is tyd vir •n V. P. regering, n.d. 




U.P. Division of Information, Sprekernotes oor nationale aangeleenthede, 
19.3.74 
U.P. Division of Information, General election, April 24, 1974. Speaker's 
notes on national issues. The U.P. and the Schlebusch Commission, April 
197 
Minutes of 'GROW', 22.4.74 
Minutes of 'GROW', 4.5.74 
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U.P. Division of Information, Provincial Election 1974, n.d. 
U.P. Division of Information, 1974 Election: Trends and factors, n.d. 
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Agenda, Founding Congress of South Africa's new opposition and alternative 
government, 29.6.77 
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Davenport T.R.H., South Africa: A Modern History,. Johannesburg, 1977 
De Crespigny A. and Schrire, The Government and Politics of South Africa, 
Cape Town, 1978 
De Villiers W.B., The Rebirth of White political opposition in South Africa, 
Johannesburg, 1975 
D1 0liveira J., Vorster - The Man, Johannesburg, 1978 
Duverger M., Political Parties, New York, 1965 
Eksteen T.A., The Statesmen, Cape Town, 1978 
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Hancock W.K., Smuts, The Fields of Force, Cambridge, 1968 
Heard/~ ... 
367 
·Heard K., General Elections in South Africa 1943 - 1970, Cape Town, 1974 
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